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Takeover and merger regulation in the 
United Kingdom and Germany 
by 
Michael Nikolaus Roos 
Abstract 
The aim of this study was to undertake a comparative analysis of the 
regulatory frameworks of takeovers and mergers in their respective legal, 
economic and cultural context in Britain and Germany. Particular 
emphasis was given to the regulation and handling of cross-border 
transactions and the developments on European level. 
The first chapters of this thesis examine the regulation and practice of 
public takeover bids contrasting the well-proven self-regulatory system 
established under the British City Code with the regulatory developments 
in Germany, inter alia, the newly introduced voluntary German Takeover 
Code 1995. With respect to cross border transactions, legal and cultural 
barriers obstructing a level playing field for (hostile) takeover offers are 
considered in detail. In this context various features of German corporate 
culture which are identified as barriers and have no equivalent in Britain, 
such as the two-tier board system, the extensive employee representation 
on supervisory board level and the role of the banks are analysed. On 
European level, the 1996 proposal for a new Takeover Directive is 
discussed critically. Those provisions of the proposed 5th Structures 
Directive designed to tackle barriers to takeovers are considered. 
The second major subdivision of this study deals with the policing of 
takeovers and mergers from a competition law perspective. Highlighting 
the differences in the understanding of what constitutes merger control in 
Britain and Germany, the institutional structures as well as the substantive 
Abstract III 
merger control criteria applied by the national authorities are compared. In 
the context of the European Merger Regulation particular emphasis is 
given to the demarcation of jurisdiction between the national merger 
control authorities and the Merger Task Force of DG IV in Brussels. 
It is submitted that this study has contributed to the understanding of 
why there is no level playing field for public takeover bids. Suggestions 
have been made as to how some of the barriers could be removed 
through legislative measures both on German and European level. It is 
further submitted that this thesis has contributed to the understanding of 
the differing concepts underlying merger control in Britain and Germany 
and that it has highlighted the challenges to the national merger control 
authorities deriving from an ever increasing internationalization of markets. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The evolution of takeover and merger regulation as a new field 
of law dating back to the mid 1960s is one of the most conspicous 
developments in the wider field of company and competition law in 
postwar Britain. With more than 6.000 announced takeover bids 
having been handled by the British Takeover Panel, Britain is the 
undisputed European leader in the regulation of public takeover 
offers. This situation is sharply contrasted by the state of affairs in 
Germany where "real" Anglo-style public takeover offers play at best 
a very limited role in practice. 
In recent years the ever increasing internationalization of 
business, more specifically the European integration with its concept 
of a common market, has added a new international dimension to 
takeover and merger regulation. Foreign bidders are frequently 
behind public takeover offers for British public companies. Against 
this scenario the question has repeatedly been raised whether British 
companies do have an equal chance to acquire abroad through 
public bids. In other words, is there a level playing field for takeover 
bids? Germany is often quoted as a jurisdiction in relation to which 
reciprocity does not exist. 
1 For an empirical study see Wymeersch, Unternehmensführung in 
Westeuropa, AG 1995,299,307. Also Krause, Zur Gleichbehandlung der 
Aktionäre bei Übernahmeangeboten und Beteiligungserwerb WM 1996, 
845; Neye, Der neue Übernahmekodex, ZIP 1995,1464; Thoma, Der 
neue Übemahmekodex der Börsensachverständigenkommission, 
Osnabrück, Arbeitspapier 9/96, p. 4. 
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Partly due to the process of internationalization and integration, 
takeover and merger regulation is the subject of considerable debate 
in Britain, Germany, and on European level as recent regulatory 
initiatives, which will be discussed in this thesis, demonstrate. In 
Britain, a far reaching debate on a competition law reform is going on 
and to some extent reflected in the Reports by the Trade and 
Industry Committee on Takeovers and Mergers in 1991 and on 
Monopolies in 1995. In Germany, a new voluntary Takeover Code 
was introduced in 1995 and a recent government proposal for a 
competition law reform is designed to bring German law more in line 
with European law. On European level, the European Merger 
Regulation, which entered into force in 1990, commenced a new 
chapter in the history of European competition law. Recently, a 
Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation (1996) was 
published by the Commission. Moreover, in 1996 the Commission 
presented a new proposal for a Takeover Directive. 
Chapters 3 to 6 of this thesis undertake to analyse and compare 
the respective regulatory takeover frameworks in Britain and 
Germany, the respective corporate culture which is reflected in these 
rules, and the legal and/or cultural barriers which allegedly obstruct 
the desired level playing field. The focus will be on bids for publicly 
listed companies as those companies are the most likely targets of 
public takeover bids. Emphasis will also be given to European 
developments, most notably the 1996 proposal for a Takeover 
Directive. The need and desirability of such a Directive will be 
discussed critically. 
Chapters 7 to 9 are devoted to a comparative analysis of merger 
control law as this field is of equally pre-eminent importance to any 
potential bidder. Clearly, with the entering into force of the European 
Merger Regulation in 1990 a new era in merger control resulting in 
the co-existence of national and directly applicable European rules 
has begun. Rumour has it that the German merger control regime 
Chapter 1 16 
exercised by the Federal Cartel Office in Berlin is rather strict, 
scaring off potential bidders, while the British and European 
authorities are rather liberal and lenient. The thesis will deal with this 
question. 
An APPENDIX contains some German and European material 
which might otherwise not be readily available to a British reader. 
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Chapter 2 
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
Before embarking on the legal analysis of the regulatory 
framework of takeover and merger control in the U. K. and Germany, 
it seems useful to provide some basic statistical data with regard to 
Anglo-German cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Table 1 at page 18 shows the number of Anglo-German mergers 
and acquisitions from 1990 to 1992. It is interesting to note that 
cross-border transactions between the U. K. and Germany were 
biased in favour of the U. K. by 116. Hence, British companies 
appear to be the more active buyers. However, the vast majority of 
these Anglo-German acquisions involve privately negotiated 
(friendly) deals where the German target is a privat limited company 
rather than a public stock corporation. 1 The acquisition of private 
companies, however, is not the subject of this thesis. 
In terms of direct foreign investment Germany invests more in 
Britain than the other way round. In 1995 Britain was the biggest 
recipient of German foreign direct investment. 2 In that year more 
than a fifth of the DM 48 billion of new German investment abroad 
went to the U. K. With an inflow of DM 10.64 billion Britain was well 
ahead of France, the second most popular target for German 
investment. British direct investment in Germany, in contrast, totalled 
DM 2.74 billion. The substantial difference in the amounts of direct 
Anglo-German investment is partly due to the larger gross domestic 
1 Trade and Industry Committee, Takeovers, para 19; Begg, Corporate 
Acquisitions, para 2.06. 
2 See Financial Times and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 May 1996. 
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product of Germany of ECU 1390.80 billion compared to 
ECU 800.85 billion of Britain. 3 The main reasons, however, are 
economic. Britain is increasingly seen as an effective alternative to 
high costs and slow growth in Germany. The main attractions of 
Britain, as repeatedly stated by German business leaders, include a 
more flexible workforce due to less rigorous labour law, lower labour 
and social costs, lower rates of taxation, good international 
communications and infrastructure, high quality financial and legal 
services, and, of course, a position inside the European Union. 4 
Prominent examples of German blue-chip investment in Britain 
during the time of writing this work include BMW, which bought 
Rover for £900 million in 1994 and has since announced an 
investment programme worth £500 million a year, and Siemens, the 
electrical engineering group, which started building a £1 billion 
semiconductor plant in north-east England. 
Table 1: M &A Transactions in 1990-1992 
Bidder 
. 
1. Target British Target German Target E. U. Target 
British Bidder 3.190 193 348 
German bidder 77 2.897 626 
E. U. bidder 408 642 2.727 
Source: European Commission, European Economy, No. 57,1994 
3 Figures of 1994 provided by Eurostat, Eurostatistics, 3/4/5-1996, p. 49. 
4 See Financial Times, 30 April 1996: Bernd Pischetsrieder, BMW's chief 
executive, said: "The U. K. currently is the most attractive country among 
all European locations for the production of cars. " Jürgen Gehrels, chief 
executive of Siemens U. K., is quoted as saying: "We could run a factory 
in Germany as flexibly as in the U. K., but we would need special 
permission for such things as seven-days-a-week working and 24-hours- 
a-day working. " 
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One of the most notable differences between the British and 
German economy of relevance to the subject matter of this work, 
relates to the corporate financing traditions in the U. K. and Germany. 
Generally speaking, the financing of German stock corporations 
relies heavily on long term bank loans and on debentures rather than 
equity capitals and only about 3600 stock corporations 
(Aktiengesellschaften), listed and unlisted included, exist. 6 The 
average age of German companies coming to the German stock 
market is 55 years, against 14 in the U. S. and only eight in Britain.? 
The number of domestic listed public companies in Germany, which 
would be the prime target for takeover bids, is significantly lower than 
in Britain as Table 2 below indicates (678 against 1.807). 
Table 2: Stock Market Comparisons (1995) 
United Kingdom Germany 
Listed Plc's (overall) 2.336 1.622 
Listed Plc's (domestic) 1.807 678 
Listed Plc's (overseas) 529 944 
New Listings 1995 (overall) 221 188 
New Listings 1995 (domestic) 184 20 
New Listings 1995 (overseas) 37 168 
Turnover Equity, DM million (overall) 1.664.493 1.733.200 
Turnover Equity, DM million (domestic) 751.258 1.691.644 
Turnover Equity, DM million (overseas) 913.235 41.556 
ource: ueutscne tiorse, Tact tsoo 
5 Hopt, European Takeover Regulation, in European Takeovers, p. 169. 
6 AG-Report 1995, R 272. 
7 Financial Times, 16 July 1996. 
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Rather than the stock corporation, the predominat form of 
business organisation for medium size firms in Germany is the 
private limited company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung = 
GmbH), of which more than half a million exist. 8 Trading in GmbH- 
shares, however, does not normally take place as it is restricted in a 
number of ways. Even large GmbH's do seldom have more than a 
few dozen shareholders and the transfer of shares is very often 
made conditional upon approval by a simple or special majority of 
the shareholders. 9 Besides, both the transfer of shares in GmbH's 
itself and any contract regarding the transfer of those shares must be 
notarised by a notary which is a costly procedure. 10 
The relatively limited role of the stock market is mirrored by the 
distribution of the German household savings. Only about 5.5 per 
cent of the German household savings in 1992 were invested in 
shares whereas 46.9 per cent went into bank-deposits, 18.0 per cent 
in bonds and 26.3 per cent in insurance and pension plans. 11 Among 
the general public, there has been a widespread suspicion about 
shares in Germany as they are considered speculative investments. 
8 AG-Report 1993, R 65. 
9 The GmbH's are governed by a special Act, the GmbH-Gesetz, which is 
very different from the Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporations Act 1965) which 
regulates stock corporations. As a rule of thumb, the GmbH-Gesetz 
allows for much more flexibility than the Aktiengesetz. The various forms 
of Partnerships are governed by the Handelsgesetzbuch (Commerce Act 
1887) and the foundation of all company law is laid by the Civil Code 
1900. 
10 Sec. 15 GmbHG. 
11 European Commission, The Economic and Financial Situation in 
Germany, p. 150. 
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Therefore, the number of shares owned by private investors is 
rather modest in Germany compared to other leading industrial 
nations including Britain: 12 
12 Data taken from Financial Times, 16 July 1996. 
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Unlike the U. K., pension funds do not play a major role as a 
basically government-provided pension system exists in Germany. 13 
At the end of 1994 about 39.6 per cent of the shares in stock 
corporations were held by industry, 17.5 per cent by foreign 
investors, 17.3 per cent by private investors, 8.4 per cent by banks, 
6.7 per cent by the government, 5.4 per cent by investment fonds, 
and 5.2 per cent by insurance companies. 14 
13 For an in-depth empirical study of the role of institutional investors in 
Germany see Baums/Fraune, Institutionelle Anleger und 
Publikumsgesellschaft: Eine empirische Untersuchung, AG 1995,97-112. 
14 AG-Report 1995, R 418. See also DTI, Barriers to Takeovers in the 
European Community, 1990, Volume 2, p. 19. 





However, the number of stock corporations has been increasing 
steadily in Germany, as Table 6 at page 25 demonstrates, and will 
continue to do so for various reasons. 15 One reason is the 
reunification of East and West Germany in 1989. Until 1992 about 
200 new stock corporations were floated in the former East 
Germany, many of them were converted from previously state-owned 
industries. 16 Another reason is the generational change in the 
ownership structure of companies. Many companies in Germany 
were formed during the "Wirtschaftswunder" days in the late 1940s 
and 1950s when Germany was rebuilt after World War II. These 
companies are traditionally either partnerships or private limited 
companies controlled by family members. With the postwar founder- 
generation nearing retirement and the businesses often having 
15 As to the new Securities Trading Act 1994 which is designed to boost 
investor confidence see 4.1.2. (2) at page 125. 
16 AG-Report 1993, R 64. 
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reached a considerable size, the question of succession frequently is 
a problem which increasingly leads to the conversion into stock 
corporations. 17 Albeit family members may still be the major 
shareholders in these stock corporations, the foundations for a 
further diversification in the ownership structure are laid which will in 
the long run lead to a more open capital market. Furthermore, the 
German government has in August 1994 amended the Stock 
Corporations Act and some related acts quite substantially in order to 
make this form of business organisation more attractive to medium 
size businesses and create a stronger equity market-18 Many of the 
changes are designed to facilitate procedural aspects, for instance, 
in connection with general shareholder meetings. Other amendments 
have a more material effect. Most importantly and most 
controversially, employee representatives on the supervisory board 
of stock corporations with less than 500 employees are not any more 
required for newly floated stock corporations. 19 With this change, 
one of the reasons to choose the form of a private limited company, 
where no employee representation is required in these 
circumstances, has gone. Although it is too early to have any 
evidence on the effect of these amendments, it is widely expected 
that medium size businesses with less than 500 employees will 
increasingly turn to the stock corporation as a form of 
incorporation. 20 
17 AG-Report 1993, R 64. 
18 "Gesetz für kleine Aktiengesellschaften und zur Deregulierung des 
Aktienrechts" vom 2. August 1994 (BGBl. 11994, S. 1961). See also 
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/6721. 
19 Sec. 76 VI Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG 1952). For details see 
Chapter 4.2.2. (2)(b) at page 138. 
20 For further details see Kindler, Die Aktiengesellschaft für den Mittelstand, 
NJW 1994,3041. 





To sum up, bearing in mind that the U. K. 's domestic listed Plc's 
outnumber their German equivalent by about 1.100, it is obvious that 
the British stock-market environment is more favourable for takeover 
bid activity than the relatively underdeveloped German stock-market. 
However, the higher number of public companies alone does not 
explain why takeovers bids are so common in Britain whereas in 
Germany hostile bids are almost unknown. 22 Given the high number 
of privately negotiated acquisitions within Germany both by German 
and European companies shown in Table 1 at page 18, it can be 
ruled out that the virtual non-existence of takeover bids in Germany 
21 Source: AG-Report 1995, R 272. 
22 For an empirical study see Wymeersch, Unternehmensführung in 
Westeuropa, AG 1995,299,307. Also Krause, Zur Gleichbehandlung der 
Aktionäre bei Übernahmeangeboten und Beteiligungserwerb WM 1996, 
845; Neye, Der neue Übernahmekodex, ZIP 1995,1464; Thoma, Der 
neue Übernahmekodex der Börsensachverständigenkommission, 
Osnabrück, Arbeitspapier 9/96, p. 4. 
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is due to lack of economic interest. In fact, more (privately agreed) 
cross-border acquisitions by Community companies were made in 
Germany (642) than in Britain (408). The reasons for the absence of 
a lifely public bid activity, the alleged lack of a level playing field, 
therefore must have deeper rooted legal and maybe (business-) 
cultural reasons. The legal environment encouraging takeover bids in 
Britain and preventing them in Germany will be discussed in the 
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Takeover Regulation and Barriers in 
Britain 
28 
In order to explain the rather opposite takeover situation in the 
U. K. and Germany, Chapter 3 begins with a description and analysis 
of the legal takeover environment in Britain. More specifically, 
Chapter 3.1 looks at the regulatory framework in the U. K. 
Chapter 3.2 continues with a study of the existing structural barriers 
to takeovers and, finally, Chapter 3.3 examines the defences open to 
the directors of a target company. The German side will be explored 
in a similarly structured chapter in Chapter 4. 
3.1. The Regulatory Framework 
The regulatory framework governing acquisitions of listed public 
companies consists of a complex mix of statutory and non-statutory 
rules. 1 Whereas the legal provisions contained in the Companies Act 
1985 and the Financial Services Act 1986 cover only few aspects of 
takeover bids, the vast majority of the regulation is to be found in the 
self-regulatory rules of the "City Code on Takeovers and Mergers", 2 
3 the "Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares", and the 
1 Begg, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, para 2.01 describes the 
situtation graphically as being "somewhat like a zoo. " 
2 Hereafter the City Code. 
3 Hereafter the SARs. 
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Stock Exchange's rules entitled "The Listing Rules of the Stock 
Exchange", the latter being generally referred to as the "Yellow 
Book". 4 Self-regulation therefore is a most characteristic feature of 
the British regulation of takeovers. 5 Although this structural concept 
is widely treasured, 6 it is not beyond criticism.? The pros and cons of 
self-regulation will be considered in Chapter 5 in connection with the 
proposed EC-Directive on Takeovers and Mergers. 8 
The competition aspects of takeovers are exclusively controlled 
by the Fair Trading Act 19739 and on European level most notably 
the Merger Control Regulation 4064/89.10 
3.1.1. The City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers 
The origins of the Code go back to 1959 when after a 
spectacular takeover battle1 1a body known as "The City Working 
4 The so called "Green Book' of the Stock Exchange regulates the Unlisted 
Securities Market (USM), where about 200 companies are registered, 
which is going to be phased out at the end of 1996. The USM is succeded 
by the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) which was opened in 
June 1995. As to these developments see Times, 16 February 1995 and 
31 July 1995; Editorial, (1995) B. L. R., Vol. 16. p. 2,15; Financial Times, 
17 May 1996: as of May 1996 there were 140 companies listed on AIM. 
5 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 
815,824-826; concering the general concept of self-regulation in the field 
of company law see Bovey, Self-Regulation, Company Lawyer, Vol. 12, 
No. 1, p. 3 (1991); see also Morse, The City Code on Takeovers and 
Merger - Self Regulation of Self Protection?, [1991] J. B. L. 509; Lord 
Alexander of Weedon, Takeovers: The Regulatory Scene, [1990] 
J. B. L. 203. 
6 As to the merits of self-regulation see e. g. Lord Alexander of Weedon, 
Takeovers: The Regulatory Scene, [1990] J. B. L. 203. 
7 Critical of the concept of self-regulation e. g. Jowell, The Takeover Panel: 
Autonomy, Flexibility and Legality, [1991] P. L. 149. 
8 See Chapter 5.1.1. (1) at p. 175 and Chapter 5.1.2. (1)(a) at p. 181. 
9 See Chapter 6, p. 265 -334. 
10 See Chapter 8, p. 335-389. 
11 Involving the U. S. companies Reynolds Metals and Aluminium 
Corporation of America as rival bidders for British Aluminium, see 
Johnston, Takeover Code, p. 14-16. 
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Party' was established by leading City institutions12 at the instigation 
of the Bank of England. 13 Their duty was to examine good business 
practice in the conduct of takeovers and mergers in order to prevent 
parlamentary legislation in this field. In 1959 the "Notes on 
Amalgamations of British Business" were proclaimed. 14 Nine years 
later the growing extent of fierce takeover battles made it necessary 
to form a new set of rules, and in 1968 the City Working Party 
published the first edition of the Code. In the same year the Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers15 was set up on the initiative of the 
Governor of the Bank of England to monitor takeovers and mergers. 
Since that time the Code is issued and administered by the Panel. 
The fourth and latest edition was published on July 8,1993.16 
(1) Scope and Structure 
The main function of the Code is to ensure a fair and equal 
treatment of all shareholders in relation to takeovers and to provide a 
regulatory framework for the conduct of takeovers. The Code is 
supposed to represent the collective opinion of those professionally 
involved in the field of takeovers as to good business standards and 
as to how fairness to shareholders can be achieved. 17 The Code is, 
however, not concerned with competition policy18 and is also not 
12 The Accepting Houses Committee, the Association of Investment Trust 
Companies, the Association of Unit Trust Mangers, the British Insurance 
Association, the Committee of London Clearing Bankers, the 
Confederation of British Industry, the Issuing Houses Association, the 
National Association of Pension Funds, and the London Stock Exchange. 
13 As to the history of the City Code and the Panel see Johnston, Takeover 
Code, p. 9; Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 7 (1) para 1035; Begg, 
Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, para 9.59. 
14 De Montmorency, Takeover Bids, [1963] J. B. L. 246,249. 
15 Hereafter the Panel. See in detail Chapter 3.1.2. at p. 36 et seq. 
16 Reproduced in Palmer's Company Law, 25th edition, Vol. 2, Part D. 
17 The City Code, Introduction, para 1 (a). 
18 Although the Code provides in Rule 12 for the possibility of a merger 
reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission or the European 
Commission. 
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concerned with the merits of a particular takeover bid. 19 Whereas 
the former question is left to the government and the EC- 
Commission the latter is ultimately to be decided upon by the 
shareholders of the target company. 
As to the scope of the Code, it is principally applicable to all 
offers for listed and unlisted public companies resident in the United 
Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. 20 The nature of the 
offeror company is in contrast of no importance in determining 
whether the Code applies or not. 21 The Code does not apply to 
offers for non-voting non-equity capital. 22 
The Code is divided into 18 chapters (A to Q), including an 
introduction, and contains three different categories of provisions. 
First, there are 10 General Principles which form a basic outline of 
the good business standard the Code seeks to ensure. The General 
Principles are followed by 38 Rules. 23 The Rules are subdivided into 
many subsections and further supplemented by Notes. Moreover, 
the Code is complemented by 4 Appendices. 24 The Rules are partly 
of a procedural nature and designed to govern specific types of 
takeovers and partly represent mere examples for the application of 
the General Principles. The Notes provide guidelines for the 
application of the Rules. Because of the Code's non-statutory nature 
and its purpose to be a rule of conduct for the business community, 
19 The City Code, Introduction, para 1 (a). 
20 The Code also applies to all offers for companies considered by the Panel 
to be resident in the Irish Republic if their shares are listed on The Stock 
Exchange or dealt in on the Unlisted Securities Market, see The City 
Code, Introduction, para 4 (a). 
21 The City Code, Introduction, para 4 (a). Only in certain limited cases 
(specified in the Introduction, para 4) offers for private companies are 
subject to the City Code. 
22 The City Code, Introduction, para 4 (b). 
23 The first edition of the Code in 1968 already embodied 35 Rules. 
24 Appendix 1: Whitewash Guidance Note. 
Appendix 2: Formula Offers Guidance Note. 
Appendix 3: Directors' Responsibilities and Conflicts of Interest Guidance 
Note. 
Appendix 4: Receiving Agents' Code of Practice. 
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the language is rather simple and non-technical. 25 According to the 
Code, persons involved in an offer have to observe the spirit as well 
as the precise wording of the General Principles and the pertaining 
Rules. As a result of this purposive or teleological approach, the 
rules can be waived in favour of underlying principles. 26 Additionally, 
the General Principles and the spirit of the Code are to be 
considered where the circumstances of the particular case are not 
explicitly covered by any Rule. 27 Thus, it is the spirit and purpose of 
the Code, and not its letter, that ultimately prevails. 
(2) Fundamental Principles underlying the Code 
The fundamental principles underlying the Code as a whole may 
be condensed to the following four basic maxims: 28 
(a) Equality of Treatment 
This tenet is not only expressed in General Principle 1, but also 
reflected in numerous rules. One example is Rule 6 which provides 
that where the offeror has purchased shares at above the offer price 
during the offer period then that offer must be increased accordingly 
for the benefit of the remaining shareholders. Another example for 
the equality of treatment is the requirement of a mandatory offer to 
all shareholders in Rule 9 when a person acquires 30 per cent or 
25 The City Code, Introduction, para 3 (a); Begg, Corporate Acquisitions and 
Mergers, para 9.64. 
26 Calcutt, The Work of the Takeover Panel, Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, 
No. 11, p. 203,205 (1990); Jowell, The Takeover Panel: Autonomy, 
Flexibility and Legality, (1991) P. L. 149,151. 
27 The City Code, Introduction to the General Principles. 
28 Calcutt, The Work of the Takeover Panel, Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, 
No. 11, p. 203,205 (1990); Jowell, The Takeover Panel: Autonomy, 
Flexibility and Legality, (19911 P. L. 149,151; Lord Alexander of Weedon, 
Takeovers: The Regulatory Scene, (19901 J. B. L. 203,204,205. 
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more of the voting rights. This offer must be at the highest price paid 
by him in the previous 12 months and be in cash or include a cash 
alternative. By this means, the Code prevents the acquirer from 
getting effective control of the target company without giving the 
remaining minority a chance to participate in the premium paid for 
the control. A last illustration of the principle of fair treatment is 
Rule 11. Rule 11 affects the consideration of a voluntary offer. When 
during the offer period or within 12 months prior to the 
commencement of the offer period the offeror purchases 10 per cent 
or more of the voting shares for cash, the offer must include a cash 
alternative for all the shares of that class at the highest price paid by 
the offeror during the relevant period. 29 In that way the offeror is 
precluded from paying more important shareholders a special cash 
price while the others get a somewhat less attractive share for share 
deal. 
(b) Adequate Information 
Another fundamental element of the Code, which is contained in 
General Principle 4 and Rule 23 and various other Rules, is the 
provision of adequate information to shareholders in sufficient time to 
enable them to consider the merits of the offer and reach a properly 
informed decision. Rule 20 requiring equality of information for all 
shareholders restricts, for example, press, television and radio 
29 The most spectacular case concerning a breach of Rule 11 is the 
takeover of Distillers by Guinness: R. v. Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers, ex parte Guinness Plc. [19891 1 All ER 509. Acting secretly in 
concert with a swiss company, Guinness purchased more than the then 
allowed 15 per cent of the shares in Distillers for cash. Consequently, 
Guinness had to pay the difference between the offer price and the 
highest paid cash price to all Distillers' shareholders -a sum which 
amounted to £85.000.000. As to the calculation of that amount see 
Morse, The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers - Self-regulation or 
Self-Protection [1991] J. B. L. 509,521. 
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interviews during the offer period, 30 and Rule 24 provides for 
detailed information in the offer document itself. 
(c) Transparency in Dealings 
Instead of prohibiting further dealings during the offer period, 
trading in the shares of the offeror company and the target company 
will normally continue. However, the Code seeks to ensure a fair 
market by requiring strict transparency of dealings. In principle, 
during the offer period the offeror, the offeree company, and any 
associates must disclose any dealings in the relevant securities of 
the offeror31 and the target company publicly, namely to the Stock 
Exchange, the Panel and the press, 32 on the business day following 
the date of the transaction. 33 The same applies to any other person, 
whether or not an associate, who owns or controls one per cent or 
more in a company involved in a takeover. 34 In addition to the 
requirements of the Code, the provisions of the Companies Act 1985 
concerning the disclosure of interests in shares apply too. 35 But 
since the obligation of disclosure under the Companies Act 1985 
arises only if a person has an interest in shares of three per cent or 
more, 36 it is very likely that, where disclosure is required under the 
provisions of the Companies Act 1985, disclosure will, if dealing 
occurs during the offer period, anyway be necessary under Rule 8.3 
of the Code, where only one per cent is sufficient to trigger the 
disclosure requirement. 37 
30 See Note 1 on Rule 20.1. 
31 Dealings in shares of the offeror company must only be disclosed in the 
case of an securities exchange offer, see Rule 8, NB. 1. 
32 Rule 8, Note 4 (a). 
33 Rule 8, Note 3. 
34 Rule 8.3. 
35 Part VI, sections 198-220 CA 1985. 
36 Section 199 CA 1985. 
37 Rule 8, Note 13. 
(d) Restrictions on Frustrating Action 
As the United States experience shows, 38 where the 
management of a target company is able to exercise any kind of 
defence tactics, it is often difficult for the entrenched managers to 
differentiate between their own interests and those of the 
shareholders. General Principle 9 therefore states that the directors 
must always act in their capacity as directors and not have regard to 
their personal or family shareholdings or to their personal 
relationship with the company. In accordance with this 
understanding, General Principle 7, which is further specified in 
Rule 21, provides that the management of the target company has 
no right to take any action, except with the consent of the 
shareholders, which could effectively result in any bona fide offer 
being frustrated and consequently in the sharholders being denied 
the opportunity to decide on the merits of a bid. Instead, under 
Rule 3.1 the board of the target company has to seek independent 
advice and the substance of the advice must be made known to the 
shareholders. Under Rule 19.4 the offeree management is even 
required to give equal information to competing bidders in order to 
prevent any undue preference to the suitor favoured by the target's 
management. The question whether, and if so which, defensive 
action can be taken in spite of General Principle 7, namely in 
advance of a bid or with the consent of the shareholders will be 
considered in Chapters 3.3.39 and 3.4.40 
38 Solomon/Schwartz/Baumann, Corporations, p. 1031,1143. 
39 See p. 70 et seq. 
40 See p. 85 et seq. 
Chapter 3 36 
3.1.2. The Takeover Panel 
The former Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson, introduced his 
judgement in the famous Datafin case by describing the Panel as a 
"truly remarkable body' which, "perched on the 20th floor of the 
Stock Exchange building in London, both literally and metaphorically 
oversees and regulates a very important part of the United Kingdom 
financial market. "41 
As part of the self-regulatory system the Panel has no statutory 
power at all and is not in any contractual relationship with the 
financial market or those who deal in the market. 42 Legally, the 
Panel is an unincorporated association with legal personality. 43 
(1) Structure of the Panel 
Analysing the structure of the Panel, it is to differentiate between 
the main membership body, the so called full Panel, the Executive 
and the Appeal Committee. 44 
The day-to-day work of the Panel is carried out by the Executive, 
which is working full-time. 45 Its workload is considerable as Table 9 
(first column) at page 41 shows. The Executive consists of a Director 
General, 46 who is usually a senior merchant banker experienced in 
corporate finance, three Deputy Directors-General, 47 two 
41 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 
815,824. 
42 l bid, p. 825. 
43 Ibid, p. 824. 
44 An up to date list of all members of the Panel, the Appeal Commitee, and 
Executive is contained in the annual reports of the Panel. 
45 The City Code, Introduction, para 2 (b). 
46 As at 18 July 1996 these was Alistair NC Defriez, seconded from 
SBC Warburg. 
47 As at 18 July 1996 these were T Peter Lee, Noel P Hinton, and Anthony 
GB Pullinger. 
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Secretaries, 48 eight Assistant Secretaries49 and supporting staff of 
about 16 people, some of whom are on secondment and some are 
permanent staff, with backgrounds in the Bank of England, merchant 
banks, the Stock Exchange, accountancy and solicitors' firms, and 
other City insititutions. 50 The mixture of permanent staff and others 
on secondment guarantees a wide range of experience represented 
in the Executive and is thus benefical for the Executive's quality of 
work. 51 
In contrast to the Executive, the full Panel meets only 
occasionally to hear any matters referred to it by the Executive52, 
appeals by parties from the Executive's decisions, and disciplinary 
matters. 53 In the year to 31 March 1995, for example, which was a 
relatively busy year for the full Panel, it held six meetings to hear 
appeals against rulings by the Executive. 54 As Table 9 at page 41 
indicates, only a relatively small percentage of appeals made to the 
full Panel are successful. To be precise, from the year ended 
31 March 1989 to 31 March 1996 a total of 33 appeals were made to 
the Panel of which only three were fortunate. 
48 As at 18 July 1996 these were Carlton P Evans (Linklaters & Paines) and 
Michael D Shaw (Herbert Smith). 
49 As at 18 July 1996 these were Helena RMZ Skarbek (Bank of England), 
Leonie S Grimes (Arthur Anderson), Richard Ozsanlav (Coopers & 
Lybrand), Angus W Pottinger (Merrill Lynch), Edward JM Baker (Ashurst 
Morris Crisp), Bernadette M McKernan (Deloitte & Touche), Patrick J 
Magee (J P Morgan), Jane M Taylor. All but Jane Taylor are seconded. 
50 See previous footnote. Also R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex 
parte Guinness Plc. [1989] 1 All ER 509,514; Calcutt, The work of the 
Takeover Panel, Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 11, p. 203 (1990). 
Concerning the Panel's composition and staffing see also The Trade and 
Industry Committee Report on Takeovers and Mergers, 1991, para 135 et 
seq. 
51 Calcutt, The work of the Takeover Panel, Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, 
No. 11, p. 203 (1990). 
52 The City Code, Introduction, para 1 (b). In 1990-91 seven meetings were 
held, three of which were on appeals from parties to bids and one on a 
disciplinary matter. See The Trade and Industry Committee Report on 
Takeovers and Mergers, 1991, para 135. 
53 The City Code, Introduction, para 1 (c). 
54 The Takeover Panel, 1994-1995 Report, p. 15. 
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The actual membership of the Panel comprises a Chairman, 55 
two Deputy Chairmen56 and three independent members, each 
appointed by the Governor of the Bank of England. 57 In addition, 
there are 12 members, who represent various City organisations as 
Table 7 at page 39 shows. The composition of the Panel is designed 
to comprehend all those who are professionally involved in 
takeovers. There has been criticism that the Panel looks excessively 
biased towards those with a direct financial interest in creating more 
takeover activity. 58 Table 7 at page 39 demonstrates that point 
impressively. Trade unions, for example, are not represented. Both 
the members of the Panel and the Executive almost exclusively 
come from a financial background in a major City institution. The 
1994/1995 Director General of the Executive, for instance, William 
Staple, who is the brother of the director of the Serious Fraud Office, 
George Staple, was on a two-year secondment from the investment 
bank N. M. Rothschild. 59 The present Director General, 60 Alistair 
Defriez, is seconded from SBC Warburg. Surely, given the 
composition of the Panel and the Executive there seems to be a 
potential for conflicts of interest. This problem is to some extent 
inherent in the concept of self-regulation where those who devise the 
rules draw them up in their own interest to avoid government 
legislation which might not be as flexible and favourable. 
55 As at 18 July 1996 this was Sir David Calcutt QC, former Chairman of the 
Bar. 
56 As at 18 July 1996 these were John FC Hull, former Chairman of J Henry 
Schroder Wagg & Co and John F Goble, former Senior Partner Herbert 
Smith. 
57 The City Code, Introduction, para 2 (a); Calcutt, The work of the Takeover 
Panel, Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 11, p. 203 (1990). 
58 Jowell, Self-regulation under threat, Financial Times, May 9,1991.; see 
also The Trade and Industry Committee Report on Takeovers and 
Mergers, 1991, para 135 et seq. 
59 Since March 1994. Financial Times, January 8,1994. 
60 As at 18 July 1996. 
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Table 7: Background of Panel Members 1996 
Name Function - Position 
Representative of 
Sir David Calcutt QC Panel Chairman Former Chairman of the Bar 
appointed by Bank of England 
John F Hull Panel Deputy Chairman Former Chairman, J Henry 
appointed by Bank of England Schroder Wagg & Co 
John F Goble Panel Deputy Chairman Former Senior Partner, Herber 
appointed by Bank of England Smith 
Sir Christoper Benson Independent Member Chairman, Sun Alliance Group 
appointed by Bank of England 
H Dennis Stevenson Independent Member Chairman, SRU 
appointed by Bank of England 
Robert B Jack Independent Member Former Senior Partner, 
appointed by Bank of England McGrigor Donald 
John GT Carter Chairman, Association of British Chief Executive, Commercial 
Insurers Union 
Douglas CP McDougall Chairman, Association of Joint Senior Partner, Baillie 
Investment Trust Companies Gifford & Company 
Clive N Boothman Chairman, Association of Unit Managing Director, Schroder 
Trusts and Investment Funds Unit Trusts 
Sir Brian Pitman President British Bankers" Group Chief Executive, LLoyds 
Association TSB Group 
Martin F Broughton Nominated by Confederation of Group Chief Executive, BAT 
British Industry Industries 
Brian M Currie President, Institute of Chartered Former Managing Partner, 
Accountants in England and Arthur Anderson, London 
Wales 
Charles KR Nunneley Chairman, Investment Deputy Chairman, Robert 
Management Regulatory Fleming Holdings 
Organisation 
John L Walker-Haworth Nominated by London Managing Director, SBC 
Investment Banking Association Warburg 
Antony R Beevor Chairman, London Investment Executive Director, Hambros 
Banking Association Corporate Bank 
Finance Committee 
John Kemp-Welch Chairman, London Stock Former Senior Partner 
Exchange Cazenove & Co 
Graham K Allen Nominated by National Managing Director, ICI 
Association of Pension Funds Investment Management 
Nicholas J Durlacher Chairman Securities and Director, Barclays De Zoete 
Futures Authority Wedd Securities 
Source: 1995-1996 Report of the Takeover Panel 
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Table 8: Background of Executive Members 1996 
Name Function Seconded from 
Alistair NC Defriez Director General SBC Warburg 
T Peter Lee Deputy Director General - 
Noel P Hinton Deputy Director General - 
Anthony GB Pullinger Deputy Director General - 
Carlton P Evans Secretary Linklaters & Paines 
Michael D Shaw Secretary Herbert Smith 
Helena RMZ Skarbek Assistent Secretary Bank of England 
Leonie S Grimes Assistent Secretary Arthur Anderson 
Richard Ozsanlav Assistent Secretary Coopers & Lybrand 
Angus W Pottinger Assistent Secretary Merrill Lynch 
Edward JM Baker Assistent Secretary Ashurst Morris Crisp 
Bernadette M McKernan Assistent Secretary Deloitte & Touche 
Patrick J Magee Assistent Secretary JP Morgan 
Jane M Taylor Assistent to the Secretary - 
Source: 1995-1996 Report of the Takeover Panel 
The Appeal Committee hears appeals from the Panel's 
decisions. It is headed by a Chairman and a Deputy Chairman who 
will normally have held high judicial office. 61 The Chairman sits with 
two members of the Panel who were not involved in the Panel's 
decision under appeal. The right of appeal is granted only in certain 
cases, in particular where the Panel proposes to take diciplinary 
action or it is alleged that the Panel has acted outside its jurisdiction 
(see Table 9 at page 41). But an appeal may in all cases be made to 
the Appeal Committee with leave of the Panel. 62 However, leave will 
not normally be granted on findings of fact or interpretation of the 
61 As at 18 July 1996 these were the Rt Hon Sir Michael Kerr, former Lord 
Justice of Appeal, and the Rt Hon Sir Christoper Slade, former Lord 
Justice of Appeal. 
62 For further details see The City Code, Introduction, para 3 (f). 
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Code. 63 As Table 9 (last column) at page 41 shows, the role of the 
Appeal Committee is very limited indeed. From 1989 until 31 March 
1996 there have only been seven appeals to the Appeal Committee, 
none of which was successful. 

























1989 253 14 3 8 (-) 2 1 (-) 
1990 230 13 5 6 (2) 1 3 (-) 
1991 132 7 3 3 (-) 1 - (-) 
1992 142 5 1 2(-) 2 2(-) 
1993 88 6 - 5 (-) 1 - (-) 
1994 81 1 - 1 (-) - - (-) 
1995 108 6 - 6(1) - 1 (-) 
1996 156 2 - 2(-) - - (-) 
Source: Annual Reports of the Takeover Panel 
(2) Functions of the Panel 
The Panel has often been described as the whistle-blowing 
referee of the fair conduct of a bid. 64 Yet, that is only part of its 
functions65 which are basically fourfold. 66 
63 The City Code, Introduction, para 3 (f), see also Morse, Role of the 
Panel's Appeal Committee defined, [1990] J. B. L. 67,69. 
64 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Pic. [1989] 
1 All ER 509,511; Lord Alexander of Weedon, Takeovers: The 
Regulatory Scene, [1990] J. B. L. 203,204. 
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First of all, the Panel is the legislator of the Code. Its second 
function is to act as an interpreter of it, and thirdly, the Panel is 
concerned to monitor compliance with the Code and to investigate 
alleged breaches. 67 To strengthen its investigative powers, the Panel 
became a designated authority68 under the Companies Act 1985,69 
the Financial Services Act 1986,70 and the Banking Act 1987. It is for 
that reason entitled to receive information obtained under those Acts 
which is otherwise not publicly available. Last but not least, the fourth 
function of the Panel is to impose sanctions to enforce the Code; it 
acts thus as a diciplinary tribunal. 71 
The Panel is, hence, much more than a mere referee. Other 
than a referee, the Panel makes the rules it interprets and even has 
the power to waive the Code's written rules in favour of the spirit of 
the Code. 72 Apart from the possibility of judicial review of the Panel's 
decisions, which is rather limited in its practical effect, 73 there is no 
separation of power at all. 
Whereas a referee is usually subject to the public scrutiny of the 
crowds, the Panel acts more or less behind closed doors, and the 
hearings before the Panel are - for the sake of speediness and 
effectiveness - informal and private. 74 There are no rules of 
65 Jowell, The Takeover Panel: Autonomy, Flexibility and Legality, [1991] 
P. L. 149,150. 
66 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 
815,841. 
67 As to the relative weakness of the Panel's investigative powers see 
Morse, The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers - Self-regulation or 
Self-Protection, [1991] J. B. L. 509,515-519. 
68 S. I. 1987 No. 859. 
69 Sections 447,449 (3) CA 1985: information acquired by the DTI under 
"books and papers" inspections. 
70 Sections 179,180 Financial Sevices Act 1986: entitled to receive 
otherwise restricted information. 
71 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Plc [1989] 1 All 
ER 509,511. See Chapter 3.1.2. (3) at pp. 44. 
72 See Chapter 3.1.2. (1) at pp. 36. 
73 See Chapter 3.1.2. (4)(b) at pp. 53. 
74 The City Code, Introduction, para 3 (e); for a thourough description of the 
Panel's procedure see R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte 
Guinness Pic. [1989] 1 All ER 509,515. 
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evidence, and even legal representation at hearings before the Panel 
is not normally allowed 175 
Among the four functions of the Panel, the one as interpreter of 
the Code, or in other words, as a consultant to the persons involved 
in the takeover bid, is the most important one from a practical point 
of view. When there is any doubt whether a proposed course of 
conduct in a takeover bid is in accordance with the Code, parties and 
their advisers are strongly encouraged to consult the Executive either 
in advance or at any time during the course of the bid. 76 During the 
offer period the Panel Executive is usually in daily contact with the 
parties' advisers, and the Executive's Director General, or one of his 
Deputies, is constantly available to give rulings on points of 
interpretation of the Code or for consultation. 77 Although there has 
been criticism regarding the institutional self-regulatory framework 
with its inherent risk of conflict of interest, the quality of the 
Executive's work as such has to the author's knowledge never really 
been disputed. This may be one reason why in the vast majority of 
cases its rulings are simply accepted by the parties and their 
advisers, and no further reference is made to the full Panel and the 
Appeal Committee. 78 Another reason may be, however, that the 
chance of success appears to be very low indeed as Table 9 at 
page 41 indicates. 
75 Ibid. 
76 The City Code, Introduction, para 3 (b); R. v. Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers, ex parte Guinness Pic. [1989) 1 All ER 509,514; Calcutt, The 
work of the Takeover Panel, Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 11, p. 204 
(1990). 
77 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Pic. [1989] 
1 All ER 509,515. 
78 Ibid. According to The Trade and Industry Committee Report on 
Takeovers and Mergers, 1991, para 136 there were only three appeals 
from parties to bids and one on a disciplinary matter in 1990-91. 
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(3) Enforcement of the Code 
Although the Panel is a self-regulatory body and has no authority 
de jure to enforce the Code, quite a number of sanctions are open to 
it. 79 These vary from quiet private warnings to tough disciplinary 
actions. That the Panel has no legal power does not mean that it is 
not operating within a legal framework. On the contrary, the work of 
the Panel is clearly linked to the regulatory structure established 
under the Financial Services Act 1986; it is tied in statutorily with the 
work of other financial regulatory bodies like the Securities and 
Investments Board (SIB), 80 the various self-regulating organisations 
(SROs), 81 and the Stock Exchange. In fact, the Panel's main power 
derives from the backing by these financial institutions as the 
following examination shows. 
(a) Private Warning 
In case of a minor inadvertent breach of the Code causing very 
little or no damage to investors, the Panel may pronounce a private 
warning to the offending party and its adviser. 82 
79 The City Code, Introduction, para 1 (c). 
80 See section 114 (2) FSA 1986; Rider/Chaikin/Abrams, Guide to the 
Financial Services Act, para 302-304. 
81 See sections 7-14 FSA 1986. Rider/Chaikin/Abrams, Guide to the 
Financial Services Act, para 306-311; Begg, Corporate Acquisitions, 
para 9.04. The four recognised SROs include the following: 
SFA: The Securities and Futures Association. 
FIMBRA: The Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory 
Association. 
IMRO: The Investment Management Regulatory Organisation. 
LAUTRO: The Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation. 
82 Begg, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, para 9.63; Morse, Self- 
regulation or Self-protection, [1991) J. B. L. 509,520. 
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(b) Public Reprimand 
In a more serious case of a breach of the Code, the Panel may 
issue a public reprimand as a deterrent and sanction. A public 
reprimand by the Panel may be embarrassing to the advising 
merchant bank and damage its reputation. It may also lead to some 
internal disciplinary action within the bank concerned. Surprisingly, 
there is hardly any of the prominent expert merchant banks which 
has not been subject to a public reprimand by the Panel for often 
very patent breaches. 83 A recent example is Rentokil's £2.2 hostile 
takeover bid for BET, the business services group. The Panel 
criticised publicly that the defending BET management compared in 
a statement the offer price which did not include dividends with BET 
shares which did include dividend payments which was misleading to 
BET shareholders. 84 
83 See for example: Petrocon Group plc. /James Wilkes plc. (Panel 
Statement February 6,1992), [1992] J. B. L. 428: breach of Rule 2.2 by 
Henry Cooke Corporate Finance Ltd., Smith New Court Corporate 
Finance Ltd., and Rothschild and Sons Ltd.; European Leisure 
plc. /Midsummer Leisure plc. (Panel Statement, May 15,1990), [1991] 
J. B. L. 66: breach of Rule 19.3 by Schroder Wagg & Co. Ltd.; Timpson 
plc. /Automagic Holdings plc. (Panel Statement, May 8,1990), [1991] 
J. B. L. 65: breach of Rules 1 and 3 of the SARs by Henry Cooke 
Corporate Finance Ltd.; Meat Trade Supplies pic. /Twigrealm plc. (Panel 
Statement, October 6,1989), [1990] J. B. L. 73: breach of General 
Principle 3 by Lloyds Merchant Bank Ltd.; Bowater Industries plc. /Norton 
Opax plc. /The De La Rue Co. plc. (Panel Statement, September 11, 
1989), [1990] J. B. L. 73: breach of Rule 19.3 by Samuel Montagu & Co. 
Ltd.; Franke Holdings AG/Carron Phoenix plc. (Panel Statement, January 
25,1990), [1990] J. B. L. 337: breach of Rule 6.2 (2) by Brown, Shipley & 
Co. Ltd.; DRG plc. (Panel Statement, November 3,1989), [1990] J. B. L. 
33: breach of Rule 19 by Lazard Brothers & Co. Ltd.; Electronic Data 
Systems Corporation/SD-Scicon plc. (Panel Statement, August 21,1991) 
[1992] J. B. L. 105: breach of note 3 on Rule 20.1 by Samuel Montague & 
Co. Ltd. 
84 Financial Times, 13/14 April 1996. 
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(c) Remedial Measures 
46 
If there has been damage to investors or the other side, the 
Panel may require the offending party to take remedial action such 
as to make the required mandatory offer, 85 to pay compensation to 
prejudiced investors, 86 to issue an amended circular, 87 to dispose of 
the shares acquired in breach of the Code, 88 or not to vote with the 
shares purchased in violation of the Code. 89 However, if the 
offending party refuses to act accordingly, the Panel itself has no 
direct means to force the offending party to comply with its ruling. To 
reach this goal, the Panel needs the support of the self-regualting 
organisations (SROs) established under the Financial Services Act 
1986 and the Stock Exchange. The way this works is dealt with in the 
following paras. 
(d) Sanctions against advisers through the SROs 
Under the Financial Services Act 1986 no person has the right to 
carry on investment business, which includes takeover activity, 
unless he is authorised to do so. 90 In broad outline, authorisation is 
generally obtained through membership of a recognised SRO. 91 
Recognition is conferred on the SROs by the Securities and 
85 Gasco Investments Ltd. /St. Piran Ltd., [1980] J. B. L. 270,358. 
86 Guinness plc. /The Distillers Company plc. (Panel Statement, July 14, 
1989), [1989] J. B. L. 520: Guinness had to pay £85m in compensation to 
Distillers' shareholders. 
87 Meat Trade Supplies plc. /Twigrealm plc. (Panel Statement, October 6, 
1989), [1990] J. B. L. 73. 
88 Timpson plc. /Automagic Holdings plc. (Panel Statement, May 8,1990), 
[1991] J. B. L. 65. 
89 Crest International Securities Ltd. /Ashbourne Investments Ltd., [1975] 
J. B. L. 44. 
90 Section 3 FSA 1986. As to investment advertisements (offer document) 
see section 57 FSA 1986. 
91 Section 7 FSA 1986. 
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Investments Board (SIB)92 to which the functions of the Secretary of 
State are delegated. 93 Practically all merchant banks or other 
advisers involved in takeover activity are members of a SRO, most 
probably the SFA94 or FIMBRA. 95 The SROs are defined as bodies 
regulating the carrying on of investment business by enforcing rules 
which are strictly binding on their members. 96 Contrary to the Panel, 
the SROs' rules and constitution must meet clearly defined statutory 
criteria outlined in the Financial Services Act and put into more 
concrete terms by the SIB's "Conduct of Business Rules. "97 Under 
these rules, failure to adhere to the Code calls into question a firm's 
status as a "fit and proper" investment business. 98 In this kind of 
situation a variety of sanctions are open to the relevant SRO. 99 
Ultimately, diciplinary actions can lead to the suspension or even 
revocation of authorisation, which means the respective merchant 
bank is then by virtue of section 3 of the Financial Services Act 1986 
temporarily or permanently restricted from carrying on any 
investment business. The available sanctions against merchant 
banks acting in breach of the Code are thus very powerful. But the 
question is whether these sanctions are applied strictly against 
offending merchant banks, which is only possible if the Panel refers 
breaches of the Code to the relevant SRO. In most cases, however, 
the Panel simply criticises the offending merchant bank for the 
breach, 100 whereas sanctions against offending parties sometimes 
92 The SIB is a private company limited by guarantee. The exercise of the 
SIB's statutory powers is subject of judicial review. 
93 Sections 10,114 FSA 1986; note also the Transfer of Functions Order 
1992 - S. I. 1992/1315 which refers certain functions from the Secretary of 
State to the Treasury. 
94 The Securities and Futures Association. 
95 The Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory 
Association. 
96 Section 8 (1) FSA 1986. 
97 See sections 48,114 and Schedule 8 of the FSA 1986. 
98 Gore-Browne on Companies, para 29.2.3.; Begg, Corporate Acquisitions 
and Mergers, para 9.57. 
99 Rider/Chaikin/Abrams, Guide to the Financial Services Act, para 1207- 
1213. 
100 See Chapter 3.1.2. (3)(b) at pp 45. 
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seem rather harsh. 101 Accordingly, there has been suspicion that in 
connection with breaches of the Code the Panel pursues offeror and 
offeree boards more vigorously than their advisers, 1 02 and that 
"nothing will happen if you are part of the charmed circle" of 
merchant banks. 1 03 It has also been asked whether the Panel "is 
concerned with the full enforcement of the Code or is conducting a 
damage limitation exercise for the City.,, 104 
(e) "Cold-Shouldering II 
Whereas the advisers to a takeover party run the considerable 
risk of losing their authorisation to carry on investment business if 
they breach the Code, it has been a slightly more difficult task to 
impose effective sanctions upon the companies concerned and their 
directors. The Ashbourne105 and St. Piran106 sagas of the early 
1980s are infamous examples of the fact that the Panel's authority 
has not always been accepted. However, this seems to have 
changed as the case of Guinness, where the company was forced to 
pay £85.000.000 to Distillers' shareholders, shows. 107 As a result of 
discussions between the Panel, the DTI, and the SIB in the 
aftermath of the Guinness-affair, the rules of the SIB and the SROs 
101 Compare e. g. Petrocon Group plc. /James Wilkes plc. (Panel Statement, 
February 6,1992), [1992] J. B. L. 428 to Re Dundee Football Club plc. 
(Panel Statement, March 11,1992) [1992] J. B. L. 430. 
102 Morse, Self-regulation or self-protection, [1991] J. B. L. 509,519; Morse, 
Breaking the rules - who bears the blame? [1991] J. B. L. 65,66; Morse, 
Inability to finance an offer, [1992] J. B. L. 105,106. 
103 Morse, Failure to make timely announcement of offer negotiations, [1992] 
J. B. L. 428,429. 
104 Morse, Enforcing and investigating breaches of the City Code, [1990] 
J. B. L. 336; Morse, Breaking the rules - who bears the blame? [1991] 
J. B. L. 65,66. 
105 [1975] J. B. L. 44. 
106 [1980] J. B. L. 270,358; see also Re St. Piran Ltd., [1981] 3 All ER 270. 
107 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Plc. [1989] 
1 All ER 509,515; see also Guinness plc. /The Distillers Company plc. 
(Panel Statement, July 14,1989), [1989] J. B. L. 520; see also Morse, Self- 
regulation or Self-protection, [1991] J. B. L. 509,521. 
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now require authorised investment businesses like merchant banks 
to decline to act in a takeover for any person who does not appear 
likely to comply with the Code. 108 Such persons are to be cold- 
shouldered. In Re Dundee Football Club Plc, for example, the key 
figures, Mr Drummond and Mr Prentice, acquired secretly acting in 
concert through various companies far more than 30 per cent of the 
voting shares in Dundee Football Club plc deliberately avoiding the 
obligation under Rule 9.1 of the Code to make a mandatory offer to 
the remaining shareholders of Dundee. 109 Consequently, both men 
were subject to serious censure by the Panel, and, moreover, the 
Panel reported its conclusions to the SIB and the relevant SROs110 
for appropriate action by them in the light of their cold-shouldering 
rules. In effect, all those authorised to conduct investment business 
were prohibited from acting for either Mr Drummond or Mr Prentice in 
connection with takeover matters. Similar to the described cold- 
shouldering procedure by the SIB and the SROs, the Stock 
Exchange's Yellow Book expresses explicitely its support for the 
Code and the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares 
(SARs). 111 Thus, a breach of the Code can also lead to the 
withholding of the facilities of the Stock Exchange by the refusal, 
discontinuance or suspension of listing, 112 which was the case in the 
notorious St. Piran-affair. 113 It should be noted, however, that the 
suspension of listing has the tendency to be more painful to the 
innocent shareholders, who in that situation cannot dispose of their 
108 Rule 2.12 of the SIB's Conduct of Business Rules. See also The City 
Code, Introduction, para 1 (c); Begg, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, 
para 2.16; Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, p. 706. 
109 See e. g. Dundee Football Club plc. (Panel Statement, March 11,1992) 
[1992] J. B. L. 430. 
110 Since Mr Drummond was a Scottish solicitor his conduct was reported to 
the relevant Recognised Professional Body (RPB) too. See section 15,16 
CA 1985. 
111 Chapter 10 of the Yellow Book: The Exchange supports the City Code 
and the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares publised by 
the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, but they do not form part of the 
listing rules. " 
112 Chapter 1 of the Yellow Book; Begg, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers, 
para 2.16. 
113 [1980] J. B. L. 358; see also Re St. Piran Ltd., [1981] 3 All ER 270. 
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shares, than to the guilty directors or the company itself. Besides, in 
St. Piran even the suspension of listing proved to be ineffective. 114 
(f) International Implications 
To sum up, since the St. Piran affair in the late 1970s and early 
1980s the Panel has been remarkably able to enforce its rulings 
upon domestic companies with a variety of effective sanctions open 
to it. The Panel also claims to apply the Code successfully to foreign 
bidders1 15 and, indeed, so far no major case of defiance by a foreign 
bidder has hit the headlines. However, foreign implications have 
caused difficulties already. In the Minocro bid for Consolidated Gold 
Fields the Panel was concerned with the effect of legal proceedings 
in New York which allegedly amounted to a forbidden defensive 
action by Consolidated Gold Fields. 116 In the bid by Hoylake 
Investments Ltd for BAT Industries pIC1 17 the Panel had to consider 
the impact of procedural requirements in the United States, where 
Hoylake needed to obtain the approval by the insurance 
commissioners in nine States, upon the bid timetable in the U. K. In 
the case of Luric Corp's bid for Merlin International Properties Ltd 
the Panel stated that the standard of care required under General 
Principle 3 has an additional dimension where a financial adviser is 
acting for a newly created off-shore overseas company. 118 It 
remains to be seen, however, whether the self-regulatory system, 
which depends to a large extent on the mutual respect, co-operation 
and closeness of the British business community in the City of 
London, works equally well when seriously challenged by a foreign 
114 Morse, Self-regulation or Self-protection, [1991] J. B. L. 500,521. 
115 Bovey, Self-regulation, Company Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 4, (1991); 
Ca/cutt, The work of the Takeover Panel, Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, 
No. 11, p. 203,207 (1990). 
116 Panel Statement, May 9,1989, [1989] J. B. L. 427. 
117 Panel Statement, September 6,1989, [1990] J. B. L. 67,68. 
118 Panel Statement, August 12,1991, [1992] J. B. L. 105,106. 
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bidder. Obviously, methods like public censuring and cold- 
shouldering look less frightful to a foreign offeror company which is 
not listed on the Stock Exchange, and it is likely that sooner or later 
the Panel will have to prove its strength at an international stage. 
(4) Judicial Review 
As discussed above, the Panel operates within a legal 
framework in so far as it is a designated authority119 to receive 
otherwise restricted information and is linked to the regulatory 
system established under the Financial Services Act and the Stock 
Exchange. 120 A further respect in which the Panel operates within a 
legal framework is that it is subject to judicial review as the Data fin 
decision established. 121 Judicial review is basically a process by 
which the courts122 exercise a supervisory jurisdiction over the 
activities of public authorities in the field of public law. 123 In contrast 
to an appeal, judicial review is neither concerned with evaluating 
evidence nor is it a fact-finding procedure. The courts do also not 
review the substantive merits of the public authority's decision in 
question, 124 and consequently the Courts do not substitute their own 
judgement of reasonableness for that of the decision-maker. The 
grounds on which judicial review can be granted are, broadly 
speaking, limited to situations where a public body exceeds its 
119 See Chapter 3.1.2. (2) at pp. 41. 
120 See Chapter 3.1.2. (3)(d) at pp. 46. 
121 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 
815,824. 
122 Usually the High Court. See section 29 (1) of the Supreme Court Act 
1991. As to the procedure in detail see Rules of the Supreme Court, 
Order 53. 
123 McLeod, Judicial Review, p. 1. 
124 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 
815,842. 
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jurisdiction (illegality), acts irrational (irrationality), or against the rules 
of natural justice (procedural impropriety). 125 
In the Datafin case, where Datafin challenged the Panel's 
decision that a rival bidder for McCorquodale, Norton Opax, was not 
acting in concert with another company, two questions of 
fundamental interest arose. First of all, it was unclear whether the 
Panel as a self-regulatory body could be subject to judicial review 
(the jurisdictional issue). Of equally great interest was the second 
question, namely in which way the court would exercise a given 
jurisdiction to grant judicial review (the practical issue). 
(a) The Jurisdictional Issue 
Judicial review extended traditionally only to public authorities, 
i. e. bodies either based on statutory or prerogative power. 126 The 
Panel, however, is a self-regulatory organisation which is neither 
based on statute nor on prerogative authority and, thus, prima facie a 
private body. Nevertheless, various reasons led Lord Donaldson 
M. R. to the conclusion that the Panel, regulating and policing the 
conduct of takeovers and mergers in the financial markets, was 
performing an important public duty and must therefore be subject to 
judicial review like any other public body. The former Master of the 
Rolls argued in particular with the willingness of the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry to limit legislation in the field of 
takeovers and mergers and to use the Panel as the centrepiece of 
his regulation of that market. 127 Thus, the innovative Datafin 
decision made for the first time clear that the essential distinction 
125 Ibid, at p. 842; Aldous/Alder, Applications for Judicial Review, p. 7-30. 
126 R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint 
Committee (1920) Ltd., [1924] 1 K. B. 171,205; Forsyth, The Scope of 
Judicial Review, [1987] P. L. 356,361. 
127 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 
815,838. 
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between a private and a public law body lies not exclusively in its 
source of power, but also in the nature of the power exercised. If the 
body in question is performing a public duty, then that may be 
sufficient to bring the body within reach of judicial review. 128 
(b) The Practical Issue 
Because of the Panel's unique character and the special nature 
of the financial markets on the one hand and the discretionary nature 
of judicial review on the other hand, it had to be decided in which 
way the judicial discretion would be exercised to interfere with the 
Panel's decisions. Broadly speaking, a much wider and far less 
interventionist approach has been applied than in the case of 
"normal" statutory public bodies. In Data fin the Court of Appeal held 
that during the course of a bid intervention by the courts would be 
rare. The Court of Appeal stated that the relationship between the 
courts and the Panel would be "historic rather than 
contemporaneous". 129 The court would allow the "contemporay 
decisions to take their course, considering the complaint and 
intervening, if at all, later in retrospect by declaratory orders which 
would enable the Panel not to repeat any error and would relieve 
individuals of the disciplinary consequences of any erroneous finding 
of breach of the rules". 130 Moreover, an application for judicial review 
would not lead to a suspension of the Panel's decision as is often 
the case with statutory public bodies. It is to be treated as valid and 
binding until and unless it is set aside. The Court of Appeal also 
stressed that the Panel should be given "considerable latitude" in 
interpreting the Code. 131 Lord Donaldson M. R. concluded that the 
128 Ibid, at p. 847. 
129 Ibid, at p. 842. 
130 l bid, at p. 838. 
131 Ibid, at p. 841. 
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only event in which he could imagine the use of the remedies of 
certiorari and mandamus would be a breach of the rules of natural 
justice. The Court of Appeal justified this restrictive approach mainly 
with the "special nature of the Panel, its functions, the market in 
which it is operating, the time scales which are inherent in that 
market and the need to safeguard the position of third parties". A 
further justification was to prevent an appeal to the court from being 
used as a defensive ploy to thwart or impede a bid. 1 32 
As a view across the Atlantic demonstrates, 133 the excessive 
use of tactical litigation has in the long term harmful consequences 
for most parties involved. 134 It has therefore been wise to limit the 
susceptibility of the Panel's decisions to judicial review. However, 
one is forced to ask whether the now established balance between 
the smooth functioning of the takeover process on the one hand and 
the rights of a possibly gravely aggrieved party by an erroneous 
Panel decision on the other hand is not severely biased towards the 
interests of the Panel. Since the decisions of the Panel are 
practically unchallengeable during the course of a bid, a wrongly 
aggrieved party has to have recourse to a mere declaratory order 
after the takeover process has ended. But a declaratory order, which 
after all is mainly designed to prevent the Panel from future errors, is 
surely of relatively little use to any aggrieved party after the takeover 
has ended. The fact that an appeal against the Panel Executive can 
be made to the full Panel and the Panel's Appeal Commiee may be 
some form of compensation for the de facto non-availability of 
judicial review during a bid. However, as the examination of this 
issue, 135 in particular Table 9 at page 41, has demonstrated, an 
appeal to the full Panel or the Appeal Committee has very little 
chance of success indeed. Moreover, neither the full Panel nor the 
132 l bid, at p. 840. 
133 Solomon/Schwartz/Baumann, Corporations, p. 1031,1143. 
134 Lord Alexander of Weedon, Takeovers: The Regulatory Scene, [1990] 
J. B. L. 203,214. 
135 See Chapter 3.1.2. (2) at page 41. 
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Appeal Committee can be likened to an independent court. Both 
Panel procedures are ultimately internal procedures with the Panel 
as judge in its own cause. It is rather indicative that Lord Alexander 
of Weedon Q. C. argued in his former capacity as Councel for the 
Panel in the Data fin case fiercely against the allegedly disastrous 
consequences of the Panel being susceptible to judicial review, 
whereas he was having nothing but praise for that very decision - 
which after all had turned against him - in his later function as 
chairman of the Panel. 136 It would very much seem that although he 
formally lost the case he eventually won it in substance as the 
Datafin decision while formally allowing judicial review restricted it in 
practical terms to an almost useless right. In this context, it is 
needless to say that no application for judicial review against the 
Panel has ever been successful, 137 and under the circumstances 
described above it is difficult to believe that an intervention by a court 
by way of orders of certiorari or mandamus against the Panel will 
ever take place during the course of a bid. However excellent the 
Panel's work generally may be, in consideration of the enormous 
power it enjoys and the negligible role played in practice by the 
Panel's Appeal Committee, 138 the control exercised by the courts 
seems rather inadequate. 
136 Lord Alexander of Weedon, Judicial Review and City Regulators, (1989) 
52 MLR 640,644,648; and Takeovers: The Regulatory Scene, [1990] 
J. B. L. 203,214. 
137 See R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] 
QB 815; R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Plc. 
[1989] 1 All ER 509; R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte 
Fayed and others, [1992] BCLC 938. 
138 See Table 9 at page 41. 
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3.1.3. The Rules Governing Substantial 
Acquisitions 
The Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares (SARs) 
are the second major set of rules which is administered by the Panel. 
They first came into force in 1981, then published by the Council for 
the Securities Industry (CSI). 139 As the CSI wound itself up in 1985 
in order to make room for the new regulatory system which was due 
to be established by the Financial Services Act 1986, the Panel 
became responsible for the SARs. The SARs contain five Rules 
each followed by a number of Notes. They are administered and 
enforced140 in the same way as the City Code and publicised 
together with it. 141 
The SARs are designed to restrict so called "dawn raids", i. e. the 
rapid acquisition of a substantial strategic stake in a target company 
listed on the Stock Exchange within a matter of minutes. 142 
Unrestricted dawn raids are considered undesirable. Because of the 
speed in which they are carried out, only institutional shareholders 
get the chance to sell at the increased dawn raid-price whereas 
small investors are left out in the cold. In case of a dawn raid, the 
City Code does not apply unless the acquisition results in the 
139 As to history see Palmer's Company Law, para 12.345. 
140 An interesting example for a clear breach of Rule 1 of the SARs is the 
case of Bowater. Bowater bought on January 11,1989 0.6 per cent in 
Norton Opax shares in the market and a further 23.6 per cent later on the 
same day from Bishopsgate Investment Trust. In fear of a full takeover by 
Bowater, Norton Opax complained to the Panel and argued that Bowater 
should be required to reduce its shareholding to below 15 per cent to 
remedy the breach of Rule 1. The Panel, however, ruled that under the 
special circumstances of the case it was sufficient for Bowater to dispose 
of the 0.6 of Norton Opax shares bought in breach of the SARs. See 
Panel Statement on February 2,1989, [1989] J. B. L. 148. 
A further example of a breach of Rule 1 and 3 of the SARs is the case of 
Timpson plc with Henry Cooke as their advisers; see Panel Statement on 
Timpson plc/Automagic Holdings plc, May 8,1990, [1991] J. B. L. 65. 
141 See 3.1.2. (3). 
142 Begg, Corporate Acquisitions, para 9.88; Palmer's Company Law, 
para 12.346; Weinberg/Blank, Takeovers, para 3-901 et seq. 
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acquirer holding 30 per cent or more of the voting rights in the target 
company, in which case Rule 9 of the City Code triggers a 
mandatory bid to all shareholders. Following a particularly aggressive 
dawn raid for Consolidated Goldfields Ltd shares143 in February 
1980, the SARs were set up to secure fair and equal treatment of all 
shareholders in the areas where the Code is not applicable-144 The 
effect of the SARs is basically twofold: 
First, they slow down the speed with which a person is able to 
increase his holding of shares to an aggregate of between 15 and 30 
per cent. 145 Under Rule 1 of the SARs a person may not acquire 
within any period of seven days 10 per cent or more of the voting 
rights of a company if that takes his stake to an aggregate of 
between 15 and 30 per cent. Below 15 per cent dawn raids remain 
unrestricted and from 30 per cent on the City Code takes over as 
stated above. According to Rule 2 of the SARs the restrictions in 
Rule 1 do not apply where the acquisition is made from a single 
shareholder or where it is pursuant to a tender offer. 146 Moreover, 
the SARs are inapplicable immediately before a person announces a 
firm intention to make an offer and they remain inapplicable until the 
offer has become unconditional as to acceptances, or lapses or is 
withdrawn. 147 
The second effect of the SARs is to promote accelerated 
disclosure of acquisitions in order to prevent the building of 
143 On February 11 Gold Field shares stood at 525p. When trading started 
the following morning the price was quoted 615/617p and by 10.00 am 
brokers acting for Angelo/De Beers had purchased 16.5 million shares at 
616p. Purchases ceased and the price fell back to 510p. See Morse, 
Panel Report for the year ended March 31,1980, [1980] J. B. L. 359. 
144 WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-902. 
145 WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-903. 
146 As to tender offers see Rule 4 of the SARs. A tender offer is a firm offer to 
buy a specified number of shares for cash only. Other than a partial bid 
under the City Code, a tender offer is published by paid advertisement in 
two national newspapers and no offer documents are sent to the 
shareholders. See Palmer's Company Law, para 12.349; 
WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-906 et seq. 
147 See SARs, Introduction, para 2. 
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substantial stakes by stealth. 148 Under Rule 3 of the SARs the 
acquirer must notify his acquisition and holding in aggregate to the 
target company and the Stock Exchange, which in turn will notify the 
Panel, by 12 noon on the following business day if his acquisition 
results in him holding 15 per cent or more of the voting rights or if his 
holding increases by a whole percentage point over 15 per cent. 
However, there is a considerable overlap with the disclosure 
requirements of the Companies Act 1985 under which disclosure is 
required when a person holds 3 per cent of the voting shares in a 
company together with any significant change in his holding above 
the 3 per cent threshold. 149 The justification for the disclosure 
requirements in the SARs lies therefore mainly in the fact the 
Companies Act 1985 allows 2 days for notification whereas 
notification under the SARs must be made before 12 noon on the 
following business day. 150 
3.1.4. The Rules of the Stock Exchange 
Another important source of rules governing certain aspects of 
takeovers are the regulations of the Stock Exchange. The Stock 
Exchange is the "competent authority"151 responsible for the conduct 
of the U. K. securities market. The most important securities market 
segment is the listed market which is a market in shares admitted to 
the "Official List" of the Stock Exchange. 152 The relevant rule book 
148 WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-909. 
149 Section 199 (2) CA 1985. 
150 Section 202 (1) CA 1985; see also WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3- 
905. 
151 Section 142 (6) FSA 1986. 
152 The second market segment, the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), is 
designed to allow smaller companies to raise capital without the 
formalities and expenses of a full listing. The USM is regulated by the 
Stock Exchange's "Green Book", the latest edition of which entered into 
force on 30 June 1994. However, since the USM is going to be phased 
out in 1996 and replaced by the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), 
which opened in June 1995, the following paras will only deal with the 
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governing the listed market is the so called "Yellow Book" of the 
Stock Exchange. 153 
Historically, the nature of the Yellow Book had been entirely self- 
regulatory. Yet, this has changed under the influence of European 
legislation. 154 In order to implement three EC-Directives, the 
government pronounced in May 1984 via Statutory Instrument the 
"Stock Exchange Regulations"155 which in turn were incorporated in 
a revised edition of the Yellow Book by the Stock Exchange in 
November 1984. Hence, from that time on, the Yellow Book- 
requirements are partly based on statutory provisions and partly 
reflect the Stock Exchange's own rules. 156 The Stock Exchange 
Regulations 1984 were replaced by Part IV of the Financial Services 
Act 1986 and accordingly a new edition of the Yellow Book was 
issued by the Stock Exchange in 1987. 
In December 1993 an entirely remodelled version of the Yellow 
Book157 came into force158 which is mainly designed to make the 
Yellow Book more user-friendly and to incorporate practices and 
interpretations which had become established over the years. 159 It is 
divided into 25 chapters preceded by an introduction and 
supplemented by 11 schedules. Broadly speaking, the Yellow Book 
Yellow Book. References to the Green Book are made in footnotes. As to 
the USM and AIM see for further references Chapter 3, footnote 4. 
153 Until the new 1993 edition the Yellow Book was formally entitled 
"Admission of Securities to Listing Rules". 
154 Broadly speaking, the following Directives are disigned to harmonise the 
conditions on which companies may be floated and regulated on Stock 
Exchanges within the EU. For details see Palmer's Company Law, 
para 5.403. 
Admissions Directive, No. 79/279/EEC; 
Listing Particulars Directive, No. 80/390/EEC; 
Interim Reports Directive, No. 82/121/EEC. 
155 S. I. 1984 No. 716. 
156 Begg, Corporate Acquisitions, para 9.15; WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, 
para 3-524. 
157 Now formally called "The Listing Rules of the Stock Exchange". 
158 Updated by Amendment No. 1 which took effect on March 10,1994. 
Reproduced in Palmer's Company Law, 25th edition, Vol. 2, Part C. 
159 Begg, Corporate Acquisitions, para 9.15. 
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aims to secure the confidence of investors in the conduct of the 
market. 160 
In a takeover, the Yellow Book may become relevant in two 
ways: First, where the issue of new shares for which listing is sought 
is used by the offeror as consideration for the acquisition. Secondly, 
the Yellow Book imposes certain "continuing obligations" on the 
companies which have obtained a full listing on the Stock Exchange. 
These continuing obligations also contain a number of provisions 
relevant in a takeover. 
(1) Listing Particulars 
Based on Part IV of the Financial Services Act 1986 large parts 
of the Yellow Book are concerned with the requirements to be 
observed when new shares are issued either by new applicants or by 
companies whose shares are already listed. 161 Frequently, a 
takeover offer contains as consideration for the acquisition a share- 
option which involves the issue of new shares for which listing is 
sought. 162 Consequently, listing particulars are required163 unless 
the new shares would increase the shares of a class already listed 
by less than 10 per cent. 164 
160 See Yellow Book, Introduction; WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-524; 
Palmer's Company Law, para 5.408. 
161 Offers to the public where listing is not sought are governed by The Public 
Offers of Securities Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/1537). 
162 See Weinberg/Blank, Takeovers, para 2-051 et seq. Pre-emtion rights do 
not apply to an issue of equity shares for a non-cash consideration, 
section 89 (4) CA 1985. 
163 Concerning listing particulars in a takeover see expressly paras 10.46 and 
10.47 of the Yellow Book. As to listing particulars in general see chapter 5 
and 6 of the Yellow Book. 
164 Para 5.27 (e) of the Yellow Book. 
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The precise and detailed information required by the listing 
particulars is set out in chapter 6 of the Yellow Book165 and contains 
basically information about the persons responsible for the listing 
particulars166, the shares for which listing is sought167, the issuer 
and its capital168, the group's activities169, the issuer's assets and 
liabilities, its financial position and profits and losses170, the 
management171, and the recent development and prospects of the 
group. 172 
(2) Continuing Obligations 
All listed companies are subject to "continuing obligations" 
imposed by chapter 9 and the following seven chapters of the Yellow 
Book. Of great importance to a listed bidder are chapters 10 and 11 
entitled "Transactions" and "Transactions with Related Parties" 
respectively. 173 Transactions, i. e. acquisitions and disposals, carried 
out by listed companies are classified into 6 different categories: 
Super Class 1174, Class 1175, Class 2176, Class 3177, Reverse 
Takeovers178, and Transactions with Related Persons179. Apart 
from transactions with related persons, the categories are, broadly 
165 The requirements concerning the prospectus imposed by the Green Book 
are compared to those of the Yellow Book considerably less demanding. 
See Begg, Corporate Acquisitions, para 9.56. 
166 Chapter 6A of the Yellow Book. 
167 Chapter 6B of the Yellow Book. 
168 Chapter 6C of the Yellow Book. 
169 Chapter 6D of the Yellow Book. 
170 Chapter 6E of the Yellow Book. 
171 Chapter 6F of the Yellow Book. 
172 Chapter 6G of the Yellow Book. 
173 Begg, Corporate Acquisitions, para 9.19; Weinberg/Blank, Takeovers, 
para 3-527. 
174 Para 10.37 of the Yellow Book. 
175 Para 10.35 of the Yellow Book. 
176 Para 10.31 of the Yellow Book. 
177 Para 10.29 of the Yellow Book. 
178 Para 10.39 of the Yellow Book. 
179 Para 11.1 et seq. of the Yellow Book. 
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speaking, defined in terms of size of the transaction relative to the 
size of the company. According to the category to which a 
transaction belongs, different requirements are set out concerning 
circulars and shareholder approval. 180 The larger the transaction in 
relation to the company, the more demanding are the obligations 
imposed by the Yellow Book. 181 
Yet, an accurate description of the elaborate and complex 
method by which the size of a transaction is assessed and the 
details of the different requirements would be beyond the scope of 
this work. 
3.1.5. Legal Provisions in the Companies Act 
1985 
Although Part XIIIA of the Companies Act 1985 is somewhat 
promisingly entitled "Takeover offers", the Act regulates only few 
confined, but nevertheless noteworthy aspects of a bid. 
(1) Compensation for Loss of Office 
Compensation for loss of office182 may under section 314 of the 
Companies Act 1985 be paid to a director who has lost his office in 
connection with a takeover only if the particulars of the payment are 
180 For details see the very clear description in chapters 10 and 11 of the 
Yellow Book. Also Begg, Corporate Acquisitions, para 9.19 et seq. and 
WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-527 et seq. 
181 The Green Book works in principle in a similar way, but lessens the 
requirements considerably. See Begg, Corporate Acquisitions, para 9.56. 
182 As stated in section 316 (3) CA 1985 compensation for loss of office does 
not include the payment of damages for breach of his employment 
contract or as consideration for his retirement from office. Generally, any 
payment to which the company is legally obliged can not be considered as 
compensation for loss of office. 
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disclosed to the shareholders and approved by them in general 
meeting. Any sum received by a director in contravention of that 
provision is deemed to have been received by him in trust for the 
former shareholders who have sold their shares as a result of the 
offer: section 315 of the Companies Act 1985.183 
It is clear from the wording of section 314 that it does not apply if 
the receiving director of the target company remains in office. This 
seems somewhat unfortunate since in such a way undisclosed 
payments could theoretically be used by the offeror company to gain 
undue influence upon the target board directors, e. g. to induce them 
to recommend favourably the offer to the shareholders. 184 However, 
any such arrangement would clearly infringe the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers. 1 85 Furthermore, as a secret profit would 
have been made by this director, the question of a breach of the 
director's fiduciary duties towards the target company would 
arise. 1 86 Contrary to section 315 of the Companies Act 1985, and 
this constitutes an important difference, the beneficiary of any action 
brought against the defective director would be the company, and 
not the former shareholders. 
(2) Compulsory Transactions 
Since the Companies Act 1929187 the right of an offeror 
company to buy out dissenting minority shareholders after a 
183 Palmer's Company Law, para 12-201. 
184 Concerning the duties which the target board directors owe to the 
shareholders in relation to advice in a takeover battle see Gething v. 
Kilner [1972] 1 All ER 1166. 
185 General Principal 5 which requires that any information given to the 
shareholders by either the offeror or the offeree board must "be prepared 
with the highest standards of care and accuracy. " 
186 As to a director's duty not to make a secret profit see Regal (Hastings) 
Ltd. v. Gulliver [1967] 2 A. C. 134. 
187 Section 155 of the CA 1929. As to history see WeinbergBlank, 
Takeovers, para 3-872. 
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successful takeover compulsorily when 90 per cent or more of the 
shareholders to which the offer has been made have accepted the 
offer has been a feature of English company law. The offeror's right 
to buy out dissenting shareholders compulsorily was later 
complemented by the minorty shareholders' right to be bought out 
once the acquirer has reached the 90 per cent threshold. The 
relevant provisions are now set out in detail in Part XIIIA of the 
Companies Act 1985: sections 428 to 430F. 188 
The terms on which the offeror is entitled or compelled, as the 
case may be, to buy the minority shares are as a general rule exactly 
the terms of the previous offer. 189 However, both parties may apply 
to the court which has discretion to decide upon the matter. Where 
the offeror is trying to buy out a minority shareholder compulsorily, 
the court may, on application of the respective shareholder, order 
that the offeror is not entitled to buy the shares compulsorily or 
specify the terms of the compulsory acquisition different from that of 
the offer. 190 Where a minority shareholder wishes to be bought out 
by the offeror the court may, on application of either party, order that 
the terms of the forced acquisition shall be such as the court thinks 
fit. 191 However, bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of 
shareholders have accepted the offer which can usually be seen as 
a clear indication of the fairness of the offer, the courts will generally 
be reluctant to interfere. 192 
In terms of policy, the discussed provisions, which are mainly 
designed to tidy up the aftermath of a successful bid, seem 
188 A procedure which bears some resemblence to these provisions is 
contained in sec. 320 of the German Stock Corporations Act (AktG). The 
majority required for such a "Eingliederung" is 95 per cent. As a result of 
the Eingliederung the parent company may give directions to the 
management board of the subsidiary, sec. 323,309 AktG. 
189 Sections 429 (2) and 430B (2) CA 1985. 
190 Section 430C (1) CA 1985. 
191 Section 430C (3) CA 1985. 
192 Re Carlton Holdings [1971] 2 All ER 1082. An illustrative example for the 
Court of Appeal preventing an compulsory acquisition because of 
improper use of this right is Re Bugle Press Ltd. [1960] 3 All ER 791. See 
also Palmer's Company Law, para 12.213. 
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ambivalent. On the one hand, what in effect takes place is an 
expropriation of private property for the sake of the business 
interests of another private person or company. On the other hand, 
every purchase of shares in the U. K. is from the outset on made 
under the conditions imposed by law amongst which are the 
respective provisions of the Companies Act 1985. From the target 
shareholder's point of view, the knowledge of the right to be bought 
out on the offer conditions prevents him from being forced to accept 
the offer for fear of getting a less favourable treatment than an 
approving shareholders 93 or being locked in. 1 94 Moreover, the 
procedure of compulsory acquisition provides for the offeror to get 
hold of the shares of holders who are untraceable which is an 
important practical aspect. 1 95 
3.2. Structural Barriers 
The high incidence of public takeover bids in the U. K. suggests 
that not many structural barriers exist. Numerous most spectacular 
bids could be witnessed during the time of writing this thesis of which 
only a few can be mentioned here: In September 1994 British 
Aerospace launched an agreed £480 million bid for the submarine 
maker VSEL which was rivalled in October 1994 by a competing 
£532 million offer from GEC. 196 Trafalgar House made a £1.2 billion 
offer for Northern Electric, a recently privatised utility, in December 
1994 which was immediately fiercely rejected by the offeree 
board. 197 In January 1995, Glaxo Holdings, the world's largest drugs 
193 Re Carlton Holdings [1971] 2 All ER 1082. 
194 WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-873, footnote 7. 
195 Section 430 (11) CA 1985 under which the consideration for these shares 
is ultimately paid into court. See also Palmer's Company Law, 
para 12.212: If the offeror does not reach the 90 per cent threshold 
because of untraceable shareholders, he may apply to the court. 
196 Financial Times, November 19,1994. 
197 Times, December 20,1994. 
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company, launched a hostile £8.9 billion bid for its rival Wellcome. 198 
A number of bids were made in the electricity sector. The Southern 
Company, a huge American utility company, launched a £1 billion 
hostile offer for South Western Electricity, another of the recently 
privatised utilities, 199 in July 1995 prompting an outcry in parts of the 
British press. 200 Hanson offered £2.5 billion for Eastern Group, 201 
and Scottish Power launched a £1 billion hostile bid for Manweb. 202 
Neither of these rather controversial electricity bids were referred to 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission for an in-depth 
investigation. 203 In April 1996, however, Ian Lang, the trade and 
industry secretary blocked, however, the bid by National Power for 
Southern Electricity and Powergen "s offer for Midlands Electricity 
(against the advice of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and 
his own officials). 204 In January 1996 Granada finally triumphed in a 
bitter £3.9 billion fight for Forte. 205 To end this list which could be 
substantially extended, in April 1996 Rentokil claimed victory in the 
hostile £2.2 billion takeover of BET. 206 
198 Times, January 1,1995. Taking into account the share options the offer 
amounts to £9.4 billion. See Times, January 27,1995. 
199 Times, July 11 and July 15,1995. 
200 See, for example, the Daily Mirror, 26 August 1995, at p. 6: "The takeover 
of South Wester Electricity is outrageous. ... Why do people of the very English counties of Devon, Cornwall and Somerset need to have their 
electriciy provided by a US firm? They don't, of course. But this is only the 
first step in a foreign takeover of the nation's vital public utilities. The 
French are already after our water. Other foreign firms will soon pitch in to 
get their hands on huge profits of the electricity and water monopolies. 
When these industries were privatised, the Tories claimed it would put 
power into the hands of customers. Instead it is leading to control being 
handed to faceless bosses thousands of miles away. ... 
The Monopolies 
Commission could stop this takeover and it should. That would 
demonstrate to foreign predators that there are not easy pickings in our 
privatised utilities. " 
201 Times, 31 July 1995. 
202 Times, 25 July 1995; 1 September 1995. 
203 Times, 1 September 1995: "Electricity bids win surprise go-ahead'. 
204 Financial Times, 16 May 1996: "Minister's decisions on bids baffle power 
industry. " 
205 Financial Times, 19 January 1996,24 January 1996. 
206 Financial Times, 27/28 April 1996. Mr Luther John Clark, the sacked 
executive of BET, is currently claiming £4 million in compensation for 
unfair dismissal in court, see Financial Times, 14 October 1996. 
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Nevertheless, in terms of structural takeover barriers the 
requirement of a mandatory offer and the provisions designed to 
prevent dawn raids seem worth mentioning. 
3.2.1. Requirement of a Mandatory Bid 
To identify Rule 9 of the City Code, which requires an offer to be 
made to all shareholders of the target company once the 30 per cent 
threshold is passed, 207 as a structural barrier to takeovers may 
perhaps be surprising from the British point of view. However, Rule 9 
imposes a restriction on the freedom to acquire shares and it can not 
be denied that its economic effect is to make the acquisition of 
control as defined by the City Code208 more expensive. Rule 9 might 
be favourable for large companies who can afford making a 100 per 
cent offer; it is a disadvantage for smaller less potent companies. 
Less expensive partial offers intended to result in the offeror holding 
less than 100 per cent are not permitted in Britain except with the 
consent of the Panel; and even if the Panel's permission can be 
obtained further requirements are to be met. 209 
In Germany, the mandatory offer rule is despite recent changes 
in connection the new voluntary German Takeover Code 1995210 
widely seen as an inappropriate restriction on the freedom to acquire 
shares. 211 Although the German Stock Corporations Act 1965 
207 See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(a) at pp. 32. The Trade and Industry Committee 
Report on Takeovers and Mergers, 1991, para 150 has even 
recommended to Lower the mandatory bid threshold to 20 per cent. 
208 The City Code (Definitions) defines the term control as follows: "Control 
means a holding, or aggregate holdings, of shares carrying 30 per cent or 
more of the voting rights (as defined below) of a company irrespective of 
whether the holding or holdings gives de facto control. " 
209 Rule 36.1 City Code. Also Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, 
pp. 723. 
210 See in more detail Chapter 4.1.1. (4) at pp. 116. 
211 Grunewald, Der geänderte Vorschlag einer 13. EG-Richtlinie, WM 1991, 
1361,1362; Hommelhoff/Kleindiek, Takeover Richtlinie, AG 1990,106, 
109; Mertens, Förderung von, Schutz vor, Zwang zu 
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requires the management of a company to treat its own shareholders 
equally, 212 there is no legally binding rule defining equality in the 
context of a takeover or providing that a bidder must treat the target 
shareholders equally (however defined). 213 Consequently, the 
German delegation in Brussels has always strongly rejected the 
inclusion of a mandatory bid rule in a future European Takeover 
Directive. 214 Hence, it is save to say that when it comes to acquiring 
shares the view that all shareholders should participate in a premium 
paid for control is not generally shared in Germany. 215 It is standard 
practice for companies to seek effective control of another company 
by simply acquiring a simple majority of shares or a blocking majority 
without having to make an offer and pay a premium for corporate 
control to all shareholders. It is obvious that the present situation in 
Germany is to the detriment of small investors who never ever have 
the chance to participate in premiums. This in turn damages the 
equity market as a whole216 in that small investors are averse to 
Ubernahmeangeboten, AG 1990,252,256. For further details see 
Chapter 5.1.1. (2) at p. 177. 
212 Sec. 53a AktG. This provision is based on Art. 42 of Directive 77/91/EEC 
of 13 December 1976, [1977] O. J. L 26/1, but the principle of equal 
treatment in the company-shareholder relationship had long been 
generally acknowledged as a fundamental company law principle before 
the introduction of sec. 53a AktG. 
213 For a thorough analysis of this issue see Reul, Die Pflicht zur 
Gleichbehandlung der Aktionäre bei privaten Kontrolltransaktionen, 
pp. 250. 
214 See Chapter 5.1.1. (2) at pp 177 and concerning the 1996 proposal for a 
European Takeover Directive Chapter 5.1.2. (3)(b) at pp. 191. 
215 Against a participation in the premiums are, for example, Grunewald, Der 
geänderte Vorschlag einer 13. EG-Richtlinie betreffend 
Übernahmeangebote, WM 1991,1361,1363; Hommelhoff/Kleindiek, 
Takeover-Richtlinie und europäisches Konzernrecht, 1990,106,108; 
Lutter, Die Treuepflicht des Aktionärs, ZHR 153 (1989), 446,462; 
Lüttmann, Kontrollwechsel in Kapitalgesellschaften, 1992, S. 180; 
Mertens, Förderung von, Schutz vor, Zwang zu Übernahmeangeboten, 
AG 1990,252,256; Sandberger, Teilübernahmeangebote und 
Zwangsbernahmeangebot im Europäischen Takeover Recht, 
DZWir 1993,319,323; critical also Baums, Übernahmeregeln in der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, ZIP 1989,1377,1379. 
In favour of a participation are, however, Berger, 
Unternehmensübernahmen in Europa, ZIP 1991,1644,1652; Otto, Die 
Verteilung der Kontrollprämie bei Übernahme von Aktiengesellschaften, 
AG 1994,167; for a very thorough analysis of the issue see Reul, Die 
Pflicht zur Gleichbehandlung der Aktionäre bei privaten 
Kontrolltransaktionen, 1991,300. See also Chapter 5.1.1. (2) at p. 177. 
216 Financial Times, 18 December 1992: German takeover rules criticised. 
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investing in equities, a fact that is clearly reflected in the stock 
market comparison provided in Chapter 2.217 
Considering the somewhat unsatisfactory stock-market situation 
and standard of equality in Germany, 218 is seems that there are at 
least very good reasons justifying a mandatory offer requirement. 
From a British standpoint, it might well be argued that the standard of 
shareholder equality is minor in Germany and it is interesting to note 
that the present German situation is quite similar to the British state 
of affairs before the introduction of the City Code in 1968.219 But 
whatever one's opinion about mandatory offers is, it must be 
acknowledged that this "barrier" does not render a takeover 
impossible, it just makes it more expensive and is therefore quite 
different from barriers existing in other European countries, most 
noteably the Netherlands and Germany. 220 
3.2.2. Restrictions on Stake-Building 
A somewhat minor "barrier" which also has no equivalent in 
German law are the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisition of 
Shares (SARs) which have been discussed earlier221 and whose 
effect mainly is to slow down the speed with which an investor is able 
to increase his holding to an aggregate of between 15 and 30 per 
cent to prevent dawn raids. Again, this "barrier" does not render a bid 
impossible, but simply restricts the bidders freedom to prevent 
abuses. The previously explained purpose of these rules, namely to 
217 See in particular Table 2 at p. 19. 
218 As to the City Code see Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(a) at pp. 32. Regarding the 
German Takeover Code see Chapter 4.1.1. (3)(a) at pp. 112. 
219 As to the pre-Code era see WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-909. 
220 Regarding German barriers see Chapter 4.2. at pp. 132. As to the 
mandatory bid requirement, shareholder equality and the protection of 
minorities under the proposed Takeover Directive see Chapter 5.1.2. (3) at 
pp 188. 
221 See Chapter 3.1.3. at pp. 56. 
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give small investors a chance to participate in premiums paid, 
justifies the restriction. 
3.3. Protective Measures in Advance of a 
Bid 
Before analysing the defensive - or rather protective - measures 
available to directors in advance of a bid it seems appropriate to 
outline briefly the duties of directors involved in creating such 
obstacles and "poison pills". 222 The City Code's non-legal provisions 
banning any defensive action by the target board do not apply in the 
period before a bona fide offer has been communicated or is 
imminent. 223 If a company is not in any actual bid situation, the Code 
is not applicable and the common law duties of directors are to be 
observed together with few statutory provisions. 224 As a company is 
regarded as the property of its shareholders, the directors are under 
a fiduciary duty to act "bona fide in what they consider - not what a 
court may consider - is in the interests of the company, and not for 
any collateral purpose". 225 In Hogg v. Cramphorn it was further 
established that the directors had not only to act in good faith, which 
imposes a subjective test, but also for a proper purpose, i. e. a 
purpose for which the power exercised was - objectively - conferred 
on them. 226 However, since many of the protective measures and 
transactions discussed in this chapter may well be entered into for 
proper purposes in the ordinary course of business it will in practice 
222 For a thorough analysis of these issues see Parkinson, Corporate Power 
and Responisbility, p. 140 et seq. 
223 General Principal 7 and Rule 21 of the Code. See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(d) at 
p. 35. 
224 See, for example, section 309 CA 1985 (Directors to have regard to 
interests of employees). 
225 Per Lord Greene M. R. in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942) Ch. 304 at 
p. 306. 
226 Hogg v. Cramphorn [1967] Ch. 254. 
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often be extremely difficult to prove that the directors did not act 
bona fide for a proper purpose, especially if they act well in advance 
of any actual bid. 227 The topics discussed below only represent the 
issues which the author considered most relevant and are not all- 
embracing. 
3.3.1. Unequal Voting Rights 
Compared to the regulation in the German Stock Corporation 
Act, English company law is more liberal concerning weighted voting 
rights as the following analysis shows. 228 A voting structure different 
from "one share - one vote" leads to some shareholders having an 
influence on the company which is disproportionate to their 
investment. Special voting powers attached to a certain class of 
shares held by a special group of shareholders, e. g. the directors of 
the company, a certain family or the government in form of a "golden 
share" in a privatised company, 229 may well be used to make a 
company bid-proof. 
In Bushell v. Faith, 230 the articles stipulated that on a resolution 
to remove a director, that director should carry three votes per share, 
which in that case rendered it impossible for the remaining 
shareholders to remove Mr Faith as a director. At first instance, an 
227 Prentice, Regulation of Takeover bids, p. 157; WeinbergBlank, 
Takeovers, para 3-786. 
228 See on the one hand Reg. 2 Table A of the CA 1985: "Subject to the 
provisions of the Act and without prejudice to any rights attached to any 
existing shares, any share may be issued with such rights or restrictions 
as the company may by ordinary resolution determine. " and section 12 of 
the German Stock Corporation Act on the other hand in APPENDIX 2. As 
to the relatively popular voting restrictions in Germany see Chapter 4.3.1. 
at p. 157. 
229 For a recent example in which the U. K. government threatened to use its 
"golden shares" in two electricity companies, National Power and 
PowerGen, in connection with a bid by a U. S. company, Southern, see 
Financial Times, 3 May 1996: U. K. to block bids for generators with 
'golden share'. See also Dine, EC Company Law, para 15.9. 
230 [1969] 1 All ER 1003. 
Chapter 3 72 
injunction was granted on the basis that such a provision infringed 
the right to remove a director by ordinary resolution. 231 However, the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords took a different view232 and 
the provision in the articles was upheld which made Mr Faith "s 
position as director unimpeachable. 
Another case illustrating some aspects of the problem is Re 
Savoy Hotel Ltd. 233 After the battle for control of that company had 
been resolved a class of equity capital was created which 
represented less than 3 per cent of the entire capital, but had the 
power to outvote all other shareholders representing 97 per cent of 
the capital. 
In Germany, after rather dreadful experiences with weighted 
voting rights in the 1920s where it occured that special shares 
outvoted ordinary shares more than ten thousand times, section 
12 (2) of the Stock Corporation Act 1965 was introduced which 
stipulates that multiple voting rights attached to a share are not 
permitted except with consent of the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 
the Bundesland where the company has its corporate seat. 234 The 
ministerial permission may only be granted if weighted voting rights 
are necessary to safeguard the overall economic interest of the 
public, especially where sensitive industrial sectors such as the 
defence or power industry are concerned. 235 Very few ministerial 
permissions have been granted so far, 236 and many academics are 
231 See now section 303 Companies Act 1985; then section 184 of the 
Companies Act 1948. 
232 As to criticism of this decision see Palmer's Company Law, para 8.033. 
233 [1981] Ch. 351. 
234 Moreover, a majority of 75 per cent is required to introduce weighted 
voting rights, section 179 (2) AktG. As far as the popular restriction of 
voting rights in Germany is concerned see 4.3.1. at p. 157. 
235 As to further references see ZollneNNoack, One share - one vote? AG 1991,117,130. In Britain the Industry Act 1975 empowers the 
government to bloc changes of control in important manufacturing 
undertakings if non-U. K. residents are involved. 
236 19 permissions until 1989. 
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rightly of the opinion that weighted voting rights should be abolished 
entirely in Germany. 237 
Although English company law permits multiple voting rights 
which might constitute a serious barrier to takeovers of non-listed 
companies, only very few listed companies do have weighted - or in 
fact otherwise unequal - voting rights. 238 The Stock Exchange 
discourages such practices, though they are not formally prohibited 
by the Yellow Book and there exists no strict "one share - one vote" 
rule. 239 Moreover, institutional investors exercise additional pressure 
against any form of weighted or restricted voting rights since this 
would reduce the institutions' influence. 240 As far as listed 
companies are concerned, weighted voting rights do therefore not 
constitute a serious practical barrier to takeovers in Britain. 
On the European level, Article 33 of the proposed Fifth Directive 
would - if passed - prohibit weighted voting rights in public limited 
companies. 241 
237 See references in Zöllner/Noack, One share - one vote? AG 1991,117, 
129 who themselfes want to maintain the present regulation to protect 
German industry aginst harmful investors. 
238 The only exception are not voting preference shares which, however, do 
not constitute a particular barrier to takeovers. To the disadvantages of 
perference shares see Weinberg/Blank, Takeovers, para 3-800 et seq. 
239 Prentice, Regulation of Takeover bids, p. 152; Boyle, Barriers to 
Contested Takeovers in the EC, Company Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 9, p. 163, 
164 (1991). 
240 Weinberg/Blank, Takeovers, para 3-805. 
241 As to the proposed 5th Directive see Chapter 5.2. at pp. 198. Article 33 of 
the proposal states: "(1) The shareholder's right to vote shall be 
proportionate to the fraction of the subscribed capital which the shares 
represent. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the laws of the Member States may 
authorise the memorandum and the articles of association to allow 
restriction or exclusion of the right to vote in respect of shares which carry 
special pecuniary advantages. Such shares may not be issued for an 
amount exceeding 50 % of the subscribed capital. Where the company 
has not fulfilled the obligations arising in respect of such shares for a 
period which may not exceed three consecutive accounting years, the 
holders of those shares shall acquire voting rights in proportion to the 
fraction of the subscribed capital which those shares represent, and the 
voting rights thus acquired shall be equivalent to those of th other 
shareholders. " 
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3.3.2. Proxy Voting 
According to section 372 (1) of the Companies Act 1985 every 
shareholder is entitled to appoint a person, his proxy, to vote for him 
at a general meeting. 242 Proxy voting is a common feature in 
corporate practice in Britain. 243 In most cases, directors are 
appointed as proxies. Having in mind that English company law 
allows directors to solicit proxies at the expense of the company on 
behalf of their policies, this is not surprising. 244 It should also be 
borne in mind that the directors often hold substantial stakes in the 
company in their own right. Proxy votes in addition to own shares 
held by the directors can, of course, not only affect the balance of 
power between ownership and control in a company in favour of the 
directors, but also hamper a bid launched by an unwelcome bidder in 
a number of ways. Since directors are only entitled to take (massive) 
defensive action if the shareholders' approval is obtained, 245 the 
directors could use their proxy-votes in order to empower themselves 
to take defensive measures against the bidder. Bearing in mind that 
in a takeover situation the entrenched management is usually 
threatened with losing their jobs it is obvious that a conflict of interest 
may arise. 
Yet, this account may sound worse than the practical situation is. 
Since the shareholders are known by name in Britain246 the offeror 
can, for example, approach the shareholders directly and acquire 
242 Reg. 59 Table A: "On a poll votes may be given either personally or by 
proxy. " Reg. 60 and 61 Table A set out sample forms for an intrument 
appointing a proxy. 
243 Dine, European Company Law, para 15.18; Boyle, Barriers to Contested 
Takeovers in the EC, Company Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 9, p. 163,165 
(1991). 
244 Peel v. London and North Western Railway Co [1907] 1 Ch 5. See also 
Dine, European Company Law, para 15.17. 
245 General Principle 7 and Rule 21 of the City Code. 
246 Section 352 of the Companies Act 1985 requires a company to maintain a 
register of members in which the name, adress and the number of shares 
held by the shareholder must be stated. 
Chapter 3 75 
proxies for itself. 247 Futhermore, a large number of the shares in a 
listed company is normally held by institutional investors248 who do 
not normally appoint proxies and whose paramount interest usually 
is to generate maximum profits and not to support any particular 
management. 
Nevertheless, restrictions on the use of proxies are contained in 
the proposed Fifth Directive. 249 Most importantly, Article 28 provides 
that in principle the appointment of a proxy shall be for one meeting 
only (unless a second meeting has the same agenda) and requires, 
inter alia, the proxy holder to request instructions from the 
shareholder concerning the exercise of his voting rights. 
The problem of proxy voting has a different dimension in 
Germany where bearer shares are used and banks250 are appointed 
as proxies. The role of the banks in Germany will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4.2.3.251 
3.3.3. Cross Shareholdings 
Cross shareholdings - both nationally and internationally - are a 
feature of any modern economy. 252 Most of these stakes are held 
for genuine investment reasons. However, mutually supportive 
holdings can also be used by the incumbent directors of two or more 
companies acting together to increase their influence and make their 
247 Prentice, Regulation of Takeover bids, p. 152. 
248 Institutional shareholders control about two-thirds of U. K. equities 
according to the Trade and Industry Committee Report on Takeovers and 
Mergers, 1991, para 210. 
249 See in detail Chapter 5.2.3. at pp. 201. 
250 It is also common for British banks and investment funds to hold their 
clients" shares in named accounts and vote those shares. See Boyle, 
Barriers to Contested Takeovers in the EC, Company Lawyer, Vol. 12, 
No. 9, p. 163,165 (1991). 
251 See Chapter 4.2.3. at pp. 143. 
252 Boyle, Barriers to Contested Takeovers in the EC, Company Lawyer, 
Vol. 12, No. 9, p. 163,165 (1991); Dine, EC Company Law, para 15.20. 
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companies - and their own jobs - immune against takeover bids and, 
thus, affect the balance of power between management and 
shareholder control. 253 Furthermore, from an economic point of 
view, any cross holding amounts ultimately to holding a stake in the 
own company which runs counter to the concept of capital 
maintenance and, hence, puts creditors potentially at risk. 254 
Although the harmful effect of cross shareholdings is clearly 
visible, only few rules exist in English law to deal with this problem. 
The only provision that deals directly with the question is 
section 23 (1) of the Companies Act 1985 which prohibits a 
subsidiary from holding shares in its holding company, the latter 
being defined as a company which holds the majority, i. e. more than 
50 per cent, of the voting rights of the other company. 255 To a limited 
extent cross shareholdings are impeded by the Stock Exchange's 
Yellow Book which provides that - normally256 - at least 25 per cent 
of any class of listed shares must be in the hands of the public, i. e. 
persons who are not associated with the directors or major 
shareholders. 257 This particular provision of the Yellow Book 
originates from the Admissions Directive. 258 Not directly addressing 
the problem of cross shareholdings, but also having a somewhat 
adverse effect is Rule 9 of the City Code which requires a mandatory 
offer to be made once the 30 per cent threshold is exceeded. By this 
means cross holdings have to remain below 30 per cent. However, 
mutual holdings below this threshold are not restricted. 
Under the present rules, many different structures of cross 
shareholdings designed to prevent a takeover are possible. 259 A 
253 WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-781 et seq. 
254 Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, §5 II 1. 
255 Section 736 CA 1985. 
256 A lower percentage of shares distributed to the public may be allowed by 
the Stock Exchange if it is considered that the market will nevertheless 
operate properly, para 3.19 of the Yellow Book. 
257 Para 3.18 of the Yellow Book. 
258 Admissions Directive, No. 79/279/EEC of 5 March 1979, [1979] O. J. 
L 66/21. 
259 WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-781. 
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fairly simple but nevertheless effective structure would be where 
three companies with co-operating boards hold stakes of 26 per cent 
in each other. In this kind of situation, neither company would be the 
holding company of any other nor has any of them exceeded the 
30 per cent threshold. Nevertheless, any two companies together 
would hold the majority in the third company and could therefore 
prevent any hostile takeover bid. However, if the parties entered into 
a formal agreement or their co-operation were very intensive, the 
Panel would regard them as shareholders acting in concert and the 
obligation to make a mandatory offer would arise. 260 It appears 
doubtful, however, whether the Panel could detect informal 
agreements of that kind since it seems almost impossible to 
determine in practice whether an investment is made for genuine or 
improper, namely defensive, reasons. 
This difficulty might also be the reason why there has not been 
effective legislation against mutually supportive holdings. 
Furthermore, any legislation designed to restrict cross holdings other 
than prohibit them entirely would necessarily be very complex and 
complicated. This last point is especially well demonstrated by the 
German piece of legislation which attempts to tackle harmful cross 
shareholdings. 261 The problem of cross shareholdings is - probably 
for the same reasons - also not addressed in the proposed Fifth 
Directive or, indeed, any other Directive262. 
260 As to "acting in concert' see City Code, Definitions. 
261 See Chapter 4.3.3. at pp. 164. 
262 Dine, EC Company Law, para 15.22. 
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3.3.4. Increase of Capital or Issue of Shares to 
a supportive Holder 
The directors may, if authorized by the articles, increase the 
company's share capital by an allotment of equity shares, the basic 
effect of which is to make an offer more expensive to a potential 
bidder. 263 If a potential bidder has already built up a stake in the 
target company he could, however, benefit from an allotment of 
equity shares for cash by way of exercising his normally existing pre- 
emption rights. 264 For a board intending to protect the company or 
themselves against a takeover bid it would be most effective 
therefore to disapplicate the pre-emption rights and issue the shares 
to a friendly holder, thus, creating a situation comparable to a cross 
holding. This, however, seems quite impracticable for a listed public 
company, both for legal and factual reasons. 
Legally, since the coming into force of the Companies Act 1980 
a number of statutory provisions, now to be found in the 1985 Act, 
exist in addition to the common law fiduciary duties of directors. 
Section 80 of the Companies Act 1985 stipulates that directors may 
only allot shares if they are authorised to do so either by an ordinary 
resolution in the general meeting or the company's articles. Further 
and more stringent requirements are to be met to disapplicate pre- 
emption rights. 265 Pre-emption rights may only be excluded if the 
directors are generally authorised by the articles - as opposed to an 
authorisation by an ordinary resolution - to allot shares. If so, the pre- 
emption rights may be disapplicated by either a provision in the 
articles or a special resolution. 266 But even where the directors are 
empowered by the articles to allot shares without being bound by 
263 Reg. 32 of Table A; section 80 et seq. 
264 Section 89 CA 1985. 
265 Section 95 CA 1985. 
266 As to further requirements regarding the special resolution see 
section 95 (5) CA 1985. 
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pre-emption rights, they still have to comply with their fiduciary duties 
which require them to act in what they consider the best interests of 
the company and for a proper purpose. Quite a number of significant 
cases dealt with the very situation that the directors issued shares to 
influence the outcome of a bid in one way or another. 267 In broad 
terms, the essence of these decisions may be summarized by saying 
that the desire to frustrate a hostile offer in order to remain in office 
must not be the only motivation for the issue of new shares. In other 
words, where the issue of shares can be justified objectively by some 
proper management considerations, the directors act within the 
scope of their power. 268 In addition to these legal requirements 
applying to all public companies, listed companies must comply with 
the numerous provisions of the Stock Exchange's Yellow Book269 
which requires a company intending to issue equity shares, 
irrespective of what is stipulated in the articles, to obtain shareholder 
consent if pre-emption rights are to be disapplicated. 270 
Since an issue of fresh shares is often on profitable terms and a 
disapplication of pre-emption rights would tend to dilute the existing 
shareholders' stakes, the shareholder consent concerning the 
disapplication will not normally be given by institutional investors. 
They even have announced that they will not support disapplication 
in listed companies unless the disapplication relates to not more than 
5 per cent of the equity shares. 271 Together with the mentioned legal 
restrictions it seems nowadays therefore most unlikely that a listed 
company may successfully issue shares to a friendly holder in order 
to frustrate a future takeover bid. In addition, once a bid has been 
267 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch. 304; Hogg v. Cramphom [1967] 
Ch. 254; Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. (1974] A. C. 821; Pine Vale 
Investments v. McDonnal and East Ltd. (1983) 8A. C. L. R. 199; 
Whitehouse v. Carlton Hotel Ltd. (1987) 70 A. L. R. 251; McGuire v. Ralph 
McKay Ltd. (1987) 12 A. C. L. R. 107. 
268 See in particular the Privy Council decision Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum 
Ltd. [1974] A. C. 821. Also Xuereb, The Rights of Shareholders, p. 62. 
269 See Chapter 4 of the Yellow Book. 
270 Para 4.42 of the Yellow Book. 
271 Keenan, Company Law, p. 195. 
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communicated, the very stringent restrictions of the City Code apply 
which explicitely state in Rule 21 (a) that the directors must not issue 
any authorised but unissued shares without the shareholders' 
consent. 272 
3.3.5. Compensation Packages for Directors 
Unlike many other European countries, the removal of directors 
as such does not constitute a barrier to takeover bids in Britain. 273 
On the contrary, because of the single-tier board system together 
with section 303 of the Companies Act 1985, which provides that a 
company may remove a director "by ordinary resolution before the 
expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding anything in its 
articles or in any agreement between it and him", the removal of 
directors appears rather facile. However, section 303 (5) of the 1985 
Act makes also clear that a director so removed is not deprived of his 
right to claim damages for breach of a contract of or for services. 
Hence, long term service agreements between the directors and the 
company will lead to substantial financial compensation claims if the 
directors of the target board are replaced in the aftermath of a 
takeover as is often the case. This might make the target company at 
least less attractive to a potential bidder. 
Regulation 82 of Table A of the 1985 Companies Act vests the 
power to determine the directors' remuneration in the general 
meeting (ordinary resolution). Such a provision in the articles does, 
however, not constitute a contract between the directors and the 
company. 274 Therefore, directors usually enter into a service or 
272 See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(d) at pp. 35, and Chapter 3.4 at pp. 85. 
273 But see the above discussion of Bushell v. Faith [1969] I All ER 1003 at 
Chapter 3.3.1. at p. 71. At to the removal of the management under 
German law see Chapter 4.2.2. (1)(b) at p. 136, and Chapter 4.2.2. (2)(a) 
at p. 137. 
274 Palmer's Company Law, para 8.038. 
Chapter 3 81 
employment contract with the company. Thereby the company is 
represented by board as Regulation 84 of Table A makes clear: "... 
the directors may appoint one or more of their number .... and enter 
into an agreement or arrangement with any director for his 
employment by the company... " Concerning the terms of that 
contract the directors are according to Regulation 84 of Table A 
largely free: "... Any such appointment, agreement or arrangement 
may be made upon such terms as the directors determine and they 
may remunerate any such director for his services as they think fit. " 
The fact that the directors in negotiating their contracts basically 
contract with themself gives rise to concern as there clearly is a 
potential for a conflict of interest. The German two-tier board system 
avoids this problem to a large extent: Concerning employment 
contracts of management board members, the company is 
represented by the supervisory board. The supervisory board 
determines the salary of the management board members, which 
according to the Stock Corporations Act has to be adequate and 
must not be excessive. 275 The remuneration of the supervisory 
board members, which also has to be "reasonable", is either 
determined by the articles or by a resolution of the general 
meeting. 276 
In order to prevent abuses by directors in respect of their 
remuneration the British Companies Act 1985 contains a number of 
provisions dealing with directors' service contracts. Most notably, 
section 319 stipulates that any contract of employment of a director 
for a period of more than five years must be approved by the 
shareholders in general meeting. The Cadbury Report on "The 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance" is even more restrictive 
and recommends that executive director's service contracts should 
not exceed three years unless shareholder approval is obtained. 277 
275 Sec. 87 AktG. 
276 Sec. 113 AktG. 
277 Finch, Corporate governance and Cadbury: self-regulation and 
alternatives, [19941 J. B. L. 51,53. 
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Furthermore, section 312 requires disclosure and shareholder 
approval for any payment by way of compensation for loss of office. 
As section 316 (3) points out, however, the requirement of disclosure 
and shareholder approval does not apply in so far as a "bona fide 
payment by way of damages for breach of contract or as 
consideration for or in connection with his retirement from office" is 
concerned278 or where the company is contractually obliged to make 
a certain payment. 279 Section 318 requires companies to keep the 
particulars of their directors' service contracts which run longer than 
one year open to inspection by any shareholder without charge at 
the company's registered office. Similar provisions are contained in 
the Stock Exchange's Yellow Book. 280 A potential bidder holding at 
least one share can therefore easily ascertain the amount of 
damages it is liable to pay after removing the directors in the wake of 
a successful bid. Detailed information - specified in Schedule 6 of the 
Companies Act 1985 - regarding the emoluments and other benefits 
of directors must also be disclosed in the notes to a company's 
annual accounts. This too may prove helpful in assessing potential 
damages payable to the target directors. 
In addition to these requirements, the City Code stipulates in 
Rule 25 (4) that the first major circular from the offeree board 
advising shareholders on an offer must contain particulars of all 
service contracts of the directors if these contracts have more than 
one year to run. Furthermore, Rule 21 prohibits the offeree board 
directors from entering into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary 
course of business without shareholder consent when a bona fide 
offer is made or imminent. Note 6 makes clear that any "abnormal 
increase in the emoluments or a significant improvement in the terms 
of service" in the directors' contracts would in a bid situation be 
278 Palmer's Company Law, para 8.214. 
279 Taupo Totara Timber Co. Ltd. v. Rowe [1978] A. C. 537. 
280 Paras 16.9 to 16.12 of the Yellow Book. 
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considered out of the "ordinary course of business", i. e. an 
inadmissible defence. 
Although the legal and quasi-legal environment regarding 
"golden handshakes" is rather restrictive, a method commonly used 
to increase the compensation payable in case of a director's removal 
is the so called "rolling contract'. 281 These service contracts of 
directors contain a term which renews the contract every day for a 
certain period. In accordance with the Cadbury Report, three years 
rolling contracts are most common. 282 Hence, the directors' 
contracts keep "rolling" the effect of which is that in case of dismissal 
at any given time the service contract always has the full period until 
expiry, thus, where a three-years contract is concerned, three more 
years to run. The dismissed director is consequently entitled to 
compensation for the loss of a three-year service contract, i. e. three 
times his annual salary plus bonuses and pension arrangements. A 
recent survey revealed that among the FT-SE 100 companies about 
50 per cent of the chief executives were on three-year rolling 
contracts. 283 However, criticism against three-year contracts from 
institutional investors is increasing. In the current political climate 
where so-called "boardroom greed' is widely discussed and was 
looked into by the House of Commons Employment Committee as 
well as the private Greenbury Committee284 the future of the three- 
year rolling contracts looks gloomy. The chief executive of the £25 
billion PosTel pension fund, Ross Gooby, has already announced 
281 Times, 18 October 1994. 
282 As to the Cadbury Report: Finch, Corporate governance and Cadbury- 
self-regulation and alternatives, [1994) J. B. L. 51,53. 
283 Bacon & Woodrow"s 1994 Directors' Total Remuneration Package 
Survey. Among the 100 FT-SE 100 companiens only 80 replied. In 39 per 
cent of all companies surveyed the Directors are on three-year contracts. 
The average basic income of chief executive directors in July 1994 was 
£208,000. Further details in Times, 18 October 1994. 
284 Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, the £689,000 chairman of 
Marks & Spencer. See Times, 7 March, 19 April and 17 July 1995. The 
Greenbury Report suggests to set service contract periods at one year or 
less. As to the contrary view see the interesting remarks by Rees-Mogg, 
Busybodies are bad for business, Times, July 17,1995. 
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that PosTel would in future vote against directors' service contracts 
of more than two years. 285 
According to a survey conducted by a corporate governance 
consultancy, Pirc, U. K. companies have paid out more than £65 
million in compensation to directors who have resigned or accepted 
less favourable terms in the past three years. 286 A recent example 
for the dimension of a director's compensation for loss of office in 
the context of a takeover is the case of John Robb, former chairman 
and chief executive of Wellcome, who had to resign after his 
company was taken over by Glaxo early in 1995. Being only on a two 
year rolling contract his basic compensation amounted to twice his 
annual salary of £475,000, i. e. £950,000. In addition, shares and 
share options netted a further £1,300,000 which brought his "golden 
handshake" to well over £2 million. 287 Needless to say, the other 
Wellcome directors enjoyed lucrative share options and employment 
contracts too. 288 When BET, the business services group, after a 
£2.2 billion bid by Rentokil was taken over in spring 1996, the chief 
executive of BET, Mr John Clark, made a profit of £3.4 million from 
selling shares as a result of the bid plus, being on a three year rolling 
contract of about £415.000 annually, more than £1 million in 
compensation for loss of office. 289 In addition, in a court battle he is 
seeking more than £4 million in damages for lost benefits such as 
bonus payments, share options and pension entitlements. 290 
285 Times, 18 October 1994. A recent survey by the consultancy Pirc has, 
however, revealed that the recommendations of the 1995 Greenbury 
report have been ignored by many quoted companies: "We're pointing out 
that any recommendations that involve taking mone out of executives' 
wallets have been ignored. " See Financial Times, 16 October 1996. 
286 Financial Times, 16 October 1996. 
287 Times, 16 February 1995 and Times, 24 March 1995. John Robb had 
options over 250,756 shares and a further 13,750 shares according to the 
Times, 31 January 1995. 
288 Times, 31 January 1995. 
289 Financial Times, BET chief poised to net £5m in takeover aftermath, 
11/12 May 1996. 
290 Financial Times, 14 October 1996 and 16 October 1996. This case is 
particularly interesting because it is expected to establish whether 
Chapter 3 85 
But however huge - and in many cases probably undeserved - 
these sums may seem for any individual to receive, it remains 
doubtful whether large compensation packages really constitute a 
serious barrier to takeovers of listed companies. In the context of the 
enormous sums involved in making such a bid - about £9 billion in 
the mentioned Glaxo/Wellcome battle -a couple of million pounds for 
the "boys" at the target's board may seem "peanuts" for any serious 
bidder. Moreover, the bidder's board might find itself in the same 
position some day and has, naturally, therefore little interest to 
oppose this system for which the shareholders pay the bill. 
3.4. Defences against an existing Offer 
In any legal system in which directors are authorised to take 
defensive actions against takeover bids this represents a serious 
barrier to the market for corporate control, and it is an undisputed 
fact that, even if defensive actions do not actually defeat the bid, 
they increase the takeover costs substantially. 291 As far as Britain is 
concerned it has been pointed out earlier that one of the City Code's 
fundamentals, stated in General Principle 7 and further specified in 
Rule 21, is to prevent the target board from taking any frustrating 
action after a bona fide offer has been communicated or the target 
board has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent, 
compensation should relate soley to loss of salary or whether share 
schemes and bonus arrangements should be included. 
291 Weinberg/Blank, Takeover, para 1-011 and 3-833. For practical examples 
see Times, 11 January 1995: Trafalgar faces £60 million bid fees. 
Financial Times, 8 March 1995: the Glaxo/Wellcome bid expenses were 
expected to be around £100 million. Glaxo, advised by Lazard Brothers, 
had estimated its expenses at £77 million, of which £30 million were fees, 
and the rest stamp duty. Wellcome, advised by Barings and Morgan 
Stanley, was expected to pay between £20 and £30 million. See also 
Financial Times, 24 January 1996: the Granada/Forte battle incurred 
£140 million in fees and costs. See also Guardian, 30 January 1995: 
Merger mania is madness. 
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except with the shareholders's consent. 292 Additionally, the Code 
provides in General Principle 9 that the directors must only have 
regard to "the shareholders's interests taken as a whole, together 
with those of employees and creditors" and not to their personal 
interests. From the wording of these provisions it appears, thus, that 
the hands of the directors are rather strictly bound. There are, 
however, a number of "adverse" actions left which are either 
tolerated by the Panel or not considered a defence in the strict sense 
of the Code. Since the possible measures are quite numerous a 
choice had to be made and the following expositions do not intend to 
be exhaustive, but try to highlight the most common defence tactics. 
3.4.1. Lobbying Shareholders 
To lobby for shareholder support seems an obvious line to take 
for an entrenched board struggling to fend off a bid. Again, both the 
City Code and common law limit the directors' freedom of action. 
According to General Principle 5 of the City Code "any document 
or advertisement addressed to shareholders containing information 
or advice ... must 
be prepared with the highest standards of care and 
accuracy. " A number of Rules concretise this principle further. 293 As 
far as common law duties are concerned directors usually owe their 
fiduciary duties only to the company. 294 However, it follows from 
Gething v. Kilner that directors in the context of a takeover also owe 
292 See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(d) at p. 35. 
293 Rule 19: Standards of care in respect of information; 
Rule 23: The general obligation as to information; 
Rule 25: Offeree board circulars; 
Rule 28: Profit forecasts; 
Rule 29: Asset valuations. 
294 Percival v. Wright [1902] Ch. 421. See also section 309 (2) CA 1985. 
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a duty to their shareholders to be honest and not to mislead them by 
surpressing information. 295 
Within these boundaries, directors may try to win their 
shareholders' support with a number of arguments. A likely line of 
defence in any takeover battle is to argue that the bid undervalues 
the target company, i. e. that the offer is inadequate and 
shareholders should receive a higher offer or keep their shares. This 
course was, for example, chosen by the Wellcome board to defend 
against the Glaxo bid. Apart from circulars and personal talks to 
major shareholders, advertisements - such as the one shown at 
page 89 - appeared for a number of days in various national 
newspapers asking the shareholders to call to hear the Wellcome- 
board's advice. By calling one could hear a recorded message from 
John Robb, the former chairman and chief executive of Wellcome, 
explaining in some detail why the board thought the Glaxo bid 
undervalued Wellcome and that the board were trying to solicit a 
better offer from another company, thus, asking the shareholders not 
to make any commitments. 
Another line of argument is to criticise the bidder. An example of 
this approach could recently be witnessed in the case of Northern 
Electric's defence against the Trafalgar House bid where the 
question was raised whether a company - Trafalgar House - which 
had not always complied with the Cadbury Code was good enough 
to run a public utility. 296 The complicated corporate structure of 
Trafalgar House with its Hong Kong and Bermuda based 
ownership297, its poor economic record in the last few years and its 
inexperience in the field of electricity generation had also been 
stressed. 
295 Gething v. Kilner [1972) 1 All ER 1166. 
296 Times, 24 January 1995. 
297 Times, 14 and 24 January 1995. 
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Given the fact, however, that shareholders normally put their 
financial interests first all lobbying will be fruitless if the offer price is 
right. 298 This kind of defence therefore appears quite harmless. 
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3.4.2. Increased Dividends 
A more serious defence is the promise of higher dividends or 
other financial incentives by the target board in order to keep - or 
rather buy - their shareholders' loyalty. Albeit Note 3 to Rule 21 of 
the City Code states that the "payment of an interim dividend by the 
offeree company ... may in certain circumstances be contrary to 
General Principle 7 and this Rule in that it could effectively frustrate 
an offer" and the directors are further bound by their fiduciary duties 
and some statutory provisions299 it appears that they do enjoy quite 
some leeway. For instance, in Trafalgar's bid for Northern Electric 
the entrenched management came up with an amazing package of 
incentives designed to "bribe" their shareholders as the Times put 
it. 300 This included a £1.50 one-off dividend per share, the issue of 
£111 million worth of unredeemable new preference shares, worth at 
least £1 per share, and an announcement that Northern's holding in 
the National Grid would be handed over directly to its shareholders, 
which would have been worth a further £2.57 per share. In 
aggregate, the incentive package would have been worth more than 
£5 per share. 301 The overall cost of the proposed incentive package 
amounted to almost half the bid price (! ) and consequently led to 
critical questions as to the price control mechanism in the electricity 
industry. Following this, an announcement to review price controls by 
the power regulator, Professor Littlechild, caused a dramatic slump 
in the value of all electricity shares, which, broadly speaking, led to 
the eventual failure of Trafalgar's bid. 302 In view of these facts, one 
has to admit that Northern's directors built up an impressive defence 
astonishing all City pundits. It is more than doubtful, however, 
299 Sections 263 (1) and 264 (1) CA 1985 which basically stipulate that 
distribution shall not be made except out of profits. 
300 Times, 24 January 1995 (Pennington). 
301 Times, 18 and 25 February 1995. 
302 Times, 11 and 16 March 1995; Financial Times, 8 March 1995. 
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whether these enormous handouts to shareholders could have been 
justified with any genuine business reasons. Given these facts, it 
appears equally doubtful whether the chief motivation of the directors 
was to act in the interest of the company as a whole as their fiduciary 
duty requires rather than defend their own positions. As far as the 
City Code is concerned, it is beyond question that they did neither 
act in accordance with the spirit of the Code to refrain from taking 
any actions designed to frustrate a bona fide offer303 nor with its 
wording. 304 The amazing thing is, however, they seemed to get away 
with it without any apparent intervention by the Panel. 
3.4.3. Lobbying the Merger Control Authorities 
Representations to the competition policy authorities to 
persuade them to veto the merger have always been a defence 
strategy in Britain. 305 As Part Three of this work analyses the merger 
control systems in Britain, 306 Germany307 and under the European 
Merger Regulation308 in more detail, a few broad remarks as to the 
role of lobbying in the merger control process may suffice at this 
stage. 
If a bid is referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC), it lapses automatically. 309 Bearing in mind the City Code's 
wording in General Principle 7 that no frustrating action may be 
taken by the board of the offeree company, the question has been 
303 General Principle 7. 
304 Rule 21, esp. Note 3. 
305 As to the topic in general see Lofthouse, Competition Policies as 
Takeover Defences, [1984) J. B. L. 320 and WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, 
para 3-831 et seq. 
306 See Chapter 6, at p. 265. 
307 See Chapter 7, at p. 335. 
308 See Chapter 8, at p. 391. 
309 Rule 12 (a) of the City Code. An intresting report on how the lobbying 
process works (BAe/GECNSEL) in practice gives Gray, A resounding 
pitter-patter of political arm twisters, in the Financial Times, 9 November 
1994. 
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raised whether lobbying is prohibited by the Code. 310 Although 
instigating a court procedure is considered inadmissible, the Panel 
took the view that lobbying is a democratic right which must be 
allowed. 311 The main difference between litigation on the one hand 
and lobbying merger authorities on the other seems to be that court 
proceedings are conducted in the (private) interest of the plaintiff 
whereas merger policy is exercised objectively in the public interest. 
Furthermore, section 76 (2) of the Fair Trading Act 1973 now 
provides that representations made to the Director General of the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) by interested parties are to be taken into 
account. 312 Hence, lobbying is not so much seen as exercising 
undue influence over the merger control authorities, but helping to 
bring arguments forward, or, as Finbow/Parr put it, "the art of 
educating government - of seeking to ensure that the OFT, the MMC 
and the Secretary of State together have available as much relevant 
information as possible to enable them to reach an informed decision 
on the issues raised by the merger. "313 Lobbying the merger control 
authorities can therefore not be illegal. Yet, it has been argued by 
one author that the defending directors might contravene against 
their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company by 
lobbying the merger control authorities since a merger would 
normally reduce competition which is generally good for the company 
involved in terms of higher profits. 314 However, in view of 
310 Lofthouse, Competition Policies as Takeover Defences, [1984] J. B. L. 320, 
329. 
311 Panel statement on Hoylake Investments/BAT Industries plc, 
September 6,1989: see Morse, The City Code, multinationals and 
overseas regulatory procedures, adaptation or surrender?, [1990] 
J. B. L. 67. 
312 Section 76 (2) which was added by the CA 1989. As to the discretion 
enjoyed by the Secretary of State see R. v. Secretary of State for Trade 
and others, ex parte Anderson Strathclyde plc [1983] 2 All ER 233,242: 
"... he [the Secretary of State] is entitled to take into account all the 
relevant circumsances, and to consider the opinion of the minority of the 
commission, and also representations and advice from persons other 
than members of the commission. " 
313 Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, p. 293. 
314 Lofthouse, Competition Policies as Takeover Defences, [1984] J. B. L. 320, 
323 et seq. 
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section 76 (2) of the Fair Trading Act 1973, this argument can hardly 
be sustained. 
The reason why the merger control authorities are so frequently 
and intensely exposed to lobbying - which is not the case in 
Germany where lobbying the Federal Cartel Office in Berlin would for 
structural reasons probably be contraproductive315 - lies in the 
relatively wide discretion they enjoy in the decision-making 
process, 316 the fact that the ultimate decision is made by a politician, 
namely the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 317 and also in 
the rather broad "public interest" criterion against which mergers are 
assessed in Britain compared to the rather narrowly defined "market 
dominance" criterion applied in Germany318 and under the European 
Merger Regulation. 319 A recent example where intense lobbying took 
place and led to surprising decisions is the rival bid by BAe and GEC 
for the submarine maker VSEL which will be discussed at a later 
stage at page 230.320 
In practice, however, the criteria taken into account by the 
merger control authorities are primarily competition aspects and it 
happens not often that a merger is referred or blocked on non- 
competition grounds. 321 Non-competition aspects which may have 
an effect are, for example, employment issues and the fact that the 
bidder is a foreign state-owned and controlled company. 322 The fact 
315 See Chapter 7.4.1. (3) at p. 307. 
316 As to the discretionary nature of the British merger control process see 
Chapter 6.1.2. at pp. 268; Chapter 6.3.2. at pp. 293, and Chapter 6.3.4. at 
PP. . 317 See in further detail Chapter 6.3.4. at pp. 242. See also Sir Bryan 
Carsberg's remarks reported in the Times, 23 February 1995. Also Begg, 
Corporate Acquisitions, para 8.39: "Merger Control in the United Kingdom 
is a highly discretionary affair" and constitutes, in the words of the 
Financial Times, "one of the most visible and arbitrary forms of ministerial 
intervention. " 
318 See Chapter 7.5. at pp. 386. 
319 See Chapter 8.4. at pp. 377. 
320 As to the lobbying taking place see Gray, A resounding pitter-patter of 
political arm twisters, in the Financial Times, 9 November 1994. The case 
is discussed in Chapter 6.3.2. at p. 230. 
321 For a detailed analysis see Chapter 6.4. at pp. 304. 
322 See Chapter 6.4.2. at pp. 311. 
Chapter 3 94 
of foreign ownership alone, however, has apparently never been the 
reason for a MMC reference or the blocking of a bid. 323 Section 13 
of the Industry Act 1975 which provides that a prohibition order may 
be issued by the Secretary of State where the change of control in 
an "important manufacturing undertaking" is considered contrary to 
the interests of the United Kingdom has also never been invoked. 
Compared to the German system, where a merger is - broadly 
speaking - automatically blocked if certain criteria are met, 324 the 
British system is more flexible on the one hand, but also less 
predictable and more open to political influence on the other hand as 
the further analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 will demonstrate. Thus, in 
the present context of takeover barriers it may be concluded that 
lobbying the merger control authorities may be used by the 
defending board members as means to influence the outcome of a 
bid. However, as lobbying in Britain is very much seen as "educating 
government" and does due to a different legal framework and culture 
appearently not have the negative tinge it has in Germany, it is a 
legitimate "defensive" measure neither infringing the fiduciary duties 
of the directors nor the rules of the City Code. 
3.4.4. Search for a "White Knight" 
In contrast to the defensive actions discussed above, the search 
by the target's directors for a rival bidder, the so-called white knight, 
to come up with a higher offer does not tend to deprive the 
shareholders of their right to decide upon the merits of the (first) 
offer. On the contrary, by creating an auction-like situation the 
shareholders get a wider choice and are likely to receive a higher 
price as a result. Thus, there is no reason for either the Code or the 
323 See Chapter 6.4.2. (2) at pp. 258. 
324 See Chapter 7.5. at pp. 386. 
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law to restrict this kind of activity of the directors. One might even 
argue that the directors required to act in the best interests of the 
company are obliged to look for an alternative bidder in order to push 
the price and boost the shareholders' profits. 
In Glaxo's recent bid for Wellcome, for example, the latter is 
understood to have - unsuccessfully - approached Hoechst of 
Germany and the U. S. companies Bristol-Myers-Squibb, Pfizer, 
Merck and Johnson & Johnson in order to solicit a higher offer. 325 
Where competing bids exist326 the difficult question arises 
whether the directors are always obliged to support the highest bid. 
In Heron International Ltd. v. Lord Grade the Court of Appeal held 
that "where directors have decided that it is in the best interest of a 
company that the company should be taken over and there are two 
or more bidders the only duty of directors, who have powers as those 
in Article 29327 is to obtain the best price. ... 
Where the directors 
must only decide between rival bidders the interests of the company 
must be the interests of the current shareholders. "328 Hoffmann J. in 
Re A Company, however, took a different view by saying: "I cannot 
accept the proposition that the board must inevitably be under a 
positive duty to recommend and take all steps within their power to 
facilitate whichever is the highest offer. "329 At the root of this 
problem lies the question of how to define the interests of the 
company in accordance with which the directors have to act: Are the 
interests of the company synonymous with the interests of the 
current shareholders330 or do the directors have to take wider issues 
325 Times, 31 January 1995 and 2 February 1995. 
326 As to the competition implications of competing bids see Chapter 6.3.2. at 
p. 230. 
327 Article 29 of the target company's articles of association provided that any 
transfer of shares required the directors' approval. 
328 Heron International Ltd. v. Lord Grade [1983) BCLC 244,265. Article 29 
of the companies articles of association provided that any transfer of 
shares required the directors' approval. 
329 Re A Company [1986) BCLC 382,389. 
330 So WeinberglBlank, Takeovers, para 3-835; Heron International Ltd. v. 
Lord Grade [1983) BCLC 244. 
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into account? As section 46 (1) of the Companies Act 1980 already 
did, section 309 (1) of the Companies Act 1985 stipulates that the 
directors have to have regard to the interests of the employees and 
not only to the shareholders' interests. 331 The effect of this provision 
is somewhat diluted, however, by subsection (2) which states that 
this duty is owed only to the company and not to the employees. This 
means in practice that the employees have no right to sue for breach 
of duties so that there is no effective enforcement of section 309. 
However, section 309 may well be used by directors to justify a 
decision which seems to contravene the current shareholders' 
interests. Whether the interests of "future" shareholders are to be 
taken into account is a controversial question in English company 
law, although this idea is opposed by the majority opinion since 
"future" shareholders cannot be identified and have no current 
interest in the company. 332 
General Principle 9 of the City Code adopts an even wider view 
than section 309 by stating: "It is the shareholders' interests taken as 
a whole, together with those of employees and creditors, which 
should be considered when the directors are giving advice to 
shareholders. " Albeit this does not imply that the interests of "future" 
shareholders are to be considered, under the Code the directors 
must have regard to far more aspects than just the satisfaction of the 
present shareholders. Interestingly, the predecessor of General 
Principle 9, then General Principle 11, dealt expressly with the 
situation of directors recommending a lower bid by providing: "There 
may be good reasons for such a board333 rejecting an offer or 
preferring the lower of two offers. The board must carefully examine 
331 Section 46 (1) CA 1980 and section 309 (1) CA 1985 have the same 
wording: "The matters to which the directors shall have regared in the 
performance of their functions shall include the interests of the company's 
employees in general as well as the interests of its members. " 
332 In the Savoy Hotel case, counsel had advised the directors that they 
should pay regard to the interests of "present and future members of the 
company. " See WeinbergBlank, Takeover, para 3-835 with further 
references. 
333 Refers to companies which are effectively controlled by their directors. 
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its reasons for doing so and be prepared to explain its decision to its 
shareholders. " 
In terms of recommending a bid, it seems therefore that the 
directors are free - in accordance with both the law and the Code - to 
support a lower bid if they have proper reasons to do so, 334 and in 
that way defend against an unwelcome higher offer. 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
Evaluating takeover regulation and barriers in Britain, it seems 
useful to differentiate between the substance of the rules governing 
takeovers on the one hand and the institutional framework 
established to administer and enforce these rules on the other hand. 
The essence of the of the British takeover rules is laid down in 
the General Principles of the City Code, of which equal treatment, 
adequate information of shareholders, transperency in dealings, and 
the restriction on frustating action are the most substantial tenets. 
Regarding the fundamental values of the City Code there is very little 
to say in terms of criticism and it is deservedly seen as a model for a 
future European regulation. Its rules are neutral in the sense that 
neither the bidder nor the target company is treated favourably. The 
mandatory bid rule - often heavily criticized in Germany in connection 
with the previous proposals for a European Takeover Directive335 - 
appears to work very well in Britain. The German argument that such 
a rule would unduly hinder share transactions is largely refuted by 
334 The opposite view takes WeinbergBlank, Takeovers, para 3-385. As to 
the legal problem how far so called lock-out agreements between a target 
board and a bidder are binding see Crowther Group plc. v. Carpets 
International plc [1990] BCLC 560; Dawson International plc v. Coats 
Patons [1991] B. C. C. 278. For a thorough analysis see Gower's 
Principles, p. 711,713. These kind of problems arose also in the 
Glaxo/Wellcome takeover: Financial Times, 8 March 1995. 
335 See Chapter 5.1.1. (2) at pp. 177. 
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the British example. It is arguable, however, that too little regard is 
being paid to the employees of the target company by the Code. 
There is no rule granting the employees or their representatives a 
right to have either a say or at least to be informed by the offeror or 
the offeree or target board. Trade unions or other employee 
delegates are not represented on the Takeover Panel. As a takeover 
will in one way or another inevitably affect the employees of the 
target company, it would seem appropriate to ensure that the offer 
document is available to the employees since the bidder is obliged to 
state therein what its intentions regarding the business of the offeree 
company and its employees are336 and to give them a right to be 
informed by the board. The same holds true for the obligatory 
statement which has to be issued by the offeree board. 337 In 
general, employee participation plays a much greater role in 
Germany as the following chapter will demonstrate. 338 
As to the institutional framework established to administer and 
enforce the takeover rules, the main responsibility lies with the Panel 
although the SROs as well as the Stock Exchange are also essential 
to the functioning of the whole system. The enforcement of the City 
Code works rather well due to the "City-style" network within which 
the Panel operates. Although the City Code is self-regulatory in 
nature, it is very much embedded in the regulatory structure 
established under the Financial Services Act 1986, in particular with 
respect to the enforcement of its rules. The commonly used phrase 
that takeover regulation in Britain is self-regulatory is therefore only 
partly true. Without the (enforcement) backing of the SIB, the various 
SROs and the Stock Exchange, all of which are statutory based 
institutions with statutory powers, the Panel would clearly not have 
the immense power it now enjoys. 
336 Rule 24.1 of the City Code. 
337 Rule 25.2 of the City Code. 
338 See in particular Chapter 4.2.2. (2) at pp. 137. 
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Critically, it has been pointed out that the composition of the 
Pane1339 and its attitude towards the influential merchant banks340 
gives rise to concern as there must be a certain potential for conflict 
of interest. 341 It has also been questioned whether the very 
restrictive approach as to judicial review is adequate. 342 The de facto 
uncontrolled power enjoyed by the Panel is amazing and has 
certainly no parallel in Germany. Concerning this last point, however, 
is has to be admitted that the approach chosen by Lord Donaldson in 
restricting judicial review effectively rules out tactical litigation as a 
defence. 
It is doubted, however, whether the institutional mainly self- 
regulatory framework which works apparently well for Britain can be 
seen as a model for other European countries, in particular 
Germany, or for a European Directive. The complex network within 
which the Panel operates is very much part of the close-knit, 
gentlemanly and maybe somewhat exclusive City-culture which used 
to be a unique feature of London as a financial centre. Yet, such a 
system cannot easily be adopted by any other country, as it is not 
just based on well drafted rules, but very much an intrinsic 
mainfestation of a certain business culture and understanding which 
has developed in almost four decades. However, as the financial 
sector is becoming increasingly international, the City has already 
become less of a gentlemanly club and will most certainly continue to 
do so. The result of this could in the long run well be that new 
challenges arise for the self-regulatory Panel, especially from foreign 
bidders against whom it is much more difficult to enforce the Code's 
rules as the St. Piran case illustrated. 343 Time will tell whether the 
(basically) self-regulatory system survives the process of increasing 
339 See Chapter 3.1.2. (1) at pp. 36. 
340 See Chapter 3.1.2. (3) at pp. 44. 
341 As to the background of the Panel and Executive members see Table 7 at 
p. 39 and Table 8 at pp. 40 respectively. 
342 See Chapter 3.1.2. (4) at pp. 51. 
343 [1980] J. B. L. 270,358; see also Re St. Piran Ltd., (1981] 3 All ER 270. 
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internationalization which will undoubtedly take place in the coming 
decades. 
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Chapter 4 
Takeover Regulation and Barriers in 
Germany 
The fact that the U. K. is a net acquirer of companies in Germany 
demonstrates that any barriers can be surmounted if the German 
side is willing to co-operate. 1 The picture, however, is quite different 
when it comes to non-agreed takeover bids for German stock 
corporations. In Germany, corporate control in a stock corporation 
normally changes behind closed doors, agreed by like-minded 
managers, bankers, and big investors in a rather secretive way. 
Public bids followed by spectacular takeover battles and 
accompanied by a great deal of media attention are extremely rare in 
Germany. In recent years there where only very few events which 
bear some remote resemblence to anglo-saxon style hostile bids for 
listed public companies. 2 
1 See Table 1 at p. 18, 
2 "Hostile" bids for non-listed stock corporations or private companies, 
where the shares are often held by a family or some other defined group 
of persons, may happen more frequently. In May 1988, for example, 
Maxwell Communications Corporation made a "hostile" bid for Brockhaus 
AG which was rejected by the 40 members Brockhaus and Meyer families 
who held the majority of the shares. Since only a tiny number of 
shareholders are involved in these kind of takeovers they belong to a 
category different from the one discussed in this work and are in their 
nature rather negotiations taking place behind the scenes than public 
bids. As to the MCC/Brockhaus case see DTI, Barriers to Takeovers, 
Vol. 2, p. 45. 
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(1) Flick Brothers 
. 
1. Feldmühle Nobel 
102 
In 1988 the brothers Gert-Rudolf and Friedrich-Christian Flick, 
influential German industrialists, pronounced shortly before a general 
meeting of Feldmühle Nobel AG, which was convened to introduce a 
5 per cent voting right limitation, 3 that they opposed the voting right 
restriction and intended to make an offer to all shareholders in order 
to buy 50 per cent of the voting shares at a premium price. 4 This, 
however, was disapproved of by the management of Feldmühle. The 
share price rose sharply in the days following the Flick 
announcement and the Flicks quickly withdrew their offer. 5 Rumours 
at that time suggested that the share price increase was partly due to 
massive purchases by the leading German bank, Deutsche Bank, in 
support of the Feldmühle management. 6 Nevertheless, the Flick's 
continued secretly - and against their public assurances? - to buy 
Feldmühle shares at the stock exchanges until they owned a stake of 
about 40 per cent. Since the few disclosure provisions then existing 
only required companies to disclose their interest if their holding 
exceeded 25 or 50 per cent, the Flick's who acted as private 
investors were under no obligation to disclose their aquisitions. 8 But 
for some reason having lost interest in controlling Feldmühle, they 
then sold their stake for a considerable premium to Veba AG in 
1989, which brought Veba's holding to 46 per cent. 9 The main 
significance of these events - apart from once again exposing the 
weakness of the German disclosure provisions10 - lies in the fact that 
for the first time somebody actually tried to take over a company 
3 As to voting rights limitations in Germany see 4.3.1. 
4 Burgard, Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen, AG 1992,41. 
5 FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, 13 and 14 June 1988. 
6 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 July 1988. 
7 Handelsblatt, 30.6.1988; Burgard, Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen, 
AG 1992,41. 
8 Sec. 20 AktG. For details see 4.1.2. (1) at pp. 123. 
9 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 August 1989. 
10 Burgard, Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen, AG 1992,41. 
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against the resistance of its management. However, one has to 
admit that the similarity between a U. K. style hostile bid and the 




The second case involved the Italian tyre manufacturer Pirelli 
who tried in 1990/1991 to win control over Continental AG in order to 
achieve synergie effects in the feeble European tyre business. 11 
Pirelli approached Continental's management in September 1990.12 
Although Continental maintained that this approach had come as a 
big surprise, they promised to consider its merits, 13 but finally 
rejected it. They argued a merger would not be in the interests of the 
company, its employees, shareholders, and its customers. 14 Still 
calling its approach friendly, Pirelli went ahead to rally for support of 
major Continental shareholders, which was particularly necessary 
because - like in the Feldmühle case - the voting rights an individual 
shareholder could exercise were limited to 5 per cent. 15 Pirelli met 
with fierce resistance from the Continental management. Although 
Pirelli managed - contravening the disclosure provisions of the Stock 
Corporation Act (! )16 - to pool enough shares to get rid of the 5 per 
11 Burgard, Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen, AG 1992,42; 
Ebenroth/baum, Die Kompetenzen des Vorstands einer 
Aktiengesellschaft, DB 1991,1157. 
12 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 September 1990. 
13 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 September 1990. 
14 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 September 1990; Economist, 26 
January 1991. 
15 As to restrictions on voting rights see Chapter 4.3.1. at pp. 157. 
16 Because of the infringement of the disclosure provision in sec. 20 of the 
Stock Corporation Act the Hannover Regional Court later quashed the 
resolution which removed the voting rights limitation from Continental's 
articles: see Landgericht Hannover, Urteil vom 29.5.1992, ZIP 1992, 
1236. The decision is based on the fact that the shareholders party to the 
pool-arrangement where "acting in concert" and that therefore their 
shares had to be aggregated. This decision was affirmed by the Higher 
Regional Court in Celle: Oberlandesgericht Celle, Urteil vom 15.7.1992, 
AG 1993,178. 
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cent voting right limitation, the final push for Pirelli came at a general 
meeting of Continental in March 1991 when the proposed merger 
was prevented by a blocking minority of more than 25 per cent. As in 
the Feldmühle case, it is not entirely clear which role the powerful 
Deutsche Bank, which was represented at Continental's supervisory 
board, played in the whole affair17 and it is interesting to note that 
Continental was defended by Morgan Grenfell, the British merchant 
bank that is a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank since 1989.18 It is alleged 
that Deutsche Bank "convinced" the German car companies Daimler 
Benz and Volkswagen to buy stakes in Continental to mount some 
form of rescue operation to frustrate Pirelli's efforts. 19 Although 
finally defeated, in the opinion of many, Pirelli could have succeded if 
they had tried more vigourously and "fortress Germany" had not 
been the only reason Pirelli's bid failed. 20 A certain lack of planning 
as well as deep divisions among Pirellis senior managers over 
which course to pursue and Mr Pirelli's refusal to buy shares 
aggressively during the course of the bid in order to come to an 
agreement with Continental probably contributed to Pirelli's defeat. 21 
If Pirelli had succeeded in taking over Continental, this might have 
inspired other companies to bid for a German target. Yet, Pirelli not 
only failed, but also incurred huge losses believed to be in the area 
of DM 470 million because of share price warranties they gave to co- 
operating Continental shareholders. 22 The whole affair therefore 
17 Helmer, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8. April 1993; Economist, 7 
December 1991: Management Focus: Pre-merger management; 
Economist, 22 June 1991; Economist, 18 May 1991; Economist, 23 
February 1991. 
18 Economist, 12 September 1992: Bidding for Europe's takeover business. 
The article suggests that the acquisition of Morgan Grenfell by Deutsche 
Bank was part of a general strategy by European banks to buy British 
takeover expertise. 
19 Economist, 23 February 1991 and 18 May 1991. 
20 Helmer, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8. April 1993.; Economist, 7 
December 91: Management Focus: Pre-merger management. 
21 Economist, 7 December 91: Management Focus: Pre-merger 
management. Economist, 30 November 1991: Europe's corporate castles 
begin to crack. 
22 Continental's share price fell by about a third during the course of the bid. 
As to the warranty arrangements in detail see the decision of the Regional 
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added to the general perception that German stock corporations are 
practically immune from takeover bids. 23 
(3) Krupp J. Hoesch 
The third case, Krupp GmbH's successful merger with Hoesch 
AG, both steelmakers, was not an outright public bid either. Yet, 
what makes it worth mentioning here is that Krupp's approach to 
Hoesch was very different from the usual German business practice 
in that no co-operation was sought at the beginning. In October 1991 
Krupp revealed that it had secretly acquired a 24.9 per cent stake in 
Hoesch24 and hinted that its allies were holding enough shares to 
confer effective control on Krupp, 25 albeit due to a voting right 
restriction in Hoesch's articles Krupp itself - like any other 
shareholder - could only vote a maximum of 10 per cent of its shares 
in Hoesch. 26 Krupp then asked for a merger with its ailing rival. 
Although Hoesch's management reacted offended at first, the 
merger finally proceeded without a defence from Hoesch. 
Remarkably, mighty Deutsche Bank, which was represented on 
Hoesch's supervisory board, got wind of Krupp's plan only after 
Krupp's public announcement. This is very unusual indeed for such 
a big deal. Indicative too is the fact, that Krupp was not represented 
by one of the three traditional establishment banks - Deutsche Bank, 
Court in Hannover: Landgericht Hannover, Urteil vom 29.5.1992, 
ZIP 1992,1236; also Burgard, Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen, 
AG 1992,43, footnote 34b. Also Economist, 7 December 91: 
Management Focus: Pre-merger management. 
23 Economist, 23 February 1991 and 18 May 1991. 
24 Just below the 25 per cent disclosure theshold in sec. 20 AktG. However, 
the Securities Trading Act 1994 now requires disclosure of 5 per cent 
stakes. Krupps way will therefore not be practicable any more. See 
Chapter 4.1.2. (2) at pp. 125. 
25 Economist, 9 November 1991 and 19 October 1991. 
26 Joussen, Die Treuepflicht des Aktionärs bei feindlichen Übernahmen, 
BB 1992,1075,1080. 
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Dresdner und Commerzbank - which normally handle these deals, 
but by the aggressive, but state-owned WestLB. 27 
Especially the events surrounding Feldmühle and Continental 
received wide publicity and triggered much comment by academic 
writers28 and the managements of large German stock corporations 
began to worry about their much enjoyed safety and 
independence. 29 Some academics believed that the repercussions 
of the "takeover fever" prevalent in the U. K. and the U. S. during the 
1980s had finally reached Germany and expect anglo-saxon style 
takeovers in a not too distant future to happen in Germany. So far, 
however, there is very little evidence to support that view. 
Apart from providing a survey of the defensive measures open to 
a target company (4.3. ), the following chapter undertakes to outline 
the legal environment within which takeover bids had to take place 
(4.1. ) and analyse in some depth the determining structural factors 
which are - obviously - impeding takeover bids in Germany (4.2. ). 
27 Economist, 16 May 1992: WestLB unbound. 
28 In English: Henle, Defences to Corporate Takeover in Germany, (1994] 
4 ICCLR 122. In German: Burgard, Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen, 
AG 1992,41; Daum, Die unkoordinierte Übernahme, S. 44 ff; 
Ebenroth/Daum, Die Kompetenzen des Vorstands einer 
Aktiengesellschaft, DB 1991,1157; Ebenroth/Rapp, Abwehr von 
Unternehmensübernahmen, DWiR 1991,1; Knoll, Übernahme von 
Kapitalgesellschaften, 1992, S. 37; Marquardt, WiB 1994,537; Salje, 
Feindliche Übernahmen, JA 1990,321; Sandberger, 
Teilübernahmeangebote und Zwangsübernahmeangebote im 
Europäischen Takeover-Recht, DZWir 1993,319. 
29 See for instance Economist, 26 December 1992: Rattling the vorstand: 
Corporate governance in Germany. Die Zeit, 16 August 1991; Burgard, 
Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen, AG 1992,41, footnote 3; Joussen, 
Die Treuepflicht des Aktionärs bei feindlichen Übernahmen, BB 1992, 
1075. Also Werner, Probleme feindlicher Übernahmeangebote, p. 7. 
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4.1. The Regulatory Framework 
Given the rareness of public takeover bids in Germany, it is not 
surprising that there are no legally binding rules specifically designed 
to govern public takeover bids. There are, however, a few disclosure 
provisions to be noted in the Stock Corporations Act 1965 and the 
newly indroduced Securities Trading Act 1994. The only rules 
specifically addressed to takeover bids are not legally binding. They 
are contained in the German Takeover Code 1995 (see 
APPENDIX 1). 
4.1.1. The non-legal German Takeover Code 
1995 
A first faint debate about the regulation of takeover bids, which 
at that time were completely unknown in Germany, was triggered in 
1974 by Professor Pennington 's "Report on Takeover and other 
bids" which he prepared on behalf of the EC-Commission. 30 This 
report presented a first draft of a Takeover Directive. 31 In January 
1979, at a time when a number of other European states had already 
introduced some form of takeover regulation, the German 
deliberations finally resulted in the non-binding Takeover 
Recommendations 1979.32 They were drafted by the so-called Stock 
30 EC Doc. XI/56/74-E. As to the Pennington Report see Bradley, 
Harmonising Takeover and Merger Regulations within the EEC, Company 
Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 131,135. See also Chapter 5.1. at p. 173. 
31 See Chapter 5.1. at p. 173. For early German articles on the issue see 
e. g. Behrens, Rechtspolitische Grundsatzfragen einer Europäischen 
Regelung für Übernahmeangebote, ZGR 1975,433; Bess, Eine 
europäische Regelung für Übernahmeangebote, AG 1976,169. As to 
Professor Pennington"s role see lmmenga/Hellberg, Corporate Takeovers 
through the Public Market, p. 25. 
32 For a brief analysis see Assmann/Bozenhard, Übernahmeangebote, 
p. 40. Also Grunewald, Was bringt der Vorschlag einer 13. EG-Richtlinie, 
WM 1989,1235,1236. 
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Exchange Experts Commission (Börsensachverständigen- 
kommission), a private body of independent experts involved in the 
financial services industry appointed by the Federal Ministry of 
Finance which was first set up in 1968.33 However, the Takeover 
Recommendations 1979 lacking any enforcement mechanism have 
never gained any practical relevance34 and were widely critized for 
being too fragmentary and vague. 35 
Despite the absence of any real takeover bid activity in 
Germany, 36 in summer 1994 the Stock Exchange Experts 
Commission felt bound to deliberate on a new set of takeover rules 
for two reasons: First, the German debate on the takeover issue has 
recently been inspired by new developments on European level. 37 
Secondly, and more importantly, it was and is widely felt that 
regulatory measures aimed at bringing the German stock market 
more in line with international standards in order to boost investor 
confidence in the German stock market, especially abroad, are 
needed. The efforts by the Stock Exchange Experts Commission 
can, thus, be seen as part of the wider efforts by the German 
government and the financial community to internationally strengthen 
the competitive position of Germany as a financial centre, the 
German slogan being the "Finanzplatz Deutschland' concept. 38 The 
33 As to the institutional framework see Chapter 4.1.1. (5)(a) at p. 119. 
34 Assmann, Verhaltensregeln für freiwillige öffentliche 
Übernahmeangebote, AG 1995,563; Neye, Der neue Übernahmekodex, 
ZIP 1995,1464; Sandberger, Teilübernahmeangebote und 
Zwangsübernahmeangebote, DZWir 1993,319,320. 
35 Assmann, Verhaltensregeln für freiwillige öffentliche 
Übernahmeangebote, AG 1995,563. 
36 For an empirical study see Wymeersch, Unternehmensführung in 
Westeuropa, AG 1995,299,307. Also Krause, Zur Gleichbehandlung der 
Aktionäre bei Übernahmeangeboten und Beteiligungserwerb WM 1996, 
845; Neye, Der neue Übernahmekodex, ZIP 1995,1464; Thoma, Der 
neue Übernahmekodex der Börsensachverständigenkommission, 
Osnabrück, Arbeitspapier 9/96, p. 4. 
37 See Chapter 5.1 at pp 173 and in particular Chapter 5.1.2. at pp. 180. 
38 As to these motives see, for example, Assmann, who is one of the 
leading German academics in this field, in Verhaltensregeln für freiwillige 
öffentliche Übernahmeangebote, AG 1995,563; Baumann, who is a 
board member of Siemens, in Der neue Verhaltenskodex für 
Unternehmensübernahmen, WM 1996,901,902; Breuer, who is a board 
member of the Deutsche Bank, in Handelsblatt, 23 June 1994; Neye, who 
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German Takeover Code was adopted in July 1995 and entered into 
"force"39 in October 1995 (see APPENDIX 1). As Hans-Werner 
Neye, who took part in the discussions leading to the adoption of the 
new rules, 40 reports, the deliberations on the new Takeover Code 
were heavily influenced by the concept and ideas of the City Code 
and the (previous) 1989/1991 proposal for a European Takeover 
Directive, which itself was also modelled on the City Code. 41 It 
therefore not surprising that the German Takeover Code shows 
many features of the City Code. 
(1) Legal nature 
The Stock Exchange Experts Commission which adopted the 
German Takeover Code is a private body of independent experts 
with backgrounds in industry and the investment services sector 
including an official from the German Ministry of Finance. Hence, the 
rules drawn up by this body can - as the English City Code - only be 
voluntary in nature and do not have the force of law. 42 Unlike the 
City Code, however, which claims in its introduction to represent "the 
collective opinion of those professionally involved in the field of 
takeovers as to good business standards and as to how fairness to 
shareholders can be achieved'43 no similar statement can be found 
is a high-ranking official at the German Ministry of Justice and took part in 
the dicussions leading to the adoption of the new Takeover Code, in Der 
neue Übernahmekodex, ZIP 1995,1464,1465; Schuster, Head of the 
Fundamental Issues Group at Deutsch Morgan Grenfell, in Neue Reglen 
für Übernahmen, Die Bank 1995,609; Thoma, Der neue 
Übernahmekodex der Börsensachverständigenkommission, Osnabrück, 
Arbeitspapier 9/96, S. 4. 
39 It remains to been seen whether "force" is the correct word in this context. 
See Chapter 4.1.1. (5)(b) at p. 120. 
40 Neye, Der neue Übernahmekodex, ZIP 1995,1464,1465. 
41 See Chapter 5.1. at pp. 173. 
42 See German Takeover Code, Introduction: "The Takeover Code is a set 
of recommended rules conduct for parties involved in voluntary public 
takeover offers.... " 
43 City Code, Introduction, para 1(a). 
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in the German Code. There hardly could be, critics of the German 
Takeover Code might add, as no public discussions or consultations 
took place prior to the adoption of the German Code by the Stock 
Exchange Experts Commission. 44 It is therefore questionable 
whether the German Code reflects the collective opionion of those 
involved in (maybe future) takeover bids rather than just the opinion 
of the Stock Exchange Experts Commission. Not surprisingly, the 
German Code has been criticized by practicioners and academics 
alike, 45 in particular with respect to the newly introduced mandatory 
bid rule. 46 Although the new German Takeover Code has clearly 
sparked a lively debate as the number of recent articles cited in the 
footnotes clearly indicates, given that it has been "in force" for a 
relatively short period of time only, it is too early to draw any definite 
conclusions as to its acceptance in practice. 47 
(2) Scope and Structure 
The German Takeover Code containing 24 rather short articles 




Conduct of the Offer 
Duties of the Offeror 
Duties of the Target 
44 This has be critiziced by Kallmeyer, Der Übernahmekodex der 
Börsensachverständigenkommission, AG 1996,169. As to the members 
of the Stock Exchange Experts Commission see Chapter 4, footnote 80. 
45 See in particular Kallmeyer, Der Übernahmekodex der 
Börsensachverständigenkommission, AG 1996,169; also Assmann, 
Verhaltensregeln für freiwillige öffentliche Übernahmeangebote, AG 1995, 
563,570; Friese, Verraten und verkauft, Capital 11/1995, p. 113; Klemm, 
Der Übernahmekodex ist zu vage, Börsenzeitung Nr. 85 of 3 May 1996. 
46 Art. 16 of the German Takeover Code. See Chapter 4.1.1. (4) at pp. 116. 




It applies to public offers for stock corporations 
(Aktiengesellschaften) or partnerships limited by shares 
(Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien) which have its corporate seat 
in Germany and are listed on a German Stock Exchange or traded in 
the over-the-counter market (Freiverkehr). 48 The scope of the City 
Code is wider as it applies to offers for both listed and unlisted public 
companies. 49 Bids for non-German targets listed on a German Stock 
Exchange are, hence, not governed by the new Code. 
In terms of securities, the German Code covers primarily offers 
for securities which directly or indirectly confer voting rights, but 
provides that it is to be applied to offers for non-voting preference 
shares analogously. 50 In this last respect the German Code is wider 
than the City Code which does not apply to non-voting preference 
shares. 51 The legal nature or origin of the bidder is as under the City 
Code irrelevant. 52 
From a German point of view it is conspicous that the Takeover 
Code is, untypical for German regulations, preceded by an 
introduction and a section of definitions which betrays the English 
model. Although the whole text of the German Takeover Code 
comprises only a couple of pages, as APPENDIX 1 shows, and is 
therefore far less detailed than the City Code which is a book 
containing more than 100 pages, 53 the basic regulatory approach is 
the same. In harmony with the City Code, the Takeover Code gives 
prominence to a number of General Principles54 and stipulates in 
words almost identical to those of the City Code that the rules "must 
be observed not only according to its letter but also according to its 
48 German Takeover Code, Definitions "Target". 
49 See Chapter 3.1.1. (1) at pp. 30. 
50 German Takeover Code, Definitions "Securities". 
51 See Chapter 3.1.1. (1) at pp. 30. 
52 German Takeover Code, Definitions "Offeror'. 
53 As to the structure of the City Code see Chapter 3.1.1. (1) at p. 30. 
54 Articles 1-6 of the German Code. See Chapter 4.1.1. (3) at pp. 112. 
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underlying purpose. "55 As under the City Code, the German 
Takeover Code empowers the German Takeover Commission, a 
body comparable to the English Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 56 
to modify or waive the application of individual provisions if their 
application would damage legitimate interests of the offeror, the 
target, or shareholders. 57 Hence, both sets of rules aim for a code 
which is flexible and, unlike legal statutes, easy to amend. 
(3) Fundamental Principles underlying the 
Takeover Code 
As the German Takeover Code is modelled on the English City 
Code, it not surprising that it is governed by the same basic 
regualtory principles, most notably the principles of equality and 
adequate shareholder information. Some of these principles are 
contained in the section entitled "General Principles", others are to 
be found in the remaining sections of the German Code. 
(a) Equality of Treatment 
Article 1 of the German Takeover Code, which could well be a 
direct translation of General Principle 1 of the City Code, provides 
that all shareholders of the target company are to be treated equally 
55 German Takeover Code, Introduction. The City Code provides in its 
Introduction, para 3(b), that the Rules and General Priciples "are to be 
interpreted to achieve their underlying purpose. Therefore, their spirit 
must be observed as well as their letter and the Panel may modify or 
relax the application of a Rule if it considers that, in the particular 
circumstances of the case, it would operate unduly harshly or in an 
unnecessarily restrictive or burdensome or otherwise inappropriate, 
manner. " 
56 As to further details see Chapter 4.1.1. (5)(a) at pp. 119. 
57 Article 23 of the German Takeover Code. 
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by an offeror. This very basic tenet is further specified by various 
other articles. 
The principle of equality is of relevance, for example, in 
connection with partial offers in respect of which the Takeover 
Code58 provides in harmony with the City Code59 that 
oversubscribed offers are to be scaled down proportionally. As 
partial offers are, contrary to the City Code, not subject to the 
consent of the Takeover Commission or any additional qualification, 
this provision could well become of particular importance if public 
bids were to become popular in Germany. 
As under the City Code, equality of treatment is also required in 
respect of the terms of the offer. 60 Article 13 provides that if the 
offeror acquires during the offer period61 shares on terms more 
favourable than specified in the offer document, these more 
favourable terms must be made available to all target shareholders. 
Article 14 stipulates that if the offeror makes a better second offer 
during the offer period, those shareholders who already have 
accepted the first offer must be made available the terms of the 
improved second offer. Contrary to Rule 35.1 of the City Code, which 
prohibits new offers by the offeror for the same target for a period of 
12 months following the closing of the previous bid, there is no such 
restriction under the German Takeover Code. However, Article 15 
provides that if the bidder comes up with an improved offer within a 
specified period62 of time of not less than 12 months after the 
previous bid, the more favourable terms must be made available to 
those who have already accepted the first bid. Furthermore, the 
principle of equality is of relevance in connection with the terms of 
58 Article 10 of the German Takeover Code. 
59 Rule 36.7 of the City Code. 
60 See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(a) at pp. 32. 
61 Article 11 of the German Code requires a minimum offer period of 28 
days. Under Rule 31.1 of the City Code the minimum offer period is 21 
days. Both Codes limit the maximum offer period to 60 days. 
62 To be specified in the offer document. 
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the mandatory offer required under Article 16. This last issue will be 
discussed in more detail at a later stage. 63 
(b) Adequate Information 
In line with General Principle 4 of the City Code, 64 Article 2 (1) of 
the German Takeover Code undertakes to ensure that all 
shareholders of the target company are given sufficient time and 
information to reach a properly informed decision on the offer. Most 
important in terms of information is the offer document the content 
requirements of which are less stringent than those of the City Code 
as a comparison between Rule 24 of the City Code and Article 7 of 
the Takeover Code shows. Unlike the City Code there is no provision 
which requires the offeree board to obtain competent independent 
advice which is to be made known to the shareholders. However, 
according to Article 18 of the German Takeover Code, the offeree 
board has to publish without delay "a reasoned statement of its 
position in relation to the offer. " 
Under Rule 20.2 of the City Code any information given by the 
target company to one offeror or potential offeror must be given 
equally and promptly to any (potentially) competiting bidder, even if 
that bidder is less welcome. Albeit Article 2 (2) basically provides for 
the same right, this right is somewhat more restricted under the 
German Takeover Code as the management board of the target is 
obliged to make such information available to a (potential) competing 
bidder only "upon proper exercise of its discretion and in the interests 
of the holders of securities" and where that bidder has 
"demonstrated a genuine interest in taking over the target. " Hence, 
the situation of (potential) competing bidders is somewhat less 
63 See Chapter 4.1.1. (4) at pp. 116. 
64 See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(b) at pp. 33. 
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favourable than in Britain, the standard of equality is lower. This rule 
appears to reflect to some extent the different German takeover- 
culture which has traditionally been sceptical about the idea of an 
auction between competing bidders. Another provision which seems 
to mirror the less confrontational takeover culture in Germany is 
Article 4 of the German Code which provides that "the 
announcement of an offer should generally be preceded by 
consultations between the offeror and the target. " There is no 
provision to this effect in the City Code. Moreover, unlike the City 
Code, Article 5 of the German Takeover Code stipulates that prior to 
making a public bid the offeror is obliged to inform the target, the 
relevant German Stock Exchanges, the Federal Supervisory Office 
for Securities Trading and the Executive of the German Takeover 
Commission. 65 
(c) Transparency in dealings 
Dealings prior to the announcement of the intention to make an 
offer are governed solely by the insider trading provisions of the 
German Securities Trading Act. 66 During the offer period, 67 dealings 
in relevant securities are to be disclosed to the Takeover Executive 
the following business day. 68 As a matter of course, both the British 
and the German rule book prohibit the creation of a false market by 
65 Article 5 of the German Takeover Code. 
66 Sec. 12-20 of the German Securities Trading Act. The City Code contains 
in Rule 4.1 some specific provisions regarding the period prior to an offer. 
67 As to the lengths of the offer period see Chapter 4.1.1. (3)(a) footnote 61. 
68 Article 12 of the German Takeover Code, which is broadly in line with 
Rule 8.1 (Notes 3,4 and 5) of the City Code. See also 
Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(c) at pp. 34. 
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those involved in the bid. 69 Any announcement must be prepared 
with the highest standard of care and accuracy. 70 
(d) Restrictions on frustrating action 
Regarding defensive measures, Article 19 of the Takeover Code 
is largely in line with Rule 21 of the City Code71 which prohibits the 
frustration of a bona fide offer during the offer period. The defences 
open to a German target will be examined in further detail in 
Chapter 4.4.72 
(4) Mandatory Offer 
The most salient and most controversial feature of the new 
German Takeover Code is the mandatory offer requirement provided 
for in Articles 16 and 17.73 A comparison with the mandatory bid 
requirement contained in Rule 9 of the City Code shows, however, 
that the respective provisions differ in virtually all important aspects, 
including, inter alia, the thresholds, the timetable, and the 
determination of the offer price. 
Notwithstanding various exceptions pursuant to which a 
mandatory offer is dispensible, a mandatory offer has in principle to 
be made once the acquirer including persons acting in concert74 
69 Article 3 of the German Takeover Code = General Principle 6 of the City 
Code. 
70 Article 8 of the German Takeover Code; General Priniple 5 of the City 
Code. 
71 See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(d) at pp. 35 and Chapter 3.4. at pp. 85. 
72 See Chapter 4.4. at pp. 165. 
73 For a critical discussion see Assmann, Verhaltensregeln für freiwillige 
öffentliche Übernahmeangebote, AG 1995,563,569 et seq. 
74 As to concert parties, Article 16 of the German Takeover Code refers to 
sec. 22 (1) of the German Securities Trading Act (APPENDIX 3). 
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have acquired more than 50 per cent of the voting rights in the 
target. The relevant threshold under the City Code is 30 per cent. 
Contrary to the U. K. where the mandatory bid has to be made 
without delay, under the German Code, the offeror has up to 21 
months (! ) to make the offer after passing the 50 per cent threshold 
for the following reason: Article 16 stipulates that a mandatory offer 
is dispensible if the offeror embarks following the acquisition of the 
majority stake on one of the reconstructions of the corporate group 
specified in Article 16 within a period of 18 months (see 
APPENDIX 1). If no such corporate reconstruction has taken place 
during that period, the offeror than has a further 3 months within 
which he has to make the mandatory offer. In the meantime the 
minority shareholders left in the target are kept in suspence. This 
rule is to some extent a result of the different concept of minority 
shareholder protection through the law of groups in Germany. 75 
However, this rule might well cause speculation, uncertainty, and 
maybe insider dealing in the market of the target shares during the 
long waiting period. It is also open to question whether that rule can 
be considered fair to investors who are after all left in a limbo. 
Whether this rule is able to enhance investor confidence in the 
German Stock Exchange market both nationally and internationally 
appears, thus, somewhat doubtful. 76 
According to Article 16, a mandatory offer is also dispensible 
where the acquirer purchased the relevant shares in order to place 
them with a third party, where the threshold was passed 
unintentionally and subsequently reduced, or where the acquirer is 
released by the remaining shareholders of the target company from 
the obligation to make an offer. Furthermore, Article 23 stipulates 
that the Takeover Commission may release an acquirer from the 
obligation to make a full offer if "legitimate interests" would be 
75 See Chapter 4.2.5. at pp. 151. 
76 Critical also Thoma, Der neue Übernahmekodex der 
Börsensachverständigenkommission, Osnabrück, Arbeitspapier 9/96, 
p. 11,15. 
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damaged otherwise. A definition or examples illustrating this 
somewhat vague term are not provided. 
If despite the numerous exceptions it ever comes to a mandatory 
bid under Article 16 of the voluntary German Takeover Code, 77 the 
pricing rules of Article 17 are to be regarded. Contrary to the City 
Code, which requires the offer to be made at not less than the 
highest price paid for target shares during the offer period or in the 
preceding 12 months, the German rules are far less stringent. 78 
Article 17 of the German Code differentiates between the situation 
where the acquirer has following the passing of the 50 per' cent 
threshold made no further purchases and where he has made further 
purchases. In the first case, paragraph 1 of Article 17 stipulates that 
the offer price "must resonably reflect the then current market price. 
It should not be more than 25 per cent below the price which the 
majority shareholder paid for securities of the target in the six months 
period prior to the passing of the threshold. " If the acquirer has made 
further purchases, paragraph 2 of the mentioned article provides that 
after passing the 50 per cent threshold, the acquirer then has to offer 
"the weighted average price paid in the course of such purchases" 
provided it is higher than the price to be offered under paragraph 1. 
Hence, regarding the pricing of the mandatory offer, the provisions of 
the German Takeover Code provide for a rather limited degree of 
equal treatment of target shareholders that falls clearly short of the 
strict standards prescribed by the City Code. 
(5) Adminstration and Enforcement 
Although the institutional structure set up by the German 
Takeover Code is clearly modelled on the British Panel on 
77 Sceptical as to the future practical relevance of the mandatory bid 
provision also Neye, Der neue Übemahmekodex, ZIP 1995,1464,1466. 
78 Rule 9.5 of the City Code. 
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Takeovers and Mergers, the differences regarding the enforcement 
of the German rules are substantial. 
(a) Institutional Framework 
Three different bodies are involved in the administration of the 
German Takeover Code all of which are private in nature: 
(1) the Stock Exchange Experts Commission 
(2) the Takeover Commission 
(3) the Executive79 
The Stock Exchange Experts Commission has drawn up the 
Takeover Code. The Ministry of Finance appoints and dismisses the 
members of the Stock Exchange Experts Commission, but there is 
no legal basis for this and the government has no control or influence 
over the independent experts. 80 Apart from amending the Takeover 
Code and the drafting of internal procedural rules, the main 
responsibility of the experts is to appoint the members of the 
Takeover Commission, its chairman and deputies. 
79 Address: Übernahmekommission, Geschäftsstelle, c/o Deutsche Börse 
AG, Börsenplatz 7-11,60313 Frankfurt a. M., Tel. 0049/69/21018276, 
Fax 0049/69/21011331. 
80 As at June 1996 the members were: Dr. K. -H. Baumann (board member 
of Siemens AG); Dr. D. Breipohl (board member of Allianz AG); Dr. R. -E. 
Breuer (board member of Deutsche Bank AG); Prof. Dr. H. E. Buschgen 
(University of Cologne); G. Eberstadt (board member of Dresdner Bank 
AG); U. E. Flach (board member of DG Bank); J. W. Gaddum (vice- 
president of the Deutsche Bundesbank); M. Hagena (ministry for 
economics of Lower Saxony); D. Kauffmann (representative of a small- 
investor protection association = Schutzgemeinschaft der Kleinaktionäre); 
Dr. A. Kollar (board member of Westdeutsche Landesbank); H. Loehr 
(board member of Bayer AG); H. P. Schreib (representative of an investor 
protection association = Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für 
Wertpapierbesitz); Dr. W. Seifert (board member Deutsch Börse AG); L. 
Tröbinger (board member of Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG); Dr. J. Henke 
(German Ministry of Finance); K. -B. Caspari (German Ministry of 
Finance); G. Wittich (Superviory Office for Securities Trading); H. -J. 
Schwarze (Secretary of the Stock Exchange Experts Commission). 
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The Takeover Commission, consisting of 7 to 15 members with 
backgrounds predominantly in the financial services industry, 81 is 
comparable to the British Takeover Panel. The members are 
appointed for a period of five years reappointment being possible. 
The Takeover Commission appoints the Head of the Executive, 82 
decides on requests by the parties to release them from certain 
provisions of the Takeover Code, 83 and hears appeals from 
decisions by the Executive. 84 
The Executive carries on the day-to-day work. It examines 
whether offer document complies with the provisions of the German 
Code and may publish comments, recommendations and decisions 
in relation to cases. 85 
(b) Enforcement Mechanism? 
Contrary to the complex enforcement-network examined in 
relation with the City Code, 86 in terms of enforcement there is little 
one can say with respect to the German Takeover Code. Article 21 
of the German Code asks potential offerors, targets and providers of 
investment services to "acknowledge the provisions of this Code. " A 
81 Article 20 (1)-(4) of the German Takeover Code. Members of the 
Takeover Commission as at June 1996: H. Loehr (board member Bayer 
AG); Dr. R. E. Breuer (board member Deutsche Bank AG); J. Benner- 
Heinacher (representative of a small-investor protection association = 
Schutzgemeinschaft der Kleinaktionäre); Dr. D. Breipohl (board member 
Allianz Holding AG); G. Eberstadt (board member Dresdner Bank AG); 
Dr. M. Gentz (board member Daimler Benz AG); Prof. Dr. Dr. H. 
Havermann (KPMG); Prof. Dr. Dr. K. Hopt (Hamburt University); Dr. N. 
Juchem (Bayrische Vereinsbank AG); D. Kauffmann (representative of an 
investor protection association = Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für 
Wertpapierbesitz); Dr. A. Kollar (board member Westdeutsche 
Landesbank); Dr. K. J. Lauk (board member VEBA AG); M. Mathes 
(Union-Investment Gesellschaft mbH); Dr. W. G. Seifert (board member 
Deutsche Börse AG). 
82 Article 20 (7) of the German Takeover Code. 
83 Article 23 of the German Takeover Code. 
84 Article 21 (2) of the German Takeover Code. 
85 Article 21 (2) of the German Takeover Code. 
86 See Chapter 3.1.2. (3) at pp. 44. 
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list featuring those who have acknowledged the German Code is to 
be published by the Executive. As of end of April 1996, of 674 listed 
German companies 229 "acknowledged' the Code. 87 However, 
according to a report in a leading German business magazin in 
August 1996 the 100 biggest listed stock corporation in Germany 47 
have so far refused to acknowledge which may well be considered 
as a serious blow for the new regulatory system. 88 Among the top 
100 companies which have refused acknowlegdement so far a 
numerous well respected blue-chip corporations such as the 
carmakers BMW and VW. 
If the Executive has found a party, which has acknowledged the 
German Code, to have acted in contravention of it, it may publish 
after having granted that party a hearing an adverse comment. 89 No 
further sanctions are available, neither to the Executive nor to the 
Takeover Commission or the Stock Exchange Experts Commission! 
Time will tell whether companies feel bound by their non- 
contracual good-will acknowledgement in any "hard cases" in future. 
Given that self-regulation has in the past never really been taken 
seriously in Germany, 90 it seems rather unlikely that a purely "social' 
acknowledgement of the Code will be enough to command 
compliance with the new Code when it counts. 
87 Thoma, Der neue Übernahmekodex der 
Börsensachverständigenkommission, Osnabrück, Arbeitspapier 9/96. 
p. 25. 
88 Wirtschaftswoche, Nr. 34 of 15.8.1996, p. 68-69. 
89 Article 21 (2) of the German Takeover Code. 
90 A very eloquent example are the past experiences with the voluntary 
insider-rules. See in detail Mennicke, Insider regulation in Germany: the 
change from self-regualation to criminal law, Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, 
No. 5, p. 155 et seq. (1994). 
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(6) Summary 
Although the German Code shares the basic values of the City 
Code (equality, adequate information, transparency, no frustrating 
action), it deviates in detail on many crucial aspects, in particular in 
relation to the mandatory offer requirement. The most notable 
difference, however, is the almost complete lack of any (hard) 
enforcement mechanism. Albeit the German Takeover Code might 
be considered a first cautious step into the right direction and might 
have some beneficial public-relations effects in terms of increasing 
investor confidence in the Finanzplatz Deutschland, as long as there 
is no effective enforcement mechanism in place, it appears to early 
to take the German Code seriously as a regulatory framework. It 
clearly is not in the same class with the City Code and given the 
different German tradition, business culture and constitutional 
background, it seems rather unlikely that it ever will be. 
4.1.2. Disclosure Provisions 
The merits of disclosure provsions have always been 
controversial in Germany. When disclosure provisions were first 
introduced into the law of stock corporations through the Stock 
Corporations Act 1965 many considered them a contravention of a 
claimed "principle of anonymity'. 91 Due to the predominant use of 
bearer shares investors otherwise enjoyed complete privacy and not 
even the company itself knew who its owners were. As a result of the 
controversy, the provisions introduced in the Stock Corporations Act 
1965 clearly bear the marks of compromise. However, the newly 
introduced Securities Trading Act 1994 has brought about quite 
91 See Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, §6 11 1 with further 
references. 
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dramatic changes and put - as far as its scope reaches -a sudden 
end to the so much cherished culture of secrecy. The following 
chapter undertakes to analyse the existing disclosure provisions 
highlighting the effect the recent changes may have in terms of 
public takeover bids. 
(1) The Stock Corporations Act 1965 
As far as stock corporations are concerned, Section 20 of the 
Stock Corprations Act is the cornerstone of the German disclosure 
provisions (see APPENDIX 2). 92 It has been in force since 1965 and 
applies to all stock corporations. Under section 20 only two 
disclosure thresholds exist. An enterprise holding shares in a stock 
corporation must inform the respective stock corporation for the first 
time when its holding exceeds 25 per cent and for the second time 
when it exceeds 50 per cent. It must also be disclosed if the holding 
falls below the mentioned thresholds. There is, however, no 
obligation to state the precise size of the holding. It is sufficient to 
announce that, for example, the 25 per cent threshold has been 
exceeded, which can mean anything between 25 and 49 per cent. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that section 20 of the Stock 
Corporations Act applies only to enterprises. 93 Private investors are 
regardless of the size of their stake not covered by section 20. 
Compared to British standards set by the Companies Act 1985, 
the German disclosure provisions in the Stock Corporations Act 1965 
seem remarkably lax. 94 The British Companies Act 1985 requires 
92 Burgard, Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen, AG 1992,41; 
Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, §6 I-IV. 
93 This means any form of corporation, including partnerships. See Huffer, 
Aktiengesetz-Kommentar, § 15 Rn. 6 and § 20 Rn. 2. 
94 For a very critical discussion of the German disclosure provisions in 
particular see Adams, Die Usurpation von Aktionärsbefugnissen mittels 
Ringverflechtung in der "Deutschland AG", AG 1994,148,153 et seq. 
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disclosure of the precise size of the stake once a person has 
acquired an interest in 3 per cent or more of the voting rights in a 
public company and thereafter if there is any increase or decrease. 95 
Hence, the British provisions effectively prevent a bidder from 
secretly building up a stake sufficiently large to launch a bid taking 
both the target and the market by surprise. 
Apart from the very high thresholds, what makes the situation in 
Germany worse is that the few provisions contained in the Stock 
Corporations Act have never been properly enforced which is 
unanimously admitted in Germany. 96 According to subsection 7 of 
section 20 the only consequence of an infringement of the disclosure 
obligation is that the shareholder's membership rights may not be 
exercised until he discloses properly. This means in practice that he 
must not vote his shares nor does he receive any dividend and 
neither can he exercise any pre-emption rights. If in such a situation 
the shareholder votes his shares anoymously nevertheless, he is 
liable to a rather low maximum fine of DM 50.000 and resolutions 
passed because of these votes in a general meeting are liable to be 
rescinded, as was the case in Pirelli's takeover attempt. This, of 
course, presupposes that he is caught. Once a previously defecting 
shareholder has disclosed his interest properly, all his membership 
rights revive. One school of thought interpretes section 20 even in 
the way that after the proper disclosure the shareholder is 
retroactively entitled to the full dividend! 97 Regardless of one's 
opinion concerning this last point, there can be no doubt that the 
legal consequences of a contravention of the disclosure provisions 
can not seriously deter a potential bidder from breach of the 
disclosure provisions. Besides, with banks acting as proxies and the 
common use of bearer shares, the veiling of the true ownership of 
95 See section 199 (2) CA 1985. For an analysis Gower, Principles of 
Modern Company Law, pp. 613. 
96 Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, §6 111; V. 
97 See Hoffer, Aktiengesetz-Kommentar § 20 Rn. 8 with further references. 
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shares is rather facilitated by the legal environment and the chances 
to actually get caught seem rather dim. 
Coming back to the takeover question, these rather lenient 
disclosure provisions may well have been one of the reasons why 
public bids have in the past not been seen as a practical, or 
necessary, means to win control. In a legal environment which 
treasures secrecy and does not require the purchaser to treat the 
target's shareholders equally by way of a mandatory offer or the 
requirement to pay a premium for corporate control, there seems to 
be no real need for a public bid. Effective control may - at least in 
most cases - cheaper be acquired by secretly purchasing de facto 
control on the Stock Exchanges and buying from major single 
shareholders outside the Stock Exchanges, which, of course, is 
standard practice in Germany. 98 The point here made is quite well 
demonstrated by the Flick case. When the Flick brothers announced 
publicly that they intended to win control in Feldmühle, share-prices 
skyrocketed which caused them to withdraw. When they went on to 
acquire by stealth what ultimately amounted to a 40 per cent stake, 
they made a huge profit. Acquiring a 24.9 per cent stake secretly 
was also crucial in the reported Krupp/Hoesch case. However, due to 
the newly introduced Securities Trading Act 1994 the situation has 
changed. 
(2) The Securities Trading Act 1994 
"German boardrooms blink in clear light of disclosure" 
proclaimed the Times in 1995.99 As far as listed stock corporations 
are concerned, this is true. For non-listed stock corporations, 
98 Daum, Die unkoordinierte Übernahme einer Aktiengesellschft, p. 70-74; 
Peltzer, Hostile Takeovers in der Bundesrepublik, ZIP 1989,69 at 72; 
Financial Times, 18 December 1992: German takeover rules criticised; 
99 Times, 16 January 1995. 
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however, the described insufficient disclosure regime of the Stock 
Corporations Act 1965 remains relevant. 
It might well be argued that the recent changes in German 
investment law, of which the Securities Trading Act 1994 is only the 
most important part, mark the beginning of a new era for the German 
securities markets. 100 The scope of the Securities Trading Act goes 
beyond the introduction of new disclosure provisions for listed stock 
corporations. 101 It implements the Insider-Dealing-Directive102 and 
makes insider-dealing, which seemed to be a rather popular 
boardroom sport, enjoyed even by the former chairman of the most 
powerful trade union in Germany, 103 for the first time ever illegal. 
The new act also contains legally binding rules of conduct for 
investment firms and securities dealers, thus, implementing Art 10 
and 11 of the Directive on Investment Services in the Securities 
100 Weber, Deutsches Kapitalmarktrecht im Umbruch, NJW 1994,2849. 
101 For a thorough and detailed commentary on the new Securities Trading 
Act see Assmann/Schneider, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, Köln 1995. The 
Securities Trading Act establishes for the first time a supervisory 
authority, the Federal Authority for the Supervision of Trading in Securities 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel), charged with monitoring 
the securities markets, thus exercising functions roughly comparable to 
the London Stock Exchange and the SIB. Furthermore, the Act finally 
implements the Insider-Directive (89/592 [1989] O. J. L334/30) and 
renders insider transactions for the first time in German law illegal. It also 
introduces legally binding rules of conduct for investment firms and 
securities dealers, thus implementing prematurely Art 10 and 11 of the 
Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field(93/22 [1993] O. J. 
L141/27). See Weber, Deutsches Kapitalmarktrecht im Umbruch, 
NJW 1994,2849. As to the new insider regulations see Mennicke, Insider 
regulation in Germany: the change from self-regulation to criminal law, 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 5, p. 155 (1994). 
102 89/592 [1989] O. J. L334/30 
103 Franz Steinkühler, being the chairman of the Metal Workers Union 
(IG Metall) and a member of the Daimler Benz AG supervisory board as 
an employee representative, was caught red-handed in Summer 1993 
when he bought shares in MAH worth DM 1.000.000 prior to an acquistion 
of that company by Daimler Benz of which he because of his position 
confidentially knew. He made a profit of DM 100.000 in a few days, which 
by any standards, especially by working class standards is remarkable. 
However, after a some days of denying, he resigned. The only really 
remarkable thing about this affair is that Steinkühler got caught at all, the 
reason being a highly unusual conincidence, namely that a bank 
employee privy to Steinkühler's private transactions acted in gross breach 
of his duty of secrecy and made Steinkühler's share-dealings public. To 
the Steinkühler case see also Mennicke, Insider regulation in Germany: 
the change from self-regulation to cirminal law, Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, 
No. 5, p. 155 (1994). 
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Field. 104 To monitor and enforce the new disclosure, insider-dealing, 
and conduct rules, a new public agency was created: the Federal 
Authority for the Supervision of Trading in Securities 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel), located in Frankfurt 
am Main. Although most of the new legislation is based on European 
directives, it fits well into the German government's ambitious 
"Finanzplatz Deutschland' concept which is designed to lift the 
German securities industry to the international standards and attract 
more foreign investors. 105 In the context of public takeover bids the 
disclosure provisions are most important and the following paragraph 
will focus on them. 
The new disclosure provisions basically implement - with a four- 
year delay106 - the provisions of the Major Shareholdings 
Directive. 107 Section 21 of the Securities Trading Act now requires 
disclosure of a holding when 5,10,25,50 or 75 per cent are 
exceeded or when a stake falls below any of these marks (see 
APPENDIX 3). An indication that the German government is serious 
about its "Finanzplatz Deutschland' concept is that the lowest 
threshold of 5 per cent is below the Directive's minimum requirement 
of 10 per cent. 108 The acquirer has to notify the target company and 
the newly established Bundesaufsichtsamt within 7 days from the 
day of the transaction. 109 The target company has to publish these 
notifications within 9 days in the official Securities-Gazette. 110 
Contrary to the Stock Corporations Act, the exact size of the stake 
has to be revealed and the disclosure requirement is not restricted to 
104 93/22 [1993) O. J. L141/27. This directive had to be implemented by 1 
January 1996. 
105 As to these motives in the context of the new German Takeover Code 
1995 see Chapter 4.1.1. at pp. 107. 
106 The directive was due to be implemented by January 1,1991. Section 21 
of the Securities Trading Act is came into force at January 1,1995. 
107 88/627 [1988) O. J. L348/62. As to the implementation in Britain see 
Palmer's Company Law, para 16.115 et seq. 
108 In Britain under sec. 199 (2) CA 1985 a3 per cent interest has to be 
closed. 
109 Sec. 202 of the British CA 1985 allows only a2 day period. 
110 Wertpapiermitteilungen. Sec. 25 of the Securities Trading Act. 
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enterprises. Section 22 of the Securities Trading Act defines in some 
detail under which circumstances shares hold by a third person or 
company are to be aggregated to the acquirer's shares. 
Contravention of the disclosure provisions in the Securities Trading 
Act renders the transgressor liable to a fine. Contrary to the Stock 
Corporations Act this liability arises automatically when the acquirer 
does not comply with the disclosure provisions, and it does not 
depend on him voting the shares. However, bearing in mind the large 
sums involved in takeover transactions, it seems questionable 
whether the maximum fines involved -a maximum of DM 500.000 for 
the defective acquirer - really constitutes a serious deterrent. 
Furthermore, as highlighted before the use of bearer shares and the 
role of the banks as proxies make it difficult to unveil the true 
ownership of shares. It remains to be seen, thus, how the new rules 
will work in practice and to what extent the new Bundesaufsichtamt 
für Wertpapierhandel is able to enforce them. 
However, as far as the "market for corporate control" is 
concerned, it appears likely that - compliance with the new rules 
assumed - the common German practice to acquire large stakes or 
even control by stealth will change. Acquisitions of major stakes on 
the Stock Exchange will not go unnoticed any more and, thus, cause 
the target's share price to rise, making the acquisition more costly. 
With the new disclosure provisions in force for a relatively short 
period of time only, 111 it remains to be seen which the effect in terms 
of takeover activity will be. Because of the early disclosure now 
required, the target management will be aware of a potential 
takeover very early on. This, in turn, will afford them considerably 
more time to install defensive measures and it will not be possible 
any more for a predator to outwit the target management by the sort 
of surprise-attack seen in the KrupplHoesch case. 112 Looked at it 
that way and bearing in mind that German managers are at least not 
111 January 1,1995. 
112 See Chapter 4(3) at pp. 105. 
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to the same extent as their British colleagues restricted from taking 
defensive actions, 113 the new disclosure provisions may have the 
effect of making non-agreed takeovers - inadvertently - even more 
difficult. 
The new provisions may also change the way in which corporate 
control is normally transferred in Germany. With major acquisitions 
through the stock exchanges now being less attractive, it might turn 
out that predators in future increasingly consider public takeover bids 
as means to win corporate control over a stock corporation in 
Germany. However, a more likely scenario seems to be that dawn 
raids become more popular in order to avoid the negative price 
effects of early disclosure -a development seen in Britain decades 
ago and now regulated against by the Rules Governing Substantial 
Acqusitions, 114 but not restricted in Germany. 
4.1.3. Developing a regulatory framework? 
In the absence of a legally binding takeover code, efforts have 
been made to develop a regulatory framework by having recourse to 
general concepts of German civil law. 115 Law in Germany, as a civil 
law country, is primarily based on precise statutes. However, where 
statutes do not exist, where they are insufficient or flawed, it is 
traditionally left to academics, mainly the law professors, and the 
courts to fill the gaps. The legal community discusses and elaborates 
different dogmatic concepts and forms after some time a leading 
opinion, the so-called "herrschende Meinung", which carries in 
practice quite some authority and is after a period of time often 
adopted by the courts. Many fields of law, like the law of tort or 
113 As to the academic controversy see Chapter 4.4. at pp. 165. 
114 See Chapter 3.1.3. at pp. 56. 
115 See especially Assmann/Bozenhard, Übernahmeangebot, p. 55-106; also 
Daum, Die unkoordinierte Übernahme einer Aktiengesellschaft, p. 59 et 
seq. 
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labour law, are to a large extent governed by this kind of case law. 
The law of takeovers could, in the absence of a takeover code, in the 
opinion of some academics become a further example. 
It is acknowledged that the duties imposed by the law of tort are 
not sufficient to govern takeovers. 116 It has been argued, however, 
that the offeror, if he already is a shareholder of the target company, 
is under a fiduciary duty not to harm fellow shareholders. 117 This 
would according to that opinion mean that, for instance, the offeror 
had to disclose his interests much earlier than required by the Stock 
Corporations Act. 118 The Federal Supreme Court has in the Linotype 
case acknowledged that in special circumstances a major 
shareholder may be under such a fiduciary duty. 119 However, this 
case involved a situation where the major shareholder colluded with 
the company management to the detriment of the remaining 
shareholders. It is not yet fully established, however, in which 
circumstances exactly shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the other 
members of the company, although further development in that area 
is very likely. 120 Besides, if an offeror is not a shareholder of the 
target company, this concept based on fiduciary duties theory runs 
into difficulties. 121 
116 Daum, Die unkoordinierte Übernahme einer Aktiengesellschaft, p. 54 et 
seq. 
117 Burgard, Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen bei der Aktiengesellschaft, 
ZIP 1992,47 et seq. Rejecting this approach sharply: Joussen, Die 
Treuepflicht des Aktionärs bei feindlichen Übernahmen, BB 1992,1075et 
seq. Also Daum, Die unkoordinierte Übernahme einer Aktiengesellschaft, 
p. 56. 
118 Burgard, Die Offenlegung von Beteiligungen bei der Aktiengesellschaft, 
ZIP 1992,47 et seq. Because of the new Securities Trading Act, this point 
is is now obsolete as far as listed companies are concerned. See 
Chapter 4.1.2. (2) at pp 125. 
119 Bundesgerichtshof "Linotype": BGHZ 103,184,194 = BGH WM 1988, 
325. 
120 Joussen, Die Treuepflicht des Aktionärs bei feindlichen Übernahmen, 
BB 1992,1075; Timm, Treuepflichten im Aktienrecht, WM 1991,481. 
121 Daum, Die unkoordinierte Übernahme einer Aktiengesellschaft, p. 56. 
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It has also been suggested to apply the law of contract, which is 
basically contained in the Civil Code. 122 However, the principle most 
relevant here is not contained in the Civil Code. It goes back to 
roman law and has been updated by the courts: the rule of culpa in 
contrahendo. This rule essentially imposes a duty of loyalty and 
fairness on prospective parties to a contract. Under this rule quasi 
contractual duties, which are considerably more stringent than the 
duties under the law of tort, exist before the parties actually enter into 
a contract. This rather vague concept has over the decades been put 
into more concrete terms by the courts. A prospective party 
contravening the culpa in contrahendo rule is in principle liable to 
damages. 
However, in a field as complex and technical as takeovers the 
parties involved need clear and unmistakeable guidance. 
Uncertainties would undoubtably lead to lenghty and destructive 
court battles, a danger well recognised in Britain. 123 The attempts to 
derive concrete takeover rules from the culpa in contrahendo rule 
may therefore be fine academically and of some use as long as a 
legally binding takeover code does not exist. In practice, however, 
only detailed and precise written rules can provide the certainty 
needed. 
4.1.4. Summary 
The legal environment concerning takeover bids in Germany is, 
apart from the newly introduced general disclosure provisions, 
largely characterised by the absence of legally binding rules. The 
voluntary Takeover Code 1995 can not be expected to have much 
bearing in practice as long as there is no effective enforcement 
122 Assmann/Bozenhard, Übernahmeangebote, p. 75 et seq; Grunewald, 
Was bringt der Vorschlag einer 13 EG-Richtlinie, WM 1989,1233. 
123 See Chapter 3.1.2. (4) at pp. 51. 
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mechanism in place. Because of this deficiency, equal treatment of 
the target's shareholders by a bidder is not guaranteed. 
4.2. Structural Barriers 
When it comes to barriers to non-agreed takeover bids, 
Germany has a notoriously bad reputation in the anglo-saxon world. 
The Economist, for instance, talks of "fortress Germany' and 
"Germany's sometimes xenophobic industrial establishmenY'124 and 
claims that an "influential old-boy network' together with "legal 
barriers" make German stock corporations all but impregnable. 125 
The following chapter tries to get to the bottom of these kind of 
statements by analysing in some depth the existing structural 
barriers. Actual defences to takeovers are considered in 
Chapter 4.3.126 and Chapter 4.4.127 
4.2.1. Equity markets 
It has been pointed out in Chapter 2 that the equity markets in 
Germany are rather underdeveloped. The economic environment is 
therefore somewhat obstructive to a flourishing market for corporate 
control. Although government initatives - represented in Chapter 2- 
endeavour to encourage the flotation of stock corporations, and 
probably will succeed in the long run, the number of officially listed 
stock corporations in Germany is still much smaller than in Britain. 128 
124 Economist, 7 December 1991: Management Focus: Pre-merger 
management. 
125 Economist, 23 February 1991: Our crowd: Corporate governance in 
Germany. 
126 At pp. 156. 
127 At pp. 165. 
128 See Table 2 at p. 19. 
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Furthermore, the shareholder structure tends to be less open than in 
Britain. In non-listed stock-corporations family holdings often play the 
dominant role and listed companies are frequently part of a 
corporate group with another company holding a controlling stake, 129 
the latter facilitated by the absence of a requirement of a mandatory 
bid. It has been estimated, thus, that the number of listed stock 
corporations susceptible to takeovers in terms of ownership structure 
hardly exceed 100, which is a small number indeed. 130 
4.2.2. Two Tier Board System and Employee 
Representation 
A bidder having acquired the majority of shares normally 
endeavours to replace the existing management with his 
confidants. 131 This is, of course, all the more vital if the takeover has 
been hostile and the existing management can not be expected to 
co-operate. However, dismissing the management of a German 
stock corporation is not as easy a task as it is in principle in a British 
public company where section 303 of the Companies Act 1985 
applies. The division of power in a British public company and a 
German stock corporation differs quite fundamentally in that in the 
structure of the English public company is rather straightforward with 
only two corporate organs - the general meeting of the shareholders 
and the board of directors - who share all power between them. 132 
129 Estimates are that about 75 per cent of all stock corporations are part of a 
corporate group: see Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, §1 III 2d. 
For an empirical study see Görling, Die Verbreitung zwei- und 
mehrstufiger Unternehmensverbindungen, AG 1993,538-547. 
Concerning cross-shareholdings as takeover barriers see Chapter 4.3.3. 
at pp. 164. As to the law of groups in Germany see Chapter 4.2.5. at 
pp. 151. 
130 Hopt, European Takeover Regulation, p. 165,168. 
131 Marquardt, Gesellschafts- und steuerrechtliche Instrumente zur Abwehr 
feindlicher Übernahmen von Aktiengesellschaften, WiB 1994,537,540. 
132 Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, p. 147 et seq. 
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The German model, quite well known in Europe since its adoption by 
the proposed, but blocked, Fifth Directive in 1972,133 is more 
complex. Power has to be shared between three organs: The 
general meeting of shareholders, the management board, and the 
supervisory board. 134 However, what really differentiates a German 
stock corporation form a British public company is the high degree of 
employee participation at all levels in a German stock corporation. 135 
The following account examines the difficulties a bidder is likely 
to face at the post-acquisition stage. The removal and appointment 
of the members of both the management and the supervisory board 
in which context employee participation plays an important role are 
considered. 
(1) The Management Board 
The management board is exclusively responsible for the day-to- 
day management of the company. 136 The implementation of new 
policies by a successful bidder can therefore only be successful if the 
support of the management board is secured by either co-operation 
with or removal of the members of the incumbent management 
board. Neither the general meeting nor the supervisory board have 
the power to interfere with what is considered a managerial or 
executive task. 137 The law of stock corporations places great 
133 First draft: (1972] O. J. C131/49. For details see Palmer's Company Law, 
para 16.402 et seq. See also Chapter 5.2. at pp. 198. 
134 Management Board: Sec. 76-94 AktG. Supervisory Board: Sec. 95-116 
AktG. General Meeting: Sec. 118-147 AktG. 
135 A very good analysis in English provides Hadden, Employee Participation 
- What Future for the German Model?, Company Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 6, 
p. 250 (1982). Note however the amendmends made in in 1994 
mentioned in the text. 
136 Sec. 76 AktG. 
137 Sec. 76 (1), 111 (4) AktG. Huffer, Aktiengesetz-Kommentar, § 76 Rn. 7. It 
is possible, however, by way of a specific provision in the articles to make 
certain deals or actions by the board members which are to be specified 
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emphasis on the independence of the management board and 
regards certain powers as managerial and therefore inalienable by 
the management board. A provision in the articles granting the 
general meeting the right to give directions by special resolution as 
Regulation 70 of Table A of the Companies Regulations 1985 in 
Britain does would be void under the Stock Corporations Act. The 
English approach is more flexible since the division of power is to a 
large extent left for the members to decide upon in the articles. 1 38 
The independence of a German management board is most 
drastically reflected by the provisions governing their appointment 
and removal. 
(a) Appointment of Management Board Members 
The members of the management board are appointed for a 
period not exceeding five years by the supervisory board, and not by 
the general meeting. 1 39 Reappointment is possible, though. A new 
supervisory board resolution is, however, required in the latter case. 
Unless the articles provide for a greater majority, a simple majority of 
the supervisory board is needed for the appointment or 
reappointment. The supervisory board determines the salary of the 
management board members, which according to the Stock 
Corporations Act has to be adequate and must not be exessive. 140 
Disproportionate severance payments would constitute a breach of 
duties on the part of the supervisory board. The service contracts of 
the board members may not exceed their term of office -a provision 
which effectively prevents rolling contracts in the form commonly 
dependent upon the consent of the supervisory board, sec. 111 (4) 
sentence 2 AktG. 
138 Pennington, Company Law, p. 572. 
139 Sec. 84 (1) AktG. 
140 Sec. 87 AktG. 
Chapter 4 136 
applied in Britain. 141 Excessive compensation packages are 
therefore not possible in Germany. 142 
(b) Removal of Management Board Members 
A member of the management board may only be removed by a 
resolution of the supervisory board. 143 Again, unless the articles 
impose more stringent rules, a simple majority suffices. Yet, even if 
the supervisory board decided unanimously to dismiss a member of 
the management board, removal is only possible if it is justified by 
either of the following three grounds: a gross violation of duties, 
incapability to manage or a vote of no confidence by the general 
meeting. 144 Hence, a predator holding the majority of shares can 
provide a sufficient cause to dismiss the management board by a 
vote of no confidence. However, even if it does so it is ultimately left 
for the supervisory board to decide on a discretionary basis whether 
to dismiss any or all members of the management board. 145 If the 
supervisory board eventually decides to dismiss a member of the 
management board, this decision can be challenged by the 
dismissed member in court. 146 To sum up, there is no direct way for 
the general meeting, i. e. a successful bidder, to enforce the 
replacement of the members of the management board. This can 
141 Sec. 84 (1) sentence 5 AktG. As to rolling contracts in Britain see 
Chapter 3.3.5. at pp. 80. 
142 Peltzer, Hostile Takeovers in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland?, 
ZIP 1989,69,74. 
143 Sec. 84 (3) AktG. However, the dismissal-resolution does under the 
relevant labour law provisions, in particular sec. 626 BGB (serious cause), 
not automatically terminate the service contract of the director the result 
of which is that the dismissed director may still be entitled to his salary 
until the service contract expires. 
144 Sec. 84 III AktG. For details see Huffer, Aktiengesetz-Kommentar, § 84 
Rn. 38,39. 
145 Hauschka/Roth, Übernahmeangebote and deren Abwehr im deutschen 
Recht, AG 1988,181,188; Daum, Die unkoordinierte Übernahme, p. 106. 
146 Bundesgerichtshof BGH WM 1981,759; Huffer, Aktiengesetz- 
Kommentar, § 84 Rn. 33. 
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only be achieved with the help of the supervisory board. It is 
therefore of utmost importance to a bidder to win control of the 
supervisory board. 
(2) The Supervisiory Board 
The supervisory board has the general duty to oversee the 
management of the stock corporation, but is not concerned with the 
day-to-day business. 147 In addition, the Stock Corporations Act 
provides for a number of specific powers and duties and the articles 
may confer further powers on the supervisory board as long as this 
does not conflict with the exclusive managerial tasks of the 
management board. The articles may, for instance, require approval 
by the supervisory board of certain transactions, like the acquisition 
of another company. Most importantly, as has already been pointed 
out the supervisory board is responsible for the appointment and 
removal of members of the management board. 
(a) Appointment and Removal of the Members of the 
Supervisory Board 
Pursuant to the Stock Corporations Act, the members of the 
supervisory board are elected by ordinary resolution by the 
shareholders in general meeting for a maximum period of five 
years. 148 Staggered terms of office are possible. 149 The general 
meeting is empowered to dismiss the members of the supervisory 
147 Sec. 111 AktG. 
148 Sec. 102 AktG. 
149 See Hauschka/Roth, Übernahmeangebote und deren Abwehr, AG 1988, 
181,187. 
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board they elected. 150 However, such a resolution will normally 
require a three-quarter majority of the capital represented at the 
general meeting. 151 The articles may allow for a greater or lesser 
majority. In practice, most of the listed stock corporations have 
modified their articles so that a simple majority suffices to remove the 
supervisory board, 152 but this may well change if takeovers were to 
become more frequent in Germany. Unlike the removal of the 
management board, a sufficient or just cause is not required for the 
dismissal of a member of the supervisory board. The remuneration 
of the supervisory board members is either determined by way of a 
provision in the articles or a resolution of the general meeting. 153 
This fairly clear picture is complicated and modified by the law 
concerning employee representation. Additionally, special 
appointment rights may be granted to certain shareholders. 
(b) Employee Representation 
The law regarding employee representation is complex and 
somewhat unmethodical. Only a basic review of the facts most 
relevant to a potential bidder will be given here. 154 The law is 
contained in a number of different acts outside the Stock 
Corporations Act. 
150 Sec. 103 AktG. 
151 Sec. 103 AktG. 
152 Otto, Obstacles to foreigners are nothing but a myth, Financial Times, 20 
February 1991. 
153 Sec. 113 AktG. 
154 A good review provide Martens, Das Recht der unternehmerischen 
Mitbestimmung, JuS 1983,329 and Hadden, Employee Participation - 
What Future for the German Model?, Company Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 6, 
p. 250 (1982). 
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(aa) Coal and steel industry with more than 1.000 
employees 
Employee representation on supervisory board level was first 
introduced in the coal and steel industry by the Coal and Steel Co- 
Determination Acts 1951 and 1956 (Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz). 
Under these provisions a supervisory board normally consists of 11 
members, five of which are selected by the shareholders and five by 
the employees. 155 The eleventh member remains neutral. He is an 
agreed candidate selected jointly by both the shareholder and the 
employee representatives of the board. 156 Once selected all 
members of the supervisory board are elected by the general 
meeting. Because of this selection process, complete parity between 
the two major groups of the supervisory board exists and the vote of 
the neutral member will often be decisive. 157 The employee 
representatives can be removed by a resolution of the general 
meeting only if the employees propose to do So. 158 The neutral 
member can only be dismissed by court order if a sufficient cause 
exists. 159 For a successful bidder this means in practice that he will 
normally only be able to dismiss five out of eleven supervisory board 
members. Consequently, he is dependent upon the co-operation of 
either the neutral member or at least one member of the employee 
representatives to achieve the all important replacement of the 
members of the management board. Thus, as far as the steel and 
155 Sec. 4 Montan-MitbestG 1951. Where corporate groups in the coal and 
steel sector are concerned, sec. 5 (1) of the Montan- 
Mitbestimmungsergänzungsgesetz 1956 applies (15 supervisory board 
members, 7 shareholder representatives, 7 employee representatives, 1 
neutral member). 
156 Sec. 8 Montan-MitbestG 1951. 
157 For details see Konzen, Paritätische Mitbestimmung im Montanbereich, 
AG 1983,289. 
158 Sec. 11 Montan-MitbestG 1951, Sec. 103 AktG. 
159 Sec. 11 (3) Montan-MitbestG 1951. 
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coal industry is concerned, the prospects of a hostile bidder winning 
effective control over the two corporate boards look rather bleak. 
(bb) Stock corporations with less than 2.000 
employees outside the coal and steel industry 
Pursuant to the Works Constitution Act 1952 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952) at least one-third of the members 
of the supervisory board must consist of employee 
representatives. 160 Hence, the shareholder representatives retain 
the absolute majority of seats. In this category employee 
representation might be annoying, but it does not constitute a barrier 
to a successful bidder gaining control over the corporate boards. The 
suspervisory board must have at least three members. The 
maximum number permitted by the Stock Corporations Act varies 
from 9 to 21 members depending on the capital of the company. 161 
It should be noted that in 1994 an amendment to the relevant 
Works Constitution Act 1952, designed to increase the popularity of 
stock corporations, abolished any form of mandatory employee 
representation on supervisory boards of newly floated stock 
corporations with less than 500 employees. 162 Existing stock 
corporations with less than 500 employees are not affected, though. 
160 Sec. 76 BetriebsVerfG. 
161 Sec. 95 AktG. 
162 Sec. 76 (4) BetnebsVerfG. See also Chapter 2 and Kindler, Die 
Aktiengesellschaft für den Mittelstand, NJW 1994,3041,3045. 
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(cc) Stock corporations with more than 2.000 
employees outside the coal and steel industry 
According to the Co-Determination Act 1976 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976) half the members of the supervisory 
board must consist of employee representatives in this category. 163 
The employee representatives are elected by the employees and 
may only be removed by them. 164 The number of supervisory board 
members depends on the size of the company and ranges from 12 
to 20.165 However, unlike the coal and steel industry, parity is not 
fully achieved because the chairman of the supervisory board, who 
is, if no other agreement is reached, elected by the shareholder 
representatives of the board, has a casting vote. 166 Thus, although 
equal in number, the shareholder representatives can - if all 
members are present - always secure a majority in the supervisory 
board. Again, employee representation in these companies may be 
considered a "nuisance" by a successful bidder; it does not deter it, 
however, from exercising effective control over the corporate boards. 
(c) Special Appointment Rights 
Special rights to appoint up to one-third of the shareholder 
representatives of the supervisory board may be granted by the 
articles to certain shareholders. 167 Supervisory board members 
appointed in that way may only be removed by the shareholders 
163 Sec. 7 MitbestG 1976. 
164 Sec. 31 MitbestG 1976. 
165 Sec. 7 MitbestG 1976. 
166 Sec. 27,29 MitbestG 1976. 
167 Sec. 101 AktG. Henle, Defences to Corporate Takeover in Germany, 
(19941 ICCLR 122,126; lmmenga/Hellberg, Corporate Takeovers through 
the public market, p. 30. 
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having the appointment right. 168 Consequently, where such rights 
exist together with the law regarding employment representation they 
may easily prevent a bidder from gaining control of the supervisory 
board. 
(3) Summary 
Compared to English company law removing and appointing the 
members of the two corporate boards in Germany is generally 
speaking a major operation not easily achievable on a short-term 
basis. However, depending on the company's articles, its field of 
business and size, the removal requirements and the scale of 
employment representation on the supervisory board differ widely. 
Apart from the coal and steel industry, employee representation 
cannot prevent an successful bidder from gaining control of the 
corporate boards, though it makes German companies certainly less 
attractive to a foreign bidder not used to such a complex system of 
corporate governance. The main hurdle is the 75 per cent majority 
normally required to dismiss the shareholder representatives of the 
supervisory board. However, the articles of large companies may 
and often do stipulate a lower threshold. Yet, if special appointment 
rights are granted to particular shareholders, the bidder is in 
companies with more than 2.000 employees unlikely to succeed. 
Once the bidder controls the supervisory board, the dismissal and 
reappointment of the management board does not constitute a great 
problem. In any case, a very thorough analysis of the articles of the 
potential target company and the employment law applicable is 
essential in order to assess the difficulties a bidder might face. 
Although it does in most cases not seem impossible to overcome 
these obstacles, provided the bid is very carefully planned and 
168 Sec. 103 AktG. 
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handled, the statement that the mentioned obstacles are "nothing but 
a myth"169 appears exaggerated to say the least. In general, the two- 
tier board system together with the absence of a provision equivalent 
to section 303 of the Companies Act 1985 on the one hand and the 
extensive employee representation on the other hand complicate 
takeovers and give German stock corporations some scope for the 
erection of barriers. Since the obstacles mentioned here represent a 
fundamental part of German company and labour law and are not 
specifically erected with an intent to hamper (foreign) takeovers, 
changes are not likely in this respect. 
4.2.3. The Role of the Banks 
To itemize banks as takeover barriers may be surprising to a 
British reader. Indeed, given the enormous fees involved in 
Britain, 170 British merchant banks are among the main beneficiaries 
and promoters of takeovers and, thus, quite the opposite of a barrier. 
In order to understand why and in what way German banks are 
likely to impede non-agreed takeover bids, it is necessary to examine 
the role of banks in the German economy first. The unique position 
of German banks mainly derives from four factors. 171 
169 Otto, Obstacles to foreigners are nothing but a myth, Financial Times, 20 
February 1991. 
170 See, for example, Times, 11 January 1995: Trafalgar faces £60 million 
bid fees. Financial Times, 8 March 1995: the Glaxo/Wellcome bid 
expenses were expected to be around £100 million. Glaxo, advised by 
Lazard Brothers, had estimated its expenses at £77 million, of which £30 
million were fees, and the rest stamp duty. Wellcome, advised by Barings 
and Morgan Stanley, was expected to pay between £20 to £30 million. 
See also Financial Times, 24 January 1996: the Granada/Forte battle 
incurred £140 million in fees and costs. See also the critical article in the 
Guardian, 30 January 1995: Merger mania is madness. 
171 See Raiser, Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regelungen zur Einschränkung 
des Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften, NJW 1996, 
2257; Maier-Reimer, Protection Against Hostile Takeovers in Germany: 
Banks and Limitations on Voting Rights, p. 242 et seq. For an analysis 
including an empirical study see ZBB-Dokumentation, Die Macht der 
Banken - Anhörung im Bundestag, ZBB 1994,69-100. 
Chapter 4 144 
First, there is the traditional universal banking system which 
normally leads to a "house-bank relationship" between a bank and its 
client. 172 Unlike British banks which are usually either retail banks, 
wholesale banks, merchant banks or security firms and provide more 
or less specialized services only, 173 German banks are not normally 
specialized, but offer all sorts of financial services one can think 
of. 174 They may well be likened to a financial supermarket. 175 The 
fact that German companies are able to receive all financial services 
they possibly need from one bank normally leads to the so called 
house-bank relationship with one particular bank. In other words, a 
close long-term relationship with symbiotic features evolves between 
the bank and the company. Since the financing of German 
companies depends heavily on bank credits, 176 it is as important for 
the bank to be well informed about the company's affairs as it is for 
the company to enjoy the bank's goodwill and trust. Shopping 
around for financial services has not been a feature of corporate 
finance in Germany although there are indications that this may 
change in future. 177 
Secondly, this already close relationship between house-bank 
and company is often intensified by directorates on the supervisory 
board of the client-company granted to representatives of the house- 
bank which affords the bank with complete insight into the 
company's affairs. The Monopolies Commission 
(Monopolkommission) revealed that in 1988 the nine biggest banks 
held ninty-four seats on the supervisory boards of ninty-six of the 
172 Baums, Banks and Corporate Control in Germany, p. 267,270; Daum, 
Die unkoordinierte Übernahme, p. 242. Hopt, European Takeover 
Regulation, p. 165,169. A very good analysis regarding potential conflicts 
of interest arising from the universal banking system presents Petzer, Die 
Rolle der Banken bei Unternehmensveräußerungen, ZIP 1991,485. 
Werner, Probleme feindlicher Übernahmen, p. 19. 
173 Prest/Coppock"s, The UK Economy, p. 79 et seq. 
174 For an enumeration of the business carried out by banks see §1 
Kreditwesengesetz (Banking Act 1993). 
175 Hopt, European Takeover Regulation, p. 165,169. 
176 See Chapter 2 at pp. 17. 
177 Baums, Banks and Corporate Control in Germany, p. 267,270. 
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biggest 100 companies in Germany! The leading Deutsche Bank 
alone held thirty-five of these seats. 178 A survey of the exclusive 
DAX-30-Index companies unveiled that 25 per cent of the non- 
employee supervisory board members were bank 
representatives. 179 These frequent personal interlocks between 
leading banks and blue-chip German companies have resulted in a 
close-knit network of establishment figures - something rather well 
known in Britain. 
Thirdly, the banks regularly hold considerable stakes in the 
major companies they have business with which further strengthens 
their influence. 180 The table contained in APPENDIX 4 showing the 
stakes held by German banks in listed German Stock Corproations 
illustrates this point well. 181 
Last but not least, banks usually act as depositaries for small 
investors and administer and vote their shares. 182 Unlike Britain, 
proxy voting by the management of a stock corporation is not 
admissible in Germany. 183 Whereas in Britain proxies may unduly 
increase the board's power they most certainly do so in respect of 
banks in Germany. 184 
Looking back at these four factors - house-bank relationships, 
personal interlocks, stakes, and proxy votes - it is evident how 
178 For further details see Baums, Banks and Corporate Control in Germany, 
p. 267,275. As to a chracterisation of the Deutsche Bank see Economist, 
22 June 1991: "... Rich, aloof, secretive, it has been admired for its skill, 
but often attacked, even feared, as a behind-the scenes puller of the 
strings... " 
179 Raiser, Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regelungen zur Einschränkung des 
Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften, NJW 1996,2257, 
2258 with further details and references. 
180 Baums, Banks and Corporate Control in Germany, p. 267,271. 
181 For detailed information see AG-Report, Fragen im Bundestag zu den 
Bankbeteiligungen, AG 1995, R 506-507. Adams, Die Usurpation von 
Aktionärsbefugnissen mittels Ringverflechtung in der "Deutschland AG", 
AG 1994,148,153. 
182 Sec. 135 AktG and the provisions of the Depotgesetz 1937. Baums, 
Banks and Corporate Control in Germany, p. 267,272. 
183 Sec. 136 II AktG; Huffer, Aktiengesetz-Kommentar § 134 Rn. 25. 
184 K. Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 28 IV p. 717; Baums, Banks and 
Corporate Control in Germany, p. 267,272. 
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powerful the position of the large banks in both the German 
economy as a whole and in respect of their clients is. Because of 
those close house-bank relationships, a hostile bid for the client 
company is very likely to be rejected by the bank too. If the house- 
bank co-operated with the bidder, it would risk to lose its old client to 
another bank. Besides, hostile takeovers as a means of acquiring 
corporate control are still viewed with distaste by the conservative 
German banking establishment. 185 The former president of the 
Deutsche Bank, who was murdered by left-wing terrorists in 1989, 
Alfred Herrhausen, once coined the phrase, that "takeovers are a 
wrong track of capitalism". 186 Hence, if, for example, an unwelcome 
foreign company attempted to win control over a large German stock 
corporation, it would most probably not only have to put up with 
defensive measures installed by the target company itself but also 
with the house-bank voting its own shares and, more importantly, the 
proxy-shares of its clients against the bidder. 187 If the house-bank is 
one of the big three private banks - Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank 
and Commerzbank - which is not unlikely if a large stock corporation 
is concerned, the number of shares voted by the bank could be very 
considerable. This position is further strengthened by the usually 
relatively low level of shareholder participation in general 
meetings. 188 Although shareholders may instruct the depository 
bank on how to vote their shares, 189 private investors normally do 
not bother. Whether this habit would change in case of a takeover 
185 See Werner, Probleme feindlicher Übernahmen im Aktienrecht, p. 7 et 
seq. Economist, 4 July 1992; Hopt, European Takeover Regulation, 
p. 165,169. 
186 Werner, Probleme feindlicher Übernahmen im Aktienrecht, p. 7. 
187 Adams, Die Usurpation von Aktionärsbefugnissen mittels 
Ringverflechtung in der "Deutschland AG", AG 1994,148,155. 
188 For an empirical study see ZBB-Dokumentation, Die Macht der Banken - 
Anhörung im Bundestag, ZBB 1994,69,76. The following figures relate to 
1992: BASF: 50,3 %; Bayer. 50,1 %; Conti-Gummi: 52,8 %; Daimler. 
79,0 %; Hoechst 71,3 %; Hoesch: 87,6 %; Mannesmann: 37,2 %; 
Schering: 35,9 %; Siemens: 50,0 %; Thyssen: 68,2 %; VEBA: 51,0 %; 
VW: 34,9 %. 
189 Sec. 135 AktG. 
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battle taking place seems rather doubtful. 190 If, as is often the case, 
the voting rights exerciseable by one shareholder are restricted to, 
say, 5 per cent, the situation becomes even more difficult for a 
bidder. 191 Whereas the bidder as a single shareholder cannot 
exercise more than 5 per cent of its own shares, the bank can vote 
up to 5 per cent for each of its proxy-clients for it is not considered a 
single shareholder in its capacity as proxy. In these cases, banks are 
de facto by far the most important "shareholders". 
To sum up, in the present "corporate climate" in Germany it is 
likely that a hostile bid would be opposed by the relevant house- 
bank(s) of the target company. For the reasons given, this would 
result in a very serious barrier for any bidder-192 Although the power 
of the banks has been widely criticized in recent years, the present 
system is part of German corporate culture and not easy to change. 
While the present system clearly hampers a "market for corporate 
control", as it is known in Britain, and therefore constitutes a barrier, 
the German system has its advantages in terms of corporate 
governance too which is why many oppose changes to the present 
structure. A major argument in favour of the German system is that 
the heavy involvement of the often very competent banks, which 
have a natural interest in their clients prospering, helps 
management, ensures that difficult (financial) reconstructions go 
through, and guarantees a higher overall measure of stability which 
contributes of the success of the economy as a whole. However, in 
the face of growing international competition and the desire to make 
the German stock market more attractive to (foreign) investors, it is 
likely that the banks will lose some of their power in the long run. A 
number of proposals to that end have been made, including a 
limitation of the banks' right to hold stakes in non-banking 
190 Contrary: Otto, Obstacles to foreigners are nothing but a myth, Financial 
Times, 20 February 1991. 
191 See in detail Chapter 4.3.1. at pp. 157. 
192 The same conclusion reaches Adams, Die Usurpation von 
Aktionärsbefugnissen mittels Ringverflechtung in der "Deutschland AG", 
AG 1994,148,153. 
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corporations and a restriction of the banks' function as 
depositaries. 193 
4.2.4. Availability of Corporate Information 
The availability of corporate information is one of the essential 
pre-conditions without which a market for corporate control cannot 
operate. The following subchapters will consider the accessibility of 
the target's articles, the availability of financial information, and the 
identification of its shareholders. 
(1) The Articles 
Although there is no centralised Companies Registration Office 
as it exists in England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, 194 
Commercial Registers (Handelsregister) are located at every District 
Court (Amtsgericht) in Germany. 195 Thus, several hundred of them 
are spread all over the country. 
Stock corporations are required to file their articles at the time of 
the initial registration and whenever amendments are made with the 
competent Commercial Register, 196 within whose jurisdiction they 
have their corporate seat. The corporate seat of a stock corporation 
is determined by the articles subject to the qualification that it must 
either be the location of the company's headquaters or a place 
193 As to further references to these recent developments see Raiser, 
Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regelungen zur Einschränkung des 
Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften, NJW 1996,2257, 
2258 et seq.; Baums, Vollmachtstimmrecht der Banken - Ja oder Nein?, 
AG 1996,11 et seq. For a balanced review of these issues see also 
Peitzer, Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regelungen zur Einschränkung des 
Einflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellschaften?, JZ 1996,842 et 
seq. and Peltzer, Die Vertretung der Aktionäre in Hauptversammlungen 
von Publikumsgesellschaften, AG 1996,26 et seq. 
194 Sec. 704 CA 1985. 
195 Sec. 8 HGB (Handelsgesetzbuch = Trade Act). For details see the 
Commercial Register Rules 1937 (Handelsregisterverfügung). 
196 Sec. 36,37,181 AktG. 
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where the company has at least a production unit. 197 Documents 
submitted to the Commercial Register are open for inspection by the 
public without any further qualifications. 198 
To identify the competent Commercial Register is not a problem: 
Stock corporations are required to state on their business letters 
where the corporate seat is located, which the competent 
Commercial Register is, and the registration number under which the 
company's articles are to be found in the respective Commercial 
Register. 1 99 Moreover, the names of the management board- 
members as well as that of the chairman of the supervisory board 
have to be specified. Hence, is should not prove difficult for a 
potential bidder attain the target's articles at little to no cost. 
(2) Financial information 
Apart from the share price, which reflects to some extent the 
company's performance, financial information basically means 
accounting information. The implementation of the Forth200 and 
Seventh201 Directive had a radical effect on German accounting, the 
details of which are beyond the scope of this work. 202 
As in Britain, companies are categorised. Publicly listed stock 
corporations are deemed to be large companies, i. e. the most 
stringent accountancy rules apply. 203 
197 Sec. 5 AktG. 
198 Sec. 9 HGB. 
199 Sec. 80 (1) AktG. The situation is identical with respect to limited 
companies: sec. 35a GmbHG. These provisions go back to Article 3 of 
the First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968, O. J. L 65/8. 
200 78/660; [1978] O. J. L222/11. Implemented in the U. K. by the Companies 
Act 1981. 
201 83/349; [1983] O. J. L193/1. Implemented in the U. K. by the Companies 
Act 1989. 
202 See Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 29 IV, p. 759 et seq. 
203 Sec. 267 HGB. 
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A stock corporation has to file its year end balance sheet 
together with the related profit and loss account and notes thereto 
plus the directors'204 and the auditors' report with the relevant 
Commercial Register. Of particular interest to a potential bidder 
could be the directors' report, which must provide a fair review of the 
development of the business. 205 Again, all information filed with the 
Commercial Register is publicly accessible. 206 Because of the 
detailed provisions in the Accounting Directive, the differences 
between Britain and Germany in this respect seem rather minor. 
(3) Shareholder Identification 
The predominant use of bearer shares in Germany has been 
pointed out in different contexts before. 207 It is obvious, that the 
anonymity afforded by bearer shares is an obstacle to the 
identification of shareholders. The knowledge of the ownership 
structure is, however, an important factor in assessing the prospects 
of a public offer. If it happens to be the case that (some) registered 
shares are issued, 208 the register of members may be inspected at 
the company's registered office by any member free of charge. 209 
The severity of the barrier here discussed has been reduced - as 
far as listed stock corporations are concerned - since the introduction 
of the Securities Trading Act in January 1995, which lessened the 
disclosure thresholds from 25 per cent to only 5 per cent. 210 
204 In a stock corporation normally prepared by the management board 
(Vorstand). 
205 Sec. 264,289 HGB. 
206 See Chapter 4.2.4. (1) at pp. 148. 
207 See Chapter 4.1.2. at pp. 122. 
208 Sec. 10 AktG. 
209 Sec. 67 AktG. 
210 See Chapter 4.1.2. (2) at pp. 125 and APPENDIX 3. 
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However, shareholders holding less than 5 per cent may only be 
contacted through banks, if the banks act as depositaries, 211 or 
public media announcements. If a notice of the offer is published in a 
specific quasi-official publication, the Wertpapiermitteilungen lll, 
banks acting as depositaries are under No. 16 of the 
Sonderbedingungen für Wertpapiergeschäfte212 obliged to inform 
their clients holding shares of the target of the offer. Although it is in 
respect of those shareholders using banks as depositories not 
possible for a bidder to indentify them by name, it is possible to 
contact them "anonymously" through the banks. 
To sum up, shareholder identification remains a somewhat 
difficult issue in Germany, albeit it should not be considered an 
absolute barrier to a takeover. 213 
4.2.5. The Law Governing Groups of 
Companies 
The German Stock Corporations Act comprises a distinct body 
of rules governing the relationship between holding companies and 
subsidiaries (see APPENDIX 2). 214 Although this so called 
"Konzernrecht' does not impede the acquisition of a controlling 
stake, it can complicate the post-acquisition integration of the newly 
acquired stock corporation into the bidder's empire and in so far 
constitute an indirect barrier to a successful takeover. 215 Moreover, 
the concept of a special law of groups has no direct equivalent in 
211 To the role of banks in this context see Chapter 4.2.3. at pp. 143. 
212 Sonderbedingungen for Wertpapiergeschäfte reproduced in WM 1995, 
362 et seq. For a discussion see Kumpel, Die neuen Sonderbedingungen 
for Wertpapiergeschäfte, WM 1995,137,143. 
213 As to the disclosure of members present at a general meeting see 
Sec. 129 Akt and Article 29 of the proposed 5th Directive. 
214 Sec. 291-328 AktG. A translations of these provisions can be found in 
Hopt (ed. ), Groups of Companies in European Laws, 1982, p. 265-295. 
215 Hopt, European Takeover Regulation, p. 171. 
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English law216 and a British bidder might therefore not be fully aware 
of the implications these rules have in practice. 
The aim of the German law of groups mainly is to protect 
minority shareholders in and creditors of the subsidiary company 
from the particular hazards which come with dependency from 
another company. 217 It has been pointed out earlier that the 
absence of a mandatory bid requirement results in companies often 
holding just as large a stake as is necessary to control the target 
company effectively, and the need for a special law of groups is 
therefore greater than in Britain. 218 
Corporate groups in Germany may be based either on some 
form of control contract, 219 which is to some extent favoured by tax 
law, 220 or on the holding of a controlling stake, the so-called de facto 
group. 
(1) Contract-based Groups 
The conclusion of a control contract and/or profit transfer 
contract between the holding and the subsidiary company as 
provided for in section 291 of the Stock Corporations Act leads to a 
complete dependency of the subsidiary company and grants the 
holding company the right to give binding instructions which may be 
detrimental to the interests of the subsidiary as long as the parent 
company is acting in the interest of the group as a whole. 221 Thus, in 
216 Pennington, Company Law, p. 748; Prentice, Groups of Companies in 
European Laws, p. 99; Schmitthoff, The wholly owned and controlled 
subsidiary, [1978) JBL 218. 
217 For an outline of the German law of groups in English see Immenga, The 
Law of Groups in the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 85-121. 
218 See Chapter 3.2.1. at pp. 67. 
219 As to the different types of contracts see Sec. 291,292 AktG. 
220 Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, § 10 I. 
221 Sec. 308 AktG. For details see Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, 
§ 18. 
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this kind of situation the target company is fully integrated and the 
bidder has achieved its aim. However, coming to this point is not an 
easy task for a bidder, and the price to pay is considerable. A control 
or profit transfer contract requires the approval of 75 per cent of the 
capital represented in the general meetings of the respective 
companies and needs to be filed with the Commercial Register. 222 
The requirement of a consideration not being a concept of the civil 
law, there are no provisions regarding this matter. However, the law 
undertakes to protect the minority shareholders in the subsidiary and 
its creditors in various ways, of which only the most important are 
mentioned here. 
First, in the interest of the subsidiary's creditors the holding 
company must settle any losses the subsidiary runs up throughout 
the financial year. 223 
Secondly, a fixed dividend must be guaranteed to the minority 
shareholders in the subsidiary based on the subsidiary's record 
previous to the control and/or profit transfer contract. 224 The exact 
amount payable to the minority shareholders may be reviewed by the 
courts on the application of any minority shareholder. 
Thirdly, a control or profit transfer contract must contain a clause 
granting any minority shareholder the right to be bought out for a 
fixed price. 225 Again, if a shareholder is not satisfied with the price 
offered, he may bring the issue before the courts - which 
shareholders in practice often do. 
222 Sec. 294 AktG. 
223 Sec. 302 AktG. 
224 Sec. 304 AktG. 
225 Sec. 305 AktG. 
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(2) De Facto Groups 
Where a de facto group exists, i. e. a group not based on a 
contract but on a controlling stake, the holding company must, unlike 
the parent company in a contract based group, not use its influence - 
in whatever way it is exerted - to force the subsidiary into any 
detrimental transactions or other disadvantageous steps unless it 
takes precautions to compensate the subsidiary for the losses 
incurred within the financial year. 226 Unless a control contract is 
concluded, the management of the subsidiary is - at least in theory - 
fully independent and not obliged to follow any instructions given to it 
by either its general meeting or, indeed, anybody else. 227 It has to 
act in the best interests of the subsidiary company and not the group. 
If the holding company exerts a detrimental influence without making 
good the losses ensuing, the holding company228 itself as well as 
the members of its boards229 may be liable for the damages suffered 
by the subsidiary because of the detrimental influence exercised. 
The management of the subsidiary may also be liable because of a 
contravention of its duty to act in the best interests of the (subsidiary) 
company. 230 Both the subsidiary company itself and, more 
importantly, its shareholders may instigate court procedures against 
the holding company and its management to claim damages. 
Moreover, if the de facto influence wielded by the holding 
company reaches a degree where the subsidiary is - contrary to the 
principle of independence of management231 - permanently more or 
less run like a mere branch of the holding company, 232 the holding 
226 Sec. 311 AktG. 
227 Sec. 76 AktG. Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, § 19 I; Immenga, 
The law of groups, p. 85,107. 
228 Sec. 317 AktG. 
229 Sec. 318 AktG. 
230 Sec. 93 AktG. 
231 Sec. 76 AktG. 
232 So-called "qualifizierter faktischer Konzern". 
Chapter 4 155 
company has according to the majority opinion to settle all losses the 
subsidiary incurs throughout the financial year regardless of any 
specific and identifiable detrimental actions forced upon it by the 
holding company (qualified de facto group). Since such a situation of 
total de facto dependency would amount to a situation by and large 
similar to that under a control or profit transfer contract, the majority 
opinion in Germany advocates that consequently these rules should 
apply by way of analogy in order to prevent a circumvention of the 
stricter shareholder and creditor protection guaranteed by these 
rules. Hence, the consequences for a successful bidder exercising 
the described strong influence on the target can be drastic. 
Generally speaking, however, it is very difficult for the minority 
shareholders, with whom as potential plaintiffs lies the burden of 
proof, to assess what is going on in the respective boardrooms and 
whether any detrimental influence is exercised by the holding 
company. 233 To address this problem the law requires the 
management board of the subsidiary to draw up on an annual basis 
a detailed so-called dependency report specifying any transactions 
between the respective companies and any steps taken by the 
subsidiary at the instance of the holding. 234 This report is examined 
by the subsidiary's auditors, but for reasons of business secrecy it 
may not be inspected by shareholders or creditors235 which has led 
to the general belief that the dependency report is of little use in 
practice. Generally, it is widely acknowledged that the enforcement 
of the rules concerning de facto groups leaves much to be 
desired. 236 As has been stated, their enforcement mainly relies upon 
either the subsidiary's management or the shareholders bringing 
actions for damages against the holding company. The subsidiary's 
233 Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, § 21 II; Immenga, The law of 
groups, p. 85,108. 
234 Sec. 312 AktG. 
235 Sec. 313 AktG. 
236 Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, § 20 IV 1; Immenga, The law of 
groups, p. 85,108. K. Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, § 31 IV 1, p. 802. 
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management, however, if appointed by the holding company, will not 
normally act against the holding company, and individual 
shareholders usually lack the evidence and the considerable 
financial means necessary to bring such an action about. 
Enforcement against a foreign holding company looks even more 
difficult. 237 Nevertheless, a potential foreign bidder must be aware of 
the obligation imposed on it by the law of groups. 
(3) Summary 
To sum up, although the German law of groups is far too 
complex to be fully considered in this chapter, the point here made is 
that these rather complicated rules tend to restrict the integration of a 
stock corporation into a corporate group in favour of the protection of 
minority shareholders in and creditors of the subsidiary. Full 
integration is only possible if both parties enter into a control and/or 
profit transfer contract. However, even if the majorities required for 
this can be secured, it has been demonstrated that such a contract 
has its drawbacks too. Similar to the law concerning employee 
representation, the law of groups does not prevent a bidder from 
acquiring control, but it renders corporate governance more difficult 
and probably makes German stock corporations less attractive in the 
eyes of potential foreign bidders. 
4.3. Protective Measures in Advance of a Bid 
Given the structural barriers inherent in German law, it is obvious 
that there is comparatively little need for additional defensive 
measures. This chapter will be confined to those "poison pills" of at 
237 Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, §8 111 2. 
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least some practical relevance in the present corporate climate in 
Germany. Two defensive measures, namely staggered terms of 
office for the members of the supervisory board238 and special 
appointment rights239, have already been examined in the pertinent 
context of the respective structural barriers. 
4.3.1. Restrictions on Voting Rights 
Restrictions on voting rights have a long history in Germany. 
They were widespread during the 1920s, provoked mainly by the 
general fear of "foreign infiltration". 240 Their use was severely 
restrained, however, when the 1938 amendment to the Stock 
Corporations Act 1937 made the introduction of such restrictions 
conditional upon ministerial approval. Yet, this condition was 
abolished by the Stock Corporations Act 1965241 and voting 
restrictions became fashionable again in the mid 1970s when after 
the "oil-crisis" in 1973/74 oil-exporting Arab states such as Kuwait 
and Iran bought large stakes in German blue-chip stock 
corporations, such as Daimler Benz and Krupp, which was - rightly or 
wrongly - commonly perceived as a threat to national security. 242 
The latest wave of voting restrictions came in the late 1980s when 
the managements of large listed stock corporations with a widely 
dispersed shareholder structure, alarmed by events in neighbouring 
European countries and Germany itself, suddenly realised the 
possible threat of takeovers. 243 Nowadays voting restrictions are the 
238 See Chapter 4.2.2. (2)(a) at pp. 137. 
239 See Chapter 4.2.2. (2)(c) at pp. 141. 
240 Baums, Hbchststimmrechte, AG 1990,221,239. 
241 Sec. 134 AktG. 
242 Haberland, Aktienrechtliche Maßnahmen zur Abwehr unerwünschter 
Beteiligungen, BB 1975,353. 
243 Martens, Stimmrechtsbeschränkung und Stimmbindungsvertrag im 
Aktienrecht, AG 1993,495: Zbllner/Noack, One share - one vote? 
AG 1991,117. 
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German standard "poison pill", indroduced by companies like Asko, 
BASF; Bayer, Continental, Deutsche Babcock, Deutsche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank, Dykerhoff, Henkel, Hoesch, Mannesmann, Veba. 
and Volkswagen, to mention but a few illustrious names. 244 
As has been explained earlier, voting right limitations restrict the 
number of votes an individual shareholder may exercise. 245 The 
most common limit chosen is 5 per cent. To introduce a voting right 
restriction into the articles of a stock corporation a 75 per cent 
majority of the capital represented in the general meeting is 
required. 246 The articles may provide that shares held by a 
nominees or a controlled, dependent, or affiliated company must be 
aggregated to the holding. 247 
The economic effect of a restriction on the exercisable votes is 
that investors are strongly discouraged to acquire a stake exceeding 
the percentage of the voting right limitation. A point often made to 
justify the introduction of voting right restrictions is that they, apart 
from scaring off corporate raiders, protect small investors from 
becoming locked-up minority shareholders deprived by a 
domineering majority shareholder. 248 However, this is only part of 
the picture. As one would think, there is clear evidence that the 
introduction of a voting right restriction affects the share price 
adversely because the company becomes less attractive to large 
investors. 249 The drop of the share price, however, is certainly not in 
the interest of small investors and neither is depriving them of the 
benefits of an attractive takeover offer. In fact, the interests of small 
investors often seem to play the least role in the introduction of a 
voting right restriction. What all too often seems to be behind it can - 
244 For details see Baums, Höchststimmrechte, AG 1990,221 footnote 6. 
245 See Chapter 4.2.3. at pp. 143. 
246 Sec. 134,179 AktG. 
247 Sec. 134 AktG. 
248 Martens, Stimmrechtsbeschränkung und Stimmbindungsvertrag, 
AG 1993,496. 
249 According to Baums, Höchststimmrechte, AG 1990,221,226the average 
share share price drop is about 4 per cent. 
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with only slight exaggeration - be called an unholy alliance beween 
the incumbent management and the depositary banks. 250 The 
management, especially the members of the supervisory board who 
are appointed and dismissed by the general meeting, favour the 
introduction of voting right restrictions because in the absence of 
powerful shareholders the balance of power is further shifted in their 
direction and guarantees almost complete independence from 
shareholder control and pressure. 251 Quite similar are the interests 
of the banks. In their capacity as proxies they are not considered to 
be shareholders which allows them to vote for each client the shares 
up to the voting limit! 252 This leads to the banks being by far the 
most influential voters in these companies, their proxies alone often 
representing the "majority". Since any bidder would acquire vast 
numbers of shares from small investors in a takeover, it is inevitable 
that the banks lost proxies which reduced their influence. 253 This is, 
of course, reason enough for them to oppose takeover bids and to 
vote in favour of the introduction of voting right limitations. 
Concerning the introduction of voting right limitations there is, 
hence, a clear conflict of interest regarding the management of the 
company and the banks. Some academic writers have called for a 
change of law and the abolition of voting right restrictions, which 
appears to be the preferable view. 254 The majority opinion, 255 
however, maintains that voting right restrictions are essential to scare 
250 Critical too Adams, Unbehinderte Übertragbarkeit, AG 1990,243,250; 
Baums, Höchststimmrechte, AG 1990,221,227 et seq. 
251 See Chapter 4.2.2. (2)(a) at pp. 137. 
252 See Chapter 4.2.3. at pp. 143. 
253 Adams, Höchstimmrechte, Mehrfachstimmrechte und sonstige 
wundersame Hindernisse, AG 1990,63 and Adams, Unbehinderte 
Übertragbarkeit, AG 1990,243,250; Baums, Höchststimmrechte, 
AG 1990,221,227 et seq. 
254 Adams, Höchstimmrechte, Mehrfachstimmrechte und sonstige 
wundersame Hindernisse, AG 1990,63; Baums, Höchststimmrechte, 
AG 1990,221,227 et seq. 
255 Huffer, Aktiengesetz-Kommentar, § 134 Rn. 5; Martens, 
Stimmrechtsbeschränkung und Stimmbindungsvertrag, AG 1993,496; 
Zöllner/Noack, One share - one vote? AG 1991,117. 
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off destructive corporate raiders and there seems at present little 
prospect for a change of law in Germany. 256 
Although a bidder may try to circumvent the restriction legally by 
entering into shareholder agreements, 257 Pirelli's example in the 
attempted Continental takeover showed that this may have 
disastrous consequences. 258 Besides, depending on the 
shareholder structure this may not always be possible and in any 
case very difficult to organise for a foreign bidder. As many of the 
more important general meeting resolutions, in particular any change 
of the articles, require a twofold majority (majority of the votes plus 
75 per cent of the share-capital respresented concerning which the 
voting right restriction does not apply), 259 by acquiring a blocking 
stake of 25 per cent of the share-capital a bidder may use this 
blocking power to force in the long run the incumbent management, 
who may not be ousted from office due the voting right limitation, to 
make concessions. 260 Hence, restrictions on voting rights may not 
make a stock corporation completely bid proof, but they are an 
effective and widely used weapon in the German anti-takeover 
arsenal to make the post-acquisition integration of the target very 
difficult. 
256 As to changes proposed by Art. 33 (2) of the draft 5th Directive see 
Chapter 5.2.2. at pp. 200. 
257 Baums, Höchststimmrechte, AG 1990,221,225; Martens, 
Stimmrechtsbeschränkung und Stimmbindungsvertrag, AG 1993,495, 
496. 
258 See Chapter 4. (2) at pp. 103. 
259 Sec. 134 (1) sentence 6 and sec. 179 (2) AktG. 
260 See in detail Baums, Höchststimmrechte, AG 1990,221,225. 
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4.3.2. Registered Shares with Restricted 
Transfer 
Recent events, which will be discussed later, give reason to 
examine the use of registered shares in the context of takeover 
defences. Although the shares issued in Germany are predominantly 
in the form of bearer shares, 261 the Stock Corporations Act permits 
the issue of registered shares as well. 262 Moreover, the articles may 
make the transfer of registered shares conditional upon the consent 
of the company which, unless the articles stipulate otherwise, means 
that the management board has to make this decision. 263 If the 
articles do not specify the grounds on which the transfer may be 
refused, the directors enjoy wide discretion. They are only bound by 
their duty to act in the best interests of the company. 264 Rather 
untypical for German stock corporation law, but quite like the 
situation in English company law, much is left for the articles to 
determine in respect of transferability. However, both in Britain265 
and Germany266 securities must be freely transferable if they are to 
be listed on a stock exchange. Yet, exceptions to this principle may 
be made by the competent authorities in the respective countries as 
long as the restricted transferablity does not disturb the market. A 
direct comparison of the wording267 of the relevant provisions shows, 
261 See Chapter 4.2.4. (3) at pp. 150. 
262 Sec. 10 AktG. 
263 Sec. 68 AktG. 
264 Landgericht Aachen, ZIP 1992,924; Huffer, Aktiengesetz-Kommentar, 
§ 68 Rn. 15. Henle, Defences to Corporate Takeover in Germany, [1994] 
4 ICCLR 122,124. 
265 Rule 3.15 of the Yellow Book. 
266 Sec. 5 Börsenzulassungsverordnung. 
267 Rule 3.15 of the Yellow Book: "In exceptional circumstances approved by 
the Exchange an applicant may take the power to disapprove the transfer 
of shares provided that the exercise of such power would not disturb the 
market in those shares. " 
Sec. 5 II Nr. 2 Börsenzulassungsverordnung: "Die Zulassungsstelle kann 
Aktien, deren Erwerb einer Zustimmung bedarf, zulassen, wenn das 
Zustimmungserfordernis nicht zu einer Störung des Börsenhandels führt. " 
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however, not only that the British drafting is more precise but also 
that the requirements are more stringent. Under the Yellow Book 
restricted transferability may only be allowed in "exceptional 
circumstances" whereas the German Admission Rules do not require 
this. In practice, restricted transfer of shares in Germany is often 
found in smaller non-listed stock corporations dominated by a family. 
However, for historical reasons insurance companies listed on the 
German stock exchanges frequently do have registered shares with 
restricted transfer. 268 As the following example demonstrates, a 
hostile takeover of such an insurance company in Germany is - at 
best - extremely difficult. 
In 1990/1991 the French insurance company Assurances 
Generales de France (AGF), in which the French government has a 
75 per cent stake, tried to acquire a so-called blocking minority269 of 
little more than 25 per cent in the German Aachener and Münchener 
Versicherungsgruppe (AMB), whose capital consists mainly of 
registered shares, the transfer of which is conditional upon the 
management board's consent. 270 Having acquired a small stake 
already, AGF then wanted to acquire a further 17.6 per cent stake in 
AMB, consisting of registered shares with restricted transferability, 
from a Swedish insurance company which would have brought its 
holding beyond the 25 per cent blocking-threshold. However, 
pursuant to the power vested in them by the articles, the 
management board of AMB simply disapproved of this deal giving no 
further reasons. AGF challenged this decision unsuccessfully in 
court. It was held that it was perfectly legitimate for AMB to reject 
AFG on the grounds that it wanted to remain independent from 
(= The admissions authority may admit securities to listing provided the 
admission would not disturb the market. ) 
268 Otto, Übernahmeversuche bei Aktiengesellschaften, BB Beilage 12/88, 
p. 6, footnote 55. Landgericht Aachen, ZIP 1992,924,925. 
269 A number of important corporate decisions, like e. g. the amendment of 
the articles, need the approval of a 75 per cent majority in the general 
meeting. Thus, the holding of a blocking majority increases this 
shareholder's influence considerably. 
270 As to the details see Landgericht Aachen, ZIP 1992,924 et seq. 
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foreign quasi-governmental influence. Furthermore, the wording of 
the court's decision suggests that because of the wide discretion 
vested in the management by the articles in this case that the 
decision would not have been different had the bidder not been 
owned by the French government, but private investors. This case, 
hence, highlights that where registered shares with restricted 
transferability exist, a hostile foreign bidder faces - depending on the 
drafting of the target's articles - either a difficult or impossible task. 
By simply denying approval, the target's management can always 
pass the buck to the bidder who then has to file court proceedings if 
it wants to succeed. This in itself is an impediment for a bidder. 
Although a bidder may theoretically to some extent circumvent the 
restricted transferability of the shares by entering into shareholder 
agreements with the holders, 271 this will often be difficult to be put 
into practice, especially by a foreign bidder. 
However, outside the insurance sector, the chance that 
registered shares with restricted transferability will become 
widespread in listed stock corporations seems quite remote. To 
convert ordinary shares into registered shares would require a 
unanimous decision by the general meeting, 272 which is virtually 
impossible to achieve. Restricted shares may either be issued when 
a new company is floated or when an already existing company 
increases its capital. But in the present climate there is no indication 
that the issue of registered shares with restricted transferability is 
becoming increasingly popular. Given the huge structural barriers 
and the easier option of limited voting rights there is no need for this 
measure either. If hostile takeover bids were to increase drastically, 
this might change to a certain extent. However, as far as listed stock 
corporations are concerned, the provisions contained in the Listing 
271 Otto, Übernahmeversuche bei Aktiengesellschaften, BB Beilage 12/88, 
p. 6; Marquardt, Gesellschafts- und steuerrechtliche Instrumente zur 
Abwehr feindlicher Übernahmen von Aktiengesellschaften, WiB 1994, 
537,538. 
272 Sec. 180 II AktG. 
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Admission Rules would limit extensive listing of registered shares 
with restricted transferability. 273 
4.3.3. Cross Shareholdings 
As far as mutually supportive holdings are concerned, 
circumstances in Germany seem not too different from those in 
Britain and reference is therefore made to Chapter 3.3.3.274 
However, the rather insufficient disclosure provisions in Germany 
have rendered it difficult in the past to uncover the real extent of 
cross shareholdings which has been very strongly criticized. 275 The 
newly introduced Securities Trading Act, the disclosure provisions of 
which entered into force in 1995, might bring some change with 
respect to listed stock corporations. 276 At present it is estimated that 
about 70 to 75 per cent of all stock corporations in German belong to 
a corporate group. 277 
In Britain, mutually supportive stakes are to some extent 
restrained by the mandatory bid requirement in Rule 9 of the City 
Code, the relevant threshold of which is 30 per cent. In Germany, the 
Stock Corporations Act legislates against them, though it does so in 
a rather half-hearted way. 278 The basic principle of the provision 
here concerned is that where two companies hold stakes of at least 
25 per cent in each other the company which last passed the 25 per 
273 Sec. 5 II Nr. 2 Börsenzulassungsverordnung. 
274 See pp. 75. 
275 Adams, Die Usurpation von Aktionärsbefugnissen mittels 
Ringverflechtung in der "Deutschland AG", AG 1994,148; Görling, Die 
Verbreitung zwei- und mehrstufiger Unternehmensverbindungen, 
AG 1993,538; Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, §1 III 2d. 
276 See Chapter 4.1.2. at pp. 122. 
277 Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht, §1 III 2d. For an empirical study 
see Görling, Die Verbreitung zwei- und mehrstufiger 
Unternehmensverbindungen, AG 1993,538,543. 
278 Sec. 328,19 AktG (APPENDIX 2). For a detailed discussion of mutually 
supportive holdings in Germany see Emmerich/Sonnenschein, 
Konzernrecht, § 5. 
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cent threshold must - regardless of the size of its stake - not exercise 
voting rights exceeding 25 per cent, whereas the votes of the other 
company are not restricted. For example, where company A acquires 
30 per cent in company B and B subsequently purchases 40 per cent 
of the shares in A, then B must not vote those shares exceeding the 
25 per cent threshold. 
Hence, large mutually supportive holdings remain legal. Since 
many of them are held for genuine investment reasons, it seems 
doubtful whether a further confinement would be economically 
justifiable. Admittedly, however, they may well be used as effective 
defences. 279 
4.4. Defences against an existing Offer 
Before turning to the individual measures available to a 
defending management, the rather fundamental question has to be 
answered whether the management of a German stock corporation 
is generally empowered to take any defensive steps. 
4.4.1. Admissibility of Defensive Actions 
In Germany, the Stock Corporations Act does not deal 
specifically with this question. In principle, however, it is 
acknowledged that the management has to remain neutral with 
respect to the composition of the shareholders. 280 This principle of 
279 Adams, Die Usurpation von Aktionärsbefugnissen mittels 
Ringverflechtung in der "Deutschland AG", AG 1994,148,153. 
280 Adams, Was spricht gegen eine unbehinderte Übertragbarkeit, AG 1990, 
243,246 f.; AssmannBozenhardt, in: 
Assmann/Basaldua/Bozenhardt/Peltier, Übernahmeangebote, S. 113 f.; 
Ebenroth/Daum, Die Kompetenzen des Vorstands einer 
Aktiengesellschaft, DB 1991,1105,1158; Hahn, Die Regulierung von 
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neutrality is also reflected in the voluntary German Takeover Code 
1995. Its Article 19 prohibits, like the City Code, 281 to "take any 
measures which conflict with the interests of the holders of securities 
in accepting the offer. "282 However, as the management has to act in 
the best interests of the company, 283 the question arises whether 
there might be occasions in which the best interests of the company 
entitle or even require the management of the target board to resort 
to defensive actions against a hostile bidder. Three different schools 
of thought have developed. 
(1) First, there are those who argue that the management may 
not take any defensive measures after a bona fide offer has been 
communicated. 284 They stress that the management must not 
exercise any influence regarding the composition of the company's 
shareholders, that it ought to be the shareholders who choose the 
management and not the other way round, that the existing 
shareholders must not be deprived of the opportunity to decide upon 
the merits of the offer themselves. This point of view is very much in 
line with the firm stance taken by the City Code. 
(2) Antagonistically, others maintain that the management may 
take all steps they think fit as long as they act in the best interests of 
the company, which may include frustrating actions against a 
takeover bid. 285 Their main argument is that the interests of a 
Übernahmeangeboten in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, ZBB 1990,10, 
19; Hopt, Aktionärskreis und Vorstandsneutralität, ZGR 1993,534, 
548 ff.; Immenga, Vertragliche Vinkulierung von Aktien, AG 1992,79,81; 
ders., in: Kreuzer (Hrsg. ), Öffentliche Übernahmeangebote, 1992, S. 11, 
28 ff.; Rümker, Übernahmeangebote, in: Festschr. Heinsius, 1991, 
S. 683,688 
281 General Principle 7 and Rule 21 City Code. See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(d) at 
pp. 35 and Chapter 3.4. at pp. 85. 
282 See Chapter 4.1.1. (3)(d) at pp. 116. 
283 To the precise meaning of this see Mertens, Kölner Kommentar zum 
AktG, § 76 Rn. 16 et seq. 
284 Adams, Was spricht gegen eine unbehinderte Übertragbarkeit, AG 1990, 
243; AssmannBozenhardt, Übernahmeangebote, p. 101 et seq. 
285 Martens, Der Einfluß von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat auf die Kompetenzen 
und Struktur der Aktionäre, in Festschrift für Beusch, p. 529 et seq.; 
Werner, Probleme "feindlicher" Übemahmeangebote im Aktienrecht, p. 5 
et seq. 
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company do not only comprise the present shareholders' interests, 
but equally the employees' interests as well as public interests. 
Accordingly, where the management arrives bona fide at the 
conclusion that the takeover is detrimental to some of these wider 
issues they are not only entitled, but obliged to fight the offer. 
(3) A third school of thought, which probably represents the 
majority of the legal community, tries to reach a compromise by 
arguing that in principle the management may not resort to defensive 
actions, save in extremely exceptional circumstances. 286 Examples 
given for those circumstances include the situation where the bidder 
has a criminal back-ground, like a Mafia-organisation, where it is a 
politically discredited state, where the bidder acts in clear breach of 
the law or where the financing of the bid is unsound. 
4.4.2. Actual Defensive Measures 
Since hostile takeover bids are almost non-existent in Germany, 
there is little to no practical experience with actual defensive actions. 
Some measures used in Britain, like lobbying shareholders287 or 
searching for a white knight, 288 are doubtlessly possible in Germany 
too. 289 
Drastic measures like the issue of authorised capital to a friendly 
holder through the exclusion of pre-emption rights290 or the 
286 Mertens, in Kölner Kommentar zum AktG, § 76 Rn. 26; Hopt, 
Aktionärskreis und Vorstandsneutralität, ZGR 1993,534; 
lmmenga/Hellberg, Corporate Takeover through the Public Market, p. 28. 
287 See Chapter 3.4.1. at pp. 86. 
288 See Chapter 3.4.4. at pp. 94. 
289 HauschkalRoth, Übernahmeangebote und deren Abwehr im deutschen 
Recht, AG 1988,181,193. 
290 Sec. 203 AktG. Hopt, Aktionärskreis und Vorstandsneutralität, ZGR 1993, 
534,560; Marquardt, Gesellschafts- und steuerrechtliche Instrumente zur 
Abwehr feindlicher Übernahmen, WiB 1994,537,541; Otto, 
Übernahmeversuche bei Aktiengesellschaften, BB Beilage 12/1988,1,8 
et seq. 
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acquisition of its own shares by the target company291 are very 
restricted both by statute and case law which makes these ploys 
inoperable in a takeover situation. 
Unlike the City Code, there is no rule in German law which 
prevents the management of a targeted stock corporation from 
entering into contracts "otherwise than in the ordinary course of 
business. "292 Hence, if hostile bids became more frequent in 
Germany, it is rather likely that creative company lawyers would try to 
devise different forms of contractual "poison pills". Moreover, court 
proceedings during the offer period are unlike the U. K. in no way 
restricted and it is, thus, predictable that, like in the U. S., court 
proceedings on all kinds of grounds, like a breach of securties 
regulations, could be used as a ploy to block or delay the bidder's 
plans. A few measures which might possibly be adopted by the 
defending management are outlined below. 293 
(1) "Crown Jewel" Defence 
A defence line, known in the U. S. as "crown jewel' defence, 
where the company sells or disposes of material assets or plants to a 
third party to thwart the bidder's plans might be taken in Germany 
too. Shareholder consent for such a measure is only required where 
the management either sells the entire assets of the company 
(75 per cent majority)294 or where the most important part of the 
company is sold (simple majority). 295 
291 Sec. 71 et seq AktG; Otto, Ubernahmeversuche bei Aktiengesellschaften, 
BB Beilage 12/1988,1,8. 
292 Rule 21(e) City Code. 
293 See also Hauschka/Roth, Ubernahmeangebote und deren Abwehr im 
deutschen Recht, AG 1988,181,191 et seq. 
294 Sec. 361 AktG. 
295 BGH 83,122 (Holzmüller). 
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(2) Corporate Acquisitions 
Like selling assets, it would equally be possible for the target 
company to acquire assets. The entrenched management could, 
thus, acquire a third company in order to increase its size and thwart 
the takeover bid by triggering the intervention of the competition 
policy authorities under the relevant merger regulations. 
(3) "Pac Man" Defence 
Not very likely in Germany, but legally thinkable still, is a defence 
line, known in the U. S. as "pac man" defence, where the target 
company replies by making a counter-offer for the predator 
company. 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
The analysis has shown that there are no legally binding rules 
specifically designed to govern takeovers. The newly introduced 
voluntary Takeover Code 1995 is lacking an effective enforcement 
mechanism and can therefore at present not be expected to be 
taken seriously. It is clearly not in the same category with the City 
Code. 
Due to the absence of a binding regulation in respect of, for 
example, equal treatment of shareholders, fixed time limits for the 
offer period, or a mandatory bid requirement, a bidder enjoys 
considerably more freedom than it does in Britain - at the expense of 
small investors, though. 
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In addition to the comparatively underdeveloped stock market in 
Germany, there are, however, a number of structural barriers 
inherent in German company law and corporate culture which 
effectively prevent a market for corporate control and render German 
Stock Corporations rather unattractive to foreign bidders. Although 
these barriers are not specifically intended to prevent takeover bids 
and do not inhibit the acquisition of shares or the announcement of a 
bid itself, they impede and delay the integration of the newly 
acquired company profoundly. It has been demonstrated that the 
two-tier board structure and the 75 per cent majority mostly required 
render the replacement of the old management difficult. Far reaching 
employee representation on supervisory board level complicates 
matters further, and certainly makes large German stock 
corporations less attractive, especially to foreign bidders who are not 
used to this kind of complicated corporate governance structure. 
Appointment rights to the supervisory board granted to certain 
shareholders may, together with employee representation, render a 
German Stock Corporation impregnable. If, however, the bidder 
manages to win control of the supervisory board, the rather complex 
German law of groups imposes a number of obligations which 
complicate the integration of the German company into the bidders 
group. Hence, even without any specific defences designed to put off 
a potential bidder, German stock corporations are difficult prey, and 
a British bidder would be confronted with a number of corporate 
governance features inherent in German law with which it is not 
familiar. 
Given these structural barriers it is not surprising that there has 
been little need for additional protective measures. However, a 
simple, but nonetheless relatively effective measure frequently 
installed is the restriction of voting rights. Bearing in mind the huge 
influence of the banks as depositaries it is difficult to see how an 
unwelcome foreign bidder could overcome these obstacles. 
Chapter 4 171 
In a hostile bid situation the management of a German target 
company would not to the same extent as the directors of a British 
public company be prevented from taking frustrating actions. Given 
the extreme rarity of takeover bids in Germany, it still remains to be 
seen to which measures a target management would resort, how 
effective these would be, and how the courts would react. 
To sum up, it can not be ruled out that a bidder with substantial 
financial strength, determination, time, and precise knowledge of the 
German legal and economic system and business culture might 
succeed with a hostile bid now and again, but it clearly seems at 
present out of the question that public takeover bids will in the 
foreseeable future become as easy and popular as they are in 
Britain. 
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Chapter 5 
EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS 
Considering a level playing field for takeovers vital to the 
Common Market and stressing the need for harmonisation in this 
area, the EC-Commission tries to tackle the issue by two means: 
First, there is the "Proposal for a 13th Directive on Company Law 
concerning Takeover Bids", the latest version of which has been 
proclaimed in February 1996 (APPENDIX 6). 1 The proposal basically 
undertakes to ensure equal treatment, adequate information, and the 
protection of minority shareholders through providing for a certain 
takeover procedure. However, apart from restricting the use of 
certain defensive tactics, 2 it does little in terms of removing structural 
barriers to takeovers. This is left to the proposal for a "Fifth Directive 
on Company Law concerning the Structure of Public Limited 
Companies". 3 
While there is activity regarding the Takeover Directive, as the 
newly released 1996 version shows, the proposed Fifth Directive 
remains blocked, mainly due to the politically controversial issue of 
employee participation in public companies. Therefore, the greater 
part of this chapter will be devoted to the newly proposed Takeover 
Directive. 
1 February 7,1996. EC Doc. 95/0341, COM (95) 655 final. 
2 Article 8 lit. a. See Chapter 5.1.2. (4) at pp. 193. 
3 Amendment O. J. 1991, C 7/4; amended O. J. 1991, C 321/9. Up to date 
version published in Dine, EC Company Law, A8. See Chapter 5.2. at 
pp. 198. 
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5.1. The Proposed 13th Directive 
The first effort to create a European law of takeovers dates back 
well over two decades when Professor Robert R Pennington 
presented his "Report on Takeover and other Bids" in 1974 which he 
drew up on behalf of the EC Commission. 4 With Professor 
Pennington being an English law professor, Britain having by far the 
highest number of takeover bids and the most developed securities 
markets in Europe, and the City Code by and large having already 
proven its virtue as an efficient regulatory framework, it seems quite 
natural that all European takeover proposals, of which four were 
proposed to date, have ever since been heavily influenced by the 
British model. 5 
Sparked by Professor Pennington's proposal in 1974 a few 
articles were published on this matter, 6 but the discussion of the idea 
of a European Takeover Directive soon died down in the following 
years, the reason being an international slow-down of takeover 
activity and a lack of a need for harmonisation in the field of 
takeovers. As far as Britain was concerned, the City Code was 
already in force at home7 and euro-wide acquisitions were not as 
frequent as today. Hence the issue of a "level playing field" was not 
as pressing as it is these days. Regarding Germany, takeover bids 
as a technique of acquiring control of a company were virtually 
4 EC Doc. XI/56174-E. The Pennington Report presented a first draft of a 
Takeover Directive. See Bradley, Harmonising Takeover and Merger 
Regulations within the EEC, [1986] Company Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4, 
p. 131,135. Also lmmenga/Hellberg, Corporate Takeovers through the 
Public Market, p. 25. 
5 Dine, The Proposal for a Thirteenth Directive on Takeover, [1991] 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 5, p. 83; For a comparison with the City 
Code see Kenyon-Slade/Andenas, The Proposed Thirteenth Directive, 
p. 149; also Sealy, The Draft Thirteenth E. C. Directive on Takeovers, 
p. 135,140. 
6 For major contributions see Behrens, Rechtspolitische Grundsatzfragen 
zu einer Europäischen Regelung für Übernahmeangebote, ZGR 1975, 
433; Bess, Eine europäische Regelung for Übernahmeangebote, 
AG 1976,169. 
7 See Chapter 3.1.1. at pp. 29. 
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unheard of at that time. Therefore, from a German point of view it is 
self-evident that there was no need for any harmonisation in the field 
of takeovers. 
It was not until 1987, a time when takeover activity was on the 
increase again, that the EC-Commission came up with a new 
proposal for a Takeover Directive. 8 Taking account of 
recommendations by the European Economic and Social 
Committee9 and the European Parliament, 10 a further amendment 
followed in 1990.11 The 1987,1989, and 1990 proposals, with which 
the current 1996 proposal contrasts sharply, were basically 
structured in the same way providing for a detailed legal regulation of 
takeover bids the conerstone being the requirement of a mandatory 
bid modelled after the City Code. However, these proposals were 
almost unanimously fiercely rejected throughout Europe - albeit for 
different reasons - which led in summer 1991 to a standstill of the 
negotiations on the takeover-law harmonisation. However, in its 
declaration presented at the Edinburgh Summit in December 1992 
the EC-Commission indicated its intention to go ahead with the 
project and to revise the 1990 proposal once again. In order to 
assess the views of the member states before starting to redraft the 
proposed Directive, a questionnaire12 was sent to the member states 
in July 1993, which - as an interesting example of "harmonisation in 
practice" - is contained in APPENDIX 5. The intention to present a 
new proposal was reconfirmed at the European Council in Essen 
(Germany) in December 1994. Taking into account the outcome of 
the questionnaire, the latest proposal was finally adopted in February 
1996. Unlike the previous amendments, this latest draft is not just 
8 EC Doc. XV/63/87-E. The intention to present a new proposal for 
Takeover Directive was previously made known in 1985 in the EC White 
Paper on the completion of the Internal Market 1992. 
9 O. J. C 298,27.11.1989, p. 56. 
10 O. J. C 38,19.2.1990, p. 41. 
11 O. J. C 240,26.09.1990, p. 7. Published in Dine, EC Company Law, A14. 
12 To this step see Bovis, Developments at European Union level, [1994) 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 7, p. 213. 
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another proposal introducing minor changes, but rather a new start 
of the so far ill-fated harmonisation attempts trying a different 
approach. Contrary to the previous proposals, the current proposal 
abandons the ambitious plan of a detailed and precise Takeover 
Directive and confines itself to what it calls a "framework" Directive 
consisting of "certain principles and a limited number of general 
requirements. "l 3 This new approach leaves the Member States with 
ample room for manoeuvre on implementation of the Directive. 
However, it remains to be seen whether this "framework approach it 
really is not only a new, but also a constructive way forward on 
harmonizing European takeover laws and not just the result of a 
political deadlock, a Directive of the lowest common denominator 
avoiding all controversial issues. In order to understand why this new 
approach was taken, it appears useful to briefly examine which the 
main stumbling blocks to takeover harmonisation have been in the 
past (5.1.1. ). After considering this, the 1996 proposal will be 
discussed in detail (5.1.2. ). 
5.1.1. Why did the previous Proposals fail? 
The answer to this question can not be given uniformly without 
having regard to the individual Member States. However, the British 
and Germans appear to represent the two main factions and it 
seems therefore justified in the context of this thesis to concentrate 
on these countries. 
(1) British Objections 
Given the fact that the previous proposals for a Takeover 
13 See Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal, para 7. 
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Directive exhibited many of the same features as the City Code, 14 
like for example the mandatory bid requirement, it seems at first 
glance rather surprising that, apart from few exceptions, 15 the 
proposals were so strongly rejected throughout the British legal 
profession. 16 Apart from a number of more or less serious flaws and 
inconsistencies in the drafting, 17 which could have been corrected, 
the reason for this outright repudiation in Britain was not so much the 
substance of the proposed rules itself, but the fact that the well 
functioning self-regulartory system with all its virtues, namely flexiblity 
and relative freedom from judicial interference during the bidding 
process, was feared to be threatened. 18 In a thorough analysis of 
this issue, which appears to reflect the majority opinion in Britain on 
the past proposals quite well, Kenyon-Slade and Andenas wrote: 19 
"the Directive 
... 
threatens to undermine the existing 
United Kingdom scheme by sweeping away the self- 
regulatory ethos which is so fundamental to the 
application and operation of the City Code. Specifically, 
14 For a detailed comparison of the Directive with the City Code see Sealy, 
The Draft 13th EC Directive on Takeovers, p. 135,140 and Kenyon- 
Slade/Andenas, The Proposed Thirteenth Directive, p. 149-188. 
15 Jowell, The Takeover Panel: Autonomy, Flexibility and Legality, [1991] 
P. L. 149 et seq. See also a statement of the Scottish Law Society 
reproduced in Dine, EC Company Law, para 14.60 et seq the main 
argument being that a statutory system might have more regard to 
emplyees' interests and the interests of the general public. It also appears 
that at least in the past the Labour Party had objections against the self- 
regulatory system, see Calcutt, The Work of the Takeover Panel, [1990] 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 11, p. 203,206. 
16 For a summary of the criticism and a reproduction of a number of official 
statements see Dine, EC Company Law, para 14.48-14.67. See also the 
criticism by the chairman of the Panel: David Calcutt, The Work of the 
Takeover Panel, [1990] Company Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 11, p. 203,207 
and the Panels Director General, William Staple in Rothschild man to 
head Panel, Financial Times, January 8,1994; Kenyon-Slade/Andenas, 
The Proposed Thirteenth Directive, p. 149,155; Sealy, The Draft 
Thirteenth E. C. Directive on Takeovers, p. 135,143. 
17 For example, there is no provision concering the price of a mandatory bid. 
It would, hence, be possible for the offeror to offer a ridiculously low price 
which would reduce the mandatory bid requirement to absurdity. As to this 
point see Wouters, Towards a Level Playing Field, [1993] CMLRev 267, 
281. 
18 See in detail Chapter 3.1.2 at pp. 36. 
19 Kenyon-Slade/Andenas, The Proposed Thirteenth Directive, p. 149. 
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the proposed Directive threatens to introduce a statutory 
system of takeover regulation which is likely to be plagued 
by excessive bureaucracy, inflexibility, and constant 
tactical litigation that would imperil the entire regulatory 
agenda. " 
From the German perspective, where self-regulation is 
traditionally regarded with suspicion and not seen as a serious 
alternative to statutory regulation, the British worries have never 
been fully understood. As Lord Donaldson put it in Datafin: "Self- 
regulation is an emotive term'2° - and Germans by and large do not 
appear share this emotion. 21 However, since the British experiences 
with self-regulation in the field of takeover bids have overall been 
very positive, the scepticism towards any Brussels-imposed changes 
seems understandable. 22 
(2) German Objections 
The German objections focused mainly on the requirement of a 
mandatory bid. Besides, the need for a takeover statute has been 
questioned. 
This last point is somewhat evident in a country with hardly any 
Anglo-style public takeover bids. 23 As has been examined in 
20 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 
815,826. 
21 As to recent developments regarding the voluntary German Takeover 
Code 1995 see Chapter 4.1.1. at pp. 107. 
22 Warning that the British fears might be exaggerated: Jowell, The 
Takeover Panel: Autonomy, Flexibility and Legality, [1991] P. L. 149 et 
seq. See also the statement of the Scottish Law Society reproduced in 
Dine, EC Company Law, para 14.62. 
23 For an empirical study see Wymeersch, Unternehmensführung in 
Westeuropa, AG 1995,299,307. Also Krause, Zur Gleichbehandlung der 
Aktionäre bei Übernahmeangeboten und Beteiligungserwerb WM 1996, 
845; Neye, Der neue Übernahmekodex, ZIP 1995,1464; Thoma, Der 
neue Übernahmekodex der Börsensachverständigenkommission, 
Osnabrück, Arbeitspapier 9/96, p. 4. 
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Chapter 4.2, a number of structural legal, economic, and cultural 
barriers impede takeover bid activity as it exists in the U. K. Although 
the proposed, but blocked Fifth Directive makes some efforts in 
terms of removing these barriers, as will be further discussed 
below, 24 it is debatable whether the EC has set its priorities right and 
done enough to remove these barriers. 
The opposition against the requirement of a full mandatory bid 
for all outstanding shares when a certain threshold (one third) was 
exceeded was insurmountable in Germany25 with only few 
dissenting opinions. 26 As has been pointed out earlier, 27 there is no 
specific takeover law in Germany and the acquirer enjoys, apart from 
some disclosure provisions, complete freedom. 
(a) One line of argument against the mandatory bid often put 
forward in Germany is that the requirement of a mandatory bid would 
render the acquisition of control more expensive which would be 
detrimental to the securities markets. It is also feared that such a rule 
would lead to further concentration and more intensive forms of 
control since it would not be possible any longer to acquire stakes of 
just, say, 40 or 50 per cent. The consequence, it is argued, were 
increased problems under the relevant merger control and 
24 Chapter 5.2. at pp. 198. 
25 Assmann/Bozenhard; Übernahmeangebote, p. 37; Baums, 
Übernahmeregeln in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, ZIP 1989,1376; 
Assmann, Verhaltensregeln für freiwillige öffentliche 
Übernahmeangebote, AG 1995,563; Grunewald, Der geänderte 
Vorschlag einer 13. EG-Richtlinie betreffend Übernahmeangebote, 
WM 1991,1361,1362; Hahn, Die Regulierung von Übernahmen in der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, ZBB 1990,10,17; Hommelhoff/Kleindiek, 
Takeover Richtlinie und europäisches Konzernrecht, AG 1990,106; 
Mertens, Förderung von, Schutz vor, Zwang zu Übernahmeangeboten, 
AG 1990,252; Peltzer, Übernahmeangebote nach künftigem Europa- 
Recht, p. 179,191,231; Sandberger, Teilübernahmeangebote und 
Zwangsübernahmeangebote im Europäischen Takeover-Recht, 
DZWir 1993,319,321 et seq; Werner, Probleme "feindlicher" 
Übernahmeangebote, p. 5,12. 
26 Adams, Was spricht gegen eine unbehinderte Überbarkeit, AG 1990,243; 
Hahn, Die Regulierung von Übernahmen in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, ZBB 1990,10; Reul, Übernahmeangebote in der 
ökonomischen Analyse, p. 11,23. 
27 See Chapter 4.1. at pp. 107. 
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competition laws. 
Whether this is a realistic picture is somewhat difficult to say. 
The British example with its flourishing securities markets suggests 
that the economic problems caused by a compulsory bid rule should 
not be exaggerated. 28 It should also be taken into consideration that 
the existence of a mandatory bid rule might well boost investor 
confidence in the markets - as the highest standard of equality of 
treatment can be ensured this way - which could contribute to a more 
active equities market. 29 However, this correlation is often 
overlooked or at least not given much weight in Germany. 
(b) A second line of argument centres around the dogmatic 
consequences of a mandatory bid rule in Germany. As stated 
previously, the German law of groups offers a complex and 
sophisticated set of rules designed to protect minority shareholders 
within a subsidiary company. 30 Hence, it is reasoned that there is no 
need for any further protection by way of a mandatory bid rule in 
Germany. Steps in this direction should according to this opinion in 
any case be left to the European harmonisation of the law of groups 
through the proposed 9th Directive. 31 The idea that small investors 
should participate in any premiums paid in connection with the 
transfer of large stakes is not generally acceped in Germany. 32 
Equal treatment of all shareholders, it is suggested, may better be 
achieved by a pro-rata-rule as stipulated by the U. S. Williams Act. 33 
28 In this direction also Hopt, Übernahmeangebote im europäischen Recht, 
p. 187,202. 
29 Reul, Übernahmeangebote in der ökonomischen Analyse, p. 11,24. 
30 See 4.2.5. at pp. 151 and Appendix 2. 
31 To this proposal Palmer's Company Law, para 16.430. 
32 See for example Grunewald, Der geänderte Vorschlag einer 13. EG- 
Richtlinie betreffend Übernahmeangebote, p. 1361,1363; 
Hommelhoff/Kleindiek, Takeover Richtlinie und europäisches 
Konzernrecht, AG 1990,106,107; Lutter, Die Treuepflicht des Aktionäres, 
ZHR 153 (1989), 446,462; LUttmann, Kontrolwechsel in 
Kapitalgesellschaften, 1992, S. 180 f, 208 f; Mertens, AG 1990,252,257; 
Sandberger, DZWir 1993,319,323 f; critical also Baums, ZIP 1989,1377, 
1379. 
33 For a comparison with the U. S. rules see Wouters, Towards a Level 
Playing Field, [1993) CMLRev 267,282. 
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Considering these arguments, it has to be admitted that the 
existence of a law of groups changes the legal parameters and 
makes a direct comparison with the situation in Britain, where no 
such set of rules exists, difficult. Because of the law of groups, the 
need to avoid minorities in subsidiary companies through a full 
mandatory offer is reduced and the position of minority shareholders 
in subsidiary companies is because of the extra protection offered by 
the law of groups probably somewhat better in Germany - at least in 
theory. On the other hand, it is almost unanimously acknowledged in 
Germany that the law of groups often fails to achieve its protective 
goal, particularly when it comes to so called qualified de facto 
groups. 34 Besides, a mandatory bid rule would not mean that the law 
of groups had to be abandoned or changed. Since not all mandatory 
bids would lead to a 100 per cent majority, having a law of groups 
would still make sense. It is true, however, that the introduction of a 
mandatory bid rule would mean a very radical change of law in 
Germany for which the legal and business community is despite the 
voluntary Takeover Code 1995 not ready yet. 35 Unfamiliarity with 
such a rule certainly accounts for some of the opposition. 36 
5.1.2. The 1996 Proposal 
Taking account of the objections discussed above, the 1996 
proposal tries to appease both the British and German sides not only 
by pursuing the new framework approach, but also by (a) allowing a 
non-legal implementation of the Directive through self-regulatory 
rules and (b) abolishing the requirement of a mandatory bid. 
Although the new proposal covers most of the field of the 1990 
34 See Chapter 4.2.5. (2) at pp. 154. 
35 As to the somewhat "ill-bred" mandatory bid rule in the new voluntary 
German Takeover Code see Chapter 4.1.1. (4) at pp. 116. 
36 In this direction Hopt, Übernahmeangebote im europäischen Recht, 
p. 187,209. 
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proposal, it is much more loosely drafted specifically referring to the 
principle of subsidiarity37 "laying down a framework consisting of 
certain common principles and a limited number of general 
requirements which Member States will be required to implement 
through more detailed rules according to their national systems and 
their cultural contexts. "38 An indication of this new framework 
approach is the volume of the new proposal which consists of only 
12 rather concise articles as opposed to 24 lengthy articles in the 
previous version. 
(1) Scope 
The scope the new draft is defined in Article 1 by three criteria 
relating to (a) the nature of the provisions which are to be 
harmonized, (b) the "nationality" of the target company and (c) the 
relevant securities subject to the bid. 
(a) The nature of the provisions to be harmonized - 
Implementation of a Directive through Self-regulation? 
The co-ordination measures prescribed by the proposed 
Directive apply not only "the laws, regulations and adminstrative 
provisions" but also - and this is new - to "other mechanism or 
arrangements of the Member States relating to takeover bids. "39 This 
wording is no coincidence. It is a concession to the British delegation 
which has been adament about keeping the self-regulatory system 
37 Article 3b (3) EC-Treaty: "Any action by the Community shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. " 
38 Preamble, indent 7. 
39 The phrase "other mechanisms or arrangements" is also used in 
Article 3 (1) and Article 11 (1). 
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as established under the City Code. 40 However, it is questionable 
whether the implementation of a Directive purely through self- 
regulatory rules without any legal backing is lawful under the EC- 
Treaty. 
Article 189 (3) EC-Treaty stipulates: "A Directive shall be 
binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of form and methods. " This article leaves no doubt that 
addressees of a Directive are Member States only. 41 Only Member 
States can be held responsible by the EC-Commission through the 
treaty violation proceedings under Article 169 EC-Treaty. Hence, if a 
private body were to implement a Directive there would be no way for 
the EC-Commission to take any action against it in case of non- or 
inadequate implementation which would contradict the enforcement 
system set up by the EC-Treaty. Moreover, according to 
Article 189 (3) it is the "national authorities" who are charged with 
implementing Directives. The term "national authority', however, 
implies the body charged with this duty has to have some legal 
backing. With respect to the British legal system it could perhaps be 
argued, as Lord Donaldson in effect did in the Datafin case 
concerning judicial review proceedings against the private Takeover 
Panel, 42 that under certain circumstances a private institution 
performing public duties can be deemed to be a public body, or in 
other words a national authority. Yet, from a European perspective, 
the question is not only how individual member states define the 
term "national authority', but whether there are under European law 
certain qualifications which are to be met by a "private institution" in 
40 The phrase in question was inserted virtually at the last minute giving way 
to British pressure. As to the political background see Neye, Der neue 
Vorschlag der Kommission für eine dreizehnte Richtlinie über 
Übernahmeangebote DB 1996,1121, who is high-ranking official in the 
German Ministry of Justice and was involved in the negotiations. 
41 See also Article 12. 
42 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 
815,838. As to details see Chapter 3.1.2. (4) at pp. 51. 
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order to qualify as a "national authority' within the meaning of 
Article 189 (3) EC-Treaty. Although the ECJ repeatedly stated that a 
Directive is "binding on all the authorities of Member States including, 
for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts"43 there is no decision 
specifying what is required for an institution to be considered a 
"national authority'. Hence, whether the Takeover Panel having no 
statutory, prerogative or common law powers would be considered a 
"national authority' by the ECJ is at least doubtful. 44 However, an 
argument in favour of recognition of the Panel as "national authority' 
is that it is - in theory, not necessarily in practice - subject to judicial 
review. 
However, even if the Panel were considered a "national 
authority' there is one more problem connected with the idea of 
implementation through self-regulation. The ECJ has long 
established that Directives have to be implemented by binding acts, 
and that can only mean that there has to be some legal backing. In a 
case against Belgium the ECJ stated in no uncertain terms: "It 
should be remembered, in that regard, that according to the 
consistent case-law of the Court, each Member State must 
implement Directives in a manner which fully meets the requirement 
of legal certainty and must consequently transpose their terms into 
national law as binding provisions. "45 A purely self-regulatory system 
would not meet these requirements. 46 Unlike legislation in whichever 
43 Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case 14/83), 
[1984] ECR 1891,1909, para 26; Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable 
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Case 222/84), [1986] 1651,1690, 
para 53. 
44 As to the Panel's status see R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex 
parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 815,825. Also Chapter 3.1.2. 
45 Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium 
(Case 239/85), [1986] 3645,3659, para 7. See also the similar wording in 
Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of 
Germany (Case 361/88), [1991] 2567,2600, para 15. 
46 See also Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic 
of Germany (Case 361/88), [1991] 2567,2600, para 15: "it should be 
borne in mind in that respect that, according to the case-law of the Court, 
the transposition of a directive into domestic law does not necessarily 
require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in 
express, specific legislation; a general legal context may, depending on 
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form, self-regulatory rules, however well enforced, do ultimately not 
have the force of law. 47 This is acknowledged by the City Code itself 
which states in the introduction: "The Code has not, and does not 
seek to have, the force of law. "48 In terms of European policy, the 
objective of harmonizing the laws of the Members States, and that is 
what Directives are about, would be compromised if Members States 
were allowed to leave the implementation of Directives to ultimately 
non-accountable private bodies. If a self-regulatory approach toward 
takeover regulation were wanted, the given instrument on European 
level would be the Recommendation under Article 189 (4) EC-Treaty 
which does not have the force of law. 49 A Directive, however, 
requires legal implementation. Although conceding that the City 
Code "resembles legislation"50 and is recognized by the courts, 51 the 
government and other regulatory authorities in Britain, 52 for the 
reason given above it is submitted that under European law the City 
Code could not pass as a proper implemention of the proposed 
Directive unless it has some statutory backing. A legislative 
"framework" act would be required under Article 189 (3) EC-Treaty. 
The proposed Directive in effectively allowing implementation 
through self-regulatory "mechanisms or arrangements" consequently 
infringes primary EC-law, namely Article 189 (3) EC-Treaty. A 
the content of the directive, be adequate for the purpose, provided that it 
does indeed gurarantee the full application of the directive in a sufficiently 
clear and precise manner so that, where the directive is intended to 
create rights for individuals, the persons concerned can ascertain the full 
extent of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them before the 
national courts. " Also Commission v. Netherlands (Case 160/82), [1984] 
CMLR 1 230; Commission v. Netherlands (Case 291/84), [1989] 
1 CMLR 479. To the nature of directives Lasok, European Law, p. 122. 
47 For analysis of the phenomenon of self-regualtion see Page, Self- 
Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension, (1986) 49 MLR 141-167. 
48 City Code, Introduction, para 1(c). 
49 For details see Lasok, European Law, p. 135. 
50 These words were used by Watkins L. J. in R. v. Spens [1991] 1 W. L. R. 
624,632 (C. A. ). 
51 R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin Plc. [1987] QB 
815; R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness Pic. 
[1989) 1 All ER 509; R. v. Spens [1991) 1 W. L. R. 624 (C. A. ) 
52 As to the enforcement of the City Code see Chapter 3.1.2. (3) at pp. 44 
and (4) at pp. 51. 
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Member State relying on a functioning self-regulatory system instead 
of transposing the Directive into its legal system would - for technical 
reasons - act in breach of Article 189 (3) of the EC-Treaty even if the 
self-regulatory rules would meet - as the City Code does - all the 
substantive requirements of the Directive. Hence, the words "other 
mechanisms or arrangements" should be deleted in Article 1 of the 
new proposal which would mean a return to the wording of the 1990 
proposal. 
(b) Offeree Company governed by the Law of a 
Member State 
A further pre-condition to the applicability of the new proposal is 
that the offeree company53 is "governed by the law of a Member 
State". The criteria necessary to determine by which law a company 
is governed are not specified in the proposal. This silence can be 
interpreted in two ways. (1) First, one could argue that the question 
of whether a company is governed by the law of a Member State 
should - as a conflict of laws question - be left to the individual 
Member States. However, this could lead to conflicting results as 
different connecting factors are favoured by the Member States. In 
English law, a corporation is domiciled in the country in which it was 
incorporated, while most European countries including Germany 
connect a corporation to the country in which it has its actual 
headquarters. 54 Hence, a company headquartered in England but 
having been established under, say, Czech law would from an 
English standpoint considered a Czech company, to which the 
Directive would not be applicable. This would not necessarily be the 
53 Defined in Article 2 as the "company whose securities are the subject of 
the bid. " 
54 Stone, The Conflict of Laws, p. 106; Ebenroth, in Münchner Kommentar, 
nach Article 10 EGBGB, para 139 et seq. 
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case from a German standpoint. (2) Those divergencies could be 
avoided if the question of which law governs a company would - at 
least in the context of interpreting a European Directive - be 
answered uniformely. The route to such a uniform European conflict- 
rule is shown in Article 58 (1) of the EC-Treaty. Under this provision 
only "companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a 
Member State and having their registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business within the Community' 
enjoy the right of establishment. If these criteria were applied in the 
present context to determine whether a company is governed by the 
law of a Member State, discrepancies with respect to the scope of 
the Directive could be avoided. 55 
(c) Securities admitted to trading on a Stock Exchange 
As a third pre-condition, the proposed Directive applies only to 
those companies governed by the law of a Member State whose 
securities are admitted to trading wholly or partially on one or more 
Stock Exchanges in the Community. Securities are defined as 
transferable securities carrying voting rights in a company or 
conferring entitlement to obtain transferable securities carrying such 
rights. 56 
The limitation of the proposed takeover rules to target 
companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a Stock 
Exchange indicates that the Directive is placed in the field of capital 
market law rather than company law. The approach contrasts with 
the original 1989 proposal57 and with the City Code, 58 both of which 
55 As to the idea of Article 58 (1) EC-Treaty as a uniform European conflict- 
rule see Ebenroth, in Münchner Kommentar, nach Article 10 EGBGB, 
para 196. 
56 Article 2. 
57 Article 1 Proposal 1989. 
58 City Code, Introduction, para 4 (a). 
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apply to listed and unlisted public companies, but is in line with the 
1990 proposa159 and the German Takeover Code. 60 The approach 
taken by the 1989 proposal and the City Code seems preferable, 
though. If there is a need for a harmonization of takeover laws and if 
it is considered necessary to provide for extra protection of minority 
shareholders during a bid, it is difficult to see why only shareholders 
of listed companies should enjoy these rights. One could even argue 
that shareholders of non-listed public companies need the additional 
protection even more as for them selling their stocks may in the 
absence of a regulated market and the protection of the Stock 
Exchange not be as easy as for shareholders of listed companies. 
Therefore, a return to the wording of the original 1989 proposal 
seems desirable. 
(2) General Principles 
Clearly influenced by the City Code, the new proposal contains 
in addition to a number of more specific rules five General 
Principles. 61 These General Principles are in harmony with those of 
the City Code62 and the voluntary German Takeover Code63 
(equality, sufficient information, transparancy in dealings, restriction 
on defensive action). Also in line with the City Code and the German 
Takeover Code, the supervisiory authority may, on the basis of a 
reasoned decision - quite like the British Takeover Panel64 and the 
German Takeover Commission65 - modify or relax the rules if it 
considers this appropriate in the individual case as long as it adheres 
59 Article 1 Proposal 1990. 
60 German Takeover Code, Definitions "Target'. 
61 Article 5. 
62 See Chapter 3.1.1. (2) at pp. 32. 
63 See Chapter 4.1.1. (3) at pp. 112. 
64 City Code, Introduction, para 3 (a). 
65 See Chapter 4.1.1. (5)(a) at pp. 119. 
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to the underlying purpose of the General Priniciples66 which read as 
follows: 67 
(a) all holders of securities of an offeree company who are in the same 
position are to be treated equally; 
(b) the addressees of a bid are to have sufficient time and information to 
enable them to reach a properly informed decision on the bid; 
(c) The board of an offeree company is to act in the interests of the 
company as a whole; 
(d) false markets must not be created in the securities of the offeree 
company, of the offeror company, or of any other company concerned 
by the bid; 
(e) offeree companies must not be hindered in the conduct of their affairs 
for longer than is reasonable by a bid for their securities. 
(3) Protection of Minority Shareholders 
The protection of minority shareholders when a change of 
corporate control takes place has always been the central issue in 
the takeover harmonisation attempts. The previous proposal, 
influenced by the City Code, provided for a mandatory bid to all 
target shareholders giving them the right not only to leave the target 
company, but also to participate to some extent in the control 
premiums paid. As has been pointed out earlier, the majority opinion 
in Germany - and other continental countries68 - does not (yet) 
accept the wisdom of a mandatory bid rule, but believes in the 
concept of protecting minority shareholders through a particular set 
of rules, namely the law of groups, designed to protect minority 
66 Article 4 (4). 
67 Article 5 (a) corresponds with Principle 1 of the City Code; 
Article 5 (b) corresponds with Principle 4 of the City Code; 
Article 5 (c) corresponds with Principles 7 and 9 of the City Code; 
Article 5 (d) corresponds with Principle 6 of the City Code; 
only Article 5 (e) has no direct equivalent among the City Code's 
principles, but the content of this priciple is an overriding value of the City 
Code as well. 
68 For the Netherlands see Wymeersch, The Mandatory Bid: A Critical View, 
in Hopt (ed. ), European Takeover Regulation, 1992, p. 351 et seq. 
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shareholders in subsidiaries once a control-relationship has been 
established. As the disparity of views has proved insurmountable, 
the EC-Commission capitulated on this point which is the single most 
significant change of the new proposal. The new proposal only 
requires that following the acquisition of "control' national rules give 
proper safeguards to minority shareholders. However, the proposal 
leaves it for the Member States to either provide for a mandatory bid 
rule (for which case the proposal contains some provisions in 
Article 10) or to provide for "other appropriate and at least equivalent 
means in order to protect the minority shareholders" of the target 
company. The Explanatory Memorandum to the new proposal more 
specifically points to the law of groups as it exists in some 
continental Member States. 
Article 3 Protection of minority shareholders 
(1) Where a natural person or legal entity who as a result of 
acquisition, holds securities which added to any existing holdings give 
him a specified percentage of voting rights in a company referred to in 
Article 1, conferring on him the control of that company, Member 
States should ensure that rules or other mechanisms or arrangements 
are in force which either oblige this person to make a bid in 
accordance with article 10 or offer other appropriate and at least 
equivalent means in order to protect the minority shareholders of that 
company. 
(2) The percentage of voting rights which confers control for the 
purposes of paragraph 1 and the way of its calculation shall be 
determined by the law of the Member State where the supervisory 
authority is located. 
Article 3 in its present form provokes criticism for three reasons. 
First, there is the fact that Article 3- like Article 1- allows 
harmonisation through "other mechanism or arrangements", i. e. 
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through self-regulation. As has been explained, 69 this amounts to a 
contravention of Article 189 (3) of the EC-Treaty which demands 
legal implementation. Secondly, the notion of control as drawn up in 
the new proposal appears problematic. Finally, the concept of "other 
appropriate and at least equivalent means in order to protect the 
minority shareholders" also engenders questions. 
(a) Acquisition of Control 
Contrary to the City Code, 70 the German Takeover Code, 71 and 
the previous proposals, 72 the newly proposed Directive refrains from 
defining the term control. Rather, it contains in Article 3 (2) a conflict 
rule according to which "the percentage of voting rights which 
confers control ... and the way of its calculation" is to be "determined 
by the law of the Member State where the supervisory authority is 
located. " Article 4 (2) stipulates that "the authority competent for 
supervising the bid shall be that of the Member State in which the 
offeree company has its registered office if the securities of the 
company are admitted to trading on a regulated market in that 
Member State. " Although this conflict-rule taken individually makes 
sense, the point is whether it is prudent as a matter of policy to 
abstain from introducing clear thresholds and calculation rules as for 
example contained in the City Code. The way the proposed Directive 
is drafted now, the whole affair is left to the individual Member 
States. Hence, Member States could define control as holding a 30, 
50 or maybe 75 per cent stake of voting rights. Equally far-reaching 
could be the differences between the rules governing the calculation 
69 Chapter 5.1.2. (1)(a) at pp. 181. 
70 Rule 9.1. City Code: 30 per cent. See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(a) at pp. 32. 
71 Article 16 German Takeover Code: 50 per cent. See Chapter 4.1.1. (4) at 
pp. 116. 
72 Article 4 (1) Proposal 1989 and 1990: the percentage could be defined by 
the Member State but was not to exceed one third of the voting rights. 
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of holdings (who is acting in concert etc. ). The harmonizing effect of 
this rule is zero. Given that the protection of minority shareholders is 
considered a central issue by the EC-Commission, some common 
threshold which triggers the application of the minority protection 
rules and some common principles as to the calculation of holdings 
seem indispensable if a harmonized protection of minority 
shareholders is really wanted. 
(b) Mandatory Bids 
As has been explained, the mandatory bid is no longer treated 
as the only means to protect minority shareholders. However, where 
Member States opt for a mandatory bid rule, Article 10 which 
contains some minimum requirements applies. The new proposal 
permits both full and partial bids. In both cases, the offer has to be 
made to all shareholders which follows as a matter of course from 
the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. A partial bid has to 
be made for a "substantial parf' of the remaining shares. According 
to the Explanatory Memorandum of the proposed Directive this 
"percentage should be high enough to meet the objective of the 
protection of minorities. " There is, however, no hint as to how much 
precisely that would be. Shares tendered in excess of what the 
offeror of the partial bid is willing to acquire have to be scaled down 
in the same proportion with respect to each shareholder (scaling 
down pro rata). This rule ensures equal treatment and corresponds 
with the relevant provision on partial bids of the City Code73 and the 
German Takeover Code. 74 
A serious shortcoming of Article 10 is that it is rather vague on 
the price of a mandatory bid. Unlike the City Code under which the 
73 Rule 36.7 City Code. 
74 Article 10 German Takeover Code. 
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bidder has to offer the highest price paid for shares of the target 
company within a specified period of time to enable all shareholders 
to participate in premiums paid, Article 10 of the new proposal only 
provides that the offer should be made "at a price which meets the 
objective of protecting" the shareholders' interests. Again, the 
proposal is vague on a crucial matter. Thus, Member States could try 
to dilute the mandatory bid rule by allowing a mandatory bid price 
significantly below the premium (as the German Takeover Code 
effectively does). 75 
(c) Other appropriate Means 
In addition to the mandatory bid, Article 3 of the new proposal 
now allows "other appropriate and at least equivalent means in order 
to protect the minority shareholders. " The Explanatory Memorandum 
to the 1996 proposal points out that this new approach was 
necessary to accommodate certain Member States (Germany most 
notably) which protect minorities through a law of groups. In practice, 
it will be most difficult for the EC-Commission and the ECJ to assess 
whether the law of groups or other mechanism of a Member State 
really is equivalent to a mandatory bid in all respects. The scenario 
of the EC-Commission taking action against Germany before the 
ECJ under Article 169 of the EC-Treaty because the German law of 
groups provides for insufficient protection in the case of qualified de 
facto groups seems hardly realistic. Article 3 clearly is the result of a 
political compromise the intention of which was to enable the 
Member States to keep their national rules. 76 Again, the harmonizing 
effect of this rule, if there is any, is minimal. 
75 See Chapter 4.1.1. (4) at pp. 116. 
76 As to the political background see Neye, Der neue Vorschlag der 
Kommission für eine dreizehnte Richtlinie über Übernahmeangebote 
DB 1996,1121. 
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The regulatory minimalism exercised by the EC-Commission 
begs the question whether a harmonisation at such a low level still 
makes sense. Article 3 demonstrates that a real consensus on the 
protection of minority shareholders in the context of a change of 
control of a company is not achievable at present. Article 3 not even 
defines the notion of control let alone the way in which minority 
shareholders are to be protected. As long as time is not ripe for a 
European solution on the protection of minority shareholders, which 
is obviously the case at present, it is submitted that the issue should 
be excluded from the proposed takeover Directive. The regulation of 
takeover bids would still make sense without provisions on the 
protection of minority shareholders. In fact, the issue of protection of 
minority shareholders goes far beyond the regulation of takeover 
bids anyway as public bids are just one technique to acquire 
corporate control. The protection of minority shareholders is a 
concern at the heart of company law independent from the 
acquisition technique applied. Hence, a takeover Directive should 
concentrate on regulating those (mainly procedural) issues specific 
to takeover bids (offer document, timing, duties of offeror and offeree 
company, supervisory authority etc. ) and leave the more general 
issue of minority protection to a possible later Directive - if and when 
real consensus is reached among the Member States. 
(4) Restrictions on Defensive Action 
In line with the City Code, 77 the German Takeover Code, 78 and 
the previous proposals, 79 the management of the target company is 
obliged to refrain from adopting defensive measures which may 
77 Rule 21 City Code. See Chapter 3.1.1. (2)(d) at pp. 35. 
78 Article 19 German Takeover Code. See Chapter 4.1.1. (3)(d) at pp. 116. 
79 Article 8 Proposal 1989 and 1990. 
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result in the frustration of the bid. 80 However, this rule takes effect 
only once the announcement of the intention to make a bid is made 
by the offeror. Prior to this point of time, the general company law 
rules of the individual Member States apply. 
As to court proceedings as a defensive measure, it is left to the 
Member States to determine to what extent the courts may intervene 
in a takeover bid as long as an injured party enjoys "adequate 
remedies, whether through an appeals procedure operated by the 
supervisory authority or through the right to take proceedings before 
the courts to claim compensation. "81 
(5) Procedural Rules 
As a consequence of the framework-approach pursued by the 
1996 proposal, the procedural provisions are reduced to an absolute 
minimum. A feature known from the City Code is that a high standard 
of transparency is sought to avoid insider-trading in advance of a bid. 
Therefore, Article 6 requires that "the decision to make a bid is made 
public" and that the supervisory authority and the management of the 
target company are informed previously by the bidder. Article 6 (3) 
provides for a basic minimum content of the offer document which is 
to be made public. The way the offer document and other relevant 
information is to be made public is left to the Member States. 
Member States only have to ensure that the creation of false 
markets in the securities of the offeree and offeror companies are 
avoided and that the relevant information is readily and promptly 
made available to the addressees of the bid. 82 The offer period may 
not be less than four or more than ten weeks. The management of 
the target company has to publizise 91 a document setting out its 
80 Article 8 lit (a). 
81 Article 4 (5). 
82 Article 7. 
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opinion on the bid together with the reasons on which it is based. "83 
Contrary to the City Code, there is no obligation on the target 
management to seek and publish "competent independent advice. "84 
Unlike the previous proposals, the 1996 version contains no 
provisions on the withdrawal or nullity of the bid, the revision of bids, 
competing bids, or the disclosure of the result of bids. It simply states 
in Article 9 that the Member States have to ensure that rules are in 
force which govern at least these issues. Thus, as has been 
repeatedly pointed out in other contexts, the harmonizing effect with 
regard to procedural rules is minimal indeed. The City Code would 
easily fulfill all the procedural requirements. 
(6) Supervisory Authority 
As the previous proposals, 85 the draft Directive provides for a 
supervisory authority which is to be charged with supervising all 
aspects of the bid. Contrary to the previous proposals according to 
which the designated (state) authority could delegate all or part of its 
powers to "associations or private bodies", the new proposal allows 
the direct designation of "associations or private bodies" without prior 
delegation from a (state) authority. The supervisory authorities must 
have "all the powers necessary for the exercise of their functions, 
which shall include responsibility for ensuring that the parties to a bid 
comply with the rules made pursuant to the Directive. " 
Notwithstanding the high level of enforcement achieved by the British 
Takeover Panel through the co-operation with other (statutory) 
bodies like the Stock Exchange and the SIB, 86 it is difficult to see 
how a private body with no legal backing should be able to properly 
83 Article 8 lit (a). 
84 Rule 3.1 City Code. 
85 Article 6 Proposal 1989 and 1990. 
86 See in detail Chapter 3.1.2. (3)(d) and (e) at pp. 46 and 48. 
Chapter 5 196 
enforce the proposed rules in every case. Again, the question arises 
whether the self-regulatory approach allowed by this proposal is in 
line with primary EC law, namely Article 189 (3) of the EC-Treaty. 87 
(7) Summary 
As the proposed Directive only undertakes to create "a 
framework consisting of certain principles and a limited number of 
general requirements" concerning takeovers one could not expect 
detailed regulation covering all aspects of a topic as complex as 
takeover bids. Though acknowledging that the principle of 
subsidiarity should play a major role in future harmonisation efforts, it 
appears doubtful in the case of the proposed Takeover Directive 
whether a harmonisation at such a low level would still make sense. 
Apart from the issue of defensive measures the proposed Directive 
backs down from all controversial issues. This is most manifest with 
respect to the protection of minority shareholders in the context of a 
change of control. Furthermore, to allow harmonisation by way of 
self-regulation, as the proposal does, may accommodate British 
objections, but is - to say the least - highly problematical with respect 
to primary European law. The procedural rules are so loosely drafted 
that the harmonizing effect would be minimal. The contribution of the 
proposed Directive towards a "level playing field" for takeovers and 
mergers would therefore be minuscule. Time simply appears not to 
be ripe for a substantive harmonisation of takeover laws. Under 
these circumstances it seems more in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity to just shelve the proposal until a substantive consensus 
is reached than to adopt a fragmentary and problematic Directive 
which is neither fish, flesh, nor fowl. 
In the U. K. the new proposal has already provoked strong 
87 See Chapter 5.1.2. (1)(a) at pp. 181. 
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opposition from the Takeover Panel, 88 for whom any Takeover 
Directive would mean a loss of power and more accountability, the 
Law Society and the House of Lords Select Committee. 89 The 
greatest British concern appears to be, as in the past, 90 that the 
directive would undermine the Takeover Panel and the City Code by 
making the regulatory system in the U. K. statutory. MrAlistair 
Defriez, the Panel's director general (1996), is quoted as saying that 
"tactical or nuisance litigation would inevitably result' and that the 
Directive might lead compensation claims of up to £1 billion from 
losing bid battles. 91 The 1995-1996 Report of the Takeover Panel 
reads as follows: 92 
"The Panel does not believe that there would be any benefit for 
takeover regulation in the UK if these proposals were adopted and, 
indeed, it is concerned about the risks which they would pose to the 
existing system. In particular, the Directive, which would require 
statutory implementation, could lead to a legalistic interpretation of the 
Code with the consequent risk of greater resort to and intervention by 
the Courts. Participants in takeovers would inevitably seek to 
challenge Panel decisions which might lead no only to the granting of 
injunctive relief by the Courts in the UK but also to issues being 
referred to the European Court of Justice. It could result in tactical 
litigation between the parties. This interference with the takeover 
process would adversely affect the speed, flexibility and certainty with 
which the Panel is currently able to operate and would add significantly 
to the costs and disruption incurred during the course of a bid. 
The Panel continues to question both the need for this Directive as 
most Member States have in recent years introduced measures to 
regulate takeovers and the need for action on a European basis under 
88 Takeover Panel, 1995-1996 Report, p. 12 
89 See Financial Times, 2 August 1996. Welcoming the proposal in priciple 
as "a first step" and rejecting the claim that it would lead to tactical 
litigation, Andenas, European take-over regulation and the City Code, 
[1996) Company Lawyer, Vol. 17, No. 5, p. 150,152: "There is no reason 
to fear that a takeover directive will lead to more litigation and undermine 
the City Code and the Takeover Panel. The English case law is clear in 
this respect, and the European Commission's 1996 proposal contains 
provisions making it possible to exclude new remedies. " 
90 See Chapter 5.1.1. (1) at pp. 175. 
91 See Financial Times, 20 June 1996. 
92 At p. 12. 
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the principle of subsidiarity. " 
The German industry, in contrast, has generally welcomed the 
new proposal93 the underlying reason for this positive reaction 
probably being that a Directive as proposed would have very little if 
any practical effect and would, hence, be without serious 
consequences for the cherished German system. 
5.2. The Proposed 5th Directive 
The first version of this Directive was proposed in 1972 and has 
since repeatedly been amended, 94 the latest amendment being 
made in 1991.95 The proposed Directive deals with a number of 
important issues, namely the structure of the management of a 
public company, employee participation, directors' liability and voting 
rights. The fundamental obstacle to agreement from the British point 
of view has always been the highly political question of employee 
participation. 96 Quite apart from this rather overshadowing issue, 97 
the proposal in its latest version contains a number of provisions 
93 Gemeinsamer Arbeitsausschuß des Bundesverbandes der Deutschen 
Industrie, des Bundesverbandes Deutscher Banken, der 
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, des Deutschen 
Industrie- und Handelstages, des Gesamtverbandes der Deutschen 
Versicherungswirtschaft für Fragen des Unternehmensrechts, 
Stellungnahme zum Vorschlag für eine 13. gesellschaftsrechtliche 
Richtlinie Ober Übernahmeangebote, RV 47/86 of 29 March 1996. Also 
Baums, The New Draft Proposal for a Directive on Takeovers - the 
German Perspective, Osnabrück, Arbeitspapier 10/96. 
94 As to it history see Palmer's Company Law, para 16.402. 
95 [1991] O. J. C321/9. Up to date version published in Dine, EC Company 
Law, A8. 
96 See e. g. Boyle, Draft Fith Directive: Implications for Directors' Duties, 
Board Structure and Employee Participation, [1992] Company Lawyer, 
Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 6 at p. 8; Hopt, Labour Representation on Corporate 
Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic 
Integration in Europe, International Review of Law and Economics, (1994) 
14,203-214. 
97 Palmer's Company Law, para 16.402. 
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designed to remove some of the existing barriers to takeovers. 98 
5.2.1. Removal of Directors 
It has been seen that removing the incumbent management 
from office is one of the main difficulties encountered by a bidder for 
a German stock corporation. 99 In order to remedy this barrier, 
Article 36 (3) of the proposed Directive provides that "for resolutions 
appointing or dismissing members of the administrative, 
management or supervisory organ, neither the law nor the 
memorandum or articles of association may require a majority 
greater than the absolute majority of votes" 
Being in line with section 303 (1) of the British Companies Act 
1985, this provision would affect section 108 of the German Stock 
Corporations Act according to which, if no other provision is 
contained in the articles, a three-quarter majority is needed to 
appoint and remove those members of the supervisory board who 
are shareholder representatives. 100 Moreover, the law regarding 
special appointment rights in Germany would be affected. 101 As 
discussed earlier, special rights to appoint up to one-third102 of the 
shareholder representatives of the supervisory board may be 
granted to certain shareholders and only those shareholders are at 
present entitled to remove the directors so appointed. 103 If 
98 See Andenas, The future of EC company law harmonisation, [1994) 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 121; Dine, EC Company Law, A8.52 
and A15.1 et seq.; Palmer's Company Law, para 16.448. 
99 See Chapter 4.2.2. at pp. 133. 
100 See Chapter 4.2.2. (2)(a) at pp. 137. 
101 Sec. 101,103 AktG. See Chapter 4.2.2. (2)(c) at pp. 141. 
102 As to a restriction of the number of appointment rights see Articles 4 (5) 
an 21 B (5) of the proposed 5th Directive: "The memorandum or articles of 
association may not confer on the holders of a particular category of 
shares an exclusive right to put forward nominations for a majority of 
those members of the supervisory organ whose appointment is a matter 
for the general meeting. " 
103 Sec. 103(2) AktG. 
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Article 36 (3) were implemented, those specially appointed directors 
could - as any other shareholder representatives on the supervisory 
board - also be dismissed by an ordinary resolution of the general 
meeting which in turn would reduce the impeding effect of special 
appointment rights in Germany considerably. 
Hence, the implementation of Article 36 (3) would render the 
supervisory board more accountable to the general meeting and, 
thus, facilitate the seizing of control over the corporate management 
organs by a successful bidder at the post acquisition stage. This is to 
be fully welcomed as a step in the right direction. It is to be expected, 
however, that the legally binding implemention of such a provision in 
Germany would be strongly opposed by many. 
5.2.2. Restrictions on Voting Rights 
Another major oblstacle in Germany identified previously is the 
frequent restriction on the number of voting rights exercisable by a 
single shareholder. 104 Promoting the principle of "one share - one 
vote", Article 33 of the proposed 5th Directive in its latest version105 
would not only restrict the use of preference shares further, but also 
prohibit the limitation of voting rights in the way described. 106 
In order to open the German market for corporate control and 
104 See Chapter 4.3.1. at pp. 157. 
105 Article 33: "(1) The shareholder's right to vote shall be proportionate to 
the fraction of the subscribed capital which the shares represent. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the laws of the Member States may 
authorise the memorandum and the articles of association to allow 
restriction or exclusion of the right to vote in respect of shares which carry 
special pecuniary advantages. Such shares may not be issued for an 
amount exceeding 50 % of the subscribed capital. Where the company 
has not fulfilled the obligations arising in respect of such shares for a 
period which may not exceed three consecutive accounting years, the 
holders of those shares shall acquire voting rights in proportion to the 
fraction of the subscribed capital which those shares represent, and the 
voting rights thus acquired shall be equivalent to those of th other 
shareholders. " 
106 Palmer's Company Law, para 16.449. 
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boost the equities markets by ensuring more shareholder-democracy 
while reducing the power of the banks, the new Article 33 is to be 
highly welcomed too. Again, however, many will take a different view 
in Germany. 107 
5.2.3. Proxy Voting 
Proxy votes, in Britain often exercised by directors108 and in 
Germany by banks, 109 have been identified as barriers to takeovers 
in both countries, the problem being worse in Germany because of 
the additional influence of the banks through their holdings, their 
frequent representation on supervisory board level and the limitation 
of voting rights. Recognizing this problem, Article 28 restricts the 
freedom of the proxy to vote the shares to some extent. 110 In 
107 See e. g. Zöller/Noack, One share - one vote? AG 1991,117,128. 
108 See Chapter 3.3.2. at pp. 74. 
109 See Chapter 4.2.3. at pp. 143. 
110 Article 28: "(1) Where national law allows credit institutions, or groups of 
shareholders, or other persons in the course of their professional 
activities, or a company itself to invite shareholders to appoint them as 
proxies, Article 27 and the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) the appointment shall relate only to one meeting; it shall, however, be 
valid for successive meetings having the same agenda; 
(b) the appointment shall be irrevocable; 
(c) the invitation shall be adressed either in writing or by publication in one 
or more nationally distributed newspapers to every shareholder whose 
name and permanent address is known; 
(d) the invitation must include the following at least: 
(aa) the agenda indicating the items to be discussed and the proposals 
for decisions; 
(cc) a statement to the effect that the documents referred to in Article 30 
are available to any shareholder who requests them; 
(dd) a request for instructions concerning the exercise of the right to vote 
in respect of each item on the agenda; 
(ee) a statement of the way in which the proxy will exercise the right to 
vote if the shareholder gives no instructions; 
(e) the right to vote shall be exercised in accordance with the statement 
made to the shareholder. This shall not, however, affect national laws 
which allow the proxy to depart from the instructions received or the 
statements made. In the event of any such departure, the proxy shall 
inform the shareholder. 
(3) A Member State may provide that, contrary subparagraph 1(a), the 
appointment shall not relate to one or more general meetings having the 
same agenda but to specified period of not more than 15 months. In that 
event, the particulars listed in subparagraph 1(d) must be communicated 
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principle, the appointment of the proxy shall relate only to one 
meeting and the shareholder may give instructions concerning the 
exercise of the vote. If no instructions are given, the proxy is in 
principle obliged to vote in a way previously stated and made known 
to the shareholder. However, these provisions are considerably 
diluted by exceptions allowing the member states to provide that the 
proxy may depart from the instructions, if such were given, or his 
statement to the shareholder. 111 Moreover, member states may also 
provide that the appointment of a proxy shall not relate to a single 
general meeting, but to a period of not more than 15 months, 112 
which would in effect often lead to the proxy having full discretionary 
power. It is therefore rather doubtful whether Article 28 would have a 
significant effect in terms of removing the barrier considered here. In 
fact, Article 28 is in essence very similar to the law as it stands at 
present in Germany. 113 
5.3. Concluding Remarks 
Contemplating the European developments in terms of 
takeovers it appears that the emphasis has since the mid 1980s 
been clearly placed on the creation of a Takeover Directive 
regulating the takeover procedure and ensuring the equal treatment 
of shareholders rather than the removal of existing barriers. Whether 
the EC-Commission has in that respect got its priorities right seems 
questionable. As long as in some member states, like in Germany, 
structural barriers exist which most effectively prevent takeover bids, 
there seems - at least in respect of these countries - no point in 
having a takeover law regulating procedural aspects. British 
to every shareholder referred to in subparagraph 1(c) before each general 
meeting. " 
111 Article 28(1)(e). 
112 Article 28(3). 
113 Sec. 135 AktG. 
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acquisitions in Germany would not substantially be facilitated simply 
by having a Takeover Directive. This is particularly true under the 
terms of the 1996 proposal the harmonizing effect of which would be 
minimal. 
What is needed at the present stage are reinforced efforts to 
remove the existing barriers. When this is achieved, the need for a 
Takeover Directive will then arise automatically. Although the 
proposed 5th Directive takes some quite useful steps to tackle some 
of the most eminent barriers, especially since the second 
amendment of the 1988 version in 1991, the chance that this 
Directive will be adoped in the foreseeable future is more than dim. 
The reason being not so much the provisions concering the takeover 
barriers, but the most controversial question of employee 
participation. Hence, a logical way forward would be to separate 
these different issues, i. e. to strike off the provisions regarding 
employee participation from the proposed 5th Directive and to return 
to them later in a different Directive. 114 This approach, however, 
appears to have been rejected by the Commission, the result of 
which is that the prospects for the creation a "level playing field" in 
Europe remain bleak at present. 
114 See also Andenas, The future of EC company law harmonisation, [1994] 
Company Lawyer, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 121,122; Dine, EC Company Law, 
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Chapter 6 
MERGER CONTROL IN 
BRITAIN 
6.1. Introduction 
Part Three of this work undertakes to explore the way in which 
takeovers and mergers are policed by the relevant public authorities 
in Britain, Germany and under the European jurisdiction. The 
relevant field of law, called merger control in Britain, concentration 
control in Brussels, and "Fusionskontrolle", 
"Zusammenschlußkontrolle", or "Kartellrecht" in Germany, is in all 
three jurisdictions regarded as part of the wider field of competition 
law. This classification gives by itself some information about the 
concern which lies at the heart of merger control law: competition. In 
a way, however, this categorisation is somewhat misleading as it is - 
at least in Britain - not only competition that matters. 1 
Basically merger control is a form of governmental intervention in 
an otherwise lawful commercial transaction with the purpose of 
protecting the wider public. 2 Whereas the company law aspects of 
regulatory control over takeovers considered in Part Two of this work 
deal, broadly speaking, with the technicalities of making a bid and, in 
terms of substantive law, with the equal treatment of shareholders 
during the bidding process, thus the protection of private interests, 
merger control in Britain pursues a much wider and in a sense much 
1 See Chapter 6.4.2. at pp. 254. 
2 For a discussion on a fundamental level see Kenneth George, Do we 
Need a Merger Policy?, p. 281-300. 
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more difficult task. It undertakes - at least in principle - to evaluate 
the merits of a takeover or merger in order to establish, or rather 
prognosticate, whether a particular transaction "operates, or may be 
expected to operate, against the public interest. "3 
The principal aim of Part Three of this work - beginning with 
Chapter 6 on merger control in Britain - is to analyse and compare 
the respective merger control procedures and to review and appraise 
the substantive public interest criteria applied by the relevant national 
and European authorities. It is proposed to highlight the main 
discrepancies between the respective regulatory systems along with 
the frictions arising from this, particularly in the case of international 
mergers. Where appropriate, suggestions will be made as to 
possible scope for reform. 4 
6.1.1. Historical Development 
Unlike the self-regulatory system established under the City 
Code governing the acquisition of shares through takeover bids, 
public merger control in Britain is - and has always been - based 
entirely upon statutes. 
Merger control in Britain formally begins with the enactment of 
the Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965. Although no power to control 
mergers existed prior to the 1965 Act, to fully understand the present 
system it is imperative to go back in time some further 17 years to 
the 1948 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) 
Act, with which modern competition law in the United Kingdom 
began. 5 The 1948 Act set up the independent Monopolies and 
3 Sec. 84 (1) FTA 1973. 
4 See Sir Bryan Carsberg, Director General of the Office of Fair Trading, in 
Times, February 23,1995. 
5 For a thorough analysis of U. K. merger policy see Fairburn, The Evolution 
of Merger Policy in Britain, p. 193-230. 
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Restrictive Practices Commission, 6 the early forerunner of today's 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), consisting of 
businessmen, economists, trade unionists and lawyers. On referral 
by the Board of Trade, the Commission examined restrictive trade 
practices7 and manufacturing monopolies against a somewhat vague 
public interest criterion including inter alia business efficiency and 
competition. 8 
As the takeover activity increased sharply in the late 50s and 
early 60s -a developement which also led to the Notes on 
Amalgamations of British Business (1959) and finally to the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers (1968)9 - the case for 
governmental control over mergers became widely accepted. 10 The 
proposals made by the Conservative government in its 1964 White 
Paper1l were largely adoped by the Labour government, which 
came into power in October 1964, and included in the Monopolies 
and Merger Act 1965. The 1965 Act itself was very much based on 
the 1948 Act, which by and large meant that the regulatory structure 
which had previously applied to monopolies was simply extended to 
mergers from that time on. 12 Henceforth, certain mergers13 could be 
referred by the Board of Trade to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission which then investigated whether the merger operated 
against the public interest. 14 Contrary to the 1948 Act, however, the 
term "public interest" was not defined in the 1965 Act. Following an 
adverse finding by the Commission the Board of Trade was entitled 
6 Sec. 4 (1) FTA 1973 still refers to the original 1948 Commission. 
7 The investigation of restrictive practices was hived off from the 
Commission in 1956 by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956. 
8 Sec. 14 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act 1948. 
9 See Chapter 3.1.1. at pp. 29 with further references. 
10 Fairbum, The Evolution of Merger Policy in Britain, p. 194. Also 
Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 61. 
11 Conservative White Paper: Monopolies, Mergers, Restrictive Practices, 
London 1964, Cmnd 2299. 
12 Sec. 6-8 MMA 1965. 
13 Qualifying for investigation were mergers leading to a market share of at 
least 1/3 or involving assets taken over worth more than £5 million over: 
sec. 6 (1)(b) MMA 1965. 
14 Sec. 6 (2) MMA 1965. 
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to prohibit the merger or take other appropriate action. 15 
The basic regulatory framework established by the 1948 and the 
1965 Acts has largely been confirmed by the Fair Trading Act 1973 
(FTA 1973), which replaced the 1965 Act in toto and is the relevant 
piece of legislation today. Part V of the FTA 1973 distinguishes 
beween "newspaper merger references"16 and "other merger 
references". 17 The provisions on "other merger references" apply in 
principle to all forms of merger and to any sector of industry. Apart 
from newpaper mergers, a number of specific provisions 
supplementing the Fair Trading Act are in force with regard to 
mergers involving water companies, 18 building societies, 19 banks, 20 
and broadcasters. 21 Concerning those special sectors a stricter 
merger control regime applies, which will not be discussed in detail in 
this chapter. 22 
A number of minor amendments to the FTA 1973 were 
introduced by the Companies Act 1989 and the Deregulation and 
Contracting Out Act 1994. However, the basic structure and 
principles are still very much the same. 
To sum up, the development of merger control in the United 
15 Sec. 3 MMA 1965. 
16 Sec. 57-62 FTA 1973. The reason for the specific provisions on 
newspaper mergers is the political sensitivity of the issues involved, 
namely the freedom of expression of opinion and the unbiased 
presentation of news. 
17 Sec. 63-75 FTA 1973. 
18 See sec. 32-34 of the Water Industry Act 1991. The MMC must have 
regard to the principle that the number of water enterprises under 
independent control should not be reduced so as to prejudice the ability of 
the Director General of Water Services to make comparisons between 
water companies. As to MMC reports so far see General Utilities 
pic/Colne Valley Water Company/Rickmansworth Water Company, 
Cm 1929 (1990); General Utilities plc/Mid Kent Water Company, 
Cm 1125 (1990); Southern Water plc/Mid Sussex Water Company, 
Cm 1126 (1990); Lyonnaise des Eaux SA/Northhumbrian Water Group 
plc, Cm 2936 (1995). 
19 Sec. 93-95 Building Societies Act 1986. 
20 Sec. 21 Banking Act 1987. 
21 Sec. 2 Broadcasting Act 1990. 
22 In principle newspaper and water industry mergers are automatically 
referred to the MMC contrary to the ordinary procedure where the 
Secretary of State enjoys a very wide discretion whether to refer or not. 
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Kingdom has shown a remarkable continuity as far as the legislative 
framework is concerned. In the following chapter it is proposed to 
analyse the current regime in some depth. Particular emphasis will 
be given to the question whether calls for reform are justified or 
not. 23 
6.1.2. Overview over the Merger Control 
Process 
The complexity of the British merger control process makes it 
necessary to provide a brief overview over the regulatory framework 
before embarking on a more detailed analysis of particular aspects 
of the decision-making process. The merger control process involves 
in principle three different institutions, each of which plays an entirely 
different role: 
(1) The Director General of the Office of Fair Trading (DGFT) 
(2) The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) 
(3) The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
In a nutshell, the Director General of the Office of Fair Trading 
(DGFT) has the duty to monitor the takeover and merger activity 
across the country and advise the Secretary of State on whether a 
23 See quite spectacular and fundamental criticism by Sir Bryan Carsberg, 
Director General of the Office of Fair Trading, in his evidence to the Trade 
and Industry Committee, see Times, February 23,1995 and the Trade 
and Industry Committee, Fifth Report: U. K. Policy on Monopolies, 1995, 
Evidence February 22,1995, p. 30; also Hutchings, The Need for Reform 
of U. K. Competition Policy, [1995] 4 ECLR 211; Pratt, Changes in U. K. 
Competition Law: A wasted Opportunity? [1994] 2 ECLR 89,94. Also 
Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, Takeovers and Mergers, 
1991, paras 284 et seq; with muted criticism Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger 
Control, p. 323-336. 
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merger meets the qualifying criteria set out in the FTA 197324 and 
should be referred to the MMC. 25 As a more flexible alternative to 
suggesting reference or clearance the DGFT may also propose to 
the Secretary of State to seek an undertaking with the merging 
parties remedying the identified adverse effects of the merger in lieu 
of a reference. 26 
The Secretary of State, who is not bound by the advice given to 
him by the DGFT, decides on a discretionary basis whether to refer 
or clear the merger, or accept undertakings in lieu of reference. 
Merger references can be made both before27 and after28 a 
merger has taken place. If a reference is made, the MMC 
investigates the transaction in depth in order to establish whether the 
merger qualifies for investigation, 29 and if so, whether it operates, or 
may be expected to operate, against the public interest. 30 Its findings 
are published in most informative reports. 31 In its reports the MMC 
specifically recommends what further course the Secretary of State 
should take. 
If the merger does not qualify for investigation or if no adverse 
effects on the public interest are to be expected, the merger is 
automatically cleared, and the Secretary of State has no further role 
to play. In the event of an adverse MMC report, however, the 
Secretary of State may clear the merger or interfere with it in such a 
way as he considers requisite for the purpose of remedying or 
preventing the adverse effects specified in the MMC report. 32 He 
24 See Chapter 6.2. at pp. 214. 
25 Sec. 76 FTA 1973. 
26 Sec. 75G-75K FTA 1973. 
27 Sec. 75 FTA 1973. 
28 Sec. 64 FTA 1973. 
29 As to the relevant criteria see Chapter 6.2. at pp. 214. 
30 Sec. 69,84 FTA 1973. See Chapter 6.4. at pp. 245. 
31 An up-to-date list of all reports may be obtained from the MMC, New 
Court; 48 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JT. Reports are available from 
HMSO Publications Centre, PO Box 276, London SW8 5DT. 
32 Sec. 73 (2) and Schedule 8 of the FTA 1973. R v. Secretary of State, ex 
parte Anderson Strathclyde plc (1983] 2 All ER 233,242. 
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may, for example, forbid a proposed or dismantle an implemented 
merger. If the Secretary of State decides to forbid a proposed 
merger, each House of Parliament has the opportunity to veto his 
decision; if he orders the dismantling of a completed merger, each 
House of Parliament must approve of this decision by majority 
vote. 33 Alternatively, the Secretary of State may ask the DGFT to 
seek undertakings in lieu of such orders from the merging parties 
with a view to remedying the adverse effects of the merger by this 
means. 34 
Reflecting upon the British merger control system as outlined 
above two features in particular seem worthy of note and further 
examination: 
(1) First, the tripartite institutional structure - OFT, MMC and 
Secretary of State - of the British merger control process. In the 
evidence recently given before the Trade and Industry Committee 
the MMC admitted that it is "not aware of any state which has a 
tripartite structrue like ours. "35 The U. K. system certainly contrasts 
sharply with the German36 and European37 regulatory frameworks, 
both of which favour a unitary system where - in principle -a single 
body is in charge from A to Z. The question arises whether the 
inherited British merger control structure, which has been in place for 
quite some time now, is still able to meet the demands of an effective 
and efficient merger control process in a modern capitalistic 
economy. On the face of it, at least, a unitary system where only one 
authority is involved in the decision-making process from the 
beginning on appears to be simpler. Before coming to any 
conclusions on these questions the pro's and con's of the respective 
systems will be carefully considered in the following chapters. 
33 Sec. 91,134 FTA 1973. 
34 Sec. 88 FTA 1973. 
35 Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report, 1995, para 127; evidence 
p. 22. 
36 See Chapter 7 at pp. 265. 
37 See Chapter 8 at pp. 335. 
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(2) The second point of particular interest from a comparative 
point of view is the key-role played by the Secretary of State within 
the merger control process. It is the Secretary of State who decides 
in a "filtering function"38 on a discretionary basis whether a merger is 
to be referred to the MMC in the first place. Mergers he does not 
want to be scrutinized are not referred and go through. If a reference 
has been made by him and the MMC reports adversely, it is again 
the Secretary of State who then takes the final decision. The 
institutional and policy question arising is whether it is appropriate 
that the decision making power lies almost exclusively with a 
government minister rather than a politically independent body or 
person. In terms of substantive merger policy, it will be interesting to 
examine if, and to what degree, merger decisions are because of this 
institutional structure motivated by political considerations. 
In order to come to any substantiated conclusions on the points 
raised, it is necessary to examine the crucial stages and the 
underlying philosophy of the decision-making process in Britain more 
closely. 
38 Goyder, Public Interest Criteria, Fordham 1994, p. 125,129. 
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Office of Fair Trading 
DGFT identifies mergers of interest and advises 
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(2) Both Houses have to approve of a divestement order 
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6.2. Mergers Qualifying for Investigation 
In order to qualify for investigation a business transaction has to 
meet certain qualitative and quantitative criteria provided for in the 
Fair Trading Act: 
(1) The transaction must constitute a merger as defined by the 
Act (6.2.1. ). 
(2) In terms of quantity, the merger must either satisfy a market 
share or assets test (6.2.2. ). 
(3) The merger must haven taken place not more than six 
months before the reference is made (6.2.3. ). 
(4) There must be a territorial link to the U. K. (6.2.4. ) 
6.2.1. Definition of a Merger 
In the commercial reality the term merger is used for a wide 
range of transactions, encompassing, for example, public takeover 
bids, the purchase of shares on the Stock Exchange, the acquisition 
of assets, joint ventures, management buy-outs, reconstructions and 
amalgamations. The Fair Trading Act, flexibly taking account of the 
commercial diversity of transactions, 39 defines mergers in broad 
terms leaving wide discretion to the relevant authorities. 40 Under 
section 64 (1) of the Act a merger is deemed to exist where "two or 
more enterprises .... have ceased to 
be distinct enterprises. " 
39 Stagecoach Holdings Pic/Lancaster City Transport Ltd, Cm 2423,1993, 
para 6.21. 
40 See OFT, Mergers. A guide to the procedures under the FTA 1973, p. 3. 
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The term "enterprise" is defined as "the activities, or part of the 
activities, of a business"41 comprising any form of identifiable 
business regardless of the legal status of the acquired business. 42 
The purchase of a factory including equipment, employees, 
customers, suppliers and goodwill would undeniably amount to the 
acquisition of an enterprise. 
Broadly speaking, enterprises "have ceased to be distinct 
enterprises" where control of one has passed to the controller of the 
other. 43 Of central importance is, hence, the notion of "contror'. 
Section 65 (3) stipulates that "a person or group of persons able, 
directly or indirectly, to control or materially to influence the policy of 
a body corporate, or the policy of any person in carrying on an 
enterprise, but without having a controlling interest in that body 
corporate or in that enterprise, may .... be treated as having control 





A controlling interest 
Ability to control policy 
Abiltity materially to influence policy 
The term "controlling interest' is well-defined in company law 
terms, meaning a shareholding carrying more than 50 cent of the 
voting rights. 44 What is meant by the ability "to control or materially 
to influence the policy" of another enterprise is far more difficult to 
establish both in theory and practice. These terms are not defined by 
the Act and have no direct equivalent in company law. The OFT 
41 Sec. 63 (2) and 137 (2) FTA 1973. 
42 Butterworth's Competition Law, Div. VII, para 62. Also AAH 
Holdings/Medicopharma NV, Cm 1950,1992, para 6.69; Stagecoach 
Holdings Plc/Lancaster City Transport Ltd, Cm 2423,1993, para 6.21. 
43 Butterworth's Competition Law, Div. VII, para 66; Finbow/Parr, U. K. 
Merger Control, para 2.007. 
44 OFT, Mergers. A guide to the procedures under the FTA 1973, p. 5. 
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declared that a view "has to be taken case by case in the light of the 
particular circumstances. "45 Of course - but what does that mean? 
Much depends upon how widely the shares are dispersed46 and on 
the de facto balance of power between the merging enterprises. 47 In 
the merger between P&0 and European Ferries, the 'leading case" 
for this matter, 48 the stake acquired by P&0 in European Ferries 
effectively amounted to only 16.1 per cent of the voting stock, but the 
MMC pointed out that no other shareholder controlled more than 
5 per cent and that P&0 had good connections with most 
institutional shareholders, which probably enabled it to block any 
resolution of which it disapproved. 49 It has been indicated by the 
OFT that a shareholding in excess of 15 per cent is liable to be 
examined to see whether the holder is able materially to influence 
policy. A stake of 25 per cent or more, which confers on the holder 
the power to block special resolutions, is almost certain to be seen 
as conferring power materially to influence policy. Above that stage a 
shareholder may already have the ability to control policy, i. e. de 
facto control. If a person moves from one category of control to 
another, for example from the ability materially to influence policy to 
the ability to control policy, this step qualifies again for 
45 OFT, Mergers. A guide to the procedures under the FTA 1973, p. 5. 
46 The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company/European 
Ferries Group plc, Cm 31,1986, para 8.6.; Government of Kuwait/BP, 
Cm 477,1988, para 8.16. 
47 Stagecoach Holdings plc/S. B. Holdings Ltd, Cm 2845,1995, para 2.38: 
"Stagecoach is the biggest operator of bus services in the U. K., with ver 
broad experience in the industry and an impressive record of growth, 
efficiency and profitabilty. SBH, although a substantial operator, is much 
smaller and weaker than Stagecoach and will be willing to be advised by 
Stagecoach on how to improve its performance. " 
48 Comparable cases, albeit involving a higher stakes, are Eurocanadian 
Shipholdings/Furness Withy/Manchaster Liners, HC 639,1976 (28.8 %); 
GUS/Empire Stores, Cmnd 8777,1983 (29.99 %); 
Pleasurama/Trident/Grand Metropolitan, Cmnd 9108,1983 (20.02 %); 
Lonrho/House of Fraser, Cmnd 9458,1985 (29.9 %); Government of 
Kuwait/BP, Cm 477,1988, (21.6 %); recently: Stagecoach Holdings 
plc/S. B. Holdings Ltd, Cm 2845,1995(20 %). 
49 The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company/European 
Ferries Group plc, Cm 31,1986, para 8.6. 
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investigation. 50 Thus a particular transaction may qualify up to three 
times if the acquisition is made by stages. 
6.2.2. Quantitative Criteria 
In terms of size the Fair Trading Act demands either an "asset 
test' or a "market share test' to be met. 
The assets test is satisfied where the gross value of the world- 
wide assets taken over exceeds £70 million. 51 Most merger 
references are made on the basis of the assets test since it is much 
easier for the authorities to ascertain whether this test is satisfied. 52 
The market share test is satisfied if the merger results in a 
market share of at least 25 per cent of goods or services of any 
description in the United Kingdom or in a substantial part53 of it for 
the merging enterprises. 54 To identify the relevant market and 
determine the size of a market share is inherently difficult and 
requires not only precise data, but depends also very much on how 
the market is defined in terms of the relevant product (substitutability 
analysis) and geographic market. 55 To facilitate this task for the 
competiton authorities at the qualifying stage, the Fair Trading Act 
allows for wide discretion: 56 
50 Butterworth "s Competition Law, Div. VII, para 66. 
51 Sec. 64 (1)(b) FTA 1973. See Increase in Value of Assests Order 1994, 
SI 1994/72). 
52 Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 682. 
53 What is meant by substantial part of the U. K. has been the subject of a 
House of Lords decision: R. v. MMC, ex parte South Yorkshire Transport 
Limited [1993] 1 All ER 289,297: "the part must be of such size, character 
and importance as to make it worth consideration for the purposes of the 
Act. " 
54 Sec. 64 (1)(b) and (2), (3) FTA 1973. 
55 Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 2.014. 
56 See OFT, Mergers: A guide to the procedures under the Fair Trading Act 
1973, para 13. Also Raybould/Firth, Comparative Law of Monopolies, 
Pt. 114.4.2. p. 454. 
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".... the Secretary of State or the Commission, as the case may 
be, shall apply such criterion (whether it be value or cost or price or 
quantity or capacity or number of workers employed or some other 
criterion, of whatever nature) or such combination of criteria as may 
appear to the Secretary of State or the Commission to be most 
suitable in all the circumstances. '57 
The assets/market share approach employed in Britain differs 
from the qualifying criteria applied under German58 and European59 
merger control law. There, the quantitative qualification is based on 
the turnover of the parties involved. While the British approach is 
probably more to the point as the asset and market share test relate 
directly to the merger itself, the turnover based calculation in Europe 
and Germany may be easier to handle in practice as the turnover 
figures are set out in the balance sheets of the enterprises involved. 
6.2.3. Time Limit 
A merger reference, if it is made after the merger has taken 
place, can only be made within a six months period after the date the 
enterprises have ceased to be distinct. 60 However, the six months 
period will not begin to run unless the merger has been "made 
public". 61 The term "made public" is defined as being so publicized 
(in the financial press) as to be generally known or readily 
ascertainable. 62 
57 Sec. 68 (3) FTA 1973. 
58 See Chapter 7.3.2. at pp. 293. 
59 See Chapter 8.3.2. at pp. 362. 
60 For more details see Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 2.018. 
61 Sec. 64 (4) FTA 1973. 
62 Sec. 64 (9) FTA 1973. 
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6.2.4. Territorial Link 
As a matter of course, a merger may only be investigated by the 
U. K. authorities if there is some U. K. link. 63 The Fair Trading Act 
requires that of the merging enterprises "one at least was carried on 
in the United Kingdom or by or under the control of a body corporate 
incorporated in the United Kingdom. '64 Hence, a merger between 
two foreign companies may be investigated if one of the enterprises 
has a U. K. subsidiary, branch or a representative office. 65 An 
example of this constellation is the merger between MiTeK Industries 
Inc and Gang-Nail Systems Inc, both of which were incorporated in 
the U. S. 66 However, each of the corporations had a subsidiary 
operating in the U. K., namely Hydro-Air Ltd and Gang-Nail Systems 
Ltd. The U. S. merger between the parents would have resulted in the 
subsidiaries together having a market share of 76 per cent in the 
U. K., which prompted the MMC to recommend that MiTeK should 
divest itself of Gang-Nail Systems Ltd. A number of the MMC's 
reports have dealt with mergers involving foreign companies, 67 but 
the jurisdictional question as such appears, contrary to experiences 
in Germany, 68 never to have caused a problem in practice. 69 The 
definition, in particular the phrase enterprise "carried on in the 
63 For a more general analysis of the issue see: Lowe, Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction. The British Practice, RabelsZ 1988,157 et seq. 
64 Sec. 64 (1) FTA 1973. In its publication, Mergers: A guide to the 
procedures under the FTA 1973, the OFT states on p. 3: "at least one of 
the enterprises must be carried on in the United Kingdom or by or under 
the control of a body corporate incorporated in the United Kingdom. This 
means that a merger between two foreign companies may still qualify for 
investigation where either company controls any enterprise which is 
carried on or incorporated in the United Kingdom. " 
65 Butterworth "s Competition Law, Div. VII, para 63. 
66 MiTeK Industries Inc and Gang-Nail Systems Inc, Cm 429,1988. 
67 For an appraisal of the substantive issues involved in the context of 
foreign companies see Chapter 6.4.2. (2) at pp. 258. 
68 See Chapter 7.3.3. at pp. 295. 
69 Butterworth's Competition Law, Div. VII, para 64. 
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U. K. ", 70 seems wide enough to catch any transaction in which the 
U. K. could possibly have an interest. 71 
It should be noted, however, that the Secretary of State's 
power72 to make orders against foreign firms is strictly limited by 
section 90(3) of the FTA 1973 which stipulates that he may not take 
any formal extraterritorial action against foreign enterprises. 
6.3. Procedural Aspects 
The following paras intend to examine those procedural features 
which are determinative to the British merger control process. As it is 
not possible within the scope of this work to provide an exhaustive 
description of every procedural detail of the quite sophisticated 
merger control process in Britain, 73 the following representation will 
concentrate on certain aspects which appear of particular interest 
both from a comparative point of view and in respect of the ongoing 
debate in Britain. 74 
70 It is not entirely clear what is meant by this expression, in partiular 
whether the mere sale of products by an overseas enterprise which has 
no permanent place of business in the U. K. would satisfy the territorial link 
requirement. See Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 2.012; 
Butterworth's Competition Law, Div. VII, para 63. 
71 As to the territorial aspects under European law see Chapter 8.3.2. (2) at 
pp. 365. 
72 As to the powers of the Secretary of State see section 73 and Schedule 8 
of the FTA 1973. 
73 For a precise and up-to-date description of the merger control procedure 
refer to Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, 1995; also Freemann/Whish, 
Butterworth's Competition Law, Division VII, 1994. 
74 See in particular the Reports of the Trade and Industry Committee, First 
Report, Takeovers and Mergers, 1991; Fifth Report: U. K. Policy on 
Monopolies, 1995. Also the Annual Report of the DGFT 1994. Hutchings, 
The Need for Reform of U. K. Competition Policy, [1995) 4 ECLR 211; 
Pratt, Changes in U. K. Competition Law: A wasted Opportunity? (1994) 
2 ECLR 89,94. 
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6.3.1. The OFT Procedure 
The Director General of the Office of Fair Trading (DGFT) heads 
the Office of Fair Trading, which is a non-ministerial government 
department established by the FTA 1973.75 
(1) Function of the OFT 
As has been pointed out earlier, the basic statutory function of 
the DGFT in relation to merger control is to keep himself informed of 
actual and anticipated merger activity76 and advise the Secretary of 
State as to possible references. The need for such a "watchdog" is 
at least partly due to the fact that, unlike Germany77 and the EC, 78 
Britain has no legal requirement that the parties to a merger should 
notify the merger control authorities or seek clearance before 
implementing the merger. 79 Hence, the merger control authorities do 
not automatically know about ongoing mergers. This illustrates the 
liberal attitude taken by the Fair Trading Act towards controlling 
mergers. To compensate for this "procedural disadvantage" of the 
OFT, the Secretary of State has power to refer a completed merger, 
if he believes it qualifies, within six months of its having taken place 
and being made public to the MMC. 80 The OFT may learn of a 
merger from the financial press, other government departments, or 
voluntarily from the merging parties themselves, or third parties with 
75 Address: Field House, 15-25 Bream's Buildings London EC4A 1 PR. For a 
description of the OFT's work by the director of the Competition Policy 
Division of the OFT see: Martin Howe, U. K. Merger Control: How does the 
System Reach Decisions? A Note on the Role of the Office of Fair 
Trading, [1990) 1 ECLR 3-10. 
76 Sec. 76 (1)(a) FTA 1973. 
77 Sec. 24a (1) GWB. 
78 Art. 4 of the Regulation 4064/89. 
79 As to the pro's and con's of pre-notification see DTI, Blue Paper on 
Mergers Policy, para 3.1-3.17. 
80 Sec. 64 (4) FTA 1973. See 7.2.3. 
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an interest, for example competitors or consumer protection groups. 
The absence of a mandatory pre-notification requirement has been 
criticized by the Trade and Industry Committee for being too 
"informal and uncertain". 81 They recommended that pre-notification 
should be made mandatory where assets of more than £30 million 
are involved. 82 Although Sir Gordon Borrie, the DGFT at that time, is 
probably right in saying in his evidence to the Trade and Industry 
Committee that it is rather unlikely that any merger which would 
result in serious detriments to the public interest would escape the 
notice of the OFT, 83 a pre-notification requirement would facilitate 
the policing of mergers and the additional "administrative burden" on 
companies does not seem unreasonable provided that the 
notification threshold is high enough to catch only large deals. The 
£30 million threshold proposed by the Trade and Industry Committee 
appears to make sense. 
A voluntary pre-notification system has been introduced in 
Britain by the Companies Act 198984 which amended section 75 of 
the FTA 1973. This new procedure has so far received a reserved 
reception, with numbers declining (1990: 51 pre-notification cases; 
1995: only 11). 85 
As far as OFT proceedings are concerned a number of options 
are available to the merging parties: 
81 Trade and Industry Committee, First Report on Takeovers and Mergers, 
1991, para 79,80. 
82 The pre-notification requirement in Germany and the EU is primarily 
based on the turnover of the merging parties, not on the assests taken 
over. 
83 See the evidence given by Sir Gordon Borrie, DGFT of the day, to the 
Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, para 78, Question 823. 
84 Section 146 of the CA 1989. For more details see The Merger (Pre- 
Notification) Regulations 1990 (S. l. 1990 No. 501). A special form called 
"Office of Fair Trading Merger Notice" for notifiying the DGFT has been 
issued by the OFT. 
85 See Table 10 at p. 224, column 4. 
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(a) Not to seek clearance at all, i. e. to risk intervention 
(b) Confidential guidance prior to a merger 
(c) Voluntary pre-notification 
(d) Traditional written submission 
(e) Undertaking in lieu of reference (where adequate) 
Each of these procedures has its strengths and weaknesses 
which cannot be discussed here. 86 Suffice it to say that the right 
choice of procedure very much depends on the concrete situation 
and often involves an element of tactic. 87 Table 10 at page 224 
provides some information as to the workload of the OFT and the 
choice of procedure in practice. Quite remarkable is the gap between 
the high number of cases first examined and the very small number 
of cases in respect of which a reference to the MMC is finally 
recommended. These figures indicate that merger control in Britain is 
exercised in a rather liberal way. 
86 Useful information is provided by the OFT's publication Mergers: the 
Content of Submission. A note by the Office of Fair Trading, March 1994. 
87 For an excellent analysis of the considerations to which the parties should 
have regard to in making this choise see Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger 
Control, Chapter 3. 
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1986 524 313 -- 55 15 
1987 478 321 -- 40 6 
1988 456 306 -- 45 11 
1989 427 281 -- 32 14 
1990 369 261 51 22 21 
1991 285 183 38 15 8 
1992 200 125 9 21 10 
1993 309 197 13 46 5 
1994 381 231 7 76 8 
1995 473 275 12 107 11 
Source: Annual Reports of the DGFT 
(2) Personnel and Resources 
Among the various functions of the OFT merger control accounts 
for only a relatively small part of its work. According to the Annual 
Report 1994 the OFT spent in 1994 only 4 per cent of its 
£19.6 million budget directly on merger control. 88 The Mergers 
Secretariat, the subdivision of the OFT charged with the 
administration of mergers, is relatively small comprising in 1993 the 
88 Allocation of OFT resources: Regulatory: 26%; Information: 16%; 
Restrictive trade practices: 13%; Consumer policy: 12%; Monopolies and 
anti-competitive practices: 11 %; Economics: 8%; Legal: 7%; Mergers 4%; 
International: 3%. 
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head of the Secretariat, two principal case officers and four other 
case officers, four economists, a lawyer, and six support staff. 89 
Given these limited resources both financially and personnel- 
wise, it is obvious that the merger investigations undertaken by the 
Mergers Secretariat of the OFT can only be of a rather superficial 
and cursory nature. 90 This is admitted by the DGFT in his 1994 
Annual Report himself: 
"My information-gathering powers give me limited ability to 
make a fully rounded judgement of whether or not anti- 
competitive behaviour is working significantly against the public 
interest. When / propose making a reference, the company or 
companies concerned may tell me that they would prefer to 
change their behaviour rather than bear the costs and other 
detrimental consequences of a reference. But this is difficult for 
me because, without undertaking a more detailed investigation 
than is possible for me, I lack confidence in judging what 
changes are needed to deal with the situation. "91 
Under the present institutional structure it is, of course, the 
MMC's function to carry out the in-depth investigation. The question 
is, however, whether it makes sense to split the investigation process 
in this way. While it is comprehensible that the procedure is as such 
split in a preliminary and an in-depth examination, it is more difficult 
to understand why these stages should be performed by different 
institiutions and different people. If one authority only were charged 
with investigating mergers, as it is the case in Germany, the EC, and 
many other countries, the same people would deal with the merger 
from the very beginning on and knowledge about the merger could 
89 Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, paras 1.003 and 3.028 et seq. As to 
critical remarks on the calibre of the OFT staff in general see Trade and 
Industry Committee, First Report, para 104 et seq. A problem appears to 
be that Civil Service salary constraints make it difficult for the OFT (and 
the MMC) to attract high-quality staff from outside the public sector. 
90 See also Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, para 287 et seq. 
91 Sir Bryan Carsberg, Annual Report 1994, p. 15. 
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build up from the very first day. Under the present system, however, 
the investigative process is interrupted when a reference to the MMC 
is made. To some degree the work done by the OFT is duplicated by 
the MMC. From the companies' point of view dealing with only one 
authority throughout the procedure is preferable to the present 
situation. Given the DGFT's own admission that he is not able to 
"make a fully rounded judgement" and given the fact that the MMC 
procedure is very expensive and time consuming for the companies 
involved, it is questionable whether a decision as important as a 
reference decision by the Secretary of State, should be based on 
such inherently limited advice. 
(3) Policy of the DGFT 
Surprisingly, there is no provision contained in the FTA 1973 
stipulating the matters the DGFT has to take into account when 
making his recommendation. 92 Section 84 of the FTA 1973, which 
refers to the public interest, is directly addressed to the MMC only. 93 
It is, however, tacitly accepted by everybody involved that the criteria 
applicable by the MMC must be equally relevant to the DGFT. 94 
An analysis of the recommendation policy of the DGFT is 
impeded by the fact that the reasons for a recommendation are not 
publicized. 95 The DGFT submits a summary of the main features of 
the merger and those issues of particular concern to the Secretary of 
State. The DGFT has in the past declared that in making his 
recommendation he would have regard to the current publicly-stated 
92 Raybould/Firth, Comparative Law of Monopolies, Pt. 114.4.1. p. 449. 
93 See Chapter 6.3.3. (3) at pp. 239. 
94 Sir Gordon Borne in his evidence given to the Trade and Industry 
Committee, First Report, para 254 and Q 796. 
95 Goyder, Public Interest Criteria, Fordham 1994, p. 125,129. 
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government policy. This dependence on government policy has led 
to harsh criticism by the Trade and Industry Committee: 
"... by accepting that he does choose to operate within stated 
government policy, Sir Gordon Borrie [the DGFT at that time] is, in 
our view, both limiting his independence and compromising the 
integrity of the advice he gives. "96 
On the other hand, the Secretary of State is not bound by the 
DGFT's advice anyway. Were the DGFT not to take account of the 
government policy of the day, the result would simply be a more 
frequent divergence between the Secretary of State's reference 
decision and the advice given to him by the DGFT. 97 The whole 
concept of the DGFT's independence is somewhat feeble as the 
DGFT is appointed by the Secretary of State. 98 Given the relative 
lack of transparency at this stage of the process, 99 the DGFT 
following the government's policy is at least conducive to certainty 
and predictability and, thus, in the interests of industry. 
(4) Timing 
The general position under the Fair Trading Act 1973 is that a 
completed merger cannot be referred to the MMC by the Secretary 
of State if it has taken place and made public at least six months 
previously-100 This limits the period of uncertainty for those 
companies who decide to go ahead with a merger without seeking 
clearance. 
96 Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, para 254. 
97 Sir Gordon Bowie, Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, para 255 
and Q 274. 
98 Sec. 1 (1) FTA 1973. He can, however, only be removed by the Secretary 
of State on the grounds of incapacity or misbehaviour. 
99 Goyder, Public Interest Criteria, Fordham 1994, p. 125,129. 
100 Sec. 64 (4) FTA 1973. 
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Within this six-months-period the administrative timetables under 
which the DGFT has to operate differ according to the choosen 
procedure. 
(a) Confidential Guidance. In the non-statutory confidential 
guidance cases, the DGFT aims to advise the Secretary of State 
within 19 working days, which should ensure that the Secretary of 
State's reference decision is reached within 25 working days 
overall. 101 
(b) Pre-notification. Under the statutory pre-notification 
procedure the Secretary of State must reach his decision within 20 
working days with the possibility of a single extension of 15 working 
days. 1 02 To allow the Secretary of State time to reach his decision, 
the DGFT has to submit his advice a few days earlier. 
(c) Traditional written submission. In traditional non-pre- 
notification cases no particular statutory time limit is imposed on the 
DGFT apart from the six months period mentioned above. The 
DGFT has announced, however, that he aims to offer his advice 
within 39 working days which should enable the Secretary of State to 
come up with a decision within 45 working days. 103 
Hence, whichever procedure is chosen a couple of weeks 
elapse until the DGFT is ready to submit his advice. It is submitted 
that some of this time could be saved if a single authority where to 
investigate mergers. It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
German unitary model works better in practice. 104 
101 OFT, Mergers: the Content of Submissions, March 1994, p. 1. 
102 Sec. 75B(2)(3) FTA 1973. Merger Pre notifications Regulations 1994, 
SI 1994/1934. See Annual Report of the DGFT 1994, p. 41. 
103 OFT, Mergers: the Content of Submissions, March 1994, p. 1. 
104 Chapter 7 at pp. 265. 
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6.3.2. The Secretary of State's Reference 
Decision 
The Fair Trading Act 1973 is silent as to the grounds upon which 
the Secretary of State should base his reference decision. It is 
generally accepted, however, that the Secretary of State should be 
guided by the broad criteria set out in section 84 of the Fair Trading 
Act, which are directly addressed only to the MMC. 105 Given the 
absence of clear reference criteria in the Act and the fact that the 
Secretary of State is not legally bound by the advice given to him by 
the DGFT, it is clearly the policy of the Act to vest the widest possible 
discretion in the Secretary of State. 106 This was confirmed by the 
House of Lords in Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State in connection with 
the House of Fraser saga, where Lonrho unsuccessfully challenged 
the decision of the Secretary of State not to refer the successful bid 
by the Al Fayed brothers for House of Fraser, i. e. Harrods, to the 
MMC. 107 
In practice, the Secretary of State relies heavily on the advice 
given to him by the DGFT and divergencies are rather scarce as 
Table 11 below indicates. 
105 Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State, [1989] 2 All ER 609,617. OFT, Mergers: 
A guide to the procedures under the Fair Trading Act 1973, p. 7. 
106 Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 4.001: "As a matter of law, 
however, the Secretary of State has an almost unlimited discretion in 
deciding whether to refer a merger to the MMC. " Also Whish/Sufrin, 
Competiton Law, p. 686. 
107 Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State, [1989] 2 All ER 609,617. 
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S. O. S. 
Total references 
made by the S. o. S. 
1986 15 2 -- 13 
1987 6 -- -- 6 
1988 11 -- -- 11 
1989 14 -- -- 14 
1990 21 -- 4 25 
1991 8 1 -- 7 
1992 10 -- -- 10 
1993 5 2 -- 3 
1994 8 -- -- 8 
1995 11 2 -- 9 
Source: Annual Reports of the DGFT 
In view of the wide discretion enjoyed by the Secretary of State 
there have been complaints about a lack of predictability regarding 
the reference policy. 109 This appears to be true as far as competing 
bids are concerned, as the recent battle for the submarine maker 
VSEL by BAe and GEC demonstrates. Whereas the City confidently 
expected the rivalling bids to be cleared, 110 the Secretary referred 
both. This was understandable and in line with the DGFT's advice as 
far as GEC's bid was concerned since competition concerns 
108 These figures do not include newspaper references. 
109 Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 687; Also John Swift, Merger Policy: 
Certainty or Lottery?, p. 264,279 et seq, who concludes that merger 
policy is more predictable than is generally acknowledged. 
110 Financial Times, December 8,1994. 
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arose. 111 BAe's bid, however, was referred on the ground of "public 
interest involving national security". The Financial Times suggested 
that "this phrase may more accurately be read as 'political 
expediency"'. 112 Accordingly, the MMC did not identify any adverse 
competition or other public interest consequences in BAe "s case. 113 
Clearly, competing bids put the Secretary of State in a difficult 
position. Contrary to the BAe/GECNSEL case it has so far been 
publicly stated government policy to consider each bid 
independently. 114 However, if one bid is cleared and the other 
referred, this may easily lead to complaints about discrimination and 
a distortion of market forces. To either refer or clear both bids may 
appear to be the easy way out from the Secretary of State's point of 
view -a view which he apparently took in the BAe/GECNSEL case. 
However, to refer a company unjustifiedly in order to avoid reaching 
a politically difficult decision, seems too heavy a price to pay from 
that company's point of view. 115 
Apart from the difficult issue of competing bids and some 
uncertainty in connection with foreign state-controlled bidders, 116 the 
successive Secretaries of State have at least since the so called 
Tebbit-Doctrines 17 in 1984 by and large pursued a fairly consistent 
111 See the adverse finding by the MMC in May 1995: The General Electricity 
Company plc and VSEL, Cm 2852. 
112 Financial Times, December 8,1994. 
113 British Aerospace Public Limited Company and VSEL plc, May 1995, 
Cm 2851. 
114 The DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy deals specifically with that 
problem in para 2.28 and Annex F: "The blocking of rival bids, in an 
attempt to remove the unfairness and distortion created by the original 
reference decision, would create further distortion and unfairness, not 
least to the bidder who finds his bid blocked although it is in itself 
unobjectionable. " Also Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 4.016. 
115 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy deals specifically with that problem in 
para 2.28 and Annex F. 
116 See Chapter 6.4.2(2) at pp. 258. 
117 Lord Tebbit in reply to a Parliamentary Question on July, 5,1984: "1 
regard mergers policy as an important part of the Governments's general 
policy of promoting competition within the economy in the interests of the 
customer and of efficiency and hence of growth and jobs. Accordingly, my 
policy has been an will continue to be to make references primarily on 
competition grounds... " 
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reference policy focusing mainly on competiton aspects. 118 The 
various issues taken into account over the years will be considered 
at a later stage. 119 
Given the concurrence between the Secretary of State's 
reference decisions with the advice he receives from the DGFT one 
could raise the question whether it is necessary and expedient for 
the Secretary of State to be involved at this stage of the procedure at 
all. Why not should the DGFT himself decide upon making a 
reference as is already the case in monopoly cases? 120 An 
argument against such a change of law would be that the public 
interest criterion against which mergers are assessed in the U. K. 
leaves ample room for a wide range of political considerations. 121 
One might argue that this requires the decisions to be taken by a 
politician who is answerable to Parliament rather than a public 
servant like the DGFT. There is, hence, a correlation between 
procedural and substantive law which can also be seen in 
comparison to Germany. In Britain, merger control has through the 
public interest criterion a political dimension. Consequently, the 
Secretary of State takes the decisions. In Germany, merger control is 
exclusively based on competition and by and large seen as a 
technical administrative matter with no role for politicians: hence, 
independent public servants of the Cartel Office decide. 122 The 
question is, however, whether the public interest is the right criterion 
against which to assess mergers and whether merger control should 
be seen as having a political dimension. The advantages and 
118 See House of Commons speeches or written answers on Merger Policy: 
Lord Tebbit, July 5,1984; Lord Young, October 8,1987; John Redwood, 
March 13,1990; Peter Lilley, July 26,1990; Michael Heseltine, May 13, 
1992. See also DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, 1988, p. 7; OFT, 
Mergers: A guide to the procedures under the Fair Trading Act 1973, p. 8. 
119 See Chapter 6.4.2. at pp. 254. 
120 As to monopolies see sec. 50 FTA 1973. 
121 See Chapter 6.4.2. at pp. 254. 
122 See Chapter 7.4.1. at pp. 304 and Chapter 7.5. at pp. 315. 
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disadvantages of the either system will be further discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
6.3.3. The MMC Procedure 
A reference to the MMC has far reaching implications for the 
companies involved. 123 Some of these implications are immediate 
legal consequences, 124 most notably, a public takeover offer lapses 
automatically under the provisions of the City Code-125 Equally 
important are the economic consequences of a reference. 126 The 
MMC procedure is costly and time-consuming to the parties 
involved. 127 Extensive submissions have to be made, hearings to be 
attended and enquiries to be answered, which inevitably consumes a 
considerable amount of top-level management time. The costs of 
external advisors, i. e. solicitors, accountants etc., are substantial 
too. 128 These expenses, together with the uncertainty that 
unavoidably comes with a procedure of up to six months, 129 quite 
often cause the parties to abandon the merger proposal voluntarily 
123 Address: MMC, New Court, 48 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JT, Tel. 
0171/3241467. 
124 Sec. 74 FTA 1973: the Secretary of State has power to make interim 
orders with a view to preventing the parties from action which could 
impede the MMC's investigation; Sec. 75 (4A) FTA 1973: the parties are 
automatically prevented form further acquiring interests in each other. 
125 Rule 12 (a) of the City Code stipulates that "is must be a term of the offer 
that it will lapse if there is a reference before the first closing date or the 
date when the offer becomes or is declared unconditional as to 
acceptances, whichever is the later. " 
126 For a thorough economic analysis see Franks Harris, Shareholder Wealth 
Effects of UK Takeovers: Implications for Merger Policy, p. 149,154 et 
seq. 
127 Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report: U. K. Policy on Monopolies, 
1995, para 39. Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 5.001. 
128 Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report: U. K. Policy on Monopolies, 
1995, para 39. 
129 As to the timing see Chapter 6.3.3. (4) at pp. 242. 
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once a reference has been made, as Table 12 below 
demonstrates. 130 
Table 12: Outcome of References 
Year References made by 
the Secretary of State 
MMC Finding against Mergers 
Cleared 
Merger Abandoned 
1986 13 3 3 7 
1987 6 3 3 - 
1988 10 4 4 2 
1989 15 5 8 2 
1990 27 11 13 3 
1991 7 3 3 1 
1992 10 5 1 4 
1993 2 - 2 - 
Source: Dan Goyder, Public Interest Criteria, Fordham 1994, p. 130 
(1) Function of the MMC 
On a merger reference, the MMC's duty is to investigate and 
report on two questions: (a) whether a merger situation qualifying for 
investigation has been created, and (b) if so, whether the creation of 
that situation operates, or may be expected to operate, against the 
public interest. 131 The MMC has no power to initiate its own 
proceedings nor is it empowered to negotiate undertakings with the 
parties in lieu of reporting or is in any way involved in the 
130 Butterworth "s Competition Law, Div. VII, para 347; Finbow/Parr, U. K. 
Merger Control, para 5.010. 
131 Sec. 69 (1) FTA 1973. 
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enforcement of the action following an adverse report. 132 The basic 
idea is to have an expert commission free from any conflicts of 
interest and independent of government assess the merger. Its role 
has been likened by the Chairman of the MMC, Graeme Odgers, to 
that of a jury in a criminal trial, with the OFT playing the role of 
prosecutor. 133 Only if this impartial jury is convinced that the merger 
is detrimental to the public interest, the merger may finally be 
blocked by the Secretary of State. 134 Reasonable doubt as to the 
merits of the merger is not enough for "a conviction" as was pointed 
out in British Sugar/Berisford. 135 This demonstrates again the liberal 
attitude of the Fair Trading Act towards mergers-136 There is a basic 
presumption in favour of mergers in the U. K. 137 
(2) Personnel and Resources 
The MMC is a statutory body funded by the DTI. Its expenditure 
in the financial year 1994/1995 amounted to £6.8 million including 
£1.4 million accommodation charges. 138 
The Commission is headed by a full-time chairman, who is 
appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. 139 The 
132 Lipworth, Merger Control in the U. K., Fordham 1990, p. 205,210. 
133 Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report, 1995, para 55, Q. 18. 
134 Sec. 73 FTA 1973. See, however, the proposals made by Trade and 
Industry Committee, First Report, Takeovers and Mergers, 1991, 
para 297. Discussed below: 7.3.4. 
135 S&W Berisford Ltd. and British Sugar Corporation Ltd, HC 241,1980-81, 
para 9.40: "The question we have to consider is not merely whether there 
is a possibility that the merger will operate against the public interest. If 
only a possibility were required, hardly any merger could ever be allowed 
to proceed, for it is very rarely that such a possibility can be quite 
excluded. The question is whether the evidence creates an expectation 
that the merger will operate against the public interest. To put the matter 
colloquially, the required conclusion is not, This may happen but We 
expect that this will happen'. " 
136 See 7.3.1. (1). 
137 Butterworth "s Competition Law, Div. VII, para 347; Finbow/Parr, U. K. 
Merger Control, para 5.015; Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 689. 
138 MMC, Annual Review 1994, p. 11-12. 
139 See Schedule 3 of the FTA 1973. 
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Secretary of State also appoints the three Deputy Chairmen, who 
work part time on a31 /2 days basis. The chairman selects the 
Members, of which at present about 31, including the three Deputy 
Chairman, are appointed. They are paid for 1 1/2 days a week. The 
Members are in their inquiries supported by the MMC's staff, 
comprising about 80 officials, of which about two-thirds are direct 
staff of the MMC and the remainder are on loan from other 
government departments, most notably the DTI. 140 
Once a reference has been made, the Chairman appoints a 
specific group comprising usually five or six Members headed by a 
Chairman to investigate and report on the merger. 141 This group is 
supported by a team of staff, including inter alia economic advisers, 
accountants, industrial, and legal advisers. The Members take the 
final decision as to the public interest question. 142 The following 
chart sets out the basic organisational structure of the MMC. 
MMC Chairman 




- part time - 
Deputy Chairman 
- part time - 
ý__ 
_I Commission Members 
-part time - 
Supporting Staff 
- full time - 
140 For brief biographies of the MMC members and further details regarding 
the staffing refer to the MMC's Annual Review 1994. 
141 See MMC, Fact Sheets 1 and 4. 
142 Reg. 16 of Schedule 3 of the FTA 1973. 
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The part-time nature of the MMC differs completely from the 
structure of the German Cartel Office where full-time public servants 
have the exclusive responsibility for the investigation and decision- 
taking. 143 The part-time nature of the MMC has both strengths and 
weaknesses. On the one hand the MMC is on a part-time basis able 
to attract top people with different backgrounds in industry, business, 
the professions etc as the impressive biographical list of 
commissioners included in the Annual Reports of the MMC clearly 
demonstrates. 144 These high calibre people are likely to be capable 
of making valuable contributions which career-officials who have 
never ever worked outside the public sector and do therefore not 
have the industry experience MMC members have, could probably 
not make in the same way. However, a certain risk inherent in the 
British secondment policy is that of conflict of interest in the person 
of individual members. It is interesting to note that the German 
legislator in specifically ruling out secondments of directors from 
private companies to the Federal Cartel Office has taken a view 
diametrically opposed to the British one. 145 The U. K. -style co- 
operation between public and private sector by way of secondments 
is unknown in Germany. 
Furthermore, the question has been raised of how serious a 
one-day-per-week commitment really can be. 146 Moreover, during 
the periods when the Commissioners are not actually part of a group 
investigating a merger, they are not involved with the MMC at all. 
The point has been made by a number of witnesses to the Trade 
and Industry Committee that the Commission members are no 
143 Sec. 48 V GWB (incompatibility) even prohibits the Cartel Office staff 
from having any outside interests in the private sector in order to 
safeguard their independence! See Chapter 7.4.1. (3) at pp. 307. 
144 MMC, Annual Review 1994, p. 7-9. 
145 Sec. 48 V GWB. 
146 Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report, 1995, para 56. 
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experts on competiton matters and that they are not always as well- 
briefed as the parties wished. 147 It has also been alleged that 
because of the only sporadic involvement of the individual 
Commissioners they are prone to be dominated by particular group 
members with strong personalities and/or special knowledge, as, by 
the way, is often the case with "real" juries too. 
On the basis of diverse evidence the 1995 Trade and Industry 
Committee came to the conclusion that "there is a general 
dissatisfaction among industry and consumers with the present 
arrangements" which led to the recommendation "that appointments 
to the MMC be made on a full-time basis and that encouragement be 
given to secondment from industry, academia, consumers' groups 
and trade unions. "148 A system as proposed by the Committee 
would steer a middle course combining the strengths of the British 
and German systems while to some extent avoiding their respective 
detriments. 
147 Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report, 1995, para 67 
148 Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report, 1995, para 62. This was 
already recommended by the 1991 Trade and Industry Committee Report 
on Takeovers and Mergers, para 126. 
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Table 13: Background of MMC Members 
239 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Economics 3 3 6 8 8 8 7 
Accountancy 6 6 5 4 3 2 2 
Law 4 7 8 9 8 8 7 
Business 15 12 16 14 15 12 12 
Finance 7 6 6 4 4 4 3 
Other149 8 8 9 7 9 8 7 
Source: MMC evidence to the Trade and Industry Committee, 5th Report, 1995. 
(3) Policy of the MMC 
The key provision guiding the MMC - and, indeed, the whole 
British merger control system - is section 84 (1) of the FTA 1973 
which reads as follows: 
149 Includes Trades Union, consumer, civil service backgrounds. 
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84. (1) In determining for any purposes to which this section applies 
whether any particular matter operates, or may be expected to operate, 
against the public interest, the Commission shall take into account all matters 
which appear to them in the particular circumstances to be relevant and, 
among other things, shall have regard to the desirability - 
(a) of maintaining and promoting effective competition between persons 
supplying goods and services in the United Kingdom; 
(b) of promoting the interests of consumers, purchasers and other users 
of goods and services in the United Kingdom in respect of the prices charged 
for them and in respect of their quality and the variety of goods and services 
supplied; 
(c) of promoting, through competition, the reduction of costs and the 
development and use of new techniques and new products, and of facilitating 
the entry of new competitors into existing markets; 
(d) of maintaining and promoting the balanced distribution of industry 
and employment in the United Kingdom; and 
(e) of maintaining and promoting competitive activity in markets outside 
the United Kingdom on the part of producers of goods, and of suppliers of 
goods and services, in the United Kingdom. 
Unlike the OFT recommendation and the Secretary of State's 
reference decision, both of which are characterized by a relative lack 
of transparency, 1 50 the MMC stage of the procedure is transparent, 
since the highly detailed reports published by the MMC set out the 
underlying reasons for its finding in great detail. The criteria applied 
by the MMC in assessing the public interest will be examined in 
Chapter 6.4. in connection with the substantive law of merger 
control. 
150 Goyder, Public Interest Criteria, Fordham 1994, p. 125,129. 
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Suffice it to say at this stage that it is widely acknowledged that 
the MMC has for various reasons no, or at least no dominant, role in 
formulating British merger policy. 151 One obvious reason is that the 
MMC is not empowered to initiate its own investigations. It only gets 
what the Secretary of State wants it to have, and it is the Secretary 
of State who finally takes the decision upon an adverse finding. 
Furthermore, there is no system of precedent. This last point has led 
to the reproach of inconsistency and unpredictability on the part of 
the MMC. 152 The MMC argues, however, that each case needs to be 
considered on its own merits and that an inflexible policy in 
assessing the public interest would be contrary to the companies" 
interests who would not welcome a dependence on past cases. 153 
The MMC has a point in so far as merger cases do very much 
depend on factual matters, i. e. on an evaluation and prognostication 
of the development of the relevant markets after the merger has 
taken place, unlike judicial decisions which tend to be based to a 
much larger extent on purely legal questions. The system of 
precedent which works for the judiciary, and upon which common 
law is in fact based, is not as easily transferable to merger control as 
it might seem. However, in response to the criticism of 
unpredictability, the MMC has published a small booklet setting out 
in a simple and clear way the basics of competition assessment. 154 
A more technical barrier to formulating a consitent merger policy lies 
in the organisational structure of the MMC. As the investigations are 
undertaken by groups of commissioners who work part-time on an 
ad-hoc basis on individual merger cases and are unlike, for example, 
the officials of the German Federal Cartel Office not permanently 
involved in the merger control process there clearly is a practical 
151 Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 689; Trade and Industry Committee, 
Fifth Report, 1995, para 46. 
152 See the evidence given to the Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth 
Report, 1995, para 44. Also RaybouldlFirth, Comparative Law of 
Monopolies, Pt. II, 4.4.1, p. 450. 
153 Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 5.016; Trade and Industry 
Committee, Fifth Report, 1995, para 46. 
154 MMC, Assessing Competition, 1993. 
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difficulty in developing a coherent merger policy. The point is that 
given the current structure of the merger control process in Britain, 
the MMC, designed as a "jury", is not enabled to formulate a merger 
policy of its own, and therefore, this should not be expected of it. 1 55 
The problem of inconsistency, inherent in the present structure, can 
only properly be addressed through an organic reform of the MMC's 
role. 
(4) Timing 
The merger reference by the Secretary of State has to specify a 
period, which must principally not exceed six months, within which 
the report on the reference is to be made. 156 In practice, since the 
publication of the Blue Paper on Mergers Policy in 1988,157 the 
internal MMC procedure has been streamlined considerably and the 
Secretary of State nowadays usually only allows a three months 
period. As a thorough investigation inescapably takes some time, 
there appears, looking at the internal proceedings of the MMC, to be 
little scope for further streamlining of the process. 158 
6.3.4. The Secretary of State's Action following 
the Report 
If there has not been an adverse finding by the MMC, the merger 
is automatically cleared. The Secretary of State has no further role to 
play. Hence, in this case the final decision is taken by the MMC! 
155 Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report, 1995, para 56. 
156 Sec. 70 (1) FTA 1973. For an exception to this rule see sec. 70 (2). 
157 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, HMSO 1988. 
158 Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, paras 5.004 and 10.005. 
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In the event of an adverse MMC finding the Secretary of State is 
empowered to take the final decision - which usually takes another 
couple of weeks. 1 59 During this period he considers what action to 
take in the light of the MMC's conclusions and whether to make 
excisions from the published version of the MMC report. He may by 
way of orders, which are set out in detail in Part I and iI of 
Schedule 8 to the Fair Trading Act, either block the merger or attach 
conditions to it. He may also clear the merger unconditionally, 
although it is rather rare in practice that the Secretary of State 
deviates materially from the MMC's recommendations. In practice 
the route most often taken by the Secretary of State is to ask the 
DGFT to enter into negotiations with the merging parties in order to 
remedy the adverse effects specified in the MMC report by way of 
binding undertakings in lieu of orders. 160 
Whatever course is taken following an adverse report, the 
Secretary of State is obliged under section 73 (3) of the Fair Trading 
Act to "take into account any recommendations included in the report 
of the Commission .... and any advice given by the Director... " 
However, as was made clear by Lord Justice Dunn in R. v. Secretary 
of State, ex parte Anderson Strathclyde plc, this provision does in no 
way fetter the Secretary's options: "the Act read as a whole shows 
that the Secretary of State is not bound by the conclusions of the 
majority of the commission, that he has a wide discretion in deciding 
whether to make any order at all, in exercising that discretion he is 
entitled to take into account all the relevant circumstances, and to 
consider the opinion of the minority of the commission, and also 
representations and advice from persons other than members of the 
commission. " 161 Once again, these representations confirm the 
159 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, para 5.12; Lipworth, Merger Control in 
the U. K., Fordham 1990, p. 205,207; Critical to the length of that period 
Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, paras 7.005 and 10.006. 
160 A thorough analysis of this topic provide FinbowlParr, U. K. Merger 
Control, para 7.011 et seq. 
161 R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and others, ex parte Anderson 
Strathclyde plc [1983] 2 All ER 233,242. 
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overall impression that merger control in Britain is a highly 
discretionary affair. 
Interestingly, the Trade and Industry Committee recommended 
in its 1991 report on Takeovers and Mergers to extend the Secretary 
of State's powers to block a merger to the case where the MMC has 
cleared it. 162 The argument put forward is that the final decision 
should in any event be taken by the Secretary of State as he is 
answerable to Parliament, which the MMC is not. 
From a dogmatic point of view this seems consistent and in line 
with the general role of the MMC as an advisory body and the role of 
the Secretary of State as the ultimately responsible decision-taker. 
However, the law as it stand reflects the liberal attitude towards 
mergers taken by the Fair Trading Act in the sense of a basic 
presumption in favour of mergers. To extend the Secretary of State's 
power to cases where the MMC has cleared the transaction would 
free the Secretary of State entirely from the MMC's findings. The 
Secretary of State already enjoys completely unfettered discretion 
when making the reference decision. 163 To give him even more 
power would - rightly or wrongly - further increase the impression that 
merger decisions might be influenced by political considerations and, 
thus, contribute to the uncertainty felt by the industry because of the 
already wide discretion. From a European and German perspective, 
where merger decisions are - at least in theory - seen as 
administrative, and not political, decisions, an extension of the 
Secretary of State's power would further increase the gap between 
the regulatory systems. 
162 Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, Takeovers and Mergers, 
1991, para 297. 
163 See Chapter 6.3.2. at pp. 229. 
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6.4. The Substantive Appraisal Criteria 
It has been pointed out earlier that merger control in the U. K. is 
based on the broad concept of public interest. 164 Section 84 of the 
Fair Trading Act 1973 stipulates that the MMC, in deciding whether 
or not a merger may be expected to operate against the public 
interest, shall take into account "all matters which appear to them in 
the particular circumstances to be relevant ... 
" It is clear from the 
wording of section 84 that the MMC enjoys comprehensive 
discretion. Given this wide discretion it is not surprising that no 
application for judicial review165 of a decision made under the 
merger provisions has ever been successful in the United 
Kingdom. 166 The judicial self-restraint exercised by the courts and 
the underlying reasons for this are comparable to the situation under 
the City Code, where also no application for judicial review has been 
successful so far. 167 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the criteria applied by 
the MMC in assessing the effects of a merger on the public interest. 
164 See Chapter 6.3.3. (3) at pp. 239. 
165 R v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte Argyll Group plc, 
[1986] 2 All ER 257; R v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte 
Elders IXL, [1987] 1 All ER 451; R v. Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, ex parte Matthew Brown plc, [1987] 1 All ER 463; R v. 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte Air Europe, [1988] 4 BCC 
182; R v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte Argyll Group 
plc, [1986] 2 All ER 257. 
See also R v. Secretary of State, ex parte Anderson Strathclyde plc 
[1983] 2 All ER 233 (discussed: Chapter 6.3.4. ) and Lonrho plc v. 
Secretary of State, [1989] 2 All ER 609 (discussed: Chapter 6.3.2. ). 
166 For details see Homsby, Judicial Review of Decisions of the UK 
Competition Authorities: Is the Applicant Bound to Fail? (1993] 
5 ECLR 183 et seq; Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, 9.019; 
Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 700. 
167 See Chapter 3.1.2. (4) at pp. 51. 
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6.4.1. Competition 
In practice, the single most important issue in assessing mergers 
is competition. The underlying question is whether the merger is 
likely to confer market power which the new enterprise may be able 
to exploit at the expense of U. K. customers and consumers. 168 The 
emphasis on competition originates in the Fair Trading Act itself 
which mentions the promotion of competition in section 84 (1)(a), (c), 
and (e). 169 Competition has been given further weight as it has been 
consistent government policy170 to focus mainly on competition 
since the so called "Tebbit Doctrine" was pronounced in 1984: 
"References to the MMC would be made primarily, but not 
exclusively, on competition grounds, taking into account the 
international dimension of competition. "171 Since 1984, references 
based solely on non-competition grounds have been very rare. 172 
Assessing the potential effect of a merger on competition is 
inherently difficult. The DTI Blue Paper on Mergers Policy put it this 
way: "lt is not possible to set out rules of thumb which can be 
straightforwardly or mechanically applied to all cases: there is an 
irreducible element of judgement involved in assessing the likely 
effects of a merger on competition, which cannot be captured in 
formulae or statistics, and flexibility is essential in dealing with the 
unique circumstances of each case. '173 However, there are a 
168 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, para 2.18. 
169 See the exact wording of sec. 84 set out in full in Chapter 6.3.3. (3) at 
pp. 239. 
170 See House of Commons speeches or written answers on Merger Policy: 
Lord Tebbit, July 5,1984; Lord Young, October 8,1987; John Redwood, 
March 13,1990; Peter Lilley, July 26,1990; Michael Heseltine, May 13, 
1992. See also DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, 1988, para 2.14 et 
seq; OFT, Mergers: A guide to the procedures under the Fair Trading Act 
1973, p. 8; MMC, Assessing Competition, para 7. For an evaluation see 
also Butterworth "s Competition Law, Div. VII, paras 146 et seq. 
171 House of Commons written answer, July 5,1984. 
172 DTI, Mergers Policy, para 2.27; Soames, Merger Policy: As Clear as 
Mud?, [1991] 2 ECLR 53,56. See also Chapter 6.4.2. at pp. 254. 
173 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, para 2.15. 
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number of key factors commonly applied by the MMC, most notably, 
but not exclusively: 1 74 
(1) Market share 
(2) Remaining competitors 
(3) Countervailing bargaining power 
(4) Barriers to entry and expansion 
(1) Market Share 
As one would expect, the market share of the new enterprise 
plays an important role where a horizontal merger is concerned. 1 75 
Horizontal mergers are mergers between actual competitors. 1 76 The 
market share depends, of course, on how the relevant product and 
geographic market is defined. 1 77 The economic criteria applied in 
indentifying the relevant market cannot be discussed in detail here. 
Suffice it to say that the demand substitutability test plays a 
dominant role with regard to the relevant product market, whereas 
issues like transport costs and the perishablility of the products in 
question have some bearing on the definition of the relevant 
geographic market-178 However, as the MMC put it: "There is no 
174 MMC, Assessing Competition, paras 9,12-24. DTI, Blue Paper, para 
2.18. 
175 OFT, Mergers: A guide to the procedures under the FTA 1973, p. 10-11; 
OFT, Mergers: The Content of Submissions, para 12; OFT Research 
Paper 1, Market Definition in U. K. Competition Policy, 1993. 
176 References of vertical or conglomerate mergers are rare as detrimental 
effects are far more difficult to determine as competition issues do not 
arise by definition. See Raybould/Firth, Comparative Law of Monopolies, 
4.4.2., p. 458 et seq; Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, paras 6.044 and 
6.047. 
177 Examples of rather narrowly defined markets provides Soames, Merger 
Policy: As Clear as Mud?, [1991) 2 ECLR 53,59. 
178 For an analysis of the factors relevant in identifying the relevant markets 
see OFT, Mergers: A guide to the procedures of the FTA 1973, p. 9; 
Soames, Merger Policy: As Clear as Mud?, [1991] 2 ECLR 53,55; 
Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 6.017 and 6.005 et seq. 
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simple solution and there can be no hard and fast rules on how to 
define the market. '179 
The market share of the new enterprise is, however, not the 
only, and in many cases not even the decisive, factor as the 
Gillette/Parker and Kingfisher/Dixons cases illustrate: 180 
(a) Gillette/Parker: 1 81 When Parker Pen Holdings Ltd was 
acquired by Gillette, which owned Paper Mate and Watermann, 
Gillette's market share in the supply of refillable writing instruments 
increased from some 7 per cent to about 60 per cent in value. In 
view of the fact, however, that there were about 40 other competing 
brands of refillables supplied to the U. K. market, the MMC cleared 
the merger. 
(b) Kingfisher/Dixons: 1 82 In the Kingfisher/Dixons case 
competition in the market for electrical appliances was concerned. 
The bidder, Kingfisher, had through its subsidiary Comet a market 
share of about 9 per cent whilst Dixons had a 17 per cent share. The 
takeover would consequently have resulted in only a 26 per cent 
market share for Kingfisher. It was nevertheless blocked by the 
MMC. This decision was taken on the grounds that Comet 
(Kingfisher) and Dixons were competing vigorously on a national 
level and that retail prices for electrical appliances were likely to rise 
if the rivalry between Comet (Kingfisher) and Dixons were to 
disappear. 
These cases demonstrate the limited significance of the market 
share taken separately: a merger leading to a market share of 60 per 
cent was given the green light, whereas a takeover resulting in only a 
26 per cent market share was blocked on competition grounds. 183 
179 MMC, Assessing Competition, para 16. 
180 Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 6.017 and 6.020. 
181 The Gillette Company and Parker Pen Holdings Limited, 1993, Cm 2221. 
182 Kingfisher plc and Dixons Group plc, 1990, Cm 1079. 
183 For recent examples see also: Avenir Havas Media SA and Brunton 
Curtis Outdoor Advertising Ltd, 1991, Cm 1772: adverse finding (25.2 per 
cent); Elders IXL Ltd and Grand Metropolitan, 1990, Cm 1227: adverse 
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(2) Remaining Competitors 
The strength of remaining competitors, or more generally the 
structure of the market, is another factor which is regularly 
considered by the MMC. In this context, the MMC has, inter alia, 
regard to the number, size and market shares of competitors, 
international trade and openness of the market, the nature of 
competition (i. e. based on price, quality, or after-sales service etc), 
the financial resources of the competitors, and the rate of growth of 
the market. 184 
It has been claimed that the MMC takes too parochial and 
insular an approach when it comes to giving appropriate weight to 
the likely effect of imports on U. K. competition. 185 However, it 
appears doubtful whether this criticism is justified. At least since the 
"Tebbit Doctrine" in 1984, which promised to take "into account the 
international dimension of competition", 186 the government has been 
fully aware of the issue of import penetration. This is documented in 
various official publications187 and MMC reports. 188 A different 
finding (20 per cent); Hillsdown Holdings Plc and Associated British 
Foods Plc, 1992, Cm 2004: cleared (80-90 per cent). 
184 MMC, Assessing Competition, para 13. 
185 Reported by the DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, para 2.5 and 
Soames, Merger Policy: As Clear as Mud?, [1991] 2 ECLR 53,57; 
Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 696. 
186 House of Commons written answer, July 5,1984. 
187 See the following official documents: DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, 
para 2.5; OFT, Mergers: a guide to the procedures under the FTA 1973, 
p. 11; MMC, Assessing Competition, para 13 (b): "The intenisty of 
competition in a market is likely to be affected by the degree of its 
openness to international trade. Barriers to imports, including legal or 
institutional barriers (both tariff and non-tariff), transport costs and cultural 
barriers such as preferences for nationally-manufactured products, may 
to some extent isolate domestic producers from international competition. 
Although import penetration is relevant in assesing the intensity of 
competition, the source of the imports needs to be considered since 
import figures may overstate the intensity of competition. For example, 
imports may come from foreign subsidiaries within the same international 
grous as domestic firms, may be aimed at particular sectors of the 
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matter is, though, whether a national competition authority is really 
able to assess market events going on abroad correctly. It appears 
that for factual reasons the insight into foreign markets is necessarly 
limited. How, for example, can the British or German merger control 
authorities know how some South-Korean or Taiwanese actual or 
potential competitor is going to respond to a national British or 
German merger, whether they enter the market or not? 
(3) Countervailing Bargaining Power 
Another factor which the MMC has frequently taken into account 
in assessing competition is that of countervailing bargaining power of 
either suppliers or customers of the newly merged enterprise. 1 89 
Where its suppliers or buyers are in a particuarly strong position, the 
merged enterprise is likely to be unable to exploit its market position 
even if it enjoys a comfortable market share. Countervailing 
bargaining power on the part of a supplier is likely to exist where the 
merged enterprise depends upon the supplier's products and cannot 
switch to alternative suppliers easily. Countervailing bargaining 
power on the part of a buyer may exist where the buyer purchases a 
market, or may be regareded by some consumers as an unreliable 
source of supply. " 
188 See e. g. Monsanto Company and Rh6ne-Poulenc SA, 1989, Cm 826, 
para 1.5: "We have found that Rh6ne-Poulenc"s ability to exploit its 
predominant position in the supply of salicylic acid.... would be contrained 
by competition, particularly from Eastern European and Third World 
sources. We believe that as a result Rh6ne-Poulenc would be unlikely to 
be able to impose unreasonable price increases. We accordingly 
unanimously conclude that the proposed merger may be expected not to 
operate against the public interest. "; BICC Plc and Sterling Greengate 
Cable Company Ltd, 1990, Cm 1131, para 6.41; Trelleborg AB and 
McKechnie Extruded Products Ltd, 1990, Cm 1384, para 1.4; Sara Lee 
Corporation and Reckitt & Colman Plc, 1992, Cm 2040, para 6.32. The 
General Electric Company plc, Siemens AG and The Plessy Company 
plc, 1989, Cm 676, para 1.7.: "Furthermore, there have been changes in 
the economic environment of the United Kingdom since 1986, with greater 
emphasis on the development of a more open European market and 
international collaboration in defence. " 
189 MMC, Assessing Competition, para 18-20. 
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large portion of the merged enterprises' production. 
An example of the MMC's approach can be found in Hillsdown 
Holdings/Associated British Food (Anglia) where following the 
merger Hillsdown's market share accounted for over 50 per cent in 
the market for canned seasonal vegetables and was even higher in 
the market for canned fruits. In assessing the impact on competition 
the MMC concluded: "There are now only five canners of seasonal 
fruit and vegetables in the United Kingdom and new entry is unlikely. 
Hillsdown's ability to exploit its high market share is nevertheless 
limited by a number of factors. The buying power of the multiple 
retailers is large and their bargaining power is increased by their 
proportion of high-volume own-label sales. None of Hillsdown's 
major customers190 objected to the merger situation and most were 
unconcerned by the change. "191 The merger was cleared. 
(4) Barriers to Entry and Expansion 
It is an elementary interrelationship in a functioning market that 
where an enterprise becomes too powerful and exploits its market 
position by way of rising prices above the competitive level new 
competitors are likely to enter the market to offer the product or 
service at a lower price. Hence, the threat of entry of new 
competitors deters existing firms to some extent from abusing their 
market power even where they enjoy relatively high market shares. 
This important constraint upon the exercise of market power by 
incumbents does, however, not work where serious (artificial) 
barriers to new entry exist. 192 Where such barriers exist, incumbents 
190 Companies like Tesco and Sainsbury. 
191 Hillsdown Holdings PLC and enterprises belonging to Associated British 
Foods PLC, 1992, Cm 2004, para 1.5. 
192 Sec. 84 (1)(e) FTA 1973 therefore requires the MMC to "have regard to 
the desirability ... of facilitating the entry of new competitors into existing 
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may raise prices above the competitive level without actually 
inducing new competitors: the market is to the disadvantage of 
customers and consumers artificially constrained. 193 
What constitutes a barrier to entry has been the subject of 
heated debate among economists, most notably between the 
Chicago School, favouring a very narrow definition according to 
which only government policy and regulation could be regarded as 
barriers, and the prevailing Harvard School, advocating a much 
broader approach. 194 On the basis of its reports195 there is no doubt 
that the MMC in practice champions the Harvard approach. 196 In its 
booklet "Assessing Competition" the MMC identifies the following 
factors as potential barriers to entry: 
(a) Limited supplies (of raw materials or facilities, or lack of 
access to appropriate technology). 
(b) Institutional or regulatory barriers (licensing 
requirements, safety or quality standards, planning 
permissions, intellectual property rights, disposal or 
pollution controls). 
markets. " Stressing the importance of entry barriers, Littlechild, Myths and 
Merger Policy, p. 301,313 et seq. 
193 See MMC, Assessing Competition, para 21; OFT, Barriers to Entry and 
Exit in UK Competition Policy; Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, 
para 6.030-6.038; Harbor-d, The Analysis of Barriers to Entry, [1995] 5 
ECLR 319 et seq.; Soames, Merger Policy: As Clear as Mud?, [1991] 
2 ECLR 53,61; 
194 See Harbord, The Analysis of Barriers to Entry, [1995] 5 ECLR 319,320 
with further references. 
195 See e. g. Thomson Travel Group and Horizon Travel Ltd, 1989, Cm 554; 
Kingfisher plc and Dixons Group plc, 1990, Cm 1079; British Airways plc 
and Sabena SA, 1990, Cm 1155; Sligos SA and Signet Ltd, 1991, 
Cm 1450; Prosper De Mulder Ltd and Croda International, 1991, 
Cm 1611; Avenir Havas Media SA and Brunton Curtis Outdoor 
Advertising Ltd; 1991, Cm 1737; Bond Helicopters Ltd and British 
International Helicopters Ltd, 1992, Cm 2060; Gillette Company and 
Parker Pen Holdings Limited, 1993, Cm 2221. 
196 Also Harbord, The Analysis of Barriers to Entry, [1995] 5 ECLR 319,321; 
Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 6.030. 
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(c) Economies of scale (due to the market structure the 
entrant has to come in on a large scale if he is to 
operate profitably). 
(d) Economies of scope (there are joint costs which make 
entry profitable only if the entrant competes in two or 
more product markets at the same time). 
(e) Economies of vertical integration (in vertically integrated 
industries it may be difficult to gain access to supplies or 




Sunk costs (i. e. costs which are not recoverable on 
market exit, e. g. advertising, research and development, 
specialised machinery, fees for licences and 
permissions etc. ) 
Excess capacity by incumbents (this may enable an 
incumbent to retaliate forcefully upon entry of a new 
competitor, e. g. by lowering prices). 
(h) Product differentiation and brand loyalty (it may be 
difficult or involve huge advertising costs for a new 
entrant to match the strong brand image of an 
incumbent). 197 
It would go beyond the scope of this work to discuss each of 
these economic factors in detail. One example may suffice to 
demonstrate how such barriers are taken into consideration by the 
MMC: 
When Bond Helicopters Ltd bid for the North Sea helicoper 
business (transport of personnel to and from the oil and gas fields) of 
British International Helicopters Ltd (BIH), the result of the proposed 
197 See for a detailed analysis Parr/Hughes, The Relevance of Consumer 
Brands and Advertising in Competition Inquiries, [1993] 4 ECLR 119 et 
seq. 
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merger would have been that only two competiors would have 
remained in the North Sea helicopter market, namely Bond and a 
third firm, Bristow, each of which approximately having a 50 per cent 
market share. 198 Assessing the likely impact on competition, the 
MMC argued that any potential new entrant would face tough 
conditions, so that the emergence of a new competitor was not on 
the cards: "A new entrant needs finance, a proven safety record and 
aircraft and staff that meet stringent safety requirements. He is likely 
to face difficulty in finding suitable bases.... We concluded that 
without promise of firm contracts from customers, successful entry 
on a scale likely to provide effective competition was unlikely within a 
reasonable period.... We therefore conclude that if the acquisition 
takes place competition will be reduced and prices may be expected 
to rise. "1 99 The merger was blocked. 
To sum up, after defining the relevant market and assessing the 
immediate loss of competition resulting from the merger, the MMC 
focuses on the question whether there are potential competitors in 
related markets that could quickly and easily enter or expand into the 
market in question should following the merger prices increase. In 
assessing competition, the ease of entry for potential competitors is 
therefore almost as important as the market share criterion itself. 200 
6.4.2. Public Interest Issues other than 
Competition 
Over the years, the MMC has found a wide range of different 
198 Bond Helicopters Ltd and British International Helicopters Ltd, 1992, 
Cm 2060. The merger would have increased Bond's market share from 
29 per cent to 49 per cent. 
199 Bond Helicopters Ltd and British International Helicopters Ltd, 1992, 
Cm 2060, paras 1,6 and 1.8. 
200 OFT, Mergers: A guide to the procedures under the FTA 1973, p. 11; 
Harbor-d, The Analysis of Barriers to Entry, [1995) 5 ECLR 319,322. 
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factors other than competition to be operating against the public 
interest, 201 for example: 
- the creation of regional unemployment, 202 
- the loss of research and development capacity, 203 
- leveraged financing techniques, 204 
- foreign ownership and reciprocity, 205 
- foreign state control, 206 
- national security, 207 
- the past industrial relations record of the bidder, and208 
- incompatibiliy of the respective managements. 209 
201 For a brief discussion of those issues see also the DTI Blue Paper on 
Mergers Policy, para 2.20-2.28. 
202 H Weidmann AG and BS&W Whiteley Ltd, 1975, Cmnd 6208, para 115 
(cleared); The Sunlight Service Group Pic and Johnson Group Cleaners 
Plc and Initial Plc and Johnson Group Cleaners Plc, 1983, Cmnd 8868; 
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Standard Chartered 
Bank Ltd and The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Ltd, 1982, Cmnd 8472; 
Enserch Corporation and Davy Corporation Ltd, 1981, Cmnd 8360, 
para 9.25: "We foresee detriments to exports and employment arising 
from the loss of Davy's national character as a British bidder in overseas 
markets, the lengthening of the chain of management command, and the 
effects of certain United States legislation. "; Charter Consolidated plc and 
Anderson Strathclyde plc, 1982, Cmnd 8771, para 9.20: "We also 
conclude that both because it would affect employment within Anderson 
Strathclyed and because it would detract from the dynamism of business 
in the region, it may be expected to have and adverse effect upon 
employment in a relatively depressed part of the United Kingdom. " As to 
the regional effects of a takeover on Scotland see The Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation, Standard Chartered Bank Limited, The 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Ltd, 1992, Cmnd 8472, para 12.7-12.19. 
203 The General Electric Company and The Plessy Company Plc, 1986, 
Cmnd 9867; The General Electric Company plc, Siemens AG and The 
Plessey Company plc, 1989, Cm 676. 
204 See below Chapter 6.4.2. (1) at pp. 256. 
205 See below Chapter 6.4.2. (2) at pp. 258. 
206 See below Chapter 6.4.2. (2) at pp. 258. 
207 The General Electric Company plc, Siemens AG and The Plessey 
Company plc, 1989, Cm 676, para 1.9: "... having regard to the fact that 
Siemens is not a United Kingdom-owned company, potential conflicts with 
national security requirements" may arise. 
208 Charter Consolidated Plc and Anderson Strathclyde Plc, 1982, 
Cmnd 8771. 
209 Babcock & Wilcox Ltd and Herber Morris Ltd, 1977, HC 1975,1976-77. 
For more details on this issue see Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 699. 
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However, depite occasional calls for a broader approach, 210 the 
emphasis has very much been on competition, at least since the 
pronounciation of the Tebbit Doctrine in 1984.211 Non-competition 
factors have not normally played a decisive role. Where they were 
taken into consideration they only had an exacerbating effect as an 
additional argument beside competition concerns. 212 
In its Blue Paper on Mergers Policy the DTI stated: "the 
Government recognise that a very small number of exceptional 
cases may raise a variety of public interest issues, other than 
competition, which it would be wrong to leave entirely in private 
hands. It is therefore intended to retain the open-ended public 
interest criterion.... But this option will continue to be used 
sparingly. "213 
It appears that since 1984 non-competition references have only 
been made where highly leveraged bids or foreign takeovers, in 
particular involving foreign state-controlled companies, were 
concerned. 214 Only these two issues are therefore discussed in 
more detail below. 
(1) Leveraged Financing Techniques 
There have been three references involving leveraging aspects, 
two of which were subsequently abandoned and only one resulted in 
210 See e. g. Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, Takeovers and 
Mergers, 1991, paras 234,249 et seq. 
211 See Chapter 6.4.1. at pp. 246. 
212 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, paras 2.22 et seq; Butterworth's 
Competition Law, Div. VII, para 164; Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, 
para 4.011; Soames, Merger Policy: As Clear as Mud?, [19911 
2 ECLR 53,61; Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 700. 
213 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, para 2.27. 
214 Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, Takeovers and Mergers, 
1991, para 236. 
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an MMC report: 215 the bid by Elders lXL for Allied-Lyons in 1985.216 
Highly leveraged bids, as they are commonplace in the United 
States, are characterized by the bidder borrowing large sums of 
money, sometimes by way of so-called junk-bonds, to acquire the 
target company, which is then broken up and sold off in order to 
repay the debt ("asset-stripping"). In Britain, leveraging practices are 
by far not as extreme as in the U. S. The City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers requires bidders to provide in the offer document a 
detailed description of how the offer is to be financed which might 
have a constraining influence on bidders. 217 In particular, the City 
Code states: "Where the offeror intends that the payment of interest 
on, repayment of or security for any liability (contingent or otherwise) 
will depend to any significant extent on the business of the offeree 
company, a description of the arrangements contemplated will be 
required. "218 
The government's attitude towards leveraged bids is remarkably 
liberal and only very extreme cases will cause a reference, as the 
following quote from the DTI Blue Paper on Mergers Policy 
demonstrates: "... where there are profitable opportunities arising 
from leveraged takeovers followed by break up of the target 
company, the presumption must be that the profit arises from the 
assets concerned being put to more efficient and more profitable use 
than in the original target company, and that this is to the benefit of 
the economy as a whole. Therefore the Secretary of State will not 
normally regard high leveraging on its own as a ground for 
reference"219 
215 Reported by Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 4.010. and Soames, 
Merger Policy: As Clear as Mud?, (1991] 2 ECLR 53,62. 
216 Elders IXL Ltd and Allied-Lyons plc, 1986, Cmnd 9892. 
217 Rule 24.2 (d) and 24.7 of the City Code. 
218 Rule 24.2 (d) of the City Code. 
219 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, para 2.25. 
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(2) Foreign Ownership 
At least since the mid 1980s it has been a consistent feature of 
British merger policy to welcome foreign investment regardless of 
whether it is made by way of acquisitions of existing companies or 
direct inward investment. 220 Consequently, foreign ownership has 
not been a ground for reference in its own right, although the issue 
was considered a number of times221 and even the DTI Blue Paper 
on Mergers Policy states that "one consideration that may be 
relevant in some cases is the extent to which U. K. companies have 
reciprocal freedom to acquire companies based in the home country 
of the prospective acquirer. "222 The issue of reciprocity hit the 
headlines when the swiss company Nestle bid for Rowntree in 
1988.223 The public outcry subsequently resulted in a House of 
Commons debate in which the Secretary of State, Lord Young, 
rejected the idea of reciprocity in no uncertain terms and no 
reference to the MMC was made: "To react in that way to this 
particular bid will not have the slightest effect on Swiss practice. It is 
an extraordinary way to try to go about changing Swiss practice. For 
220 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, para 2.26. 
221 Enserch Corporation and Davy Corporation Ltd, 1981, Cmnd 8360, 
para 9.25: "We foresee detriments to exports and employment arising 
from the loss of Davy"s national character as a British bidder in overseas 
markets, the lengthening of the chain of management command, and the 
effects of certain United States legislation. "; The Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation, Standard Chartered Bank Ltd and The Royal Bank 
of Scotland Group Ltd, 1982, Cmnd 8472, para 12.39: "... transfer of 
ultimate control of a significant part of the clearing bank system outside 
the United Kingdom would have the adverse effect of opening up 
possibilities of divergence of interest which would not otherwise arise. "; 
The Government of Kuwait and The British Petroleum Company, 1988, 
Cm 477, para 8.117; Elders IXL Ltd and Allied-Lyons plc, 1986, 
Cmnd 9892; Elders IXL Ltd and Scottish & Newcastle Breweries Plc, 
1989, Cm 654. 
For a discussion of some of the cases see Goyder, Public Interest 
Criteria, Fordham 1994, p. 125 134 et seq. 
222 DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, para 2.26. 
223 This hostile takeover has obviously turned out to be a success-story, see 
the retrospection by Lorenz, Sugar Daddy, in Financial Times, April 20, 
1994. 
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those reasons, I do not believe that there is any serious point in 
reciprocity. "224 
However, things were different when issues of greater national 
importance than chocolate were at stake. In The Government of 
Kuwait and British Pretroleum Company, Kuwait's acquisition of a 
21.6 per cent stake in BP was found to operate against the public 
interest and Kuwait was required to divest of its holding of BP shares 
to 9.9 per cent: "... while it is not possible to predict the future of the 
oil markets or the Middle East, we believe that there is a high degree 
of probability that sooner or later situations will arise in which 
Kuwait's national and international interests will come sharply into 
conflict with BP"s and the United Kingdom Government's interests. 
... 
We consider that if and when these conflicts occur Kuwait will 
seek, and be able, to use its shareholding to influence BP ... and 
that 
this may be expected to be detrimental to, and will operate against, 
the United Kingdom public interests. "225 
In the early 1990s, following a number of bids by mostly French 
state owned companies for British targets, 226 the issue of foreign 
state-controlled bidders was the subject of much debate and even 
led to a formal complaint against the British reference policy on the 
ground of discrimination to EC Commission by Credit Lyonnaise, an 
aggrieved French state-controlled company. 227 The traditionally 
liberal approach towards foreign investment was somewhat modified 
in respect of state-controlled bidders by Peter Lilley, then Secretary 
224 Hansard, June 8,1988, colum 853. 
225 The Government of Kuwait and The British Petroleum Company, 1988, 
Cm 477, para 8.117. 
226 French cases: Credit Lyonnais SA and Woodchester Investments plc, 
1991, Cm 1404; British Aerospace plc and Thomson-CSF SA, 1991, 
Cm 1416; Sligos SA and Signet Ltd, 1991, Cm 1450; Amoco Corporation 
and Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine, 1991, Cm 1521. Finnish case: 
Kemira Oy and Imperial Chemical Industry plc, 1991, Cm 1406. 
227 For a thorough analysis of the issues involved see 
TaylorBointon/Collison, U. K. Merger Control and State-controlled 
Companies, [1991] 4 ECLR 133-138 and Soames, Merger Policy: As 
Clear as Mud?, [1991] 2 ECLR 53,64-70. Also Goyder, Public Interest 
Criteria, Fordham 1994, p. 125,132; Swift/Anderson, Development in 
U. K. Competition Law, Fordham 1991, p. 505,516. 
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of State. 228 Apparently without previously consulting the MMC he 
tackled the issue of 'nationalisation through the backdoor' and 
declared: "In deciding whether to refer merger situations to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, I shall in future pay particular 
close attention to the degree of state-control, if any, of the acquiring 
party. ... 
State-controlled companies are not subject to the same 
disciplines as those in the private sector. They tend to have the 
assurance of Government backing for their business activities and 
consequently they do not compete on even terms with private sector 
companies which operate under the threat of financial failure. Their 
managements may be motivated to make non-commercial decisions. 
They may not deploy resources efficiently; and an increase in the 
resources they manage may well reduce competitive forces. It is 
important that the MMC should have the chance to consider in detail 
mergers involving state-controlled companies. "229 In the wake of the 
proclamation of the so-called 'Lilley Doctrine' the Secretary of State 
made five references involving state-controlled bidders to the 
MMC. 230 Three of these references were made against the advice of 
the DGFT, 231 which is highly unusual. 232 To the embarrasment of 
the Secretary of State, the MMC subsequently cleared four of the 
five references - which proved the independence of the MMC. The 
228 As to the so-called 'Lilley Doctrine' see Trade and Industry Committee, 
First Report, Takeovers and Mergers, 1991, paras 236-240. The 
Committee concluded on the issue (para 240): "We recommend that, 
before the Secretary of State decides upon any substantial departure 
from existing reference policy, he should announce his proposals and 
give interested parteis an opportunity to make representations about their 
merits and practicality. " 
229 DTI press notie, July 26,1990, P/90/457. 
230 Credit Lyonnais SA and Woodchester Investments plc, 1991, Cm 1404; 
Kemira Oy and Imperial Chemical Industry plc, 1991, Cm 1406; British 
Aerospace plc and Thomson-CSF SA, 1991, Cm 1416; Sligos SA and 
Signet Ltd, 1991, Cm 1450; Amoco Corporation and Societe Nationale Elf 
Aquitaine, 1991, Cm 1521. 
231 Credit Lyonnais SA and Woodchester Investments plc, 1991, Cm 1404; 
Sligos SA and Signet Ltd, 1991, Cm 1450; Societe Nationale Elf 
Aquitaine, 1991, Cm 1521. 
232 See Chapter 6.3.2. at pp. 229 and Table 11 at p. 230. 
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one merger blocked233 was mainly concerned with competition 
issues and it is arguable that that merger would also have been 
blocked under pre-Lilley standards. 234 
Although Lilley's arguments seem perfectly reasonable, the 
MMC insisted that under the law as it stands there can be no 
presumption against a merger, whoever the ultimate owner of a 
bidder is. 235 Under the Fair Trading Act, each merger has to be 
considered on its own merits. Where the MMC did not find adverse 
effects on competiton or other public interest issues, the mergers 
were cleared. Following the formal complaint to the EC Commission 
against the Lilley Doctrin by Credit Lyonnaise, the Secretary of State 
was forced to declare in a press release by the European 
Commission: "When considering whether or not to make a reference 
to the MMC, the United Kingdom Government examines a range of 
factors. The fact that a company is state-owned or directed by a 
state will not per se justify a referral to the MMC; unless 
exceptionally, other public interest issues (such as security interests) 
arise, a referral would only be envisaged insofar as competition 
aspects were at stake. "236 
Albeit the Secretary of State had to climb down on the issue, 
233 Kemira Oy and Imperial Chemical Industry plc, 1991, Cm 1406, 
para 6.85: "We conclude that the merger would reduce competition in the 
United Kingdom for agricultrual fertilisers. Kemira, already the third largest 
supplier to the United Kingdom market, would acquire the largest supplier 
and become market leader. Its market share following the merger cannot 
be predicted with certainty but could be well over 40 per cent. " 
234 Butterworth's Competition Law, Div. VII, para 150.1; Soames, Merger 
Policy: As Clear as Mud?, [1991] 2 ECLR 53,66. 
235 Credit Lyonnais SA and Woodchester Investments plc, 1991, Cm 1404, 
para 8.19: "Nevertheless, we are unable to accept that we can look at 
these matters in terms, as has been suggested, of a general presumption. 
Our approach to the public interest, or to any aspect of it, is governed by 
section 84(1) of the Act. This provision requires the MMC 'to take into 
account all matters which appear to them in the particular circumstances 
to be relevant'. The subsection goes on to require the MMC to have 
regard to the desirability of five specific matters or objectives. The 
language of the subsection appears to us to exclude any presumptions, 
whether of fact or law. " 
236 Reproduced in the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before 
the Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, 1991, p. 340. 
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state-control remains a legitimate factor in assessing the public 
interest. Of course, the EC-Treaty rightly prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. But as long as foreign and British state- 
controlled bidders are treated the same way, i. e. as long as there is 
no discrimination, the Secretary of State's approach appears 
sensible. By and large, state-controlled companies are a different 
breed: the basic capitalisitic rule of the survival of the fittest does not 
apply to them. Clearly, the degree of state control and the individual 
circumstances matter greatly, but in general state-control appears to 
be a reasonable ground on which to refer and block a bid. 
6.4.3. Countervailing Benefits 
As well as affecting the public interest adversely, mergers may 
also bring about some public interest benefits, for example 
(1) increased efficiency, 237 
(2) increased international competitiveness, 238 
(3) the rescue of a failing firm, 239 and even 
(4) environmental advantages. 240 
In reaching its conclusion the MMC cautiously takes the 
beneficial effects into account and weighs them against the adverse 
effects of a merger, so that public interest detriments can be offset 
by benefits. 241 As there is no guidance in section 84 or elsewhere in 
237 H Weidmann AG and BS&W Whiteley Ltd, 1975, Cmnd 6208; Prosper 
De Mulder Ltd and Croda International plc, 1991, Cm 1611. 
238 British Airways Plc and British Caledonian Group plc, 1987, Cm 247; 
Alcatel Cable SA and STC Ltd, 1994, Cm 2477. 
239 Swedish Match AB and enterprises belongign to Allegheny International 
Inc, 1987, Cm 227; Kemira Oy and Imperial Chemical Industry plc, 1991, 
Cm 1406 (adverse finding). See Butterworth "s Competition Law, Div. VII, 
para 169.1. 
240 Prosper De Mulder Ltd and Croda International plc, 1991, Cm 1611. 
241 See Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, para 6.050 et seq; Whish/Sufrin, 
Competition Law, p. 695. 
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the Fair Trading Act as to the weight to be given to those 
countervailing benefits, the matter is very much left to the MMC's 
discretion. 
The following excerpt, taken from the report on the acquisition of 
the animal waste rendering business of Croda at Market Harborough 
by Prosper De Mulder (PDM) may suffice to explain the method 
applied by the MMC: "We have concluded that the merger has an 
adverse effect on competition in the collection of high-grade animal 
waste in the South-West and South-East of England. ... As for the 
issues other than competition, the merger is likely to improve PDM's 
efficiency, and to lead to some wider public health and environmental 
benefits, as a result of the rationalisation which it enables PDM to 
achieve in the collection and processing of animal waste. ... Having 
taken account of the limited adverse effects on competition on the 
one hand, and the important public issues of health and the 
environment as well as efficiency gains on the other hand, we 
conclude that the merger situation which we have identified does not 
and may be expected not to operate against the public interest. "242 
6.5. Concluding Remarks 
The explanations made so far indicate that the tripartite 
institutional structure has its drawbacks. Of course, fairness and 
balance of power are by and large guaranteed under the present 
system, which is why it still has numerous strong supporters. 
However, work is inevitably duplicated as the merger makes its way 
through the different merger control stages. The result of this is a 
protraction of the procedure, the costs of which in terms of expenses 
and commercial uncertainty come down with the parties to the 
242 Prosper De Mulder Ltd and Croda International plc, 1991, Cm 1611, 
para 6.77,6.80, and 6.81. 
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merger. It remains, of course, to be seen in Chapters 7 and 8 
whether the unitary system favoured in Germany and Brussel works 
more effectively. 
Another point worth noting is that the part time nature of MMC 
may not be conducive to the formulation of a consistent merger 
policy. However, the analysis of the substantive appraisal criteria has 
shown that despite the broadly defined public interest criterion the 
focus of the merger control authorities has for the last decade very 
much been on competition. References based exclusively on other 
factors are highly exceptional. Of course, public interest issues other 
than competition may influence the outcome of an investigation in 
one way or another, but competition is almost always likely to be the 
decisive factor. Given this emphasis on competition, John Swift is 
right in concluding that U. K. merger policy is more predictable than is 
generally acknowledged. 243 
Clearly, some degree of uncertainty and unpredictability is 
inherent in the present structure of U. K. merger control both because 
of the heavy involvement of the Secretary of State, who is after all a 
politician, and the open-ended and highly flexible public interest 
criterion applied. However, these uncertainty-factors are somewhat 
offset by the fact that the Fair Trading Act takes a very liberal 
approach towards mergers. It has been demonstrated that there is a 
basic presumption in favour of mergers as private business 
transactions. The onus of proof clearly rests with the authorities. 
Hence, only a very small proportion of mergers is finally blocked. As 
long as British merger policy is that liberal, it seems easy to accept a 
certain degree of unpredictability. However, if merger policy became 
under a new government, for example, more interventionist for 
ideological reasons, the inherent unpredictabiltiy would be bitterly felt 
by industry as there is ample room for polictical interference in the 
present structure. 
243 John Swift, Merger Policy: Certainty or Lottery?, p. 264,279. 
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Chapter 7 
MERGER CONTROL IN 
GERMANY 
7.1. Introduction 
Contrary to Britain where mainly procedural aspects, in particular 
the institutional framework of merger control, are passionately 
debated, 1 the institutional structure and procedural aspects of 
merger control are, broadly speaking, not on the agenda in 
Germany. An issue constantly gaining more attention, however, is 
the "europeanization" of German merger control law. 2 The 
government is planning a 6th amendment to the German Act against 
Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) specifically designed to adjust 
the German merger control law more to the European Merger 
Control Regulation. 3 This Chapter intends to examine the procedural 
and substantive German merger control law and to explain the main 
discrepancies between British and German law. 
1 See in particular the Trade and Industry Committee, Fifth Report: U. K. 
Policy on Monopolies, 1995. See also numerous other references in 
Chapter 6.3. to Chapter 6.3.4. at pp. 220-242. 
2 See for example Dreher, Das deutsche Kartellrecht vor der 
Europäisierung, WuW 1995,881-907; Möschel, Reform des 
europäischen und des deutschen Kartellrechts, EWS 1995,249,253 et 
seq. 
3 As to new European developments see Chapter 8.3.2. (4) at pp. 367. 
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7.1.1. Historical Development 
Whereas in England the ancient restraint of trade doctrine4 
prevented to some extent the cartelization and concentration of the 
economy, German legal history in the 19th and early 20th century is 
characterized by the absence of such a doctrine. 5 Rather on the 
contrary, the Reichsgericht decided 1897 in the Holzstoff- 
Fabrikanten case that as part of the fundamental freedom of trade 
competitors were entitled to enter into cartel agreements. 6 This legal 
liberalism and the worldwide economic recession of the 1920s 
resulted in a growing cartelization and concentration of the German 
economy to the point of a fully planned and controlled war-economy 
during the Hitler years.? After the breakdown of the Nazi-dictatorship 
in 1945 the allied forces demanded the decartelization and 
deconcentration of the German economy, 8 which mainly affected the 
coal and steel industry, the chemical industry, and the film industry. 
This enforced deconcentration of key-industries was at that time 
seen by many Germans as a deliberate attempt by the allied forces 
to weaken the German economy. 9 Because of these strained 
political circumstances and despite the fact that the German 
authorities were already in 1949 asked by the Allies to devise a 
German anti-trust law, it was not until 1958 that the German Act 
against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) came into force. Following a 
decade of controversial debate the Act prohibited cartels, but did not 
contain any provisions on substantive merger control in order not to 
hamper the growth of the economy during the "Wirtschaftswunder" 
4 Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 48 et seq. 
5 Harms, in GK, Einleitung Zus. -Kontrolle, Rn. 30,32; Paschke, in FK, vor 
Sec. 23 Rn. 24. 
6 RGZ 38,155,158. 
7 Harms, in GK, Einleitung Zus. -Kontrolle, Rn. 32. 
8 U. S. Zone: Gesetz Nr. 56 of 12.2.1947; U. K. Zone: Ordinance No. 78 of 
12.2.1947; French Zone: Ordonnance No. 96 of 9.6.1947. 
9 Harms, in GK, Einleitung Zus. -Kontrolle, Rn. 38. 
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years. 10 It was considered sufficient to introduce a provision 
prohibiting the abuse of economic power. The need for additional 
provisions controlling mergers was not accepted. 11 Only notification 
of certain mergers was required to give the Federal Cartel Office an 
overview over the degree of concentration in the economy. 12 A 
coalition government consisting of social democrats and liberals 
finally introduced substantive merger control provisions in 1973 by 
way of a second amendment to the GWB. 13 Although the merger 
control provisions have since been amended various times, 14 the 
1973 framework has remained in place to date. On October 3,1990 
the applicability of the GWB was through the Unification Treaty 
extended without qualifications to the territory of the former German 
Democratic Republic. 15 At present, a 6th amendment to the GWB 
primarily aimed at adjusting the GWB provisions more to the 
European competition law is being discussed, 16 but thus far no 
ministerial draft bill has been produced. 17 
10 Mestmäcker, in lmmenga/Mestmäcker, vor § 23 Rn. 4. 
11 The Economics Committee as a subcommittee of the House of 
Parliament (Bundestag) discussed this question in detail at that time: BT- 
Drucksache (1957) 11 1158 and 3644. 
12 Paschke, in FK, vor § 23 Rn. 30. 
13 Second GWB-Amendment of August 3,1973 (BGBI. I, S. 917) introducing 
merger control. 
14 Third GWB-Amendment of June 28,1976 (BGBI. I, S. 1697) tightening 
the control over newspaper mergers. Forth GWB-Amendment of April 4, 
1980 (BGBI. I, S. 458) introducing presumptions as to when a dominant 
position exists. Fifth GWB-Amendment of December 7,1989 (BGBI. I, 
S. 2486) extending the definition of what constitutes a merger. 
15 Art 8 of the Unification Treaty (BGBI. 1990 11, No. 25, p. 892). For details 
see Immenga/Mestmäcker, Einleitung Rn. 56 et seq. As to the increase of 
mergers due to unification see Table 2 at p. 19. 
16 See in particular Dreher, Das deutsche Kartellrecht vor der 
Europäisierung, WuW 1995,881-907; Möschel, Reform des 
europäischen und des deutschen Kartellrechts, EWS 1995,249,253 et 
seq. 
17 The Federal Ministry of Economics has, however, publised a paper 
outlining the basic ideas regardinging the proposed 6th amendment to the 
GWB: Bundesministerium for Wirtschaft, Eckpunkte für eine Novelle des 
Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, May 2,1996, 
Geschäftszeichen: IB 5-221200. 
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7.1.2. Overview over the Merger Control 
Process 
The relevant substantive merger control law is to be found in 
Part I, Chapter 3 of the GWB under the heading "Market-Dominating 
Enterprises" (see APPENDIX 7). Important procedural provisions are 
to be found in Part III and Part IV of the GWB. The main merger 
control statutes, sections 22 to 24b GWB, are lengthy and complex 
and, due to the frequent amendments, somewhat confusingly 
arranged. Not surprisingly, high on the agenda for the next 
amendment of the GWB is the simplification of the current 
provisions. 18 
Excluding the courts, which play contrary to Britain19 a 
prominent role in the merger control process in Germany, three 
different institutions are charged with exercising merger control: 
(1) The Federal Cartel Office 
(2) The Federal Minister of Economics 
(3) The Monopolies Commission 
At first glance there seem to be some similarities to the tripartite 
U. K. institutional framework consisting of the Office of Fair Trading, 20 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 21 and the Secretary of 
State. 22 However, this impression is deceptive as the roles played by 
the German authorities differ widely from those of their British 
18 Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zum Tätigkeitsbericht des BKartA 
1993/1994 vom 15.6.1995, Bundestag Drucksache 13/1660. 
19 See Chapter 6.4. at pp. 245. 
20 See Chapter 6.3.1. at pp. 221. 
21 See Chapter 6.3.3. at pp. 229. 
22 See Chapter 6.3.2. at pp. 229 and Chapter 6.3.4. at pp. 242. 
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counterparts. 
In principle, any transaction falling under the merger definitions23 
and meeting certain quantitative thresholds, which are turnover- 
based, is to be notified to the FCO in Berlin. 24 If the merger qualifies 
for investigation, 25 it is the FCO's job to establish whether the 
merger is to be expected to result in or strengthen a dominant 
market position for the participating enterprises. 26 If the merger 
leads to or strengthens a dominant market position, the FCO has to 
prohibit or, as the case may be, dissolve the merger, unless the 
participating enterprises demonstrate that the detrimental effects 
coming with the dominant position are outweighed by improvements 
in the competitive structure of the markets caused by the merger 
(balancing-clause). 27 
In comparison to the British system, a number of points are 
worthy of note even at this stage. First, the substantive criteria 
against which mergers are assessed differ: the public interest in 
Britain28 - market dominance in Germany. 29 Secondly, unlike the 
authorities in Britain, 30 the FCO enjoys no discretion in making its 
decision: if it finds that a dominant position which is not outweighed 
by competition related advantages has arisen or is being 
strengthened, it is bound to prohibit or dissolve the merger. 31 Thirdly, 
with regard to the balancing-clause it is important to note that 
contrary to the law in Britain32 only pro-competition effects put 
forward by the enterprises may be taken into account by the FCO. 
There is no room for other public interest considerations like regional 
development and employment, research and development, national 
23 See Chapter 7.3.1. at pp. 283. 
24 Sec. 23 1 and Sec. 24a GWB. See Chapter 7.2.1. at pp. 276. 
25 See Chapter 7.3. at pp. 283. 
26 Sec. 24 I GWB. 
27 Sec. 24 I GWB. See Chapter 7.5.3. at pp. 330. 
28 See Chapter 6.4. at pp. 245. 
29 See Chapter 7.5.1. at pp. 317. 
30 See Chapter 6.3.2. at pp. 229 and Chapter 6.3.4. at pp. 242. 
31 Sec. 24 I GWB; Bechtold, GWB, § 24 Rn. 38. 
32 See Chapter 6.4.3. at pp. 262. 
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security, foreign state control etc. 33 
Appeal against the FCO's decision lies with the Berlin Superior 
Court, the so-called Kammergericht. 34 Contrary to the judicial review 
procedure in Britain, 35 the Kammergericht is entitled to review the 
FCO's decision both on a factual and legal basis and is hence 
empowered to substitute its own decision for that of the FCO. 36 A 
second appeal against the Kammergericht decision lies, if leave to 
appeal is granted, to the Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgerichtshof) in Karlsruhe. 37 However, this appeal is limited 
to legal points; factual findings of the FCO and the Kammergericht 
may not be challenged again. 38 
The parties to a merger may also appeal to the Federal Minister 
of Economics against the FCO's decision. 39 The appeals to the 
courts and to the Economics Minister are not mutually exclusive, but 
may not be made at the same time. Hence, the parties may first 
appeal to the courts and, if unsuccessful, then appeal to the Federal 
Minister of Economics - and vice versa. 40 However, as will be 
explained in further detail in Chapter 7.4.2., 41 an appeal to the 
Minister is in most cases hardly worthwhile. Various Economics 
Ministers have repeatedly made clear that they strictly refuse to be 
drawn into any conflicts about actual merger cases. Hence, save in 
33 See Chapter 7.5.3. at pp. 330. Kleinmann/Bechtold, Kommentar zu 
Fusionskontrolle, § 24 Rn. 100; Mestmacker, in Immenga/Mestmacker, 
GWB Kommentar, § 24 Rn. 177. 
34 Sec. 62 IV GWB. 
35 See Chapter 6.4. at pp. 245. 
36 K. Schmidt, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 62 Rn. 41. 
37 Sec. 73 GWB. As to the grounds upon which leave to appeal may be 
granted see subsection (2) of Sec. 73. Most importantly, leave to appeal 
may be granted, if a fundamental point of law is raised. Against the 
descision not grant leave to appeal, a further appeal is possible, 
sec. 74 GWB. 
38 Sec. 75 II 1. For details see Karsten Schmidt, in Immenga/Mestmacker, 
GWB Kommentar, § 75 Rn. 5 et seq. 
39 Sec. 24 III GWB. 
40 Kleinmann/Bechtold, Kommentar zu Fusionskontrolle, § 24 Rn. 347; 
Mestmacker, in Immenga/Mestmacker, GWB Kommentar, § 24 Rn. 302- 
304. 
41 See pp. 311. 
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very exceptional cases an appeal to the Federal Minister of 
Economics can not be considered a passable road for any practical 
purposes. 
The issues which are to be taken into account by the Minister 
differ completely from those applied by the FCO and the courts. 42 
The issues considered by the Economics Minister resemble, in fact, 
those public interest issues other than competition applied in Britain. 
While being legally bound by the FCO's factual and legal findings, in 
particular in respect to the question of whether the merger is 
expected to lead to or strengthen a dominant position, 43 the Federal 
Minister of Economics may nevertheless permit the merger if in the 
individual case the restraint of competition is compensated by overall 
economic advantages of the merger or if the merger is justified by an 
overriding public interest. 44 Before making his decision the Federal 
Minister has to refer the case to the Monopolies Commission which 
is than required to deliver an expert opinion to the Minister to which 
he has to have regard to. 45 
The appeal-procedure before the Federal Minister of Economics 
with the advisory role of the Monopolies Commission somewhat 
resembles the British procedure, and the German provisions were, in 
fact, influenced by the British model. 46 However, looked at it more 
closely the differences in the regulatory frameworks are substantial 
and any similarities in respect of the Minister's role are superficial as 
42 See Chapter 7.4.2. at pp. 311 and Chapter 7.5. at pp. 315. 
43 Berlin Superior Court WuW/E OLG 1937,1938 (Thyssen/Holler); 
Economics Minister WuW/E BWM 159,161 (Thyssen/Holler); Economics 
Minister WuW/E BWM 165,166 (Veba/British Petroleum); Economics 
Minister WuW/E BWM 185 (VEW/Ruhrkohle); Economics Minister 
WuW/E BWM 191,199 (Daimler/MBB). See also Mestmäcker, in 
Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 24 Rn. 318. Critical to the leading opinion 
Bechtold, GWB, § 24 Rn. 50. 
44 Sec. 24 III GWB. See Chapter 7.4.2. at pp. 311. 
45 Sec. 24b V7 GWB. See Chapter 7.4.3. at pp. 313. 
46 Mestmäcker, Funktionen und bisherige Tätigkeit der Monopolkommission; 
in Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 73/74, p. 43,46; Mestmäcker, in 
Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 24b Rn. 1. 
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will be explained in more detail in Chapter 7.4.2.47 
To sum up, the FCO plays the dominant role in the German 
merger control process. Compared to the open-ended public interest 
criterion used in Britain the FCO has to take a fairly narrow view as it 
has to focus exclusively on the question of whether the merger is 
expected to result in or strengthen a dominant market position. If the 
FCO finds that a dominant market position has arisen or is being 
strengthened, it has to prohibit or dissolve the merger. There is - at 
least in theory - no discretion on its part. The underlying purpose of 
the German regulation is to provide a maximum of predictability in 
the decision-making process, while the emphasis of the British model 
appears to be more on flexibility. 
7.1.3. Statistics 
Turning to statistics, since the introduction of substantive merger 
control law in Germany in 1973 until the end of 1994 a total of 
19.224 mergers were notified to the FCO and subsequently 
consummated. 48 During this period the FCO has formally blocked 
only 108 mergers. 49 Yet, most of these decisions were challenged in 
court. In 58 of these cases the FCO decision was upheld in court, i. e. 
the merger was finally blocked. In 39 cases, however, the FCO 
decision was quashed or the matter was following the appeal 
otherwise settled (e. g. withdrawal of the prohibition on part of the 
FCO). In the remaining six cases ministerial permissions were 
granted on public interest grounds. For a direct comparison of the 
number of cases notified in Britain and Germany refer to Table 14 
(Notification Statistics) at page 281 (last column). As to the 
47 See pp. 311. 
48 Tätigkeitsbericht des BKartA 1993/1994, Bundestag Drucksache 13/1660, 
p. 148. 
49 Tätigkeitsbericht des BKartA 1993/1994, Bundestag Drucksache 13/1660, 
p. 13. 
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respective British figures in more detail see Table 10 (OFT 
Workload) at page 224 and Table 12 (Outcome of References) at 
page 234. 
In 1995 a total of 1.154 mergers were notfied to the FCO of 
which 4 were blocked by the FCO. In eight cases the participating 
enterprises either withdrew their merger proposal or modified it so as 
to avoid any conflict with the merger control provisions. 50 
According to a publication of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
between 1973 and 1991 in addition to the formally blocked mergers 
around 200 mergers were "informally discouraged" by the FCO prior 
to their consummation. 51 The informal procedure is gaining more 
and more importance with about 40 mergers "informally 
discourgaged" in 1995 alone. 52 A parallel development is taking 
place in Britain where the number of mergers dealt with in the 
"confidential guidance procedure" has clearly been on the increase 
during the 1990s. 53 
The figures mentioned above reveal three interesting points: 
(1) First, the number of mergers blocked the "hard way" is relatively 
small. 54 However, the number of "informally discouraged" merger 
proposals is quite substantial. Due to the absence of any written, let 
alone published decisions regarding the informally blocked mergers, 
these decisions cannot be analysed here. In terms of transparency 
and accountability of the merger control authorities this development 
is clearly not to be welcomed. It is also detrimental to the evolution of 
a coherent merger policy. (2) The second point worthy of note is the 
heavy involvement of the courts in the merger control process -a 
feature that differs fundamentally from merger control in Britain. An 
50 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Eckpunkte für eine Novelle des 
Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, May 1996, p. 6. 
51 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Erfahrungsbericht des 
Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums Ober Ministererlaubnis-Verfahren bei 
Firmen-Fusionen, WuW 1992,925,926. 
52 Information kindly provided by the FCO in January 1996 (Mr Kiecker). 
53 See Table 10 at p. 224 and Table 14 at p. 281. 
54 As to the situation in Britain see in particular Table 12 at p. 234. 
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appeal to the courts is very much seen "as part of the game" in 
Germany. In 199311994, for example, the FCO prohibited 7 mergers, 
all of which were subsequently challenged in court. 55 (3) Thirdly, the 
statistics show that the role of the Federal Minister of Economics, 
who has granted only six permissions on public interest grounds 
since 1973 with the latest permission being granted as long ago as 
1989 is in practice almost negligible. 56 Needless to say, that the role 
of the German Economics Minister in the merger control process has 
therefore very little in common with the part played by his British 
counterpart. 
55 Tätigkeitsbericht des BKartA 199311994, Bundestag Drucksache 13/1660, 
p. 13. 
56 As to details see Chapter 7.4.2. at pp. 311. 
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7.2. Notification Requirements 
The notification requirement, which has no equivalent in British 
law, 57 has been a feature of the German Act against Restraints of 
Competition since its introduction in 1958, hence long before the 
implementation of substantive merger control law in 1973.58 The 
57 See Chapter 6.3.1 . (l) at pp. 221. 58 Harms, in GK, Einleitung Rn. 40; Paschke, in FK, vor § 23 Rn. 30. 
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notification requirement is therefore to be seen as a set of rules fairly 
independent of the substantive merger control provisions, meaning 
that a merger59 falling under the notification requirement does not 
automatically qualify for investigation in terms of the substantive 
merger control provisions, though this is normally the case. 6° 
If the merging parties do not comply with the reporting 
requirements, they are liable to a fine of up to DM 50.000.61 
7.2.1. Notification Categories and Time-limits 
The GWB differentiates in sections 23 and 24a between 
(1) post-merger notification, 
(2) mandatory pre-merger notification, and 
(3) voluntary pre-merger notification. 
It is of particular importance to note that depending on the 
notification category different time limits for the FCO procedure 
apply. 
(1) Post-merger Notification 
Systematically and historically, post-merger notification is the 
principal form of reporting. Nowadays, however, post-merger 
notification takes place in only about 30 per cent of the cases, the 
remainder being pre-merger notification cases (see Table 14 at 
59 The definition of the term "merger" under German law will be considered 
in Chapter 7.3.1. at pp. 283. 
60 See Table 14 (Notification Statistics) at p. 281. 
61 Sec. 39 GWB. 
Chapter 7 277 
page 281). 62 Post-merger notification is required where the merging 
enterprises have had a combined turnover of more than DM 500 
million during the last fiscal year. 63 Notification has to be filed without 
delay after the merger has been consummated. 64 The fact that a 
merger has been consummated is to be published in the Federal 
Gazette, 65 although the information provided there is quite limited. 
Only the names of the merging companies, the type of the merger 
and the field of business are to be made public. 66 However, some 
degree of transparency is ensured that way as the following example 
taken from the Federal Gazette No. 44/1995 may illustrate: 67 
62 Tätigkeitsbericht des BKartA 1993/1994, Bundestag Drucksache 13/1660, 
p. 10. 
63 Sec. 23 11 GWB. 
64 Sec. 23 11 and sec. 39 12 GWB. 
65 Sec. 10 I No. 4 and sec. 23 V GWB. 
66 Sec. 23 V GWB. For details see Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, 
§ 23 Rn. 281-297. 
67 This public notice simply states that Deutsche BP Holding, which is a 
subsidiary of the British Petroleum Company, both of which are operating 
in the mineral-oil industry, has increased its existing stake in BPM 




Bekanntmachung Nr. 9/95 über Zusammenschlüsse nach § 23 
des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen 
Vom 10. Februar 1995 
19. ...... 
20. Die von der 
The British Petroleum Company plc, London/Großbritannien, 
- Mineralölerzeugnisse - 
abhängige Deutsche BP Holding AG, Hamburg, 
- Mineralölerzeugnisse - 
erhöhte ihre Beteiligung auf eine Mehrheitsbeteiligung an der 
BPM Tankstellenbetriebsgesellschaft mbH, Dresden, 
- Betrieb einer Tankstelle - 
21. ...... 
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From the receipt of the complete notification the FCO than has 
up to one year to investigate and unravel the merger. 68 This one- 
year time limit does not compare too favourably with British law. In 
Britain the "period of uncertainty' is initially limited to only six months 
as mergers may not be referred to the MMC if they have taken place 
and made public six or more months before the date of reference. 69 
(2) Mandatory Pre-merger Notification 
Mergers have to be notified to the FCO prior to their completion 
if one of the participating enterprises had turnover proceeds of more 
than DM 2 billion in the previous fiscal year or if at least two of the 
68 Sec. 24112 GWB. 
69 Sec. 64 (4) FTA 1973. See Chapter 6.3.1. (4) at pp. 227. 
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participating enterprises had each turnover proceeds of more than 
DM 1 billion during the previous fiscal year. 70 Hence, pre-merger 
notification is required only where large deals are concerned. 
Following the receipt of a complete pre-merger notification the FCO 
has, in principle, four months within which it may prohibit the merger 
proposal. 71 Within one month from notification the FCO has to 
inform the notifying party as to whether it intends to go ahead with 
the investigation (so-called "first-month-letter"). Otherwise the FCO 
may not proceed with its investigation. During the four months period 
the merger may not be consummated unless either permission is 
granted by the FCO or the "first-month-letter" has not been issued. 72 
Any transactions entered into in contravention of these provisions 
are void. 73 Merger proposals not blocked by the FCO and finally 
consummated must again be notified to the FCO in accordance with 
post-merger notification requirements. 74 In that case a simple letter 
stating the fact of consummation normally suffices. 
The four-months period to investigate large-scale mergers 
seems acceptable. The participating enterprises may, however, 
agree to an extension of the four-month period. 75 In voluntary pre- 
notification cases in Britain, the Secretary of State must come to a 
reference decision within twenty days, 76 but the MMC procedure 
following has its usual lengths of about three to four months in 
practice. 77 
70 Sec. 24a I Nos. 1 and 2 GWB. 
71 Sec. 24a II 1 GWB. Exceptions to this rule are contained in sec. 24a 11 2 
Nos. 1-8 GWB. 
72 Sec. 24a IV GWB. 
73 Sec. 24a IV GWB. Kleinmann/Bechtold, Fusionskontrolle, § 24a Rn. 115; 
Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 24a Rn. 34. 
74 Sec. 24a (3) GWB. 
75 Sec. 24a (2) No. 1 GWB. Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 24a Rn. 17,18. 
76 Sec. 75B (2) FTA 1973. See Whish/Sufrin, Competition Law, p. 686. 
77 See Chapter 6.3.3. (4) at pp. 242. 
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(3) Voluntary Pre-merger Notification 
The parties to a merger not reaching the turnover volume 
requiring mandatory pre-merger notification may choose to notify the 
FCO voluntarily prior to the consummation of the merger to avoid 
uncertainties. 78 In that case, the time-limits discussed in respect of 
mandatory pre-merger notification cases apply. 79 However, unlike 
mandatory pre-merger notification cases, the parties are allowed to 
consummate the merger during the four-months period. If they do so, 
the rules and time limits applicable to post-merger notification cases 
apply. 80 
(4) Notification Statistics 
Table 14 and 15 below at page 281 et seq. require little further 
explanation. The numbers of mergers examined by the German FCO 
exceed those investigated by the Office of Fair Trading in the U. K. 
considerably. 81 This is to some extent due to the larger size of 
Germany the gross domestic product amounting to 
ECU 1390.80 billion compared to ECU 800.85 billion in Britain in 
1994.82 Moreover, German unification and the ensuing privatization 
process in East Germany boosed the number of mergers, which is 
most visible in 1991 as Table 15 at page 281 indicates. Although 
allowance has to be made for these factors, it still appears that in 
respect of notification and preliminary examination of merger cases 
German merger control law and practice is more stringent. 
78 Sec. 24a 11 GWB. 
79 Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, GWB Kommentar, § 24a Rn. 19. 
80 Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, GWB Kommentar, § 24a Rn. 19. 
81 Table 10 at p. 224- 
82 Eurostat, Eurostatistics, 3/4/5-1996, p. 49. 
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Table 14: Notification Statistics 
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the U. K. 83 
1986 802 121 184 497 524(313) 
1987 887 183 192 512 478(321) 
1988 1159 247 275 637 456(306) 
1989 1414 269 274 871 427 (281) 
1990 1548 221 306 1021 369 (261) 
1991 2007 197 351 1459 285(183) 
1992 1743 152 411 1180 200 (125) 
1993 1514 154 310 1050 309 (197) 
1 
L 
994 1564 147 331 1086 381 (231) 
Source: Tätigkeitsberichte des Bundeskartellamtes and Annual Reports of the DGFT 
Table 15: German Unification and Mergers 
1600 1427 








o iml =I ®iýiýi 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Source: Tätigkeitsbericht des Bundeskartellamtes 1993/1994 
13 East Germany 
0 West Germany 
83 For more details refer to Chapter 6.3.1. (1) at pp. 221 and Table 10 at 
p. 224. 
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7.2.2. Content of Notification 
It is perhaps surprising that no particular filing form exists in 
Germany. Under European law, the so-called Form CO requires the 
supply of substantial information. 84 Even under the relatively lenient 
merger control regime in Britain, a special form called "Office of Fair 
Trading Merger Notice" requiring rather detailed information exists 
with respect to voluntary pre-merger notifications. 85 The information 
to be filed in Germany, which is identical in post- and pre-merger 
notification cases, is set out in section 23 (5) GWB (see 
APPENDIX 7). The amount of data required by the FCO on each of 
the merging enterprises at this stage is relatively modest. However, 
the FCO may request further information from the parties, which is 
normally provided voluntarily. 86 If not, the FCO has at its disposal 
very wide ranging and effective investigative powers87 which even 
include the search of the companies' premises provided a search 
warrant has been granted by the local court. 88 
84 Annex I to the Implementing Regulation 2367/90 of 25 July 1990, [1990) 
O. J. L219/5, contains Form CO, which specifies the information which 
must be provided in detail. 
85 Available from the OFT, Mergers Secretariat, Field House, 15-25 Breams 
Buildings, London, England EC4A 1 PR. See also S. I. 1990 No. 501: The 
Merger (Pre-Notification) Regulations 1990. As to non-pre-notification 
cases see OFT, Mergers: the Content of Submissions, March 1994. 
86 Sec. 23 VI GWB. 
87 Sec. 46 GWB. 
88 For a thorough description of the FCO's powers in English see 
Stockmann, Investigatory Powers of Antitrust Authorities and procedural 
guarantees under German Law, Fordham 1993, p. 307-336. See also 
Investigatory Powers, Fact Finding, Procedural Gurarantees, 
Transparency and independence of Antitrust Authorities: Roundtable 
Two, Fordham 1993, p. 337-372. 
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7.2.3. Persons Obliged to Notify 
In principle, the obligation to notify the FCO lies with the 
participating enterprises. Who the participating enterprises are for 
the purpose of notification depends on the type of merger89 and is 
specified in section 23 (4) GWB. In case of an acquisition of shares it 
is the buyer, the seller, and the target company who are to report. 90 
In practice, it is often internally agreed that the notification for all 
respective parties is made by only one party, usually the purchaser. 
7.3. Mergers Qualifying for Investigation 
In order to qualify for investigation three requirements must be 
fulfilled: First, a transaction must fall under the merger definition 
(7.3.1. ). Secondly, certain quantitative criteria are to be met (7.3.2. ). 
And thirdly, the German authorities have jurisdiction only if there is 
some territorial link (7.3.3. ). 
7.3.1. Definition of a Merger 
The definition of the term merger is of relevance to both the 
rules regarding notification and the substantive merger control law. 91 
Although British and German law have in common that the term 
merger is defined in very broad terms, the way the respective 
provisions are technically drafted differs completely. Under the 
89 See Chapter 7.3.1. at pp. 283. 
90 Sec. 23 (4) Nr. 2 GWB. Mestmäcker, in ImmengalMestmäcker, § 23 
Rn. 279. 
91 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 357; Mestmäcker, in immenga/Mestmäcker, 
§ 23 Rn. 134. 
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British Fair Trading Act 1973 a merger is deemed to exist where 
control of one enterprise - meaning a controlling interest, the ability 
to control policy or the ability materially to influence policy - passes to 
another. 92 Hence, British law uses general broad terms to cover all 
possible types of transactions without actually attempting to describe 
them. 
German law has traditionally taken a different approach. The 
GWB undertakes in sections 23 (2) and (3), at least in principle, to 
describe the different types of business transactions, such as the 
acquisition of assets, the acquisition of shares or the conclusion of 
enterprise agreements, constituting mergers exhaustively. 93 Any 
transaction not falling under one of the categories specified in 
section 23 is not subject to the notification requirement and 
substantive merger control. The underlying reason for this course 
has been to provide for a maximum of clarity and predictability, and 
to ensure a high degree of accountabliltiy on the part of the merger 
control authorities. Although these legal arguments clearly carry 
some weight, the German approach has at least to some extent 
failed in practice. 94 As one would imagine the parties to mergers 
have often tailored their transactions in such a way as to circumvent 
the rather inflexible merger definitions of the GWB. 95 In order to 
close these loopholes, the government was forced to amend the 
GWB at various times. 96 in particular, the Second and Fifth 
Amendment of the GWB in 1973 and 1990 added two "sweeping-up" 
provisions which are discussed later. 97 Hence, the legislative trend is 
towards the British definition-approach. It is therefore not surprising 
92 Sec. 64,65 FTA 1973. See Chapter 6.2.1. at pp. 214. 
93 Berlin Superior Court WuW/E 2145,2146 (Sonntag Aktuell II); Paschke, 
in Frankfurter Kommentar, § 23 Rn. 33; Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 357. 
94 Dreher, Das deutsche Kartellrecht vor der Europaisierung, WuW 1995, 
881,904; Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 357,358. 
95 Some notoriety gained the so-called 24.99 per cent-cases. See 
Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 357. 
96 As to the latest amendment see in particular Paschke, Der 
Zusammenschlußbegriff des Fusionskontrollrechts, p. 55. Also 
Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmacker, § 23 Rn. 134. 
97 See Chapter 7.3.1. (6) at pp. 291. 
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that the 1990 European Merger Control Regulation did not follow the 
German example. Under Article 3 (1) of the Regulation a merger is 
deemed to have occurred where "direct or indirect control", defined 
as "decisive influence", has been acquired. 98 The German set of 
rules defining the term "Zusammenschluß" as they stand today 
reflect the piecemeal development through amendments. They are a 
somewhat incoherent mixture of precise descriptions of certain types 
of transactions and more broadly framed clauses designed to close 
loopholes. It is submitted that the merger definitions in Germany 
could be simplified substantially. Time appears to be ripe for reform 
in that respect. 99 In order to simplify matters and to further European 
harmonization, the obvious route to take would be to adopt the 
definition of the European Merger Control Regulation, 100 which will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.101 
Since the merger definitions play an important role in practice, 
the following paras provide an overview over the different types of 
mergers as defined by section 23 (2) and (3) of the GWB. 
(1) Acquisition of Assets 
The acquisition of assets of another enterprise by way of 
amalgamations, reconstructions, or by any other means is deemed 
to constitute a merger if the assets acquired represent the whole or a 
98 See Chapter 8.3.1. (2) at pp. 356. 
99 Dreher, Das deutsche Kartellrecht vor der Europäisierung, WuW 1995, 
881,904; Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 358. 
100 This opinion is to some extent shared by the Ministry of Economics, 
although it is not intended to simply adopt the European definition. 
Appearantly the ideas criculate around a combination of fixed thresholds 
and the broad merger definition as used by the European Merger 
Regulation. See Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Eckpunkte für eine 
Novell des GWB, 6 May 1996, Gesch. -Zeichen IB5- 221200, pp. 13. In 
favour of an adoption of the definition of the European Merger Regulation: 
Dreher, Das deutsche Kartellrecht vor der Europäisierung, WuW 1995, 
881,904. 
101 See Chapter 8.3.1. at pp. 355. 
Chapter 7 286 
substantial part of the assets of the selling enterprise, section 23 (2) 
No. 1 GWB. Clearly, the difficulty with this provision is to determine 
in an individual case what amounts to a substantial part of the 
assets. Both the Berlin Superior Court (Kammergericht) and the 
Federal Supreme Court in Karlsruhe (Bundesgerichtshot) had to deal 
with this question various times, 102 one of the most remarkable 
cases probably being the Kettenstichnähmaschinen case. 103 This 
case concerned the sale of an industrial sewing machine factory. 
The assets sold accounted for only 0.5 per cent of the total assets of 
the seller and generated only 1.4 per cent of its total sales. The 
market share attributable to the assets was about 3.2 per cent. The 
Federal Supreme Court held - as the Berlin Superior Court had done 
before - that the key test was not whether the assets acquired 
represented a substantial part in terms of value in relation to the 
sellers total assets, but whether the acquired assets would make a 
tangible difference to the buyer with respect to his market position. 
Hence, the approach taken by the Federal Supreme Court is based 
more on a qualitative than quantitative assessment. The assets 
acquired must to some extent represent a functional and 
organisational unit. The result is a fairly wide interpretation of the 
term "substantial part ", which is very much in line with the British 
interpretation of the term "enterprise" as used by the Fair Trading 
Act. 104 In Germany even the acquistition of a mixing plant for 
bitumen costing only about DM 1.2 million - at that time roughly the 
price of a large family home as the Berlin Superior Court pointed 
102 Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 1908 and Federal Supreme Court, 
WuW/E BGH 1570 (Kettenstichnöhmaschinen); Berlin Superior Court 
WuW/E OLG 1993 (Organische Pigmente); Federal Supreme Court 
WuW/E BGH 1655 (Zementmahlanlage II); Berlin Superior Court WuW/E 
2093 and Federal Supreme Court WuW/E BGH 1763 (Bituminöses 
Mischgut); Berlin Superior Court WuW/E OLG 3591 (Coop Schleswig- 
Holstein/Deutscher Supermarkt); Berlin Superior Court WuW/E 
OLG 2887 (Krupp/Total); Berlin Superior Court WuW/E OLG 2007 
(Kunststoffrohre). 
103 Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 1908 and Federal Supreme Court, 
WuW/E BGH 1570 (Kettenstichnähmaschinen) (1979). 
104 See Chapter 6.2.1. at pp. 214. Also sec. 63 (2) and 137 (2) FTA 1973. 
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out105 - was held by the Federal Supreme Court to constitute a 
substantial part of the assets in that individual case. 106 
(2) Acquisition of Shares 
The acquisition of shares as defined by section 23 (2) No. 2 
GWB is the most important type of merger transaction in practice 
(see Table 16 at page 293). 107 Under this provision the acquisition of 
shares, aggregated with shares already held by the acquiror or 
affiliated enterprises, meeting or exceeding one of the three following 
thresholds is deemed to constitute a merger: 
(a) 25 per cent of the capital or voting rights. 
(b) 50 per cent of the capital or voting rights. 
(c) a majority interest within the meaning of section 16 (1) of the 
Stock Corporation Act 1965, i. e. the majority of the capital or 
the voting rights. 
The way the provision is drafted, (b) is of relevance only where 
exactly 50 per cent of the voting rights or the capital is acquired. 
Anything above that limit is falling under (c). 108 As to the calculation 
of the shareholding, all shares in the target held by enterprises 
belonging to the corporate group of the acquirer are to be 
aggregated. 109 The same holds true for those shares held on 
account of the acquirer by any other enterprise. 110 Each passing of 
one of the aforementioned thresholds triggers the notification 
requirement anew and, if qualifying for investigation, the substantive 
105 Berlin Superior Court WuW/E OLG 2093 (Bituminöses Mischgut). 
106 Federal Supreme Court WuW/E BGH 1763 (Bituminöses Mischgut). 
107 See also Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 360. As to the typical nature of 
shareholdings in Germany see Chapter 2 at pp. 20, Chapter 4.1.2. at 
pp. 122 and Chapter 4.2.1. at pp. 132. 
108 Bechtold, GWB, § 23 Rn. 14. 
109 Sec. 23 (1) sentence 2 GWB. 
110 Sec. 23 (2) No. 2 sentence 2 GWB. 
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merger control process. In practice stakes just below the relevant 
threshold figures are often built up. In order to close some of the 
loopholes, sentence 4 of Section 23 (2) No. 2 stipulates that a 
merger is deemed to have occurred where the purchaser is afforded 
by agreement, articles, or resolution a position which is equivalent to 
that of a minority shareholder holding a bocking minority of at least 
25 per cent. Moreover, Nos. 5 and 6 of section 23 (2) are designed 
to close remaining gaps. 111 
(3) "Joint Ventures" 
A particularly far-reaching merger definition which has no 
equivalent in English or European law is contained in section 23 (2) 
No. 2 sentence 3 GWB: where two or more companies acquire each 
- simultaneously or not - stakes exceeding the relevant thresholds 
(e. g. 25 per cent) in a third company, then a merger is not only 
deemed to have occurred between each of the acquiring companies 
and the third company, but separately also between the acquiring 
companies. 112 It is not necessary that the acquiring companies act in 
concert; they do not even have to know of their respective 
acquisitions. The underlying reason behind this rule is the so-called 
"group-effect", i. e. the assumption that the acquiring companies, 
because of their shared interest in their "joint venture", do not 
compete as vigorously as before. 113 
An example may illustrate this perhaps surprising provision: A- 
company and B-company acting independently acquire at different 
ill See Chapter 7.3.1. (6) at pp. 291. 
112 The same applies if a company is set up jointly by two or more companies 
of each holds at least a 25 per cent stake. See Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 
p. 401. 
113 Bechtold, GWB, § 23 Rn. 17; Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 401; 
Kleinmann/Bechtold, Fusionskontrolle, § 23 Rn. 128; Mestmäcker, in 
Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 23 Rn. 182. 
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times each 25 per cent (or more) in C-company. As a result mergers 
are not only deemed to have occurred between A/C and B/C, but 
also between A and B. 
Details on how to interpret this provision are highly controversial. 
One dispute revolves around the question whether a more restrictive 
interpretation is commendable in the context of substantive merger 
control as opposed to notification. 114 Contrary to the FCO, 115 the 
courts have held that in the context of substantive merger control law 
a merger between the acquiring companies may only be presumed 
to have occurred where those companies form some sort of 
economic unity. 116 Another controversy, which is repeated on 
European level, 117 surrounds the treatment of joint ventures with 
respect to the general prohibition of cartel agreements as stipulated 
by section 1 (1) of the GWB. 118 One school of thought tries to 
differentiate between co-operative joint ventures (cartel law) and 
concentrative joint ventures (merger control)119 which corresponds 
with the handling of joint ventures under the European Merger 
Regulation. 120 As this differentiation is often difficult to make in 
114 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 368; Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, 
§ 23 Rn. 191. 
115 FCO, Tätigkeitsbericht, 1979/1980, p. 25; also Monopolies Commission, 
3. Hauptgutachten, Rn. 524 et seq. 
116 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1533,1538 (Erdgas Schwaben); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1763,1765 (bituminöses 
Mischgut); Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 1895,1899 (Erdgas 
Schwaben). FCO, AG 1990,502 (MAN/ENASA). 
117 Scherf, Konzentrative und kooperative Gemeinschaftsunternehmen im 
europäischen Kartellrecht, AG 1992,245-258. Also Chapter 8.3.1. (3) at 
pp. 360. 
118 Sec. 1 (1) GWB: "Agreements concluded by enterprises or associations 
of enterprises for a common purpose and resolutions of associations of 
enterprises are ineffective insofar as they are likely to influence, through 
restraint of competition, production or market conditions regarding the 
trade in goods or commercial services. " 
119 FCO, Tätigkeitsbericht 1978, p. 23 et seq.; Bechtold, Fusionskontrolle bei 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmen, BB 1980,344; Knöpfle, Zur Unterscheidung 
zwischen Konzentrativen und kooperativen Gemeinschaftsuntemehmen, 
BB 1980,654; Schert, Konzentrative und kooperative 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmen im europäischen Kartellrecht, AG 1992,245, 
246. 
120 Art. 3 (2) of the Merger Regulation. See also Chapter 8.3. at pp. 354. 
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practice, the courts121 and the majority opinion122 therefore argue 
that a joint venture should without qualification be subject to both the 
law on cartel agreements and merger control law provided it qualifies 
under both sets of rules. However, there exist ministerial plans to 
bring German law on joint ventures more in line with the European 
Merger Regulation. 123 
(4) Enterprise Agreements 
Certain agreements between enterprises specified in 
section 23 (2) No. 3 GWB are also deemed to constitute mergers. In 
particular, agreements establishing a contract-based corporate 
group124 within the meaning of the Stock Corporations Act 1965125 
fall under this provision. Contract based groups have been discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4.2.5.126 As Table 16 below at page 293 
indicates, enterprise agreements do not form a significant part of the 
mergers investigated by the FCO. They are usually preceded by the 
acquisition of a qualifying stake in the target company, which falls 
under section 23 (2) No. 2 GWB. However, if an enterprise 
agreement following an acquisition of a stake leads to a substantial 
strengthening of the existing connection between the participating 
enterprises, the agreement is considered a separate merger subject 
121 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2169 (Mischwerke); discussed by 
Immenga, Gemeinschaftsunternehmen als Kartell und Zusammenschluß, 
ZHR 150 (1986), p. 366; also Karsten Schmidt, 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmen und Recht der 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, AG 1987,333. 
122 Bechtold, GWB Kommentar, §1 Rn. 23 et seq; Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 
p. 369; Immenga, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, §1 Rn. 503,507. 
123 See Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Eckpunkte für eine Novell des 
GWB, 6 May 1996, Gesch. -Zeichen IB5- 221200, p. 14. 
124 For example control contracts, profit transfer contracts, or shop leasing or 
business transfer contracts. See Chapter 4.2.5. at pp. 151. 
125 Sec. 291 and 291 AktG. See APPENDIX 2. 
126 See pp. 151. 
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to notification and merger control again. 127 
(5) Partially Corresponding Managements 
Section 23 (2) No. 4 GWB stipulates that, where at least half of 
the members of a corporate board in two different companies consist 
of the same persons, the situation is to be regarded as a merger no 
matter whether the boards concerned are supervisory boards, 
management boards or any other management organ. 128 Hence, if 
half of the directors in a British public company were also members 
of, say, the supervisory board of a German stock corporation and 
accounted there for at least half of the supervisory board members, 
under German law a merger would be deemed to have been 
created. The practical relevance of this merger type is negligible (see 
Table 16 at page 293). 129 
(6) Sweeping-up Provisions 
If a transaction does not fall under any of the transaction types 
described above, then - and only then - the FCO may resort to the 
sweeping-up provision contained in No. 5 of section 23 (2) of the 
GWB. According to No. 5 any transaction other than the types 
described in Nos. 1-4 is to be considered a merger if the transaction 
confers on one enterprise power to exercise directly or indirectly a 
dominant influence over another enterprise. 130 The dominant 
127 Sec. 23 (3) sentence 1 GWB. 
128 As to the two-tier board system in Germany see Chapter 4.2.2. at pp. 133. 
129 As to theoretical difficulties regarding the interpretation of this provision 
see Kleinmann/Bechtold, Kommentar zur Fusionskontrolle, § 23 Rn. 156; 
Paschke, in FK, § 23 Rn. 70; Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 23 
Rn. 221. 
130 As to the meaning of "dominant influence" see sec. 17 AktG (Stock 
Corporation Act 1965) (APPENDIX 2); Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E 
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influence must be based on some legal position, for example special 
rights in the articles or shareholder agreements. 131 A de facto 
economic influence does not suffice. The "dominant influence" 
required by No. 5 commands a higher degree of control than the 
power "materially to influence the policy of a body corporate" 
sufficient under secion 65 (3) of the British Fair Trading Act. 132 
However, the ultimate sweeping-up provision, No. 6, stipulates 
that a transaction, type-wise falling under Nos. 2,4 or 5, but failing to 
reach the quantitative criteria required there (e. g. the 25 per cent 
threshold), may nevertheless constitute a merger if the transaction 
enables one enterprise to exercise directly or indirectly an influence 
which is material with respect to competition. 133 This definition is 
very broad and in its practical effect rather close to British law. 134 
The dogmatic difference is, however, that under German law the 
No. 6 definition does apply only in exceptional cases where the 
preceding definitions contained in Nos. 1 to 5 have failed to cover the 
transaction in question. Hence, before coming to No. 6 the merger 
control authorities must consider No. 1 to 5. The British test applying 
only one standard definition regardless of the specific type of 
transaction (acquisition of shares, amalgamation, etc. ), is clearly 
more practicable without creating more legal uncertainty than the 
German rules do. Clearly, the German merger definitions are, 
because of the piecemeal historical development, 135 unnecessarly 
complicated and overdue for reform. 136 
BGH 2321,2323; Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 1993,1994 
(organische Pigmente). 
131 Bechtold, GWB, § 23 Rn. 27; Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 374; 
Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 23 Rn. 233. 
132 See Chapter 6.2.1. at pp. 214. 
133 Because of the relatively low intensity of the corporate union created by 
the No. 6 types of merger, they are not subject to pre-notification, 
Sec. 24a 12 GWB. 
134 See Chapter 6.2.1. at pp. 214. 
135 See Chapter 7.3.1. at pp. 283. 
136 See Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, Eckpunkte für eine Novell des 
GWB, 6 May 1996, Gesch. -Zeichen IB5- 221200, pp. 13. In favour of an 
adoption of the definition of the European Merger Regulation: Dreher, Das 
deutsche Kartellrecht vor der Europäisierung, WuW 1995,881,904. 
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1986 172 430 174 11 1 14 
1987 211 481 171 17 -- 7 
1988 260 616 260 13 1 10 
1989 323 741 325 17 -- 8 
1990 280 775 460 17 - 16 
1991 501 952 507 34 -- 13 
1992 320 815 560 21 - 27 
1993 290 672 507 23 -- 22 
1994 295 698 527 15 -- 29 
Source: Tätigkeitsberichte des Bundeskartellamtes 
7.3.2. Quantitative Criteria 
As in Britain, mergers are subject to control only if they are of 
significance in terms of volume. The way, however, the quantitative 
criteria are defined differs. In Britain either the assets test (worldwide 
assets taken over exceed £70 million) or the market share test 
(merging enterprises have at least 25 per cent of the market) must 
be positively satisfied. 1 37 In Germany, however, certain mergers are 
negatively exempted from control. Unlike Britain, the quantitative 
criteria applied in Germany relate either to the turnover proceeds of 
the merging enterprises or the volume of the market concerned. 
137 Sec. 64 (1)(b) FTA 1973. See Chapter 6.2.2. at pp. 217. 
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Hence, these criteria do not directly relate to the volume of the 
transaction itself, but rather to the size of the companies or markets 
involved. Albeit the German criteria might be easier to establish as 
the turnover figures are usually known, in terms of rationale the U. K. 
criteria seem preferable as they refer directly to the transaction in 
question which the German criteria do not. 
Under section 24 (8) Nos. 1-3 of the GWB the following mergers 
falling under Nos 1,2 or 3 are exempted from control: 1 38 
No. 1: Mergers are exempted from control where the joint 
turnover proceeds of the participating enterprises amounted to less 
than DM 500 million in the preceding business year. 139 
No. 2: Mergers are also exempted where an independent 
company with an annual turnover of not more than DM 50 million 
merges (voluntarily) 140 with another company. The rationale behind 
this rule is to allow small and medium sized companies to capitalize 
on their investment by way of selling the company. 141 However, this 
rather controversial rule resulted in large groups buying rather 
heavily in small markets which led to a distortion of these 
markets. 142 Therefore, the Forth Amendment to the GWB (1980) 
added that this rule shall not apply where the acquiring company has 
an annual turnover of more than DM 1 billion and the annual turnover 
of the acquired company amounts to more than DM 4 million. 143 
No. 3: A further exemption is made where so-called "bagatelle- 
markets" are concerned, i. e. markets where the volume of goods or 
services supplied amount to less than DM 10 million per annum 
provided the market concerned has been existing for at least five 
138 As to the exact wording see APPENDIX 7. 
139 As to the calculation of the turnover figures see sec. 23 (1) GWB. 
140 This rule does not apply where the acquisition is made in hostile fashion. 
Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 24 Rn. 207. 
141 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 339 and 380. 
142 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 379. 
143 As to the reasons for the restricition see Begründung zum 
Regierungesentwurf (BT-Dr. 8/2136) and the report of the parlamentary 
committee (Ausschußbericht BT-Dr. 8/3690). 
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years (Bagatellmarktklausel). The underlying rationale of this rule is 
that very small markets have little or no significance for the economy 
as a whole and are therefore not "worthy" of merger control. 144 While 
there is no similar rule to this effect in Britain, it appears that in 
practice references concerning very small markets are hardly ever 
made and the author is not aware of any reference concerning a 
market worth less than the equivalent of DM 10 million in recent 
years. 145 
7.3.3. Territorial Link 
Like Britain, the German merger control authorities may only 
assume jurisdiction if there is some territorial connection -a principle 
that follows as a matter of course as otherwise the merger control 
authorities would not have a legitimate interest in policing the 
transaction. 146 To establish a territorial link, English law asks 
whether one of the merging enterprises has been "carried on in the 
United Kingdom". 147 The approach taken by German law differs: 
section 98 (2) of the GWB stipulates that the Act shall apply to all 
restraints of competition which have "effects" within Germany even if 
the restraints were caused by events outside the German territory. 
This so-called "effects-doctrine"148 focuses on the impact a foreign 
merger might have on the German market, whereas English law 
144 Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 24 Rn. 210. 
145 In recent years one of the smallest mergers referred concerned the 
acquistion of Reckitt & Colman by the Sara Lee Corporation 
(August 1992, Cm 2040). In this case the market for shoe polish products 
was considered to be worth about £13.5 million (para 1.2 and 6.15). The 
self-selection sector, in which the merger led to adverse effects, was 
worth only £5.7 million (para 6.49 Table 2). See also FinbowlParr, U. K. 
Merger Control, para 4.020. 
146 Rehbinder, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 98 Abs. 2, Rn. 16. As to 
connecting factors in conflict rules, which section 64 (1) of the English 
FTA 1973 and section 98 (2) of the German GWB are, see in general see 
Stone, The Conflict of Laws, p. 9. 
147 Sec. 63 (1) FTA 1973. For details see Chapter 6.2.4. at pp. 254. 
148 Auswirkungsprinzip. 
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concentrates more on the business carried on in Britain by one of the 
merging enterprises prior to the merger situation. The connecting 
factors149 used by English and German law - namely "business 
carried on" versus "effects" - are fairly comprehensive. Both concepts 
appear broad enough to cover any case in which the national merger 
control authorities could possibly have an interest. The difficulty with 
section 98 (2) of the GWB has therefore not been that it is too 
narrow - rather on the contrary. Given the wide scope of 
section 98 (2) GWB, what really is of importance is the way this 
provision is interpreted and applied in practice by the relevant 
authorities. The problem has been - and still is - to find a workable 
interpretation under which the contours of the jurisdictional reach 
become clear: with regard to the (extraterritorial) application of 
national merger control law to international mergers a balance has to 
be struck between safeguarding legitimate German competition 
interests which may be affected by foreign mergers on the one hand 
and the public international law principle of non-intervention in 
foreign affairs150 on the other hand. 151 
149 As to the meaning of this term within the field of conflict of law see Stone, 
The Conflict of Laws, p. 9,385. 
150 This principle is protected under Article 25 of the German Constitution as 
part of the general priniples of the law of nations: Berlin Superior Court, 
WuW/E OLG 3051,3052 (Morris/Rothmans). Rehbinder, in 
Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 98 (2), Rn. 17. 
See also Brownlie, Principles on Public International Law, p. 291,292 and 
lpsen, Völkerrecht, p. 292. With regard to the extraterritorial application of 
national law the Permanent Court of International Justice held: "... the first 
and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that 
- failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not 
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. ... It does 
not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from 
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which 
relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely 
on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be 
tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to 
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to 
persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception 
to this general prohibition it allowed States to do so in certain specific 
cases. ... 
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that 
States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of 
their courts to persons, property and acts otuside their territory, it leaves 
them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in 
certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, ervery State 
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Unlike Britain, where the jurisdictional question appears not to 
have caused serious problems in practice, the interpretation of the 
effects-doctrine in German law has been subject to considerable 
controversy, both among academics and the merger control 
authorities, but also between the FCO and the courts. 152 One 
controversy, for example, concerns the question whether and, if so, 
how tangible the "effects" in Germany must be in order to entitle the 
FCO to prohibit a foreign merger. 153 This question is of particular 
relevance in view of the pre-merger notification requirement with its 
far-reaching consequences154 and section 23 (3) sentence 4 of the 
GWB which irrebutably presumes that a merger of two or more 
parent or holding companies also constitutes a merger between their 
subsidiaries. With a view to the political implications interference with 
foreign mergers can have, a restrictive interpretation appears 
preferable. It is therefore submitted that the "effects" on the German 
market should be tangible and concrete if they are to justify the 
notification requirement and further actions by the German 
authorities where two foreign companies merge, i. e. the mere 
possibility of effects or just potential effects should not be considered 
sufficient in the context of section 98 (2) GWB. 155 This interpretation 
seems more or less in line with the approach taken by the British 
MMC in the MiTeK Industries Inc/Gang-Nail Systems Inc156 case 
and the policy of the OFT. 157 To avoid misunderstandings: the 
remains free to adopt the principles which it regareds as best and most 
suitable. " (PCIJ Ser. A, No. 10 [1927], 18 et seq. 
151 Rehbinder, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 98 (2), Rn. 16 et seq.; Lowe, 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, RabelZ 1988,157 et seq. 
152 See Heidenhain, Anmeldung and Untersagung von 
Auslandszusammenschlüssen, AG 1989,270 et seq. 
153 Bechtold, GWB, § 98 Rn. 10; Rehbinder, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, 
§ 98 (2), Rn. 63 et seq. 
154 See Chapter 7.2.1. (2) at pp. 278. 
155 Bechtold, GWB, § 98 Rn. 10. 
156 MiTeK Industries Inc and Gang-Nail Systems Inc, Cm 429, (1988), 
paras 3.1 and 6.2. 
157 In its publication, Mergers: A guide to the procedures under the 
FTA 1973, the OFT states on p. 3: "at least one of the enterprises must 
be carried on in the United Kingdom or by or under the control of a body 
corporate incorporated in the United Kingdom. This means that a merger 
between two foreign companies may still qualify for investigation where 
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prohibition by the FCO of a foreign merger is of a declaratory nature 
only and does not have any immediate or enforcable consequences 
within the foreign country. 1 58 
However, the prohibition is a necessary legal pre-condition for 
any active steps to be taken later by the FCO on German territory 
against the adverse effects the foreign merger might have in 
Germany. The four cases discussed below may clarify the law and 
illustrate the development and problems experienced with the 
jurisdictional aspect of merger control in Germany. 
(1) Bayer France/Firestone France: In the Bayer/Firestone 
case the FCO prohibited a proposed merger between two French 
companies, namely the proposed acquisition of Firestone France SA 
by Bayer France SA without even raising the jurisdictional 
question. 159 Bayer France SA was a subsidiary of the German 
BayerAG so that there was a territorial link. However, Firestone's 
market share in Germany amounted to only 0.8 and 0.4 per cent of 
the German synthetic rubber and latex market. Hence, the "effect' on 
the German market required by section 98 (2) GWB would have 
been very small indeed. The Berlin Superior Court, therefore, 
quashed this decision arguing that the case basically was a French 
merger and that the FCO acted unlawfully by not considering 
section 98 (2) GWB and the implications of the international public 
law principle of non-intervention in foreign affairs. 160 Hence, the 
Berlin Superior Court took a more restrictive and cautious line than 
either company controls any enterprise which is carried on or 
incorporated in the United Kingdom. " 
158 As to British law see section 90(3) of the FTA 1973 which prevents the 
Secretary of State from making any orders which would "have effect so as 
to apply to any person in relation to his conduct outside the United 
Kingdom unless that person is a citizen of the United Kingdom.... " 
159 FCO, WuW/E BKartA 1837(Bayer France/FireStone France). 
160 Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 2411,2417 
(Bayer France/FireStone France I) and Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E 
OLG 2419 (Bayer France/FireStone France II). 
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the FCO. 161 As the case took place in 1980, i. e. more than fifteen 
years ago, there is some probability that the FCO would take a more 
careful line had it to decide the case again today. 
(2) Philip Morris/Rothmans: This case involved the 
acquisition of a 50 per stake by the U. S. company Philip Moms Inc in 
Rothmans Tobacco Holdings Ltd of the U. K in 1981. Both Philip 
Morris and Rothmans had subsidiaries in Germany, namely the 
Philip Morris GmbH and the Martin Brinkmann AG respectively. 162 
As the combined market share of the German subsidiaries in the 
German cigarette market would have risen to 31.2 per cent and led 
to an oligopoly, 163 the FCO prohibited the Philip Morris (U. S. ) - 
Rothmans (U. K. ) merger. 164 Having learned from the 
BayerlFirestone case, the FCO specifically dealt with section 98 (2) 
and the jurisdictional question, but concluded that the prohibition did 
not infringe the public international law principle of non-intervention 
in foreign affairs as the FCO prohibition was declaratory only and 
would not lead to the Morris/Rothmans transaction being 
automatically void. 165 According to the FCO the prohibition of the 
foreign merger as a whole was necessary in order to provide for a 
lawful basis for any actions to be taken against the German 
subsidiaries of the U. S. - U. K. companies. Again, the Berlin Superior 
Court took a more restrictive view and repealed the FCO decision 
partly. 166 It was held that the FCO decision was lawful only in so far 
as it was directed against the effects the merger would have on 
German territory. For under section 23 (3) sentence 4 of the GWB 
the merger of the U. S. - U. K. parent companies was deemed to 
161 As to this pattern see: Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 52. 
162 Under section 23 (3) sentence 4 of the GWB the merger of the parent 
companies deemed to consititute a merger of the subsidiaries. 
163 Section 23a (2) No. 2 GWB. The five leading cigarette manufacturers had 
a market share of 95.4 per cent. 
164 FCO, WuW/E BKartA 1943 (Philip Morris/Rothmans). 
165 FCO, WuW/E BKartA 1943,1953 et seq. (Philip Morris/Rothmans). 
166 Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 3051 (Philip Morris/Rothmans). 
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constitute a merger of their German subsidiaries, only the prohibition 
of this "German merger" was held to be in line with the principle of 
non-interference in foreign affairs. 167 The case was remitted to the 
FCO to reconsider this point of law again, but the FCO did not 
change its view and prohibited in 1985 the merger as a whole 
arguing that it could only prohibit the transaction as a factual event 
and that took place between a U. S. and a U. K. company. 168 
(3) Linde/Lansing: The Linde/Lansing case, which took place 
in 1989, is of interest as it indicates a change in the FCO policy in so 
far as the FCO now appears to be willing - where practicable - to limit 
the prohibition of a foreign merger to the effects that merger has 
within Germany. 169 
In Linde/Lansing, a case which concerned the market for fork-lift 
trucks, Linde Hydraulics Ltd (U. K. ), a subsidiary of the German 
Linde AG, acquired a majority interest in The Kaye Organisation Ltd 
(U. K. ) which itself had a German subsidiary, the Lansing GmbH. The 
FCO found that the (English) merger between Linde Hydraulics Ltd 
and The Kaye Organisation Ltd would strengthen the already 
dominant position of Linde AG (Germany), mainly, but not only, 
because Linde AG would gain via the British companies Linde 
Hydraulics and The Kaye Organisation (indirect) control over Lansing 
GmbH. This time, however, the FCO specifically stated that for 
reasons of public international law it saw itself not in a position to 
prohibit the (English) merger as a whole, albeit this would have been 
necessary to prevent any strengthening of Linde AG "s dominant 
position. 1 70 However, in order to block at least the most damaging 
167 Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 3051,3053 et seq. (Philip 
Morris/Rothmans). 
168 See FCO, WuW/E BKartA 2204,2210 (Philip Morris/Rothmans II). 
169 FCO, WuW/E BKartA 2363 et seq. (Linde/Lansing). See also Heidenhain, 
Anmeldung und Untersagung von Auslandszusammenschlüssen, 
AG 1989,270. 
170 FCO, WuW/E BKartA 2363,2369 (Linde/Lansing). 
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effects on competition in the German market, the FCO decided that 
Lansing GmbH must not remain part of the Linde group. Although 
this decision did not hinder any strengthening of Linde AG's 
dominant decision, it was an agreeable compromise which struck a 
balance between pure competition aspects on the one hand and the 
sensitive issue of non-intervention in foreign affairs on the other 
hand. However, a decision as solomonic as in Linde/Lansing is not 
possible in every case as the next example shows. 
(4) Gillette/Wilkinson: This case involved a complex 
international transaction at the heart of which laid Gillette's attempt 
to win control over Wilkinson's world-wide wet-shaving business in 
1990. As Gillette and Wilkinson Sword are the main global players in 
the wet-shaving market, the events led not only to an investigation by 
the U. S. anti-trust authorities, but also to a report by the British 
MMC 1 71 and a decision by the German FC0172 which provides the 
opportunity to make some direct comparisons. 
Put simply, Gillette U. K. Ltd acquired a 22.9 per cent stake in the 
Dutch company Eemland Holdings N. V. 1 73 which was the parent 
company of the Wilkinson Sword group, including, inter alia, 
Wilkinson Sword Inc (U. S. A. ), Wilkinson Sword Ltd (U. K. ), and 
Wilkinson Sword Europe GmbH (Germany). Although the 22.9 per 
cent stake consisted of non-voting shares only, Gillette reserved for 
itself a number of important continuing rights and interests in 
Eemland Holdings N. V., including pre-emption and conversion rights, 
which in effect enabled it to materially influence Eemland's and, 
171 MMC, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB /Swedish Match N. V. and Stora 
Kopparbergs Bergslags ABIThe Gillette Company, Cm 1473 (1991), para 
7.23. 
172 FCO, AG 1992,363 et seq. (GillettelWilkinson). 
173 Eemland later (in April 1990) changed its name to Swedish Match N. V. 
which is why the MMC - unlike the FCO - uses this name. See MMC, 
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB /Swedish Match N. V. and Stora 
Kopparbergs Bergslags AB/The Gillette Company, Cm 1473 (1991), para 
7.23. 
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thus, Wilkinson's policy. 174 
From the U. K. point of view the jurisdictional question was not an 
issue in this case as the acquiring party was incorporated in the U. K. 
This was slightly more difficult for the German merger control 
authorities as no German company was directly involved. However, 
as Gillette and Wilkinson were the main competitors in the German 
wet-shaving market - together having a market share of well over 
90 per cent - and Eemland being the owner of Wilkinson Sword 
Europe GmbH in Germany, the merger would have had a 
considerable "effect' within the meaning of section 98 (2) GWB on 
competiton in the German market. 
As the merger would have had an adverse effect on competition 
in both the British and the German market, the relevant merger 
control authorities of both countries found against it. Unlike the 
previous case, however, the FCO prohibited the Anglo/Dutch merger 
as a whole arguing that it was not possible to confine the prohibition 
to the effect the merger would have in Germany. In particular a 
disposal by Eemland of the German Wilkinson Sword Europe GmbH 
was not practicable for this company was according to the FCO 
economically not viable independently of the international Wilkinson 
group. The question of the public international law principle of non- 
interference in foreign affairs was not raised. As the British blocked 
the merger anyway the case was probably not as sensitive as, for 
example, the French Bayer/Firestone case discussed above where 
the French cleared "their" merger, while the German FCO (originally) 
blocked it. 
In substance, the MMC report and the FCO decision very much 
came to the same conclusions with regard to the evaluation of the 
transaction and its effect on competition in the respective markets. 
174 As to details concerning the Gillette/Eemland agreements see in English: 
MMC, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB /Swedish Match N. V. and Stora 
Kopparbergs Bergslags AB/The Gillette Company, Cm 1473 (1991), para 
7.53. In German: FCO, AG 1992,363,365 (GillettelWilkinson). 
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Formally, however, they differ. As usual, the MMC report contains 
more than 100 pages (excluding appendices) while the FCO decision 
is - as usual - rather short, hardly exceeding half a dozen pages. 
What differs too is the date of publication: the MMC report was 
published in March 1991175 whereas the FCO decision - concerning 
exactly the same events - was taken in July 1992. Making these 
direct comparisons is, however, not entirely fair as the functions of 
the MMC and the FCO differ. The FCO's function - which will be 
explained in more detail later176 - is to deliver an administrative 
decision to the participating parties. 177 The MMC's duty is to carry 
out an in-depth investigation and to deliver a report giving a full and 
exact picture of the events to the Secretary of State, the parties 
involved, and the wider public. 178 
To sum up, the application of the GWB to foreign mergers which 
have effects within Germany has been and will continue to be a 
difficult and sensitive issue. Ultimately, the problems arise from an 
asymmetrical development which is not only confined to Germany: 
markets and companies become increasingly international while the 
merger control authorities stay (largely) national. Of course, the 
international public law principle of non-intervention in foreign affairs 
should be strictly adhered to. But adherence to this principle may in 
certain cases lead to a dilemma as the national merger control 
authorities may not be able to do anything against manifest adverse 
effects a foreign merger may have in the home market. In order to 
circumvent the application of the anti-trust laws of a particular 
jurisdiction, large multinational enterprises may deliberately tailor 
their transactions accordingly and exploit this weakness inherent in 
175 As to the MMC timing see Chapter 6.3.3. (4) at pp. 242. 
176 See Chapter 7.4.1. at pp. 304. 
177 Section 24 (2) GWB. 
178 See Chapter 6.3.3. (1) at pp. 234. 
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the concept of different national merger control jurisdiction. 1 79 Yet, 
as long as there are no effective supra-national merger control 
authorities able to control multi-national transactions effectively, this 
probably is the price to pay for the luxury of keeping an (almost 
purely) national merger control system. As to the developments on 
European level which partly mitigate this situation see Chapter 8.180 
7.4. Procedural Aspects 
As has been pointed out earlier, the merger control procedure in 
Germany is dominated by the FCO, which will be reflected in the 
following representations. The Monopolies Commission comes into 
play only in those highly exceptional cases where an appeal to the 
Federal Minister of Economics is made. 
7.4.1. The Federal Cartel Office 
The FCO, established under the GWB and located in Berlin, 181 
is the competent authority to police mergers and other restraints of 
competition on federal level. 182 The FCO's duty with regard to 
merger control is to examine whether a merger creates or 
strengthens, or may be expected to create or strengthen, a dominant 
market position. If it reaches an adverse conclusion, it has to prohibit 
179 As to this aspect in Connection with the European Merger Control 
Regulation see Chapter 8.2.1. at pp. 344. 
180 See pp. 335. 
181 Sec. 48 GWB. Address: Bundeskartellamt, Mehringdamm 129, 
10965 Berlin, Telefon 0049/30/695800, Fax 0049/30/69580400. 
182 In particular cartels which exceed the territory of a single Federal State. 
Cartels affecting only one Federal State are policed by the State Cartel 
Office (Landeskartellbehörde). As far as merger control is concerned, 
however, the competence rests exclusively with the FCO in Berlin, 
sec. 44 (1) No. 1 GWB. 
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the merger and, as the case may be, to remedy the adverse effects 
of a consummated merger. 
The following paras will discuss (1) the status of the FCO, 
(2) its personnel and resources, and finally (3) its internal 
organisation. The substantive criteria applied by the FCO in 
assessing a merger will be discussed at a later stage 
(Chapter 7.5.1. ). 183 
(1) Status of the FCO 
The FCO is a so-called Superior Federal Authority 
(Bundesoberbehörde). 184 It belongs to the portfolio of the Federal 
Minister of Economics, but its status as a Superior Federal Authority 
guarantees a high measure of independence from ministerial or 
political interference. Although the Federal Minister of Economics 
may give General Instructions (Allgemeine Weisungen), which have 
to be published in the Federal Gazette, 185 he may not interfere in 
actual merger cases or withdraw competences from the FCO. 186 In 
practice, political interference in merger decisions of the FCO has 
because of the status of the FCO apparently never been a problem. 
183 See pp. 317. 
184 Sec. 48 (1) GWB and Article 87 (3) of the German Consitution 
(Grundgesetz). 
185 Sec. 49 GWB. To date the Federal Minister has issued only five general 
instructions of which only two are still of relevance to date: (1) General 
Instruction of 30.3.1976 on undertakings in the merger control procedure, 
Federal Gazette (BAnz. ) No. 66 of 3.4.1976 and (2) General Instruction of 
30.5.1980 on the handling of foreign mergers, Federal Gazette (BAnz. ) 
No. 103 of 7.6.1980. This latter General Instruction requires the FCO to 
inform the merging parties as soon as possible if it becomes clear for 
whatever reasons that a proposed merger is not going to be blocked. In 
the case of foreign participants the FCO has to do so even if the merging 
parties have failed to provide all the information required under the pre- 
notification provisions if the notifying foreign party demonstrates at the 
time of notification that, due to foreign legal provisions or other reasons, it 
has been prevented from supplying all the required particulars. However, 
this General Instruction does not free foreign parties from making a full 
report pursuant to sec. 23 (5) GWB upon consummation of the merger. 
186 See Klaue, in Immenga/Mestmacker, § 48, Rn. 14. 
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(2) Personnel and Resources 
The status of the FCO as an independent Superior Federal 
Authority engenders that the FCO has its own budget. In 1992 the 
total expenses amounted to DM 20.06 million (while the revenue 
from fines and fees added up to DM 21.25 million). 187 About one 
third of these resources, i. e. around DM 6.6 million, were spent on 
merger control. A direct comparison with the expenses of the British 
merger control authorities is difficult as mergers are policed by three 
different authorities in Britain. By and large, the FCO combines the 
funtions of the OFT, the MMC and the Secretary of State. The OFT 
spent in 1994 about £0.8 million on merger control188 and the 
expenditure of the MMC in the financial year 1994/1995 amouted to 
£6.8 million. 189 
The FCO employs about 252 permanent staff. Roughly 110 
thereof, of which half are lawyers and economists, are senior staff 
(Beamte and Angestellte des höheren Dienstes). Around 75 
members of staff are exclusively charged with merger control. 190 In 
addition there are about 13 Members of permanent staff employed 
by the German Monopolies Commission. In comparison, in the 
financial year 1994 the average number of permanent staff 
employed by the OFT was 420, hence, about 170 more than the 
FCO! However, the number of staff belonging to the so-called 
Mergers Secretariat of the OFT was relatively small with less than 20 
staff. 191 A further 77 full-time and 9 part-time staff were employed by 
187 Source: Publication of the FCO: "Das Bundeskartellamt", Pressestelle. 
Publication obtained in January 1996. 
188 See Chapter 6.3.1. (2) at pp. 224. 
189 See Chapter 6.3.3. (2) at pp. 235. 
190 Information provided by the FCO in January 1996 (Mr Foth). 
191 Annual Report of the DGFT 1994, p. 92. 
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the MMC. 1 92 Although it appears safe to say that the competition 
authorities in Britain employ more staff than their counterparts in 
Germany, with respect to merger control the differences seem rather 
modest. Britain employs roughly 100 (less than 20 OFT plus 77 and 
9 part-time MMC) while Germany has only a few less (75 FCO, 13 
Monopolies Commission). 
(3) Internal Organisation of the FCO 
Page 310 shows the organisation chart of the FCO as published 
in the biennial Report 1994/1995 of the FCO. 193 Headed by a 
president and a vice-president and further subdivided into a number 
of "Referate" (sections) dealing with general policy matters the FCO- 
divisions most important in the present context are the so-called 
"Beschlußabteilungen" (decision-units) of which there are ten each 
responsible for a different sector of industry. These decision-units, 
and not the President or Vice-President of the FCO, are under the 
provisions of the GWB exclusively in charge of the FCO decision- 
making. 194 The procedure before the decision-units is quasi-judicial, 
and there is no room for lobbying. 195 The decision-units decide in 
bodies composed of a Chairman and two Associates. The Chairman 
should as a general rule be qualified to exercise the functions of a 
judge, i. e. he must have passed the first and the second legal state 
examination (Assessor iur. ). The associates must either be qualified 
to exercise the functions of a judge or qualified for a position in the 
senior civil service (non-legal state exam). Furthermore, to ensure 
their independence, the Chairmen and the Associates of the 
192 Annual Report of the DGFT 1994, p. 93. See also Chapter 6.3.3. (2) at 
pp. 235. 
193 Sec. 50 GWB. So-called Tätigkeitsbenchte des Bundeskartellamtes. 
194 Sec. 48 (3) GWB. 
195 Haidenhein, in Investigatory Powers, Fact Finding etc, Fordham 1993, 
p. 337,340. As to the role of lobbying in Britain see Chapter 3.4.3. at 
p. 91. 
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decision-units have to be civil servants appointed for life. 196 To avoid 
any conflict of interest, the GWB specifically provides that the 
members of the FCO must not be owners, managers or members of 
the board of management or the supervisory board of an enterprise, 
a cartel or a business or professional association. 
Hence, not only the FCO as a Federal Superior Authority enjoys 
a relatively high degree of independence from ministerial 
interference, the internal organisation of the FCO also undertakes to 
guarantee that those actually responsible for making the decisions 
are independent from inside and outside pressure and not entangled 
in any conflict of interest. 
The organisational structure as outlined above contrasts sharply 
with the British approach in two ways. (1) First, as to the 
investigative stage of the merger assessment, the MMC relies on 
part-time Members appointed on a part-time secondment basis from 
senior posts in the private sector. 197 This ensures that top people 
with different backgrounds can be attracted to make contributions to 
the merger control process. On the other hand the risk of conflict of 
interest is inherent in the British system and the so appointed 
Members may often not be experts on merger control. 198 The way 
merger control is organised in Britain and Germany is, however, not 
just a procedural matter, but a reflection of a more deeply rooted 
difference in the legal culture. As has already been demonstrated 
with respect to the regulation of takeover bids, as a regulatory 
principle Britain tends to rely more heavily on the idea of self- 
regulation and co-operation between regulator and industry stressing 
the need for a flexible regulatory approach, while in Germany 
predictablility and independence appear to be the overriding legal 
values. The way the MMC is organized, with "private" part-time 
196 Sec. 48 (4) GWB. 
197 See Chapter 6.3.3. (2) at pp. 235. As to the background of the MMC 
Members see Table 13 at p. 239. 
198 See Chapter 6.3.3. (2) at pp. 235 and the criticism of the Trade and 
Industry Committee reported there. 
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Members making through the MMC-Reports weighty 
recommendations to the Secretary of State, clearly contains a self- 
regulatory element, although, of course, the MMC being based on 
the Fair Trading Act 1973 is not a self-regulatory authority in the 
strict sense of the word. The opposite holds true for the FCO as 
there is no self-regulatory element whatsoever. In fact, the GWB 
insisting on life-time civil servants declares personal involvement of 
FCO members with industry illegal. (2) The second fundamental 
difference has already been pointed out in Chapter 6.5.199 and 
refers to the political aspect of merger control. In Britain, merger 
control is under the current legal framework ultimately structured as 
a political matter. This is not only reflected in the open-ended "public 
interest" criterion applied by the merger control authorities, but 
mainly by the fact that both the reference decision200 and the final 
blocking decision201 are ultimately made by the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry. In Germany, however, merger control is 
principally seen as an administrative matter with the FCO enjoying a 
large measure of independence. However, as has been mentioned 
earlier, 202 the Federal Minister of Economics also has a (minor) role 
to play in the German merger control process, which will be briefly 
examined in the following paras. 
199 See pp. 263. 
200 Chapter 6.3.2. at pp. 229. 
201 Chapter 6.3.4. at pp. 242. 
202 Chapter 7.1.2. at pp. 268. 
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7.4.2. The Federal Minister of Economics 
The role of the Federal Minister of Economics as outlined 
above203 differs in two major respects from that of the British 
Secretary of State. 
(1) The first dissimilarity concerns the substantive appraisal 
criteria to be applied by the Minister. Unlike his British colleague with 
respect to the MMC-Reports, the German Minister of Economics is 
bound by the legal and factual findings of the FCO and the courts as 
to the existence of a dominant market position. 204 Contrary to the 
Secretary of State, the Minister may not overrule the findings of the 
FCO and the courts. 205 He may only permit a merger on grounds 
other than those taken into account by the FCO and the courts. 
Section 24 (3) of the GWB defines the appraisal criteria to be applied 
by the Minister as follows: 
"The Federal Minister of Economics shall, on application, grant 
permission for the merger, if in the individual case the restraint of 
competition is compensated by the overall economic advantages of 
the merger or if the merger is justified by an overriding public interest; 
in this context, regard shall also be given to the competitive capability 
of the participating enterprises in markets outside the territory in which 
this Act applies. The permission may only be granted if the scope of 
the restraint of competition does not endanger the principle of the 
market economy. " 
Since the FCO and the courts are by law prevented from taking 
these issues into account as they are regarded as of a political 
nature, there can be no overlap between the aspects the FCO and 
203 Chapter 7.1.2. at pp. 268. 
204 Erfahrungsbericht des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums, WuW 1992,925- 
932. Bechtold, GWB Kommentar, § 24, Rn. 50; Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 
p. 425; Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 24 Rn. 318. 
205 As to U. K. law see Chapter 6.3.2. at pp. 229 and Chapter 6.3.4. at 
pp. 242. 
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the courts on the one hand and the Minister on the other hand take 
into consideration (dominant market position versus overall economic 
advantages and overriding public interest). Consequently, conflicting 
decisions in the strict sense of the word are not possible as the 
grounds on which the decisions are taken differ by definition. In 
Britain, conflicting decisions by the DGFT, the MMC, and the 
Secretary of State may occur, though this does not happen 
frequently, as their decisions are based on the same legal grounds, 
namely the public interest as defined in section 84 of the Fair 
Trading Act. 206 
(2) Unlike the Secretary of State, the German Minister of 
Economics gets involved only if, following a prohibition by the FCO, 
an appeal is made to him. As has been mentioned, 207 since the 
introduction of merger control in 1973 only 15 appeals, of which only 
2 have been fully and 4 partly successful, have been launched (see 
Table 17 at page 315). 208 The latest ministerial permission granted 
concerned the highly controversial merger in the defence industry 
between mighty Daimler Benz and Messerschmitt/Bölkow/Blohm 
(MBB) in 1989.209 Before that, the latest permission granted dates 
back to 1981 when IBH-Holding, a construction equipment group, 
merged with Wibau (and went bust shortly afterwards). 210 All other 
permissions concerned cases in the 1970s as Table 17 at page 315 
shows. In 1993,1994, and 1995 not a single appeal has been made 
to the Minister. The reason for the very limited practical relevance of 
the ministerial appeal procedure is of a political nature. Any 
206 Chapter 6.3.2. at pp. 229. 
207 Chapter 7.1.3. at pp. 272. 
208 Tätigkeitsbericht des BKartA 1993/1994, Bundestag Drucksache 13/1660, 
p. 13. 
209 FCO prohibition: Beschluß des BKartA vom 17.4.1989, WuW/E 
BKartA 2335. Ministerial permission: Verfügung des Bundesministers für 
Wirtschaft vom 6.9.1989, WuW/E BWM 191 (Daimler/MBB). 
210 FCO prohibition: Beschluß des BKartA vom 3.7.1981, WuW/E 
BKartA 1892. Ministerial permission: Verfügung des Bundesministers für 
Wirtschaft vom 9.12.1981, WuW/E BWM 177 (IBH/Wibau). 
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involvement of the Minister in a merger case is regarded with great 
suspicion by the wider public and likely to damage the Minister 
politically. 211 Given this political climate in Germany and the fact that 
the Minister's past experiences with permissions granted were rather 
discouraging, 212 Ministers have repeatedly made very clear their 
unwillingness to be drawn into disputes over actual merger cases. 
7.4.3. The Monopolies Commission 
The Monopolies Commission, 213 which was vaguely modelled 
after the British MMC, 214 becomes involved in the merger control 
process only if an appeal is made to Federal Minister of 
Economics. 215 Unlike the British MMC, which can by not coming to 
an adverse conclusion in its report prevent the Secretary of State 
from blocking a merger, 216 the German Monopolies Commission has 
a purely advisory function. The Minister is not bound by the 
recommendation given to him as Table 17 at page 315 shows. Since 
the ministerial appeal procedure is of very limited practical relevance 
these days, so is the complementary advisory role of the Monopolies 
Commission in the merger control process. A few words on the 
Monopolies Commission may therefore suffice. 217 
211 As to harsh criticism concerning the permission of the Daimler-Benz/MBB 
merger see, for example, the Parliamentary motion by members of the 
SPD opposition party: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 11/4518. 
Answer by the Government: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 11/5232. 
See also Der Spiegel, 36/1989, p. 116 and 37/1989, p. 110-116. 
212 Erfahrungsbericht des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums, WuW 1992,925, 
927. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 423. 
213 Address: Monopolkommission, Generalsekretär Dr. Horst Greiffenberg, 
Barbarastraße 1,50735 Köln, Telefon 0049/221/7581148, Fax: 
0049/221/758/2811. 
214 Mestmäcker, Funktionen und bisherige Tätigkeit der Monopolkommission, 
Schwerpunkte des Kartellrechts 1974/75, pp. 43,46. 
215 Chapter 7.1.2. at pp. 268. 
216 Chapter 6.3.3. (1) at pp. 234. 
217 For a more detailed analysis in German see Kantzenbach, Zehn Jahre 
Monopolkommission, WuW 1984,5-15; Mestmäcker, 
, 
Funktionen und 
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The Monopolies Commission consists of five Members 
appointed for a four year term of office by the Federal President 
upon designation by the Federal Government. 218 The Members 
"must have particular knowledge and experience in the fields of 
economics, business administration, social policy, technology or 
business law. "219 The five Members are supported by seven 
permanent research staff headed by a Director General and about 
five administrative staff. The Members of the Monopolies 
Commission may neither belong to the Government nor the 
legislature of either the federation or a state, or any other legal entity 
under public law. 220 Nor may they belong to an employee or 
employers organization. In making its report the Monopolies 
Commission is bound only by the mandate established under the 
GWB. 221 Hence, the law places great emphasis on the 
independence of the Monopolies Commission. The merger reports of 
the Commission differ in size ranging from less than 50222 to more 
than a 150 pages. 223 
bisherige Tätigkeit der Monopolkommission, Schwerpunkte des 
Kartellrechts 1974175, p. 43-56. 
218 Sec. 24b (6) GWB. 
219 Sec. 24b (1) GWB. 
220 Sec. 24b (2) GWB. 
221 Sec. 24b (4) GWB. 
222 E. g. Zusammeschlußvorhaben MAN/Sulzer, Sondergutachten 19,1990. 
223 For example: Zusammenschlußvorhaben Daimler/MBB, 
Sondergutachten 18,1989. 
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Table 17: Ministerial Permissions 1973-1995 





1 Veba/Gelsenberg 9.1.74 not recommended granted 
2 VAW/Kaiser/ 
Preussag 
24.1.75 not recommended not granted 
3 Babcock/Artos 28.4.76 not recommended granted with modifications 
4 Thyssen/Hüller- 
Hille 
27.1.77 recommended with 
modifications 
granted with modifications 
5 Sachs/GKN 21.3.78 - application withdrawn 
6 VEBA/BP 4.10.78 not recommended granted with modifications 
7 IBH/Wibau 7.8.81 recommended granted 
8 Burda/Springer 17.11.81 not recommended application withdrawn 
9 Kldckner/SEN 8.11.84 not recommended application withdrawn 
10 VEW/Sidechar 19.7.85 not recommended not granted 
11 Rheinmetall/ 
WMF 
23.7.85 - application withdrawn 
12 Daimler/MBB 2.5.89 recommended with 
modifications 
granted with modifications 
13 MAN/Sulzer 20.9.89 not recommended not granted 
14 Daimler/MAN/ 
Enasa 
14.8.90 - application withdrawn 
15 Baywa/WLZ 29.1.92 not recommended not granted 
Source: Erfahrungsbericht des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums, WuW 1992,932 
7.5. The Substantive Appraisal Criteria 
Unlike the British Fair Trading Act under which merger control is 
based on the broad public interest concept which allows the MMC "to 
take into account all matters which appear to them in the particular 
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circumstances to be relevant", 224 the German GWB takes in 
section 24 (1) - roughly in line with the EC Merger Control 
Regulation225 -a comparatively narrow view focusing on the 
question of whether the merger leads, or may be expected to lead, to 
market domination by the participating enterprises. 226 
However, it is not only the rather manifest difference in the 
underlying substantive concepts - public interest versus market 
domination - which differs. At a deeper rooted level it is the 
incongruous perceptions of the nature of merger control which have 
a fundamental effect on the substantive merger evalutation. Contrary 
to Britain where merger control is structured as a highly discretionary 
affair ultimately of a political nature as only the Secretary of State 
may refer and block a merger, merger control in Germany is seen 
distinctly as an administrative matter resting with the FCO and the 
courts. 227 As a result, German merger control law is drafted as to 
ensure a maximum of predictablity - to some extent necessarily at 
the expense of flexiblity. For that reason the FCO, finding that a 
merger would lead to or strengthen a dominant market position, has 
to prohibit the merger legally with no room for discretion. 228 In that 
respect German law is strict. Another element stemming from the 
administrative nature of merger control and designed to ensure 
greater predictablity with no equivalent in British law or under the 
European Merger Control Regulation is the existence of legal 
presumptions as to when a market dominating position has arisen. 
The following paras will mainly focus on the concept of market 
domination and the criteria applied assessing it (7.5.1. ). The function 
224 Sec. 84 (1) FTA 1973. 
225 Art 2 (3) EC Merger Regulation. See Chapter 8.4. at pp. 377. 
226 Sec. 24 (1), 22 GWB. 
227 As to the neglectable role of the Federal Minister of Economics and the 
Monopolies Commission see Chapter 7.4.2 at pp. 311 and Chapter 7.4.3. 
at pp. 313. 
228 Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E 3137,3140 (Rheinmetall-WMF); 
Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 383; Rittner, Wettbewerbs- und Kartellrecht, 
§ 13 para 130. 
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of the legal presumptions contained in the GWB (7.5.2. ) and the so- 
called balancing clause (7.5.3. ) will be discussed in a more cursory 
way as their importance is rather limited in practice. It will not be 
specifically dealt with the special provisions on oligopolies. 229 
7.5.1. Creation or Strengthening of a 
Market-Dominating Position 
Section 24 (1) of the GWB stipulates that a merger which either 
creates or strengthens a market dominating position is to be 
prohibited by the FCO unless the participating enterprises 
demonstrate that through the merger competition improvements in 
the respective market which outweigh the detriments arise. 230 Unlike 
Britain, public interest factors other than those related to market 
domination may not be taken into account by the FCO. Those other 
public interest factors, if they exist, are supposed not to have any 
bearing on the merger assessment by the FCO and, as the case 
may be, the courts. 
(1) Definition of Market Domination 
Section 22 (1) No. 1 and No. 2 of the GWB define what is meant 
229 See sec. 22 (2), 22 (3) No. 3,23a (2) GWB. See also FCO, Checklist, 
Part II. For a leading case on oligopolies see Federal Supreme Court, 
WuW/E BGH 2433 (Gruner+Jahr/Zeit II). 
230 Section 24 (1) GWB: "If it is to be expected that a merger will result in or 
strengthen a market dominating position, the Cartel Authority shall have 
the powers set forth in the following provisions, unless the participating 
enterprises demonstrate that, by means of the merger, improvements of 
the competitive conditions will also occur and that these improvements 
will outweigh the disadvantages of market domination. 
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by the term market-dominating position. 231 The first alternative, 
No. 1, provides that a market-dominating position is deemed to exist 
where an enterprise has no competitors in the relevant market or 
where no substantial competition exists. This subsection as 
interpreted by the FCO and the courts covers extreme and obvious 
cases of market power only and has therefore been of relatively 
limited relevance in practice. 232 
Of much greater practical relevance is the independent second 
alternative, No. 2, which states that an enterprise is to be considered 
market-dominating if it "has a paramount market position in relation 
to its competitiors. " Methodically similar to section 84 of the British 
Fair Trading Act, 233 a number of non-exhaustive234 exemplary 
criteria are specified. No. 2 postulates that in determining whether an 
enterprise enjoys a paramount market position 
"in addition to its market share, regard shall be given in particular 
to its financial strength, its access to the supply and sales markets, its 
inter-relationships with other enterprises as well as to legal or factual 
barriers to the entry of other enterprises into the market, the ability to 
231 Section 22 GWB is not directly concerned with merger control, but 
designed only to restrict the abuse of power by market-dominating 
enterprises. Under German law monopolization through internal growth is 
not illegal and, unlike Britain, monopolies can not be dissolved. Only 
abusive practices may be prohibited. As the concept of market 
domination is defined in section 22, section 24 (1) GWB, the principal 
substantive merger control provision, makes use of that by simply refering 
to section 22. As the law uses the same definition of market domination 
for both the control of abusive practices by dominant enterprises and 
merger control the difficult question arises whether, in fact, the concept of 
market domination really is identical in both contexts. It is generally 
accepted that in determining market dominance in the context of merger 
control the emphasis is much more on the structural market factors 
(market share, financial strength etc. ) than on the acutal behaviour of the 
competitors (market conduct). For details see Mestmäcker, in 
Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 24 Rn. 25 et seq.; Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, 
§ 24 Rn. 12. 
232 FCO, WuW/E BKartA 1716,1717 (Kartoffelstärke: 70 % market share); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1685,1692 (Springer-Elbe 
Wochenblatt: 80 % market share); FCO, WuW/E BKartA 1561,1564 
(o. b.: 80 % market share); FCO, WuW/E BKartA 2405,2408 (MAN- 
Sulzer: 90 % market share). As to the relation between No. 1 and No. 2 of 
sec. 22 (1) GWB see MÖschel, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 22 Rn. 52. 
233 See Chapter 6.4. at pp. 245. 
234 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1435,1439 (Vitamin-B 12). Also v. 
Gamm, § 22 Rn. 27; Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 22 Rn. 46. 
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shift its supply or demand to other goods or commercial services, as 
well as the possibility of the opposite market side to change to other 
enterprises. "235 
The criteria used to define a paramount market position are 
distinct structural criteria based on the structure of the market in 
question. They do not include actual market-behaviour or the 
intensity of actual or potential competition as this is left to No. 1. 
Consequently, even the existence of substantial competition does 
not rule out a paramount market-position. 236 In this respect, the 
emphasis of substantive German merger control law differs from 
British law where the degree of competition in the respective market 
is the key-factor in assessing whether a merger operates, or may be 
expected to operate, against the public interest. 237 Broadly 
speaking, the approach taken by the British merger control 
authorities is much more in line with No. 1 of section 22 (1) GWB (no 
substantial competition) than with No. 2 of section 22 (1) GWB. The 
bottom-line question in assessing mergers in Germany is, whether 
the enterprise "due to market- or firm-related structural criteria has a 
scope of action which is not sufficiently controlled by its 
competitors. 11238 
Taking section 22 (1) No. 2 as a starting point, over the years a 
considerable body of case law consisting of FCO and court decisions 
has developed which makes it possible to classify those factors of 
major importance and, notwithstanding deviations in individual 
cases, to indentify a certain order of priority. Taking account of the 
decisions of the FCO and the courts as well as the legal and 
economic thinking on the issue, the FCO has in 1990 produced a 
235 These criteria were introduced by the Second Amendment to the GWB in 
1973 (BGBI. 1973 I S. 917) and last modified by the Fifth Amendment to 
the GWB in 1989 (BGBI. I S. 2486). See Möschel, in 
Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 22 Rn. 59. 
236 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1445,1449 (Valium); FCO, 
Checklist, I. (Introductory Remarks); Möschel, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, 
§ 22 Rn. 59. 
237 See Chapter 6.4.1. 
238 FCO, Checklist, I. (Introductory Remarks). 
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fairly extensive brochure called "Checklist for Merger Control 
Procedures" in order to provide guidance to the business community. 
The Checklist is because of its practical importance reproduced in its 
English version in APPENDIX 8.239 Regarding single-firm market 
domination the Checklist singles out nine factors: 
(1) Market share 
(2) Financial strength 
(3) Access to supply or sales markets 
(4) Interlocks 
(5) Barriers to market entry 
(6) Competition from imperfect substitutes 
(7) Foreign competitors 
(8) Buying power on the opposite side of the market 
(9) Market phase 
As not all of these factors can be discussed in detail here, the 
following representations concentrate on the criteria market share 
and financial strength as these factors are undisputedly of pre- 
eminent weight in the evaluation of mergers in Germany. 240 All other 
factors are, broadly speaking, confined to a complementary role. 241 
As a rule, these other factors may only strengthen an already 
existing market-dominating position, but do not create it in the first 
place. In practice, a finding of market domination will not be based 
exclusively on factors other than market share and financial strength. 
However, in assessing market domination an overall appraisal of the 
competitive market conditions taking account of both detrimental and 
beneficial effects of the merger is required. 242 In this context it 
239 This brochure is available in English and can be obtained from the FCO. 
240 Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 22 Rn. 48; Möschel, in 
Immenga/Mestmacker, § 22 Rn. 63. 
241 FCO, Checklist 1.10: "If a firm's market share and financial strength are 
insufficient evidence of its paramount scope of action, the remaining 
conditions of competition may still give the firm a decisive advantage over 
its competitors. " Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 2889 (Krupp-Total). 
242 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1445,1449 (Valium); Federal 
Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1435,1439 (Vitamin-B 12); Federal 
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depends quite like in Britain very much on the individual case which 
factors are to be given decisive weight. A paramount scope of action 
as indicated by a significant market share may, for example, be 
offset by a rival's financial strength. 
(a) Market Share 
The market share based on the turnover-percentage243 
achieved by the enterprise in the relevant market has always been 
the single most important indicator in assessing market 
domination. 244 This is partly due to the economic fact that there 
usually is a correlation between market share and economic 
power. 245 The particular importance of the market share criterion in 
Germany, however, stems from the provisions of the GWB. First, the 
market share criterion ranks first among the exemplary criteria 
specified in No. 2 of section 22 (1) GWB. Secondly, and even more 
importantly, an enterprise is according to section 22 (3) No. 1 GWB 
presumed to be market-dominating if its market share reaches one- 
third of the market (unless its turnover proceeds were below DM 250 
million in the last preceding year). The exact meaning of this 
presumption has been the subject of some debate. 246 It is 
undisputed, however, that the 1/3 threshold is not to be seen as an 
irrebuttable presumption automatically leading to a finding of market 
Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1749,1755 f (Klöckner-Becorit). For further 
details see FCO, Checklist 1.10 (APPENDIX 8). 
243 The calculation of the market share is based on turnover figures and not 
on the quantity of the products sold: Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E 
OLG 2053,2057 (Valium) and Ferderal Supreme Court, WuW/E 
BGH 1678,1681 (Valium II). 
244 Möschel, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 22 Rn. 59. 
245 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1501,1503 (Kfz-Kupplungen); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1749,1755 (Klöckner-Becorit); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2575,2580 (Kampffmeyer- 
Plange); Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 2182,2185 (hydraulischer 
Schreitausbau). 
246 For a detailed discussion see M6schel, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 22 
Rn. 91,92. 
Chapter 7 322 
domination. Nor does the burden of proof as to market domination, 
which rests with the FCO, shift to the merging enterprises once the 
1/3 level is exceeded. According to the leading opinion section 22 (3) 
is of relevance directly only where an FCO or court investigation 
leads to a non-liquet concerning market domination247 which not 
often is the case in practice. 248 However, the 1 /3 threshold can be 
seen as a rule-of-thumb-indication of when the law considers an 
enterprise to be market-dominating. In practice, the FCO and the 
courts deal with the market share criterion in a fairly flexible way, 
although the weight attributed to the market share criterion in 
Germany very clearly exceeds that in Britain where the parameter 
market share is treated with more reserve. 249 
In any case an overall appraisal of the competitive conditions is 
required by the FCO and the courts. 250 It is therefore rarely the 
market share criterion alone which determines the outcome of a 
merger investigation. Thus, neither guarantees a low market share 
the clearance of a merger nor does a market share above the 1 /3 
threshold necessarily lead to an adverse finding. In the Rewe- 
Florimex case concerning the import and wholesale market for cut 
flowers, for example, the FC0251 and the Berlin Superior Court252 
both found that despite a relatively low market share of only about 
247 Federal Supreme, Court WuW/E BGH 1501,1503 (Kfz-Kupplungen); 
Federal Supreme, Court WuW/E BGH 1749,1755 (Klöckner-Becorit); 
Federal Supreme, Court WuW/E BGH 2231,2237 (Kaufhof/Saturn); 
Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 1745,1751 (Sachs); Berlin Superior 
Court, WuW/E OLG 2234,2235 (Blei- und Silberhütte Braubach); FCO, 
WuW/E BKartA 1799,1800 (Blei- und Silberhütte Braubach); FCO, 
WuW/E BKartA 2414,2417 (WMF-Hutschenreuther); FCO, WuW/E 
BKartA 2421,2425 (Unilever-Braun); KleinmannBechtold, § 22 Rn. 223 
et seq.; Möschel, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 22 Rn. 92; Ruppelt, in 
Langen/Bunte, § 22 Rn. 62. 
248 See, however, FCO, WuW/E BKartA 1457,1461 (Veba-Gelsenberg). 
249 Chapter 6.4.1. (1) at pp. 247. OFT, Mergers: A guide to the procedures 
under the FTA 1973, p. 10-11; OFT, Mergers: The Content of 
Submissions, para 12. Finbow/Parr, U. K. Merger Control, p. 202 et seq. 
250 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1445,1449 (Valium); Federal 
Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1435,1439 (Vitamin-B 12); Federal 
Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1749,1755 f (Klöckner-Becorit); FCO, 
Checklist 1.10 (APPENDIX 8). 
251 FCO WuW/E BKartA 1876 (Rewe-Florimex). 
252 Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 2862,2864 (Rewe-Florimex). 
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12 per cent Florimex were to be considered market-dominating as it 
was provided with considerable financial resources and had easy 
access to international supply-markets while the remaining 
competitors in the market were much smaller most of them securing 
market shares of only around 0.25 per cent. Conversely, in Revell 
Plastics a market share of between 35-40 per cent was held not to 
be enough to create a market-dominating position because in that 
case a number of strong competitors, one having a market share of 
around 22 to 25 per cent, were active on the market and barriers to 
entry for new competitors were relatively Iow. 253 Hence, like in 
Britain it depends very much on the circumstances of the individual 
case whether a particular level of market share gives rise to an 
adverse finding, although the probability of an enterprise exceeding 
the 1/3 market-share threshold not being considered market 
dominating is comparatively Iow. 254 In assessing whether a merger 
leads to or strengthens a dominant market position the market share 
is the key-criterion in Germany, while in Britain, where the public 
interest is the touchstone of merger control, the market share 
criterion is not reaching the weight it has in Germany. 
(b) Financial Strength 
The second most important criterion in assessing market 
domination is the financial strength of the enterprises concerned. 255 
253 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1620,1621 (Revell Plastics). (not 
a merger case). 
254 See also FCO, WuW/E BKartA 1657 (Rheinstahl-Huller. 34 per cent = 
market domination); FCO WuW/E BKartA 1727,1729 (RWE- 
Energieversorgung Leverkusen: 25 per cent = market domination); FCO 
WuW/E BKartA 1695 (Uran: 25 per cent = no market domination); Berlin 
Superior Court WuW/E OLG 2887,2890 (Krupp-Total: 31,4 per cent = no 
market domination). 
255 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1749,1755 f (Klöckner-Becorit); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1501,1503 (Kfz-Kupplungen); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2150,2156 (Edelstahlbestecke); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2575,2580 (Kampffmeyer- 
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The relevance of this citerion is not confined to conglomerate and 
vertical mergers, but also plays a role in assessing horizontal 
mergers. 256 The financial strength criterion has no direct equivalent 
in the assessment of mergers in the U. K. although under the rubric 
remaining competitors their financial resources are considered. 257 
The financial strength criterion is named in section 22 (1) No. 2 
GWB, but there is no legal or otherwise exact definition of the term. 
In practice, a number of factors are taken into account in order to 
assess the financial strength of an enterprise, 258 most notably its 
turnover259 and cash-flow (net earnings, plus depreciation and other 
allowances). 260 The method applied in assessing the financial 
strength is from an economist's point of view261 therefore probably 
somewhat unsystematical which is not surprising given that merger 
control is at least at court-level, and to some extent also in the 
FCO, 262 in the hands of lawyers rather than economists. 
Plange); Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 1937,1938 
(Thyssen/Holler); FCO WuW/E BKartA 1711,1717 (Mannesmann- 
Brueninghaus) 
256 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 396. 
257 See Chapter 6.4.1. (2) and MMC, Assessing Competition, para 13. 
258 The Official Government Reasons for the 2nd Amendment to the GWB, 
Begründung zum Regierungsentwurf der 2. GWB-Novelle, BT- 
Drucksache VI/2520, S. 23, state that in assessing the financial strength 
of an enterprise "the whole of the financial means and possibilities of an 
enterprise, in particular its financing possiblities (equity and debt 
financing) and its access the capital markets" are to be taken into 
account. 
The FCO-Checklist states: "A firm's financial strength is determined by its 
possibilities of equity and debt financing. It may be assessed by 
measures such as turnover, profit, cash flow, net operating margin, credit 
line, access to national or international capital markets, and other 
criteria. ", para 1.2. See also Möschel, in lmmenga/Mestmäcker, § 22 
Rn. 64; Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 22 Rn. 49. 
259 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2150,2157 (Edelstahlbestecke); 
Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 3137,3146 (Rheinmetall-WMF). 
260 FCO, WuW/E BKartA 1625,1628 (GKN-Sachs); FCO, WuW/E 
BKartA 1727,1729 (RWE-Energieversorgung); FCO, WuW/E 
BKartA 1711,1717 (Mannesmann-Brueninghaus). Möschel, in 
immenga/Mestmäcker, § 22 Rn. 64; Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 22 
Rn. 49; BOhner, Die fusionskontrollrechtlich Bedeutung der Finanzkraft, 
WuW 1989,277,281. 
261 TreislEggers, Überragende Marktstellung aufgrund von Finanzmacht, 
GRUR 1988,745. 
262 See Chapter 7.4.1. (2) and (3) at pp. 306. 
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The relative weight attributed to the financial strength criterion is 
theoretically justified by the prevailing opinion with the so-called 
deterrence-doctrine, 263 basically meaning that potential entrants 
might be deterred from entering the market while acutal smaller 
competitors might be discouraged from further active competition 
against a giant-company. This is based on the assumption that a 
very large enterprise is provided with superior staying power, the 
power to compete more aggressively (predatory pricing), and to 
spend more on research and advertising. Hence, the deterrence- 
doctrine is in essence based on a prognosis as to the psychological 
effects the existence of a financially dominating competitor might 
have within the market. 264 Consequently, the soundness of this 
doctrine is extremely difficult to verify in practice. 265 There has also 
been plausible criticism both from an economic and legal point of 
view concerning the deterrance-doctrine. Economically, the 
assumption has been challenged that superior financial power of a 
competitor is necessarily detrimental to competition in a particular 
market. On the contrary, it has been argued that increased financial 
power usually leads to increased rentability which in turn spurs 
competition. 266 Legally, the point has been made, that the 
constitutional rights of property and freedom of economic action 
guarantee that a decision as economically important and far reaching 
for the merging enterprises as the blocking of a merger should not be 
based on a rather speculative and empirically unverified267 element 
263 Harms, in GK, § 24 Rn. 457 et seq.; Kleinmann/Bechtold, 
Fusionskontrolle, § 22 Rn. 175 et seq.; Möschel, in 
Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 22 Rn. 63; Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 22 
Rn. 49 
264 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 396; Knöpfle, Wird die Marktbeherrschende 
Stellung eines Unternehmens durch dessen Aufnahme in einen 
finanzstarken Konzern verstärkt?, BB Beilage 5/1985, p. 1,3 et seq. 
265 See for an empirical study, however, Bohner, Die fusionskontrollrechtliche 
Bedeutung der Finanzkraft, WuW 1989,277,284. Bühner concludes that 
diversification and superior financial strength have very little impact on the 
competitive situation in the respective market. 
266 Treis/Eggers, Überragende Marktstellung aufgrund von Finanzkraft, 
GRUR 1989,745,748. 
267 Bohner, Die fusionskontrollrechtliche Bedeutung der Finanzkraft, 
WuW 1989,277,284. 
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like the discouraging psychological effects flowing from a financially 
powerful competitor. 268 Hence, it appears arguable that the criterion 
financial strength is overrated in Germany. 
(2) Creation or Strengthening 
A merger is to be prohibited if a market-dominating position is 
either created or strengthened, section 24 (1) GWB. A paramount 
market position is created if the merger leads to a market position as 
described above which would not exist otherwise. It is strengthened if 
the merger "further deteriorates the conditions of competition on the 
market concerned. "269 This is most notably the case if the merger 
increases the market share of an already market dominating 
enterprise. If an enterprise has a market dominating position, 
horizontal mergers by such enterprises are highly likely to be 
prohibited "almost on a per se basis. "270 Yet, even without any 
increase in market share, the FCO and the courts may come to the 
conclusion that a market-dominating position is strengthened if its 
scope for autonomous action in the market is widened which may be 
the case in particular where the financial resources of an already 
market-dominating enterprise are boosted so as to discourage actual 
or potential competitors (deterrence-doctrine). 271 Regarding the 
268 Knöpfle, Wird die Marktbeherrschende Stellung eines Unternehmens 
durch dessen Aufnahme in einen finanzstarken Konzern verstärkt?, 
BB Beilage 5/1985, p. 1,3 et seq. 
269 FCO, Checklist, I. (Introductory Remarks). 
270 Markert, Merger Control in Germany: Substantive Aspects, Fordham, 
1990, p. 149,157. 
271 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2150,2157 (Edelstahlbestecke); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1501,1503 (Kfz-Kupplungen); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1655,1659 
(Zementmahlanlage II). See also: FCO, WuW/E BKartA 2363,2367 
(Linde/Lansing): a strengthening of the market position abroad through an 
international merger may also be considered a strengthening of market- 
dominating position on the national market. Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 
p. 393. As to the deterrence-doctrine see Chapter 7.5.1. (1)(b). 
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degree of strengthening necessary, German law is strict as a 
tangible or substantial deterioration of the conditions of competition 
is not required by the FCO and the courts. 272 A market share 
increase of between 1 and 4 per cent may suffice. 273 
7.5.2. Legal Presumptions 
Unlike the British Fair Trading Act the German GWB contains a 
number of legal presumptions. 274 Section 22 (3) No. 1 GWB 
according to which it is to be presumed that an enterprise having a 
market share exceeding 1/3 is in a market-dominating position has 
already been discussed. 275 In 1980 following proposals of the 
Monopolies Commission276 the Fourth Amendment to the GWB 
introduced section 23a (1) containing three more monopoly 
presumptions which were mainly aimed at vertical and conglomerate 
mergers, but do also apply to horizontal concentrations. 277 Contrary 
to section 22 (3) where it is only presumed that a market-dominating 
position exists, section 23a (1) presumes that a paramount market 
position as defined by section 22 (1) No. 2 is being created or 
strengthened. 
The presumptions contained in Section 23a (1) will be discussed 
272 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1501,1512 (Kfz-Kupplungen); 
Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1655,1659 
(Zementmahlanlage II); Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 3137,3146 
(Rheinmetall-WMF); Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1685,1691 
(Springer-Elbe Wochenblatt). Critical: Harms, in GK, § 24 Rn. 334. 
273 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1685,1691 (Springer-Elbe 
Wochenblatt: 1,3 % market share increase); Federal Supreme Court, 
WuW/E BGH 1655,1659 (Zementmahlanlage II: 4% increase). 
Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 397. 
274 The following paras are confined to monopoly-presumptions. It will not be 
dealt with the oligopoly-presumptions contained in sec. 22 (3) No. 2 and 
sec. 23a (2) GWB. 
275 Chapter 7.5.1. (1)(b) at pp. 323. 
276 Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten I, 1976, Rn. 952,957,960 and 
Hauptgutachten II, 1978, Rn. 466. 
277 Bechtold, § 23a, Rn. 1; Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 23a Rn. 2. 
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in a rather cursory way as their practical relevance has been 
limited, 278 the FCO and the courts clearly being reluctant to base 
decisions as grave as the blocking of a merger on a presumption 
rather than an overall appraisal of the relevant factors. As with 
section 22 (3) the presumptions are directly applicable only in non- 
liquet-cases, i. e. in cases where the FCO or court investigation has 
not come to any definite conclusions regarding the creation or 
strengthening of a market-dominating position. 279 Furthermore, the 
presumptions can, of course, be rebutted by the merging enterprises 
if they demonstrate that the factors generally used to substantiate a 
paramount market position do not justify an adverse conclusion in 
this case. 280 
(1) Invading-Presumption 
Pursuant to section 23a (1) No. 1(a) paramount market position 
is deemed to being created or strengthened where a large enterprise 
having a turnover of at least DM 2 billion enters into a market where 
small and medium sized companies281 have a market share of at 
least 2/3 and the merging enterprises have a combined market share 
of at least 5 per cent (Eindringungsvermutung). 282 The underlying 
278 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 405. 
279 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2231,2237 (Metro/Kaufhof); Berlin 
Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 3367,3382 (Metro/Kaufhof). Emmerich, 
Kartellrecht, p. 406; Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 23a, Rn. 7; 
Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 23a Rn. 18,19. As to the similar problem 
concerning sec. 22 (3) No. 1 GWG see Chapter 7.5.1. (1)(b). 
280 Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 23a Rn. 17. 
281 What is meant by small and medium sized enterprises is not specifically 
defined in the GWB. It is generally accepted that companies having a 
turnover of less than DM 50 million are in any case considered small or 
medium sized. Above that threshold it depends very much on the 
circumstances, in particular on the volume of the market and the relative 
size of the remaining competitors. See Bechtold, GWB, § 23a, Rn. 7; 
Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 23a, Rn. 24; Ruppelt, in 
Langen/Bunte, § 23a Rn. 6. 
282 For an example see Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 2862,2867 
(Rewe-Florimex) with a discussion of the constitutionality of this provision. 
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rationale behind this presumption is that a big player entering a 
market controlled by small and medium sized companies might 
discourage the smaller firms active in this market and stifle actual 
and potential competition. Thus, the arguments are broadly in 
harmony with the deterrence-doctrine developed by the courts in 
connection with the financial strength criterion. 283 
(2) Intensifying-Presumption 
Under section 23a (1) No. 1(b) a merger is presumed to create 
or strengthen a paramount market position if an enterprise having a 
turnover of at least DM 2 billion merges with an enterprise which is 
market-dominating in at least one market worth at least DM 150 
million (Verstärkungsvermutung). The philosophy behind this rule is 
that the combination of financial power (more than DM 2 billion) and 
market domination must be detrimental to the market concerned. 
Again, the main line of argument is that of the deterrence- 
doctrine. 284 So far, only very few decisions have been based on this 
provision285 and it appears more than doubtful whether these cases 
would have been decided in any other way without section 23a (1) 
No. 1(b). 
(3) Giants-Presumption 
Independent of the markets on which they are active, under 
283 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 406. 
284 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1501,1503 (Kfz-Kupplungen); 
Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 3137,3146 (Rheinmetall-WMF). 
Bechtold, GWB, § 23a Rn. 9; Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, 
GWB, vor § 23a Rn. 29. 
285 FCO, WuW/E BKartA 2414,2417 (WMF-Hutschenreuther); Berlin 
Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 4865 (WMF-Hutschenreuther). 
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section 23a (1) No. 2a merger between two or more "giants" having 
a combined turnover of at least DM 12 billion with two of the merging 
enterprises each having a turnover of at least DM 1 billion 
individually is presumed to create or strengthen a paramount market 
position (Gigantenvermutung). 286 Again, the underlying rationale is 
akin to the arguments put forward in connection with the financial- 
resources-criterion and the deterrence-doctrine. However, as the 
merging enterprises may rebut this presumption by demonstrating 
that the merger may not be expected to create or strengthen a 
market-dominating position on the markets where they are active, 287 
section 23a (1) No. 2 has not often been the basis of the blocking of 
a merger. 288 
7.5.3. Countervailing Benefits 
The analysis of the substantive merger control criteria has thus 
far concentrated on the first part of section 24 (1) GWB (and the 
pertaining presumptions) which provides that a merger creating or 
strengthening a dominant market position is to be prohibited. 
However, section 24 (1) GWB goes on to stipulate that a merger 
fulfilling these preconditions may exceptionally not be blocked if 
"the participating enterprises demonstrate that, by means of the 
merger, improvements of the competitive conditions will also occur and 
286 Concering joint ventures, this presumption applies only if the joint venture 
is active on a market with a volume of at least DM 750 million. This 
qualification is made in order not to hamper research- and development- 
intensive new projects in new developing markets with a relatively low 
volume which can often only be done by financially very powerful 
enterprises. 
287 For an example see FCO, WuW/E BKartA 2060 (Metro/Kaufhof); Berlin 
Superior Court, WuW/E OLG 3367,3382 (Metro/Kaufhof). The Federal 
Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2231,2237 (Metro/Kaufhof) later quashed 
these decisions for other reasons (market definition). 
288 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 408; Mestmacker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, 
§ 23a Rn. 36. See however, the Daimler-Benz/MBB case FCO, WuW/E 
BKartA 2356. 
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that these improvements will outweigh the disadvantages of the 
market domination. " 
This so-called balancing-clause (Abwägungsklausel) has a 
parallel in principle in the MMC practice to cautiously take 
countervailing benefits into account. 289 As one would think, what 
differs are the beneficial factors which are taken into consideration at 
this stage. While the U. K. merger control authorities are at liberty to 
pay attention to any public interest benefits, which may include, inter 
alia, increased efficiency, increased international competitiveness, 
the rescue of a failing firm, or even environmental advantages, the 
FCO and the courts in Germany are much more restricted. They may 
take into account only those structural factors applicable in the 
assessment of a dominant market position, i. e. the market share, 
financial resources, access to supply or sales markets, barriers to 
market entry, countervailing purchasing power, etc. Wider public 
interest matters, like employment, the rescue of a failing firm, 
regional development, international competitiveness, and so forth 
may not be considered by the FCO and the courts. 290 These "overall 
economic advantages" and "overriding public interest" issues are 
according to section 24 (3) GWB, because of the inherent political 
element involved, exclusively reserved for the Federal Minister of 
Economics as discussed above. 291 The possible competition 
benefits flowing from a merger may (logically) not be found on the 
very market concerning which the FCO has come to the conclusion 
that a dominant position is created or strengthened. The 
countervailing benefits may only be located on neighbouring or third 
markets and offset the competitive detriments in the market where 
the dominant position is created or strenthened. 292 For example, a 
289 See Chapter 6.4.3. at pp. 262 with further references. 
290 Bechtold, GWB, § 24 Rn. 17; Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 24 
Rn. 179; Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 24 Rn. 47. 
291 Chapter 7.4.2. at pp. 311. 
292 See very clearly Ruppelt, in Langen/Bunte, § 24 Rn. 48,49 and 
Mestmäcker, in Immenga/Mestmäcker, § 24 Rn. 181-183. It is 
some Times said that the countervailing competitive improvements which 
the parties may demonstrate may also be discovered on the very market 
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merger between two diversified companies may strengthen a market- 
dominating position in the market for the X-product leading to an 
adverse finding by the FCO. At the same time the very merger may 
lead to competitive improvements in a different market for, say, the 
Y-product in that the market leader in the Y-market is now 
challenged by the merging enterprises. In that sort of cross-situation, 
the merging enterprises may try to demonstrate that the 
improvements in the Y-market outweigh the competitive detriments 
in the X-market. 
Contrary to the general rule, concerning these outweighing third- 
market competitive improvements, the wording of section 24 (1) 
GWB leaves no doubt that the burden of proof lies with the merging 
enterprises. The standard of proof required of the enterprises is high: 
They have to demonstrate not only that the claimed improvements 
are highly likely to occur, but also that the improvements could not 
be achieved by a less anti-competitive means than the merger. 293 
Given the high standard of proof required, the FCO and the courts 
are usually sceptical that (only) the anti-competitive merger would 
yield third-market benefits of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the 
adverse effects. The balancing clause has therefore been of very 
limited practical relevance, at least in recent years. 294 
concering which the FCO has found a market dominating position 
(Bechtold, GWB, § 24 Rn. 20; Heidenhain/Schneider, German Antitrust 
Law, para 348; Harms, in GK, § 24 Rn. 631). This opinion, however, 
appears not to be in line with the logic of the law. As the FCO has in 
making its judgement to take into account both beneficial and detrimental 
effects on that market anyway, only benefits on third markets can be 
meant. 
293 Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 1533,1539 (Erdgas Schwaben). 
FCO WuW/E BKartA 1582 (KaiserNAW); Berlin Superior Court, WuW/E 
KG 3759,3767 (Pillsbury/Sonnen-Bassermann); Berlin Superior Court, 
WuW/E KG 3767,3773 (Niederrheinische Anzeigenblätter) and Federal 
Supreme Court, WuW/E BGH 2425,2431 (Niederrheinische 
Anzeigenblätter). 
294 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 416; Markert, Merger Control in Germany: 
Substantive Aspects, Fordham 1990, p. 149,150. For examples see 
FCO, WuW/E BKartA 1650 (Erdgas Schwaben); Berlin Superior Court, 
WuW/E OLG 1900 (Erdgas Schwaben); Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E 
BGH 1533,1539 (Erdgas Schwaben); Federal Supreme Court, WuW/E 
BGH 2899,2902 (Panorama-Anzeigenblätter). 
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7.6. Concluding Remarks 
Apart from of course numerous details, it has been 
demonstrated that there are a number of fundamental - almost 
cultural - differences between merger control in Britain and Germany 
regarding both procedural and substantive law. 
As to procedural aspects, the comparison between the 
regulatory authorities involved has revealed the contrasting concepts 
concerning the nature of merger control law. Being of a distinctly 
administrative nature in Germany with the anyway limited role of the 
Federal Minister of Economics more and more falling into oblivion, in 
Britain merger control contains a political element and is to some 
extent seen as means to shape industrial policy, which is why only 
the Secretary of State may block a merger. Moreover, the overriding 
legal values of the merger control process in Germany are 
independence and predictability, which is not to the same degree 
true for Britain, where it appears that co-operation with business and 
industry and flexibility are higher valued than in Germany. The 
comparison between the status and background of the members of 
the British MMC on the one hand and members of the decisions- 
units of the FCO on the other hand exemplifies this more general 
point. In a sense, merger control in Germany is also more 
confrontational as the heavy involvement of the courts indicates. 
There has been hardly any blocking order by the FCO which was not 
subsequently challenged in court. The opposite is true for Britain. 
The British lust for flexibilty versus the German desire for 
predictability is also reflected in the substantive merger control law. 
This is most evident with respect to the appraisal criteria. British law 
being based on the comprehensive public interest concept which 
allows the merger control authorities "to take into account all matters 
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which appear to them in the particular circumstances to be 
relevant" 295 is necessarily much more flexible than German law 
which focuses strictly on the question whether a market-dominating 
position has arisen or is being strengthened. The difference between 
British and German law is further increased by the existence of legal 
presumptions in the GWB. Although it has been demonstrated that 
the presumptions are in practice relatively harmless as the FCO and 
the courts treat them with suspicion, they still are a factor to be taken 
into account. This is particularly true for section 22 (3) GWB, the 
market-share presumption. Broadly speaking, the market share 
criterion followed by the financial strength criterion (deterrence- 
doctrine) are the factors of predominant importance in assessing 
market domination. 
295 Sec. 84 (1) FTA 1973. 





There exist at present eleven national merger control systems 
within the European Community, 1 two of which have been examined 
in the previous chapters. Needless to say, cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions within Europe are not made any easier by this regulatory 
environment. Companies effecting transnational acquisitions may 
have to deal with different national authorities, multiple filing 
requirements and deadlines, and the substantive merger control law 
may also differ substantially as is the case with Britain and Germany. 
The EC-Commission is aware of about one hundred cross-border 
acquisitions where multiple notifications to different national merger 
control authorities were required within the last two and half years. 2 
Though probably lucrative for legal advisers, for the participating 
companies this is not only costly and time-consuming, but may also 
lead to conflicting decisions by the different national authorities 
involved. Moreover, a national authority may not be able to properly 
assess a cross-border merger as its perspective is inevitably mainly 
confined to the national market whereas in reality geographic 
markets often exceed national borders. 
Pursuant to Article 3 of the EC-Treaty, which requires "a system 
1 EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 
COM (96) 19 final, para 14. 
2 EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 
1996, para 87. 
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ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted', and 
in order to remedy the somewhat unsatisfying regulatory state of 
affairs within the common market described above at least to some 
extent, the EC-Council adopted following more than 16 years of 
debate on 21 December 1989 "Council Regulation 4064/89 on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings" (Merger Regulation) 
which entered into force on 21 September 1990.3 
The Merger Regulation basically applies to "concentrations" 
having a "community dimension". Its purpose is to cover those 
mergers causing significant structural changes "the impact of which 
on the market goes beyond the national borders of any one Member 
State. "4 Following the so-called "one-stop shop" principle, a 
concentration falling within the scope of the Merger Regulation may 
not be assessed by any national competition authority. Control over 
these mergers lies exclusively with the European Commission. 
Hence, conflicting decisions are avoided and companies have to 
deal with only one authority, and only one regulatory framework 
applies. Concentrations not having a community dimension, 
however, remain subject to national merger control. 
8.1.1. Historical Development 
The EC-Treaty of Rome, agreed in 1957, did not contain any 
specific provisions on merger control. 5 Title III, Chapter 1 
3 Council Regulation 4064/98 of December 21,1989 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, [1990) O. J. L 257/14. An up to date 
version of the Merger Regulation, pertinant legislation, and numerous 
complete lists of Commission Decisions can be found in Jones/Van der 
Woude/Lewis, E. C. Competition Law Handbook, 1996. 
4 Recital 9 of the Preamble of the Regulation. 
5 It should be noted, however, that the ECSC-Treaty of Paris of 1951 
granted merger control powers regarding the coal and steel industry to 
EC-Commission (Article 66 of the ECSC-Treaty). However, these 
provisions cannot be seen as a competition-based merger control system. 
They were rather aimed at controlling an industry of considerable military 
importance. See Löffler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Vorbemerkung zur 
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(Competition Policy) of the EC-Treaty only regulated restrictive 
practices (Article 85) and the abuse of power by undertakings having 
a dominant position within the common market (Article 86). The 
absence of a comprehensive regulatory merger control framework is 
not surprising given that at that time, viz 1957, the need for a legal 
control of mergers, as it is generally accepted nowadays, was not 
even recognised on a national level let alone on the supra-national 
European level: 6 Britain introduced a regulatory system of merger 
control in 1965,7 Germany in 1973,8 and France in 1977.9 
Remarkably, even in 1989 when the European Merger Regulation 
was finally adopted, apart from Britain, Germany, and France, 
Portugal and Ireland were the only other EC-Member States with a 
national merger control law. 10 
Yet, the EC-Commission soon discovered its desire to regulate 
mergers. In 1966 a "Memorandum on the problem of mergers in the 
Common Market" dealing with the quesion of whether Article 85 EC- 
Treaty could be used as a tool to control concentrations was 
published. 11 The discussion on European merger control picked up 
momentum when the Commission in 1971 in the Continental Can 
case courageously applied Article 86 EC-Treaty to a merger, a 
decision that was subsequently upheld by the European Court of 
FKVO 4064/89, Rn. 2. For a detailed discussion of merger control under 
the ECSC-Treaty see BoslStuyck Wytinck, Concentration Control in the 
EEC, Chapter 2. 
6 See JoneslGonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 83 who point 
out that in the 1950s and 1960s mergers were welcomed without 
exception as a means to enabling European companies to compete 
effectively with the very large U. S. corporations. 
7 See Chapter 6.1.1. at pp. 206. 
8 See Chapter 7.1.1. at pp. 266. 
9 LÖffler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Vorbemerkung zur FKVO 4064/89, 
Rn. 4. 
10 LÖftler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Vorbemerkung zur FKVO 4064/89, 
Rn. 6. 
11 EC-Commission, Memorandum on the problem of merger in the Common 
Market, Competition Series Study No. 3, Brussels 1966. Part III of the 
memorandum is reproduced in Ritter/RawlinsonlBraun, EEC Competition 
Law, Appendix 20. 
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Justice. 12 However, the Commission never really doubted that under 
Article 85 and Article 86 EC-Treaty the merger control exercisable 
was at best fragmentary. 13 Hence, it became clear relatively early on 
that the best legal way to deal with mergers on European level would 
be by way of a directly binding regulation establishing a single 
authority charged with supervising European mergers. 14 
Eventually, in 1973 the Commission published its first proposal 
for a Regulation on the control of concentrations. 15 As one would 
expect, the proposal met with considerable controversy, the main 
points of debate being the legal basis of the proposed regulation 
(Article 87 and/or Article 235 of the EC-Treaty), the separation of 
power between the Member States and the European institutions, 
and on European level the division of power between the Council 
and the Commission. In the years to come, a number of 
amendments to the 1973 proposal were made, 16 but the overall 
impression is that the Merger Regulation was not seen as a high 
priority measure either by the Commission or the Member States. 17 
This changed when Commissioner Peter Sutherland presented two 
new proposals in 1988 and 1989 respectively. 18 The European Court 
of Justice again added momentum to the discussion when it 
suggested in the famous Philip Morris case19 that Article 85 of the 
12 Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, Case 6/72, [1973] 
ECR 215. For a detailed discussion see Downes/Ellison, The legal control 
of mergers in the EC, pp. 3 and Ritter/RawlinsonBraun, EEC Competition 
Law, pp. 333. 
13 As to Article 85 and Article 86 see Chapter 8.1.2. at pp. 339. 
14 See Art. 189 of the EC-Treaty. 
15 Proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the control of 
concentration between undertakings, [1973] O. J. C 92/1. 
16 For a complete list of all amendments and other Brussels-publications on 
the issue see Lbftler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Vorbemerkung zur 
FKVO 4064/89, Rn. 9. 
17 See BoslStuycklWytinck, Concentration Control in the EEC, p. 121. 
18 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, 25 April 1988, [1988] O. J. C 130/4. 
Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, 30 November 1988, [1989] O. J. 
C 22/14. 
19 BAT and RJ Reynolds v. Commission, Cases 142 & 156/84, [1987] ECR 
4487. For a detailed discussion see Downes/Ellison, The legal control of 
mergers in the EC, pp. 18. 
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EC-Treaty might in the absence of any other European merger 
control provisions be applicable to certain mergers: a result which 
nobody wanted as merger control under Article 85 of the EC-Treaty 
would have been both rigorous and fragmentary. After intense 
negotiations the European Merger Regulation was finally adopted in 
December 1989 and entered into force on 21 September 1990. 
Given that an unanimous Council vote was required for its 
adoption, 20 it is not surprising that the Regulation bears the signs of 
political compromise, in particular with respect to the division of 
powers between the Commission and the Member States. 21 
Prominent examples of this compromise are the definition of the 
community dimension (turnover thresholds)22 required for the 
Regulation to be applicable and the so-called "German clause"23 
concerning the referral from the Commission to a Member State. 
Following its legal obligation24 to review the turnover thresholds and 
the referral rules, the Commission recently published, in January 
1996, a "Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation". 25 
The suggestions made there will be discussed where appropriate. 26 
8.1.2. Residual Applicability of Articles 85 and 
86 EC-Treaty 
A difficult legal question is the applicabiltiy of Articles 85 and 86 
EC-Treaty to concentrations after the entry into force of the Merger 
Regulation. Articles 85 and 86 of the EC-Treaty are primary EC- 
20 As the Regulation is now based jointly on Art. 87 and Art. 235 of the EC- 
Treaty, the latter of which requires an unanimous vote. 
21 EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 
1996, para 46; L6ffler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 1 FKVO, Rn. 7. 
22 Art. 1. See Chapter 8.3.2. at pp. 362. 
23 Art. 9. See Chapter 8.3.3. (1) at pp. 370. 
24 See Art. 1(3), 9(5), 22 of the Regulation. 
25 EC-Commission, Community Merger Control, Green Paper on the Review 
of the Merger Regulation, COM(96) 19 final, Brussels, 31 January 1996. 
26 See Chapter 8.3.2. (4) at pp. 367. 
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legislation. The Merger Regulation is secondary legislation. Hence, 
the latter ranks lower in the hierarchy of European laws and may, 
thus, not abrogate anything written in the Articles of the EC-Treaty. 
Consequently, Articles 85 and 86 are legally unaffected by the 
introduction of the Merger Regulation and the case law as outlined 
by the European Court of Justice in Continental Can27 and Philip 
Morris28 is theoretically still of relevance. In practice, however, the 
European Commission no longer applies Articles 85 and 86 EC- 
Treaty to concentrations as defined by Article 3 of the Merger 
Regulation since its introduction. 29 As Christopher Jones, who is an 
Assistant Director General for Competition at the Directorate 
General IV of the European Commission in Brussels, states "the 
potential scope of application of Articles 85 and 86 to concentrations 
is largely - but not entirely - of historical interest. "30 In the light of this 
statement and the fact that Articles 85 and 86 have not been applied 
to any concentration since the entry into force of the Merger 
Regulation, the issue will not be discussed any further here. 31 
8.1.3. Statistics 
According to the recently published "Green Paper on the Review 
of the Merger Regulation", as of October 1995,376 concentrations 
27 Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, Case 6/72, [1973] 
ECR 215. 
28 BAT and RJ Reynolds v. Commission, Cases 142 & 156/84, [1987] ECR 
4487. 
29 See however Art. 22(2) of the Merger Regulation which intends to make it 
procedurally very difficult to apply Art 85,86 EC-Treaty to concentrations 
as defined in Art. 3 of the Merger Regulation. 
30 JoneslGonzäles-D/az, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 79. 
31 For a more detailed discussion see Bos/Stuyck/Wytinck, Concentration 
Control in the EEC, paras 3-001 et seq.; DowneslEllison, The legal 
control of mergers in the EC, pp. 2 and 178 et seq.; Fine, Mergers and 
Joint Ventures in Europe, Chapters 2 and 3; Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The 
EEC Merger Regulation, pp. 79; Ritter/RawlinsonBraun, EEC 
Competition Law, pp. 333. For an in-depth analysis in German see: Kurz, 
Das Verhältnis der EG-Fusionskontrollverordnung zu Artikel 85 and 86 
des EWG-Vertrages, 1993. 
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had been notified to the Commission, 357 of which resulted in a final 
decision. Only four concentrations, the last three of which concerned 
media markets, have been probibited since the entry into force of the 
Regulation in September 1990.32 The Commission states that a 
further 24 transactions were substantially altered so as to take 
account of the Commission's competition concerns. As of the end of 
1995 seven of the Commission's merger decisions have been 
challenged before the European Courts, of which in four cases the 
Commission's decisions was upheld33 while the three remaining 
cases34 are pending. 35 Given these figures it is safe to say that the 
direct practical impact of the Merger Regulation at least in terms of 
prohibitions (4) has been comparatively limited. 36 
32 A6rospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland, [1991] O. J. L 334/42; MSG Media 
Service, [1994] O. J. L 364/1; Nordic Satellite Distribution, [1996] O. J. 
L 53/10; RTLNeronica/Endemol, [1996] O. J. L 134/33. 
33 Mediobanca/Generali, [1991] O. J. C 334/23 = CMLR 4 [1992] 81(Court of 
First Instance, 28.10.93, case T-83/92; ECJ 11.2.96, case C 480/93); 
Nestle/Perrier, [1992] O. J. L 356/1 (Court of First Instance, 27.4.1995, 
case T-96/92); British Airways/TAT, [1992] O. J. C 326/19 = CMLR 
4 [1993] 7 (Court of First Instance, 24.3.1995, case T-3/93). 
34 Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand, [1994] O. J. L 186/38 (ECJ cases C-68/94 and 
C-38/95); Procter+GambleNP Schickedanz, [1994] O. J. L 354/32 (Court 
of First Instance case T- 290/94); Shell/Montecatini, [1994] O. J. L 332/48 
(Court of First Instance case T-322/94). 
35 Information provided by Löffler, who is an FCO official, in Löffler, Statistik 
der EG-Fusionskontrollverfahren nach fünfjähriger Anwendungspraxis, 
WuW 1996,209,212. For discussion of judicial review aspects see 
Brown, Judicial review of Commission Decisions under the Merger 
Regulation: The First Cases, [1994] 6 ECLR 296-305. 
36 Emmerich, Kartellrecht, p. 339. 
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Table 18: Decisions under the Merger Regulation 
Merger Decisions (Sep. 1990 to Oct. 1995) Provision Number 
lutside the scope of the Regulation Art. 6(1)(a) 31 
ompatible with the Common Market (first phase) Art. 6(1)(b) 303 
ompatible with the Common Market (second phase) Art. 8(2) 19 
rohibitions Art. 8(3) 4 
Source: Green Paper on Merger Control, COM(96) 19 final 
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37 Source: DG IV, Die Wettbewerbspolitik der EG 1995, XXV. Bericht. 
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38 Source: DG IV, Die Wettbewerbspolitik der EG 1995, XXV. Bericht. 
39 Source: DG IV, Die Wettbewerbspolitik der EG 1995, XXV. Bericht. 
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8.2. Overview over the Merger Control 
Process 
The purpose of this subchapter is to provide an overview over 
the merger control institutions and the procedure at European level. 
As the procedural aspects of the Merger Regulation and the 
pertaining Implementing Regulation, 40 which contains further details 
on the procedure, are generally considered successful, there is 
unlike in Britain relatively little debate concerning these issues with 
the notable exception of recently intensified (German) calls for an 
independent European Cartel Office modelled on the Federal Cartel 
Office in Berlin. 41 
8.2.1. Institutional Framework 
The Competition Directorate-General of the European 
Commission (DG IV) is charged with the enforcement of the 
competition rules under the EC-Treaty, the Merger Regulation and 
the Implementing Regulation. 42 DG IV is divided into seven 
Directorates. Directorate B, the so-called Merger Task Force, which 
was set up in 1990 by Sir Leon Brittain, Commissioner for 
40 Commission Regulation (E. C. ) No. 3384/94 of December 21,1994 on the 
notifications, time limits and hearings provided for in Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
[1994] O. J. L 377/1. 
41 See Financial Times and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of May 31,1996. 
Also Groger/Janicki, Weiterentwicklung des Europäischen 
Wettbewerbsrechts, WuW 1992,991,1001. As to details see 
Chapter 8.2.1. at pp. 344. 
42 An up to date DG IV staff list including phone-number can be found in the 
"Competition Poliy Newsletter" which is published quarterly by the 
Competition Directorate General of the European Commission. 
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Competition at that time, handles concentrations. 43 
The Merger Task Force consists of a multinational, 
multidiciplinary group of about 50 members, around half of whom are 
senior civil servants (mostly lawyers and economists), and half of 
those are on secondment, normally for a three-year term, from 
national competition authorities. 44 It is headed by a Director and 
further divided into four operational units, each of which is guided by 
a Head of Unit. These units are unlike the decision-units of the 
German FCO not organized on a sectorial basis. 45 Neither are they 
dependent and charged with the final decision-making. 
Once the Merger Task Force has been contacted either formally 
via a notification or informally, a "case team" is set up immediately on 
an ad hoc basis. It is headed by a "case manager", usually one of the 
Heads of Unit, and at least two "case handlers" who are choosen on 
the basis of expertise and language. 46 At that stage the European 
procedure bears a resemblence to the MMC procedure. 47 
43 Address: European Commission, Merger Task Force, Avenue de 
Cortenberg 150, B-1040 Brussels, Tel. (32-2) 295.86.81, Fax. (32-2) 
296.43.01. 
44 Drauz/Schrbder, Praxis der Fusionskontrolle, p. 186; See also with slightly 
different numbers Krause, E. C. Merger Control: An outside view from 
inside the Merger Task Force, [1995] J. B. L. 627,628. 
45 See Competition Policy Newsletter, DG IV staff list. Fine, Mergers and 
Joint Ventures in Europe, para 5-003. Slightly critical of this aspect 
Drauz/Schrdder, Praxis der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, p. 186, 
because managers and their advisers do not know beforehand who is 
going to handle their case. However, a positive aspect of this regulatory 
detail appears to be that the scope for lobbying (or more) is reduced this 
way. 
46 For a description of the Merger Task Force's day-to-day work see 
Krause, E. C. Merger Control: An outside view from inside the Merger 
Task Force, [1995] J. B. L. 627-637, who paints an extremely positiv 
picture. Also Drauz/Schröder, Praxis der Fusionskontrolle, pp. 186; Fine, 
Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe, para 5-003. For a highly critical 
assessment of the Commission-bureaucracy see Portwood, Mergers 
under EEC Competition Law, pp. 101. With respect to case teams 
Portwood points out that this may lead to inconsistencies within the 
Merger Task Force as certain teams may take a more liberal approach 
than others (p. 103). However, as those case teams are established on 
an ad hoc basis for each individual case, the criticism by Portwood 
appears unjustified. Clearly, not all of the 50 members of the Merger Task 
Force can be involved in handling a case given the strict deadlines 
imposed by the Merger Regulation. 
47 See Chapter 6.3.3. (2) at pp. 235. 
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The European Commission being a political institution and with 
the final blocking decisions taken by the college of all 
Commissioners, there has repeatedly been criticism as to the 
Commission's alleged susceptibility to political pressure. It has 
therefore been suggested, in particular by the German Government, 
and recently by the head of the Italian competition authority, 
Mr Giuliano Amato, that an independent competition authority taking 
over the Merger Task Force's role should be set up in order to avoid 
undue political influence. 48 The calls for an independent European 
Cartel Office are almost as old as the EC-Treaty itself. 49 From a 
German perspective, these proposals are clearly modelled on the 
German Federal Cartel Office system with its independence and 
strict focus on competition rather than industrial policy matters. 
Moreover, the German governmental criticism has to be seen in the 
wider context of frequent claims that the merger control regime 
exercised in Brussels was too lenient. This alleged leniency has led 
to lawyers openly advising their clients to tailor their transactions so 
as to avoid German law. A Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook 
published by a major German law firm states, for example: "In cases 
of doubt, where there is room for structuring an acquisition, it is 
preferable for it fall under European rather than German 
jurisdiction. "50 This development is, of course, deplored, by the FCO 
in Berlin, as Stefan Held, its former Vice President made clear: 
"... stricter application of national merger control puts `smaller 
mergers' at a disadvantage vis-ä-vis `large mergers' that come under 
EC merger control, which is expected to be more lenient. ... 
As I see 
it, the reputation of both the national cartel authorities and the EC- 
48 Financial Times and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of May 31,1996. 
Also Groger/Janicki, Weiterentwicklung des Europäischen 
Wettbewerbsrechts, WuW 1992,991,1001. 
49 For a detailed analysis of this idea from a German perspective see 
Ehlermann, Reflections on a European Cartel Office, [1995] 
CMLRev 470-486. 
50 Droste (law firm), Mergers & Acquisitions in Germany, p. 291. See also 
Bechtold, who is one of the leading anti-trust lawyers, in Antitrust law in 
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Commission will be compromised in the long run if the business 
community view them as rigorous and lenient enforcers respectively 
and manipulate the issue of jurisdiction at will. "51 As to the British 
view on these issues, the author is not aware of any claims of 
European merger control being too lenient or calls for an 
independent European Cartel Office. 
Coming back to the issue of undue political influence on merger 
decisions, it is indeed difficult to see why all Commissioners 
including those who are not concerned with competition policy at all 
should decide on merger cases. After all, competition law is a highly 
specialized and complex subject which requires not only solid legal 
knowledge but also a very deep understanding of the economics 
regarding the markets concerned. Albeit the individual 
Commissioners may be highly qualified experts in the field of their 
Directorate General, it seems doubtful whether all of them are 
experts on competition law and have sufficient expertise and 
knowledge of the actual cases enabling them to make a well 
informed decision. This (political) aspect of European merger control 
differs from both Britain and Germany as these regulatory systems 
try to ensure that the final merger decisions are taken by experts. In 
the U. K. the ultimate power to block a merger rests with the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, who should be an expert, 
and not the whole cabinet (which would be the equivalent to the full 
Commission). 52 In Germany, decisions are taken by the independent 
full-time members of the decision-units of the FCO and there is no 
involvement of a political institution at all. 53 
However, the German and Italian idea of turning DG IV into an 
an independent European competition agency is hardly more than 
the European Community and Germany - An uncoordinated co-existence, 
in Fordham 1992, p. 343,353. 
51 Held, in German Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham 1992, pp. 311,320 et 
seq. 
52 See Chapter 6.3.2. at pp. 229 and Chapter 6.3.4. at pp. 242. 
53 See Chapter 7.4.1. at pp. 304. As to the exceptional involvement of the 
Federal Minister of Economics see Chapter 7.4.2. at pp. 311. 
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wishful thinking. With the Merger Task Force at DG IV working 
smoothly from an administrative point of view and in the absence of 
any clear evidence as to politically motivated merger decisions, 54 
there is little direct need for any fundamental institutional change in 
the foreseeable future. 55 From a political point of view, establishing 
an independent European Cartel Office would mean that the 
Member States lose influence which under the present system they 
have through "their" Commissioners. Those Member States which 
are generally rather sceptical of further European integration can 
therefore not be expected to be in favour of an independent 
European competition authority for political reasons. The present 
Competition Commissioner, Karel van Miert, fiercely rejected any 
ideas as to an independent agency arguing that such an agency 
would be more costly and controversial, and even more open to 
political influence from Member States than the Commission 
presently is. 56 The establishment of an independent European Cartel 
Office being politically unrealistic, a more acceptable reform- 
response to the criticism expressed above could be to strengthen the 
position of the Competition Commissioner57 by way of delegating the 
decision-making power exclusively to him - quite like in Britain where 
the power of blocking mergers rests with the Secretary of State of 
Trade and Industry rather than the whole cabinet. 
54 Ehlermann, Reflections on a European Cartel Office, [1995] CMLRev 470, 
475. An example of political influence cited by BishopBishop, Reforming 
Competition Policy: Bundeskartellamt - Model or Muddle?, [1996] 
4 ECLR 207, seems to be MannesmannNallourec/llva, [1994] O. J. 
L 102/15, as this concentration was cleared after the College of 
Commissioners voted against the advice of the Competition 
Commissioner. 
55 BishopBishop, Reforming Competition Policy: Bundeskartellamt - Model 
or Muddle?, [1996] 4 ECLR 207,209. 
56 Offical EC Press Info IP/96/457. Also Financial Times and Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung of May 31,1996. 
57 See also Ehlermann, Reflections on a European Cartel Office, [1995] 
CMLREV 470,483. 
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8.2.2. Procedure 
As the procedure as handled by the Merger Task Force is 
generally considered very efficient and effective, a few broad 
remarks together with the flow chart at page 353 may suffice. 58 
The procedure is basically divided into two stages: Phase 1 and 
Phase 2. The initial Phase 1 investigation has to be concluded within 
one month from the receipt of a complete notification as required by 
Form CO and is of a cursory nature. 59 Both before and within the 
first three weeks following notification Article 7 of the Merger 
Regulation prohibits the implementation of concentrations having a 
community dimension. The Commission may decide to extend the 
suspensory period on its own initiative. According to Article 9 the 
Commission may refer a notified concentration to the competent 
authority of a Member State if the concentration affects a distinct 
market within that particular Member State (German Clause). 60 Vice 
versa, under Article 22 (3) a Member State may refer a national 
merger to the Commission if that merger affects trade between 
Member States (Dutch Clause). 61 Phase 1 ends with a decision 
taken by the Commissioner for Competition pursuant to Article 6 of 
the Merger Regulation. 62 As Table 18 above at page 342 shows the 
58 For a detailed description of the procedural aspects see the following 
books: Bos/Stuyck/Wytinck, Concentration Control in the EEC, para 4- 
157 to 4-382; Cook/Kerse, EEC Merger Control, Chapter 5; 
Downes/Ellison, The legal control of mergers in the EC, Chapter 4; Fine, 
Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe, Chapters 5; Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, 
The EEC Merger Regulation, Chapter 15; Portwood, Mergers under EEC 
Competition Law, Chapters 6 and 7. In German see for example: 
Drauz/Schröder, Praxis der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, pp. 186-230. 
For a commentary on the Merger Regulation see Löffler, in Langen/Bunte, 
Kartellrecht, FKVO. 
59 Form CO, [1994] O. J. L 377/9. Form CO is an annex to the Merger 
Regulation 4064/89. Reproduced, e. g., in Jones/Van der Woude/Lewis, 
E. C. Competition Law Handbook, 1996, p. 647. 
60 For details see Chapter 8.3.3. (1) at pp. 370. 
61 For details see Chapter 8.3.3. (2) at pp. 373. 
62 The Merger Regulation only speaks of decisions by "the Commission. " 
However, the Commission's Rules of Procedure ([1967] O. J. L 145/1) in 
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overwhelming majority of decisions taken by the Commission are 
Article 6 decisions. As these Phase 1 decisions are not published in 
full in the Official Journal, Series L, of the EC, there is a certain lack 
of transparency with regard to these decisions. 63 Only a brief notice 
that a decision has been taken is published in Series C of the Offical 
Journal. Interested parties may, however, obtain a copy from the 
Merger Task Force. Article 6 decisions may have one of the following 
tenors, namely 
(1) to clear the merger because it is not within the scope of the 
Regulation, Article 6(1)(a). 
(2) to clear the merger because it does not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility with the common market, 
Article 6(1)(b). 
(3) to initiate Phase 2 proceedings because the merger raises 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common 
market, Article 6(1)(c). This decision is taken by the 
Competition Commissioner in conjunction with the president. 
As Table 18 above at page 342 indicates, far less than 10 per 
cent of all notified mergers reach Phase 2. Since the entry into force 
of the Regulation in 1990 until October 1995 only 23 concentrations 
were subject to a Phase 2 investigation. 64 In Phase 2, a detailed 
appraisal of the merger takes place the time-limit being a further four 
months within which a final decision pursuant to Article 8 has to be 
reached: 
(1) Compatible with the common market, Article 8(2), 
sentence 1. 
their amended form provide for the delegation of powers. For details see 
JonesGonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 222. 
63 However, press notices are published and summaries of the decisions 
are often published in competition law journals like Common Market Law 
Review or Wirtschaft and Wettbewerb (WuW). Not quite up-to date, but a 
collection of merger decisions (translated into English) can be found in 
Gijlstra (editor), Competition Law in Western Europe and the USA, 
European Communities Materials, Volume B14 (loosleaf). 
64 See Table 18 at p. 342 above. 
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(2) Compatible with the common market, but modifications 
(conditions, obligations) required, Article 8(2), sentence 2. 
(3) Incompatible with the common market, Article 8(3). The 
Commission may, if necessary, 65 order the dissolution of the 
concentration or require any other appropriate measures to 
remedy the anti-competitive effects. 
Phase 2 decisions must be taken by the full Commission. 66 
Article 19 of the Merger Regulation furthermore requires that the 
Commission carries out all procedures in close and constant liaison 
with the competent authorities of the Member States. In particular, 
an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives of the 
authorities of the Member States is to be consulted before any 
Article 8 decision is taken. 67 It appears conceivable that through this 
route a political element may come into play. Following an adverse 
decision, the parties have two months to lodge an appeal with the 
European Court of First Instance. 68 Unlike Article 6 decisions, 
Article 8 decisions are to be published in their full (translated) version 
in the Official Journal, Series L, of the EC. Hence, with respect to 
these decisions a high degree of transparency is ensured, although it 
65 This was necessary only once: RTLNeronica/Endemol, [1996] O. J. 
L 134/33 pars 116. Under the Merger Regulation, concentrations are 
suspended until cleared. Hence, there will not normally a need for a 
dissolution-order. In RTLNeronica/Endemol, however, the need arose 
because this was not a "European" case, but a case referred to the 
Commission by the Netherlands under the "Dutch Clause", Art. 22. As to 
the Dutch Clause see Chapter 8.3.3. (2) at pp. 373. 
66 Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe, para 5-058; 
Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 222. As to criticism 
see above Chapter 8.2.1. at pp. 344. 
67 Art. 19 (3) to (7) of the Merger Regulation. For a more detailed analysis 
see Bos/Stuyck Wytinck, Concentration Control in the EEC, paras 4-310 
et seq. 
68 The Merger Regulation itself only refers only to the European Court of 
Justice. However, Council Decision 88/591 which established the Court of 
First Instance of the European Communities ([1987] O. J. L 169/1) 
stipulates that actions under Article 173 of the EC-Treaty brought by 
natural or legal persons against Decisions of the Commission are to be 
considered by the European Court of First Instance. For further details 
see Bos/Stuyck/Wytinck, Concentration Control in the EEC, paras 4-350 
et seq.; Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe, paras 5-062 et seq; 
Portwood, Mergers under EEC Competition Law, pp. 158. 
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often takes several months for the decisions to be finally published in 
the Official Journal. 69 
69 Take for example the two latest prohibitions: The decision in Nordic 
Satellite Distribution was taken July 19,1996 and published in the O. J. on 
March 2,1996 (L 53/21). In RTLNeronica/Endemol the concentration was 
blocked on September 20,1995, the decision was published on June 6, 
1996 (L 134/33). 
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Merger Task Force Procedure 
Informal Pre-notification Guidance 
Notification on Form CO 
- within 7 days of the conclusion of the concentration - 
- suspensory period before and for 3 weeks from notification - 
Request for Art. 9 
Referral to Member 
State 
German dause: threat to 
distict national market 
Request for Art. 22 
Referral to Commission 
Dutch clause: national 
merger affecting trade 
between Member States 
ý 
ý 
Phase 1 investigation 
- has to be concluded within 1 month - 
- Member State may submit request for referraL M. 9- 
- Phase 1 ends with a decision by the Competition Commissioner pursuant to M. 6- 
1 
Article 6 decision by the Competition Commissioner 
(1) not within the scope of the Merger Regulation 
(2) does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market 
(3) raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market 
'iv 
Phase 2 investigation 
detailed appraisal - 
4 months time limit - 
- close and constant liason with Member States 
- consultation with Advisory Committee of Member State representatives 
- Art. 8 decision has to be taken by the full Commission within the time limit - 
Article 8 decision by the full Commission 
(1) compatible with the common market 
(2) compatible with the common market, but modifications required 









Member States may take 
approprate measures to protect 
legitimate Interests other than 
those taken Into consideration 
by the Merger Regulation 
Appeal to the European Court of First Instance 
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8.3. Jurisdiction 
The Merger Regulation being a supra-national set of rules, the 
demarcation between Community and national sovereignty over 
mergers is of crucial importance. 7° Clear and simple rules appear 
particularly desirable in order to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between 
the Commission and national authorities over merger cases. By and 
large, the jurisdictional test applied by the Merger Regulation lives up 
to these expectations. The first paragraph of Article 21 (2) of the 
Merger Regulation states in pursuance of the one-stop shop principle 
that "no Member State shall apply its national legislation on 
competition to any concentration that has a Community 
dimension. "71 Hence, the jurisdictional reach of the Regulation is 
defined through the terms "concentration" and "Community 
dimension". What is meant by these terms will be discussed in 
subchapters 8.3.1.72 and 8.3.2.73 respectively. 
The two-part jurisdictional test outlined above is refined by three 
exceptions to the general rule that concentrations having a 
community dimension are exclusively assessed by the Commission 
and, vice versa, those not having a community dimension are 
investigated on Member State level only. These jurisdictional 
exceptions are examined in subchapter 8.3.3.74 
70 As to the competition rules applying in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) under Article 57 of the EEA-Agreement see Broberg, The 
Delimitation of Jurisdiction with regard to Concentration Control under the 
EEA Agreement, [1995] 1 ECLR 30-39. 
71 This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions discussed in 
Chapter 8.3.3. at pp. 370. 
72 See pp. 370. 
73 See pp. 373. 
74 See pp. 375. 
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8.3.1. Definition of a Concentration 
According to Article 3 (1) a concentration is deemed to arise 
where (a) two or more undertakings merge, or (b) two or more 
persons75 or undertakings acquire control of another undertaking. 76 
Hence, the Regulation differentiates between two types of 
transactions: (technical) mergers on the one hand and the 
acquisition of sole or joint control on the other. 77 This approach 
differs from both British and German law. While the British Fair 
Trading Act 1973 does not attempt to describe any specific 
transactions at all, but uses the concept of enterprises ceasing to be 
distinct enterprises, 78 the German GWB tries, at least in principle, to 
enumerate and describe specific transactions constituting mergers 
exhaustively. 79 
(1) Mergers 
The regulation does not provide a definition of the phrase "two or 
more independent enterprises merge. " Yet, a direction comprarison 
between Article 3 (1) (a) and Article 3 (1) (b) has led the to the 
generally accepted opinion that subsection (a) is intended to cover 
amalgamations (fusions) in which two or more companies are 
amalgamated into one company, whereas the much broader 
75 Only persons already controlling at least one undertaking are covered by 
the Regulation, Art. 3 (1)(b) of the Regulation. 
76 Art. 3 (5) provides for a number of exceptions regarding certain 
transactions, e. g. temporary holdings by banks and insurance companies. 
77 In order to provide guidance as to how the Commission interprets the 
notion of a concentration, the Commission has published a "Notice on the 
notion of a concentration under Coucil Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89: 
see [1994] O. J. C 385/5. Reproduced in Jones/Van der WoudelLewis, 
E. C. Competition Law Handbook, 1996, pp. 670. 
78 See Chapter 6.2.1. at pp. 214. 
79 See Chapter 7.3.1. (1)-(6) at pp. 285-291. 
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subsection (b) is to catch all other types of transactions constituting 
concentrations. 80 Hence, the particular merger definition of 
subsection (a) is rather technical and narrow81 Not surprisingly, thus, 
mergers in this technical sense are rare in practice, 82 which is why 
the Commission only had to deal with very few of those cases. 83 
However, this is basically a terminological question only as most 
transactions which would be called mergers in Britain and Germany 
are covered by the second type of concentration provided for in 
Article 3 (1) (b) of the Regulation, namely the acquisition of control, 
as the following paras will show. 
(2) Acquisition of Control 
This second type of concentration is of great practical relevance. 
The method through which control is acquired is irrelevant. Hence, 
unlike German law, 84 but in accordance with English law, 85 the 
Regulation does not attempt to describe the different types of 
transactions constituting concentrations exhaustively. Contrary to 
German law, there exist no specific thresholds indicating the 
acquisition of control. 86 Rather, methodically similar to English law, 
80 In line with Art. 3 of the Third Council Directive (EEC) No. 78/855, [1978) 
O. J. L 295/36, concerning mergers of of public limited liability companies. 
81 For a thorough analysis of the merger definition see Cook/Kerse, EEC 
Merger Control, Chapter 2.2.1. at p. 14-16. 
82 BoslStuyck Wytinck, Concentration Control in the EEC, para 4-027; 
Downes/Ellison, The legal control of mergers in the EC, p. 35; Fine, 
Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe, para 4-006; DrauzlSchröder, 
Praxis der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, p. 186. According to Löffler, in 
Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 3 FKVO 4064/89, Rn. 3 mergers within 
the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) account for less than 5 per cent of all 
concentrations vetted by the Commission. 
83 Renault/Volvo, [1990] O. J. C 281/2 = CMLR 4 [1991] 297; Kyowa/Saitama 
Banks, [1991] O. J. C 66/13 = CMLR 4[1991]331; Sanofi/Yves Saint 
Laurent, [1993] O. J. C 89/3 = CMLR 4 [1993] 300; AGF/La UniOn y el 
Fenix, [1994] C 155. 
84 See Chapter 7.3.1. at pp. 283. 
85 See Chapter 6.2.1. at pp. 214. 
86 Sec. 23 (2) No. 2 GWB: 25 and 50 per cent. See Chapter 7.3.1. (2) at 
pp. 287. 
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control is defined in comprehensively broad terms. Yet, the notion of 
control differs from that of the Fair Trading Act. Whereas 
section 65 (3) of the British Fair Trading Act defines control as the 
ability "directly or indirectly, to control or materially to influence the 
policy of a body corporate", Article 3 (3) of the Merger Regulation 
takes a significantly more restrictive approach defining control as the 
"possibility of exercising decisive influence. " 
There already exists a considerable body of Commission case 
law interpreting what is meant by the "possibility of exercising 
decisive influence. "87 Needless to say, the purchase of a majority 
stake providing de jure control confers decisive influence. 88 Matters 
become more difficult where minority stakes are concerned. 89 As a 
general rule, under the Merger Regulation, a minority holding is not 
considered to confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence 
and does therefore not constitute a concentration. There are, 
however, exceptions to this general rule. 90 A minority holding may 
confer decisive influence where the acquiror is granted far reaching 
rights giving him decisive influence in the articles of association or 
through binding shareholder agreements, 91 or where he enjoys de 
facto control due to the remaining shares being widely dispersed. In 
CCIE/GTE (1992)92 the acquiror holding only a 19 per cent stake 
87 For a complete list up to date to October 1995 of the numerous 
Commission decisions on the definition of concentration see Jones/Van 
der Woude/Lewis, E. C. Competition Law Handbook, 1996, pp. 707. 
88 See for example GEHE AG/OCP, [1993] O. J. C 114/6: 50,1 %; 
WestLB/Thomas Cook, [1993] O. J. C 216/4: 86 %; Sanofi/Yves Saint 
Laurent, [1993] O. J. C 89/3: 51,6 %; Dasa/Fokker, [1993] O. J. C 136/4: 
51 %; Deutsche Bank/Banco de Madrid, [1993] O. J. C 175/11: 100 %. 
89 See also Heidenhain, in EEC Merger Regulation, Fordham 1993, pp. 452 
who points out that the position on minority holdings, which were originally 
not thought to be covered by the Regulation, has changed since its 
introduction. 
90 Decisive influence was held to exist in: Banesto/Totta, [1992] O. J. 
C 107/25: 46,5 %; Arjomari/Wiggins Teape Appleton, [1990] O. J. 
C 321/16: 39 %; Societe Generale de Belgique/G6nerale de Banque, 
[1993) O. J. C 225/2: 26,96 %. No decisive influence was found in 
Mediobanca/Generali, [1991] O. J. C 334/23: 12,8 %. 
91 See CCIEIGTE, [1992] O. J. C 258/15; Conagra/ldea, [1991] O. J. 
C 175/18. The latter case is discussed below in connection with the 
acquisition of joint control, Chapter 8.3.1(3) at pp. 375. 
92 CCIE/GTE, [1992] O. J. C 258/15. 
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was considered to have decisive influence as he enjoyed extensive 
contractual rights, inter alia, to determine the business policy of the 
controlled undertaking and to veto all decisions of strategic 
importance. In Arjorari/Wiggins Teape Appleton (1990)93 Arjomari 
acquired a 39 per cent stake in Wiggins which was held to confer de 
facto control on the ground that the remaining shares were widely 
dispersed among 107.000 shareholders none of whom held a stake 
exceeding 4 per cent. More recently, in Societe Generale 
de Belgique/Generale de Banque (1993)94 where Societe Generale 
increased its holding in Generale de Banque from 20,94 to 25,96 per 
cent the Commission decided that a concentration had occurred as 
the previous 20,94 per cent stake conferred, due to the relatively low 
level of participation in the general meetings, a de facto voting power 
of about 45 per cent in the annual general meeting whereas the 
increased holding of 25,96 per cent would give Societe Generale a 
de facto voting power in the annual general meeting of about 56 per 
cent. In Ford/Hertz (1994), however, the Commission held that the 
increase from a 49 per cent stake to a 54 per cent holding may not 
be considered a concentration as the quality of the decisive influence 
already exercised before the acquisition did not intensify. 95 The 
passage from joint control to sole control is, however, considered a 
concentration as the Commission pointed out in ICI/Tioxide (1990). 96 
Concerning the issue of minority stakes, the Merger Regulation 
is more lenient than both British and German law in the sense that in 
the latter jurisdictions the acquisition of a substantial minority holding 
regularly constitutes a merger whereas it may only in exceptional 
cases be considered a concentration under the Regulation. This is 
most manifest in comparison to German law where section 23 (2) 
No. 2 GWB stipulates that in any case the acquisition of a 25 per 
93 Arjomari/Wiggins Teape Appleton, [1990] O. J. C 321/16. 
94 Societe Generale de Belgique/Generale de Banque, [1993) O. J. C 225/2. 
95 Ford/Hertz, [1994) O. J. C 121/4. 
96 ICI/Tioxide, [1990] O. J. C 304/27. 
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cent-stake is to be considered a merger, and, moreover, 
section 23 (2) No. 6 GWB allows for even smaller stakes to be 
considered a merger if those stakes confer "directly or indirectly an 
influence which is material with respect to competition. "97 British law 
is at least in its practical effect largely in harmony with German law in 
this respect for section 65 (3) of the Fair Trading Act defines control, 
albeit in its mildest form, as the ability "materially to influence the 
policy of a body corporate" which is clearly less than "decisive 
influence". Although no fixed thresholds are applied in Britain, as in 
Germany a 25 per cent stake is almost certain to fall under the 
merger definition of the Fair Trading Act, and the OFT has indicated 
that holdings in excess of 15 per cent are liable to be examined in 
order to assess whether they confer the ability "materially to 
influence the policy' of another company. 98 Hence, both British and 
German merger control law covers transactions which would (at 
present) not be considered a concentration under the European 
Merger Regulation. Hence, due to the comparatively narrow 
definition of concentrations under the Merger Regulation, its 
applicability in terms of transactions covered is somewhat restricted. 
However, as the definition of concentrations through acquisitions 
under the Regulation (the possibility of exercising decisive influence) 
is open to interpretation, it appears, in particular in the light of the 
history of European merger control law, that there is a risk or a 
chance - depending one's viewpoint - that in the long run the 
interpretation of this definition is broadened by the European 
Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Court 
of First Instance through case law in order to expand the European 
jurisdiction through the back-door. 
A noteworthy practical consequence of the divergencies in the 
respective merger or concentration definitions under European, 
97 For details see Chapter 7.3.1. at pp. 283. As to these aspects see also 
Bechtold, Antitrust law in the European Community and Germany - An 
uncoordinated co-existence?, Fordham 1992, pp. 343,352,355. 
98 For details see Chapter 6.2.1. at pp. 214. 
Chapter 8 360 
British, and German law is that the British and German merger 
control rules may apply to transactions having a Community 
dimension as defined by Article 1 (thresholds), but which are 
nevertheless not caught by the European Merger Regulation 
because of its narrower definition of a concentration with respect to 
minority stakes. This result appears somewhat inconsistent with the 
philosophy of the Merger Regulation as certain mergers despite 
having a community dimension are now as before assessed by - one 
or more - national authorities. In order to avoid these inconsistencies, 
a uniform merger or concentration definition in both the European 
Merger Regulation and the national merger control laws of the 
Member States appears desirable. 
(3) Joint Control - Joint Ventures 
Under the Merger Regulation, not only the acquisition of sole, 
but also of joint control constitutes a merger. This latter form of 
concentration accounts for almost half of all concentrations notified 
as Table 20 above at page 343 demonstrates. Hence, the acquisition 
of joint control is of major practical relevance. 99 
The classic case of joint control is where two parent companies 
hold a 50 per cent stake each in a subsidiary. 10° In this sort of 
deadlock-situation decisions may only be taken jointly. The same 
holds true if two or more parent companies hold stakes below 50 per 
cent as long as the important strategic decisions in the jointly owned 
company have to be taken jointly by the parents (deadlock- 
99 As to the relevance joint acquisitions in practice see Löffler, in 
Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art. 3 FKVO 4064/89, Rn. 24. 
100 Volvo/Atlas, [1992] O. J. C 17/10; Mondi/Frantschach, [1992) O. J. 
C 124/23; PechineyNiag, [1993] O. J. C 30717; Höchst/Wacker, [1993] 
O. J. C 171/4; BHF/CCF/Charterhouse, [1993] O. J. C 247/4. 
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situation). 101 An example is Conagra/Idea (1991) where the U. S. 
corporation Conagra acquired a 26 per cent stake102 in the French 
company Idea. 103 In addition to the 26 per cent voting rights, 
Conagra entered into a shareholders' agreement with the other 
remaining Idea-shareholder, who held 74 per cent of the voting 
rights. According to this shareholders' agreement Conagra secured 
for itself a number important veto rights and was therefore 
considered to have joint "decisive influence" over Idea. Among these 
veto rights were, inter alia, the approval of the annual budget; 
approval of investments exceeding 1.5 million French francs; 
approval of the development of new products costing more than 
1.5 million French francs; and the approval of the employment and 
salary of senior executives. Hence, in cases where two or more 
companies hold stakes in a joint venture differing in size and voting 
power, it depends very much on the circumstances of the individual 
case (shareholders' agreements, articles of association) whether 
these companies can be considered to have joint control. 104 
However, a joint venture jointly controlled by its parent 
companies is to be considered a concentration within the meaning of 
Article 3 (1) of the Regulation only if it is of a concentrative rather 
than a co-operative nature. 105 According to Article 3 (2) of the 
101 Renault/Volvo, [1990] O. J. C 281/2: 45: 45 %; Elf/BC/CEP-SA, [1991] O. J. 
C 172/8: 34: 34 %; Fortis/CGER, [1994] O. J. C 23/13: 49,9: 49,9 %; 
Sextant/BGT-VDO, [1993] O. J. C 9/3: 50,5: 49,5 %; 
Continental/Kaliko/DG-Bank/Benecke, [1993] O. J. C 336/11: 50,1: 49,9 %; 
Conagra/Idea, [1991) O. J. C 175/18: 20: 74 %. 
102 The stake in terms of capital amounted to only 20 per cent. 
103 Conagra/Idea, [1991] O. J. C 175/18. For a discussion of this case see 
Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 6; LÖffler, in 
Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art. 3 FKVO 4064/89, Rn. 12. 
104 For further details are provided in the Commission notice on the notion of 
a concentration under Coucil Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89: see 
[1994] O. J. C 385/5. Reproduced in JonesNan der Woude/Lewis, E. C. 
Competition Law Handbook, 1996, pp. 670, para 2. 
105 See the Commission Notice on the distiction between concentrative and 
co-operative joint ventures and Council Regulation 4064/89, [1994] O. J. 
C 385/1. There exists a vast amount of publications on the controversial 
demarcation between concentrative and co-operative joint ventures. For a 
very clear and precise analysis see Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC 
Merger Regulation, p. 51-78. Also Brown, Distinguishing between 
Concentrative and Co-operative Joint Ventures: Is it Getting any Easier?, 
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Regulation a joint venture is to be considered concentrative if it 
performs "on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous 
economic unity, which does not give rise to coordination of the 
competitive behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or between 
them and the joint venture. " A crucial factor is the complete and 
permanent absence of the parent companies from the joint venture's 
market. Joint ventures not meeting the criteria outlined above are 
excluded from the scope of the Regulation. They are assessed 
under the much stricter regime of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC- 
Treaty. The underlying rationale behind this drastic differentiation 
between concentrative and co-operative joint ventures is that only 
concentrative joint ventures amount to "real" mergers in terms of 
structural market change whereas co-operative joint ventures tend to 
be "back-door cartels" rather than concentrations. As cartels are 
generally considered more harmful to competition than mergers, 
since mergers might have numerous beneficial effects, most 
jurisdictions, including Britain and Germany, treat mergers much 
more favourably than cartels. The same holds true on European 
level which is why the differentiation between concentrative (Merger 
Regulation) and co-operative joint ventures - meaning disguised 
cartels - (Articles 85 and 86 of the EC-Treaty) is so important in 
practice. 1 06 
8.3.2. Community Dimension 
According to Article 1 (2) of the Regulation, "a concentration has 
[1996) 4 ECLR 240-249; Burnside/Mackenzie, Joint Venture Analysis: The 
latest chapter, [1995) 3 ECLR 138-146; Hawk user, A Bright line 
shareholding test to end the nightmare under the EEC Merger Regulation, 
[1993] CMLREV 1155-1183. 
106 As to the scope for reform of this differntiation see EC-Commission, 
Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, paras 98- 
121. 
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a Community dimension where: 
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 5.000 million; and 
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least 
two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 
million, 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more 
than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover 
within one and the same Member State. " 
This three-part Community-dimension test is based on turnover 
figures, 107 which is in principle in line with the quantitative 
jurisdictional test applied in Germany. However, unlike the 
quantitative tests applied in Britain108 (asset test or market share 
test) and Germany109 (turnover thresholds), the Community- 
dimension test also defines the scope of the extraterritorial 
applicability of the Regulation as the following analysis of the three 
elements of the Community-dimension test will show. 
107 Concerning the calculation of turnover, the Regualations contains detailed 
rules in Art. 5 which will not be discussed in this work. Turnover is defined 
by Art. 5 (1) as follows: "Aggregate turnover within the meaning of 
Article 1 (2) shall comprise the amounts derived by the undertakings 
concerned in the preceding financial year from the sale of products and 
the provision of services falling within the undertakings" ordinary activities 
after deduction of sales rebates and of value added tax and other taxes 
directly related to turnover. " For a detailed examination of the calculation 
rules see Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 16-30; 
Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe, paras 4-070 to 4-095; 
Drauz/Schröder, Praxis der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, p. 16-30; 
Löffler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 5 FKVO 4064/89, Rn. 1-17. 
108 See Chapter 6.2.2. at pp. 217. The assets test is satisfied where the 
gross value of the world-wide assets taken over exceed £70 million. The 
market share test is satisfied if the merger results in a market share of at 
least 25 per cent. 
109 See Chapter 7.3.2. at pp. 293. The basic rule is that mergers are 
exempted from control where the joint turnover proceeds of the 
participating enterprises amounted to less than DM 500 million in the 
preceding business year. 
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(1) World-wide turnover of ECU 5.000 million 
The combined aggregate world-wide turnover of the participating 
enterprises has to exceed ECU 5.000 million. As Christopher Jones 
of the DG IV put it, this basic quantitative test rests upon the "partial 
fiction" that mergers between very large companies or groups with 
significant financial power are more likely to have Community-wide 
effects than smaller ones. 11 o Legally, the turnover-criterion is not an 
ideal criterion or, again in the words of Christopher Jones, a "rather 
crude test" since mergers in specific specialist markets, which are 
not turnover-intensive, but equally important to the common market 
as a whole, may as well seriously affect the competitive 
conditions. 111 However, the turnover of a company or group is 
relatively easy to ascertain and the turnover criterion therefore easy 
to handle for both the enterprises involved and the Commission. 
Another question is, 112 however, whether the current turnover- 
threshold of ECU 5.000 million, which amounts to more than £4.000 
million, is a realistic one. 113 According to the 1996 Commission 
Green Paper on Merger Control, out of the largest 2.200 European 
companies only 152 companies in the EC and EFTA States had in 
1993 a world-wide turnover exceeding ECU 5.000 million. 114 This 
gives an idea of how large the participating enterprises have to be in 
order to come within the reach of the Merger Regulation. Obviously, 
the very high level of the turnover threshold is the result of a political 
compromise designed not to hand over too much power to the 
110 JonesGonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 15,19. 
111 JonesGonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 38. See also the 
analysis by the EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the 
Merger Regulation, 1996, paras 31 et seq. 
112 As to the current debate on the threshold issue see Chapter 8.3.2. (4) at 
pp. 367. 
113 Currency rate as of June 14,1996 (Financial Times) £1 = ECU 1,248. 
114 EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 
1996, para 46. 
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Commission. 115 
(2) Community-wide turnover of ECU 250 
million 
According to Article 1 (2) (b) of the Regulation, concentrations 
meeting the ECU 5.000 million world-wide threshold test come under 
the jurisdiction of the Commission only if at least two of the 
participating enterprises have a turnover of ECU 250 million or more 
Community-wide. This element has a double function. 
First, it is an additional quantitive criterion excluding smaller 
concentrations by focusing on the turnover within the common 
market (de minimis rule). 116 
Secondly, the ECU 250 million Community-wide turnover 
requirement has the important legal function of determining the 
extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Commission concerning companies 
not resident in EC Member States: 117 as long as the Community- 
wide thresholds are achieved it does not matter where the merging 
enterprises are incorporated. An example is Kyowa/Saitama Banks 
(1991)118 where two large Japanese banks merged which had 
branches in Europe meeting the ECU 250 million turnover threshold. 
As the merger did not raise any competition concerns within Europe 
it was cleared swiftly. A parallel situation arose in Bank 
America/Security Pacific (1991)119 where the merging U. S. banks 
115 See EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger 
Regulation, 1996, pars 46. Also Bright, The European Merger Control 
Regulation: Do Member States still have and independent role in merger 
control? [1991] 4 ECLR 139. 
116 See Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 15; L6ffler, in 
Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 1 FKVO 4064/89, Rn. 21. 
117 Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, pp. 88; Löffler, in 
Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 1 FKVO 4064/89, Rn. 26. 
118 Kyowa/Saitama Banks [1991) O. J. C 66/13. 
119 Bank America/Security Pacific, [19911 O. J. C 289/14. 
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met the turnover thresholds in Europe. Again, in the absence of any 
anti-competitive effects on the European market the merger was 
waved through quickly. Apparently, the application of the Merger 
Regulation to non-European mergers has as yet not led to any legal 
or political problems comparable to those experienced in Germany 
where the FCO prohibited a number of "foreign" mergers. 120 
Being based on the turnover achieved in Europe, the Merger 
Regulation defines its jurisdictional reach different from both British 
and German law. In order to be applicable, the Fair Trading Act 
requires that of the merging enterprises "one at least was carried on 
in the United Kingdom or by or under the control of a body corporate 
incorporated in the United Kingdom"121 while the German GWB 
declares itself applicable to all restraints of competition which have 
"effects" within Germany. 122 Compared to the British and German 
law, the turnover-based criterion applied by the Merger Regulation is 
much easier to handle as the turnover achieved in Europe is a 
criterion simple to ascertain. However, it is also far less flexible than 
the more vague but considerably broader concepts of 'business 
carried on Britain' or 'anti-competitive effects within Germany. ' 
Although the test applied by the Merger Regulation provides for a 
maximum of legal certainty and practicability, it appears full of gaps 
as concentrations between companies where at least one does not 
reach the ECU 250 million threshold may very well have serious anti- 
competitive effects on the common market which can not be 
remedied properly by a national merger control authority. For 
example, if a powerful European company meeting all turnover 
thresholds merged with an equally strong U. S. company not active 
on the European market, the merger might still affect competition in 
the common market: global competition might be significantly 
reduced as a result of the transaction which would in turn in the long 
120 See Chapter 7.3.3. at pp. 295. 
121 Sec. 64 (1) FTA 1973. See Chapter 6.2.4. at pp. 219. 
122 Sec. 98 (2) GWB. See Chapter 7.3.3. at pp. 295. 
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run enable the European player to raise prices within the common 
market above the competitve level without having to fear new market 
entry (oligopoly situation). Yet, the Merger Regulation would not be 
applicable. 
(3) Two-thirds Rule 
Despite achieving a joint aggregate world-wide turnover of more 
than ECU 5.000 million and a Community-wide turnover of ECU 250 
million each, a concentration does not fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Commission if each of the participating enterprises achieves 
more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-turnover in one and 
the same Member State. 123 This last element of the Community- 
dimension-test is designed to exclude from the Commission's 
jurisdiction concentrations which predominantly affect only one 
Member State. 124 
(4) New Developments 
As the definition of Community dimension is the decisive factor 
in the division of jurisdiction between the Commission and the 
123 The wording is interpreted restrictively by the Commission in the sense 
that the two-thirds turnover must be achieved by each enterprise in the 
same Member State, say Britain. The rule does not apply to a situation 
where each participating company achieves two-thirds of its turnover in its 
respective home country, for example British company A in the U. K., 
German company B in Germany, and French companc C in France. See 
Mitsubishi/Ucar, [1991] O. J. C 5/7; Digital/Kienzle, [1991] O. J. C 56/16; 
Cargill/Unilever, [1990] O. J. C 327/14. 
124 Although there have been occasional calls for a deletion of the two-thirds 
rule or for its replacement by a three-quarters rule, the Commission 
considers the two-thirds balance best suited to keep predominantly 
national mergers out of its scope. As to further references see EC- 
Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 1996, 
paras 60 and 66. 
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Member States and, moreover, since the thresholds introduced in 
1990 were very much the result of a polictical compromise, 125 
Article 1 (3) of the Regulation requires a review of these thresholds 
before the end of the fourth year following the adoption of the 
Regulation. Pursuant to this provision, the Commission has 
examined the adequacy of the thresholds in 1993126 and again in 
1996127 and concluded both times - as one would expect - that there 
are strong arguments in favour of a reduction of the current 
thresholds. Put simply, in order to come closer to achieving a level 
playing field and to avoid the problems connected with multiple 
national filings, in particular the risk of conflicting decisions by 
different national merger control authorities, the Commission 
proposes a reduction of the current thresholds to ECU 2.000 million 
world-wide and ECU 100 million Community-wide, but to maintain 
the two-thirds rule unchanged. The Commission estimates that this 
would increase its workload by an extra 65 to 80 cases per 
annum. 128 
Legally and from a European point of view, the Commission's 
arguments are compelling. However, the current debate is less legal 
than political. As the reduction of thresholds as proposed by the 
Commission would extend its jurisdiction considerably and at the 
same time restrict the Member States' powers to vet large cross- 
border mergers, it is not surprising that the proposed changes have - 
according to press reports - been rejected by a number of Member 
States including Britain and Germany. 129 
In Britain any further increase of the Commission's power seems 
125 EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 
1996, para 32; Löffler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 1 FKVO, Rn. 7 
126 Commission Report to the European Council on the review of the Merger 
Regulation, COM (93) 385 final of 28 July 1993. 
127 EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 
COM (96) 19 final. 
128 EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 
1996, para 69. 
129 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 1,1996; Financial Times, 
November 15,1996. 
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to have been rebuffed categorically as a matter of principle. The 
German government has also given a mixed reaction as it appears to 
fear that a more powerful Commission would lead to a shift from 
competition policy to industrial policy which is opposed in Bonn and 
Berlin. Instead, the Germans are opting for an independent 
European competition authority as discussed above. 1 30 The French 
apparently consider a reduction of the thresholds not necessary due 
to the effect of inflation and the enlargement of the European Union 
which makes it easier for companies to achieve the Community-wide 
turnover thresholds. Although the French undoubtedly have a point, 
given the very high level of the present thresholds it appears 
arguable whether really all concentrations having a Community- 
dimension in a material sense are covered by the Regulation. Yet, 
due to inflation time clearly is on the Commission's side. 
Probably foreseeing the political opposition to its reduction 
plans, the Commission offers a second-best, more limited solution in 
order to address at least the problem of multiple filings: where 
concentrations below the Community-dimension thresholds come 
within the jurisdiction of more than one national merger control 
system, the Commission's competences could be extended 
automatically to cover those mergers or, alternatively, the 
participating companies could be given a right to choose between 
either multiple national or single-stop Community merger control. 131 
From a strictly legal and pragmatic point of view, the reduction of 
thresholds seems preferable as it guarantees a higher degree of 
legal certainty. Only in case of a threshold reduction - as opposed to 
the multiple-filing test - does the jurisdiction of the Commission not 
depend on national merger control law. Moreover, the question 
whether a particular transaction would be subject to multiple national 
filings can be difficult to ascertain for the Commission and is in any 
130 Chapter 8.2.1. at pp. 344. 
131 EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 
1996, paras 84 et seq. 
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case time-consuming for the companies involved. However, as a 
threshold reduction appears unlikely at present for political reasons, 
if there is to come any change in the near future (which the author 
doubts), it is probably going in the direction of the second best 
multiple-filing solution. 
8.3.3. Referrals to and from Member States 
Pursuant to the one-stop shop principle, the allocation of 
jurisdiction as outlined in Article 1 rests upon the basic rule that 
concentrations having a Community-dimension are assessed 
exclusively by the Commission while those below the Community- 
dimension thresholds fall under the jurisdiction of the competent 
national authorities. As practicable and clear as the Community- 
dimension test based on turnover-thresholds might be, it is 
undisputedly a rather crude test since high turnover proceeds of the 
merging enterprises are as such no indicator of the likely (anti-) 
competitive effects a concentration might have. Hence, there is a 
regulatory need to refine the basic unsubtle threshold test of Article 1 
which is the function of Article 9, Article 22 (3), and Article 21 (3) of 
the Merger Regulation. 
(1) German Clause: Referral to Member States 
According to Article 9, a Member State may request the referral 
of a concentration to its own merger control authorities if that 
concentration 
"threatens to create or to strengthen a dominant position as 
a result of which effective competition would be significantly 
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impeded on a market, within that Member State, which 
presents all the characteristics of a distinct market, be it a 
substantial part of the common market or not. " 
Hence, Article 9 is an exception to the rule that concentrations 
with a Community-dimension are vetted exclusively by the 
Commission. Broadly speaking, Article 9 is based on the thought that 
concentrations with a predominantly national impact are better 
controlled at national level and is therefore very much in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity contained in the EC-Treaty. 132 Surprisingly, 
this rather sensible provision was introduced virtually at the last 
minute on the initiative of the German delegation backed by the 
British, which is why this rule is generally called "German Clause". 133 
If the substantive conditions of Article 9 are met, namely the 
threat of a dominant position confined to a distinct national market, 
the Commission has discretion to either deal with the case itself or 
refer it to the competent national merger control authorities. 
Thus far, the provision has played a rather limited role only, 
which could of course change rapidly if the Community-dimension 
thresholds were to be reduced. 134 Albeit the Commission has 
received. a total of 10 referral requests - eight from Germany (! ), one 
from Britain, and one from France, 135 only three referrals - one to 
each of the requesting Member States - were granted by the 
Commission. 136 Hence, it appears that the Commission interprets 
Article 9 restrictively and does in no way follow the Member States' 
132 Article 3b of the EC-Treaty. 
133 As to the history of Art. 9 see Löffler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 9 
FKVO, Rn. 2. 
134 EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Regulation, 
1996, para 93. 
135 As of 31 December 1995. Information provided by Löffler, in Statistik der 
EG-Fusionskontrollverfahren nach fünfjähriger Anwendungspraxis, 
WuW 1996,209,211. 
136 Britain: Tarmac/Steetly, [1992] O. J. C 50/25 = CMLR 4 [1992] 343; 
Germany: McCormick/CPC/RadoanklOstmann, WuW/E EV 2157; 
France: Holdercim/Cedest, [1994] C 211/4. 
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requests blindly. For example, in Alcatel/AEG Kabel (1991)137 which 
concerned a concentration in the telecommunication and power 
cables market, the Commission disagreed openly with the FCO's 
contention in the referral request that there was a distinct German 
market for telecommunication cables and that, although there was 
undisputedly a distinct market for power cables, the proposed 
concentration would threaten to create or strengthen a dominant 
position. If a case is referred to a Member State, this state applies its 
national merger control law, but is restricted in that it "may only take 
the measures strictly necessary to safeguard or restore effective 
competition on the market concerned. "138 
The British case referred back, Tarmac/Steetly (1992), 139 
illustrates well the kind of situation Article 9 was designed to cover: 
Tarmac Plc and Steetly Plc, both U. K. companies active in various 
building products sectors, created a concentrative joint venture to 
which they ceded, inter alia, all their U. K. assets, employees and 
business relating to the manufacture and sale of building bricks and 
clay roofing tiles. The concentration easily passed the Community- 
dimension test. On request by the British government, however, the 
Commission found that, basically due to high transport costs, there 
existed distinct markets within which the concentration threatened to 
create a dominant position. Concerning bricks the North-East and 
South-West of England and for tiles Great Britain as a whole were 
considered distinct markets within the meaning of Article 9. Since the 
concentration evidently had no material cross-border impact, there 
was no need for the Commission to be involved. Following the 
137 Alcatel/AEG Kabel, [1992] O. J. C 6/23 = CMLR 4 [1992] 80 = WuW/E 
EV 1713,1714. Following this decision the FCO intended to challenge the 
Commission's decision before the ECJ, but this was not considered 
politically opportune by the German government, see Löffler, in 
Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 5 FKVO, Rn. 5. 
138 Art. 9 (8) of the Regulation. 
139 Tarmac/Steetly, [1992] O. J. C 50/25 = CMLR 4 [1992] 343 = WuW/E 
EV 1814. For a more detailed discussion of this case see 
Jones/Gonzäles-D/az, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 42. 
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referral, the parties gave up their merger plans. 
The German case referred back, McCormick/CPC/ 
Rabobank/Ostmann (1993), 140 cannot be considered a "typical" 
Article 9 case as it was not referred voluntarily. The case concerned 
the creation of a concentrative joint venture which was to combine 
the entirety of McCormick's (U. S. ) and CPC's (U. S. ) herb and spice 
business in the EC and EFTA countries with the assets of Ostmann, 
the leading German company in that market. The concentration 
would mainly have affected the German market for dried herbs and 
spices. That market was considered a distinct market within the 
meaning of Article 9 by the German government as in Germany 
suppliers were basically German companies. Although the 
Commission agreed with this opinion, it had intended to deal with the 
concentration itself as it had international implications. However, this 
option had been foreclosed as a result of an error in the calculation 
of the legal deadlines provided for in Article 10 (1). Pursuant to 
Article 10 (6) the only option left open was to refer the case to the 
FCO. Following the referral, the parties withdrew their proposed 
concentration. 
(2) Dutch Clause: Referral to the Commission 
Acknowledging the fact that many concentrations that do not 
have a Community-dimension as defined by Article 1 do in reality 
have significant European cross-border effects, Article 22 (3) of the 
Regulation stipulates that at the request of a Member State a 
concentration creating or strengthening a dominant position in the 
requesting Member State but not having a Community-dimension 
may be referred to the Commission provided the concentration 
affects trade between Member States. Thus, Article 22 (3) is an 
140 McCormick/CPC/Radoank/Ostmann, WuW/E EV 2157. 
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exception to the rule that those concentrations not meeting the 
Community-dimension thresholds fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Member States and has, thus, the opposite function of Article 9. 
Parallel to Article 9, however, is the restriction of power: In 
remedying the anti-competitive effects the Commission is confined to 
those measures strictly necessary to maintain or restore effective 
competition within the territory of the Member State at the request of 
which it intervenes. 141 
As with Article 9, Article 22 (3) was also inserted virtually at the 
last minute, this time, however, at the behest of those smaller 
Member States which have, or had at that time, no merger control 
law, most notably the Netherlands ( therefore Dutch Clause). 142 
Not surprisingly therefore, the two requests which have been 
lodged under Article 22 (3) so far143 came from smaller Member 
States, namely Belgium and the Netherlands. The first case, British 
Airways/Dan Air (1993), 144 was declared compatible with the 
common market during phase 1 of the Commission's investigations 
while the second referred concentration, RTLNeronica/Endemol 
(1995), 145 was prohibited. 
Although in the two cases mentioned above no jurisdictional 
problems arose, dogmatically Article 22 (3) appears not to have been 
thought through thoroughly as it may lead to conflicting decisions 
which is just what the Regulation aims to avoid. 146 If a cross-border 
concentration not meeting the Community-dimension thresholds is 
notified to multiple national merger control authorities and one of 
these authorities makes an Article 22 request, conflicting decisions of 
the Commission and the remaining national authorities investigating 
141 Art. 22 (5) of the Regulation. 
142 Löffler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 22 FKVO, Rn. 3. 
143 As of end of 1995. 
144 British Airways/Dan Air, [1993] O. J. C 68/5 = CMLR 4[1993]235 = 
WuW 1993,286. 
145 RTLNeronica/Endemol, [1996] O. J. L 134/33. 
146 Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 47. 
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the concentration might result. Take, for example, the British 
Airways/Dan Air (1993) case. 147 In this case concerning the air 
transport market, in particular the route Brussels-London, the U. K. 
authorities cleared the merger, while Belgium lodged an Article 22 (3) 
request to get the concentration vetted by the Commission. As the 
Commission cleared the deal, no problem arose. But what if the 
Commission had blocked the concentration? What if London had 
blocked the merger while Brussels cleared it? 
Yet, these inconsistencies should not be overestimated. As more 
and more Member States have introduced national merger control 
laws, Article 22 (3) cannot be expected to be invoked very often in 
future, 148 which is particularly true if the Community-dimension 
thresholds are reduced or the "multiple filing solution"149 is 
introduced as in this case most significant cross-border 
concentrations would fall under the scope of the Merger Regulation 
anyway. 
(3) "Legitimate Interests" of Member States 
Article 21 (3) provides that "Member States may take appropriate 
measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken into 
consideration by this Regulation and compatible with the general 
principles and other provisions of Community law. " The provision 
specifies as examples for legitimate interests public security, plurality 
of the media, and prudential rules. Before any "appropriate 
measures" may be taken by a Member State the legitimate interest 
147 British Airways/Dan Air, (1993] O. J. C 68/5 = CMLR 4 [1993] 235 = 
WuW 1993,286. 
148 The Commission intents to keep Art. 22 (3) as a "useful tool, especially 
for those Member States that do not currently have a merger control 
system. " See EC-Commission, Green Paper on the Review of the Merger 
Regulation, 1996, para 97. 
149 See Chapter 8.3.2. (4) at pp. 367. 
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claimed must be formally recognized by the Commission-150 
The Member States' right to invoke legitimate interests is, 
however, restricted in a number of ways. Legitimate interests may 
not include competition considerations as these are reserved for the 
Commission (one-stop shop principle). Hence, there is no risk of 
conflicting decisions. It follows that a Member State may not allow a 
concentration on legitimate interest grounds which was previously 
blocked by the Commission on competition grounds. A concentration 
blocked by the Commission remains blocked. Consequently, the 
legitimate interests provision is of relevance only in cases where the 
Commission has already cleared the concentration and the Member 
State wants to block it. Lastly, the Regulation does not create any 
new rights for the Member States to prohibit concentrations. 
Article 21 (3) simply refers to those legitimate interest provisions 
already contained in the national law, as for example, section 84 (1) 
of the British Fair Trading Act 1973 (public interest). 
Since the entry into force of the Regulation until the end of 1995, 
Article 21 (3) has only once been resorted to. This case concerned a 
bid by Lyonnaise de Eaux SA of France for Northumbrian Water 
Group Plc of the U. K in 1995.151 The Commission recognized that 
under the regulatory system of the British Water Industry 
Act 1991152 the Director General of the Water Service (DGWS) has 
to have, as a substitute for real competition which is not possible in 
this sector, the ability to make comparisons between different water 
companies. This ability would have been prejudiced by the loss of 
Northumbrian Water as an independent water company. The 
Commission held that the DGWS' ability to make comparisons 
constituted a legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 21 (3) of 
150 Commission decision of 29.3.1994, Water Industry Act, WuW 1995,945, 
946. 
151 As to the MMC report on the proposed merger: Lyonnaise des Eaux SA 
and Northumbrian Water, July 1995, Cm 2936. The MMC recommended 
that the bid could go ahead if substantial cuts in charges to customers 
were agreed in advance with the water regulator. 
152 In particular sec. 32-34 of the Water Industry Act 1991. 
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the Regulation. 153 However, the Commission prohibited the U. K. 
merger control authorities from taking into account the potential 
implications of the merger for competition, employment and regional 
policy154 as these are consideration reserved for the Commission. 
8.4. The Substantive Appraisal Criteria 
Article 2 (3) of the Merger Regulation stipulates that "a 
concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a 
result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded 
in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared 
incompatible with the common market. "155 
On the face of it, it appears that the Regulation requires a two- 
part test156 consisting of 
(1) the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, and 
(2) a significant impediment of effective competition. 
In practice, however, the Commission has never explicitly 
applied the second part of the test. 157 Rather, as one would expect, 
the Commission continued to apply the definition of a dominant 
position already used under Article 86 of the EC-Treaty, which 
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. 158 Now as before, a 
153 Commission decision of 29.3.1994, Water Industry Act, WuW 1995,945. 
154 This was at least the interpretation which the Commission's decision was 
given by the MMC, see MMC, Lyonnaise des Eaux SA and Northumbrian 
Water, July 1995, Cm 2936, para 1.9. 
155 The following paras are concerned with single market domination. As to 
oligopolistic market power see Briones, Oligopolistic Dominance: Is there 
a Common Approach in Different Jurisdictions? A Review of Decisions 
Adopted by the Commission under the Merger Regulation, [1995] 
6 ECLR 334-347. 
156 Brittan, The Law and Policy of Merger Control in the EEC, (1990) 
15 ELR 351,352. 
157 Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in Europe, paras 4-155 et seq. 
158 Downes/MacDougall, Significantly Impeding Effective Competition: 
Substantive Appraisal under the Merger Regulation, (1994) 19 ELR 286, 
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dominant position is defined as a position "of economic strength 
enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to hinder the 
maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market by 
allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitiors and customers and ultimately of consumers. '1159 
Subsection (b) of Article 2 (1) lists a number of criteria which are 
of relevance in assessing whether a dominant position is to be 









the market position of the undertakings concerned 
their economic and financial power 
the alternatives available to suppliers and users 
their access to supplies or markets 
any legal or other barriers to entry 
supply and demand trends 
the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers 
the development of technical and economic progress 
provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not 
form an obstacle to competition. 
Apart from the last criterion, the criteria enumerated above are 
clearly competition related. A "balancing clause" as known in 
German law does not exist. 160 The test of market dominance, 
however, is basically in line with German law as defined in 
Section 24 (1) of the GWB. 161 Under both legal frameworks the 
notion of dominance is based on the concept of the merged 
293; Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, p. 130; L6ffler, 
in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 2 FKVO, Rn. 41. 
159 NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industry Michelin v. Commission, [1985) 1 
CMLR 282. For a similar definition under the Merger Regulation see e. g. 
Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, [1991] O. J. L 290/35 para 3.4: "ln the light of the 
above, the Commission considers that the unlikely occurrence of entry on 
the market means that in this respect Tetra Pak will not be constrained 
from acting to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers, and ultimately consumers. "; Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland, 
[1991] O. J. L 334/42, para 72. 
160 Chapter 7.5.3. at pp. 330. 
161 See Chapter 7.5. at pp. 315. 
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enterprises being able to act independently of competitors and 
customers. British merger control law, in contrast, is based on the 
public interest criterion and differs therefore from the outset, 
although competition is by far the single most important public 
interest factor considered by the U. K. merger control authorities as 
has been demonstrated in Chapter 6.4.162 The following paragraphs 
examine the substantive criteria applied by the Commission in more 
detail. However, it should be borne in mind that although the 
Regulation has been in force for more than five years the case 
material available is still very limited since there have been only four 
prohibitions163 and only 19 in-depth Phase 2 investigations until the 
end of 1995. 
8.4.1. Market Share 
As in Britain and Germany, the first step in the competition 
assessment after defining the relevant product and geographic 
market164 is to look at the market shares the merging enterprises 
would achieve. Unlike Germany, where a 33 per cent market share 
leads to a legal presumption of market domination, 165 no 
presumptions as to a dominant position are contained in the 
European Merger Regulation. Rather on the contrary: Recital 14 of 
the Preamble of the Regulation stipulates that a concentration may 
be "presumed to be compatible with the common market" if "the 
market share of the undertakings concerned does not exceed 25 per 
162 See pp. 245. 
163 A6rospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland (2.10.91), [1991] O. J. L 334/42 = 
CMLR 4 [1991] M2; MSG Media Service (9.11.94), [1994] O. J. L 364/1; 
Nordic Satellite Distribution, [1996] O. J. L 53/10; RTLNeronica/Endemol, 
[1996] O. J. L 134/33. 
164 As to these aspects see in detail Fine, Mergers and Joint Ventures in 
Europe, p. 183-202; Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, 
Chapter 10; L6ffler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 2 FKVO, Rn. 12-37. 
165 Sec. 22 (3) No. 1 GWB. See Chapter 7.5.2. at pp. 327. 
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cent either in the common market or in a substantial part of it. " 
In the first decision blocked, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland 
(1991), 166 which concerned the aerospace industry, in particular the 
market for regional turbo-prop aircrafts, the concentration would 
have resulted in a market share increase, even if the parties' 
definition of the relevant product market was accepted, 167 from 29 to 
50 per cent world-wide and 49 to 65 per cent Community-wide. The 
remaining competitors being relatively weak and potential new entry 
into the market unlikely, the concentration was held to create a 
dominant position. 
The second concentration blocked, MSG Media Service 
(1994), 168 concerned three segments of the wider Pay-TV market in 
Germany. As this creation of a joint venture, MSG, by the two 
leading German media groups, Bertelsmann and Kirch, and the 
monopoly cable-provider, Deutsche Telekom, would have led to a 
virtual monopoly and forclosure of the German Pay-TV market, the 
concentration was considered to create or strengthen a dominant 
position in this new developing market. 
The third prohibition again concerned the creation of a joint 
venture, Nordic Satellite Distribution (1995), between three 
Scandinavian telecommunication groups, Norsk Telekom of Norway, 
Tele Danmark, and Kinnevik of Sweden. 169 Although the 
Commission welcomed in principle the cross-border co-operation as 
it could further technical progress (see Article 2 (1)(b)), the 
concentrative joint venture was nevertheless blocked as it would 
have created a highly vertically integrated group leading to, inter alia, 
a monopoly situation in the (up-stream) market for the distribution of 
166 Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland (2.10.91), [19911 O. J. L 334/42. 
167 Namely of 20 to 70 seat commuter aircraft. The Commission found two 
different markets: (1) commuter aircraft of 40 to 59 seats: 64 % world- 
wide, 72 % Community-wide. (2) commuter aircraft of 60 seats and 
above: 76 % world-wide, 74 % Community-wide. 
168 MSG Media Service (9.11.94), [1994] O. J. L 364/1. An Art 9 request by 
the German government was rejected in this case. 
169 Nordic Satellite Distribution, [1996] O. J. L 53/10. 
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satellite frequences for Scandinavia and a dominant position in the 
(down-stream) Scandinavian Pay-TV market. 
In the last concentration blocked, RTLNeronica/Endemol 
(1995), 170 which was referred to the Commission by the Netherlands 
under Article 22, the creation of the concentrative joint venture 
Holland Media Groep would have resulted in market shares of 56 to 
63 per cent in the Dutch market for TV-advertising. In addition, 
despite a relatively low market share of only 50 per cent in the 
market for independent in-house TV-productions, Endemol would 
have gained a dominant position in this market due to a high degree 
of vertical integration (Holland Media Groep basically guaranteed to 
buy the Endemol-productions). 
Various other concentrations which resulted in high market 
shares were not blocked. In Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval (1991), 171 for 
example, Tetra Pak held a market share of more than 90 per cent. 
Although the Commission found that Tetra Pak enjoyed a dominant 
position, the concentration was not blocked as it would not have led 
to a strengthening of that position: Tetra Pak was active in the 
market for liquid food packaging systems while Alfa-Laval operated 
in the food processing equipment industry. Another example is 
Mannesmann/Hoesch (1992)172 concerning the German market for 
steel tubes where the concentration led to a market share of over 
70 per cent in the relevant market. Yet, the concentration was not 
blocked because of the potential (foreign) competition expected in 
this market by the Commission. The KNP/BTNRG (1993)173 
concentration which created an enterprise controlling more than two- 
thirds of certain segments of the Dutch and Belgian printing press 
market was cleared after undertakings remedying some of the anti- 
competitive effects were given. An interesting case is 
170 RTLNeronica/Endemol, [1996] O. J. L 134/33. 
171 Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, [1991) O. J. L 290/35. 
172 Mannesmann/Hoesch, [1992] O. J. L 114/34. 
173 KNP/Bührmann TetterodeNRG, [1993] O. J. L 217/35. 
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Kali+Salz/MdK/Treuhand (1993)174 because in this case the "failing 
firm defence" was invoked successfully. In this case the West- 
German company Kali+Salz, which had a 79 per cent market share 
of the fertiliser-potash market, took over the bankrupt East-German 
MdK company which led to an aggregate market share of 98 per 
cent. However, as Kali+Salz would have picked up the business of 
MdK anyway, the concentration was cleared. 
These few examples may suffice to demonstrate that the 
Commission handles the market share criterion in a rather flexible 
way which is clearly more lenient than the approach taken by the 
German FCO under the GWB and more in line with the flexible 
British approach. Even high market shares exceeding 60 per cent do 
not necessarily result in a blocking of the concentration. On the basis 
of the cases so far decided by the Commission it would seem that 
concentrations leading to relatively low market shares below about 
40 per cent would - at present - only in very exceptional cases risk 
prohibition. Because of Recital 14 of the Preamble, it can practically 
be outruled that a concentration resulting in a market share of less 
than 25 per cent would be prohibited. 175 
8.4.2. Remaining Competitors 
In order to assess whether the new combined entity would be 
able to act to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
it is necessary to examine the market position of those competitors in 
terms of market shares, size and resources. Broadly speaking, the 
larger the gap between the merging firms and the next largest 
competitor, the greater the likelihood of a finding of market 
174 Kali+Salz/Md K/Treu hand, [1994] O. J. L 186/38. 
175 See also Drauz/SchrÖder, Praxis der europäischen Fusionskontrolle, 
p. 111; Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, pp. 133. 
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dominance. This approach is methodically in line with that of the 
British176 and German177 merger control authorities. 
In Aerospatiale-A/enia/de Haviland (1991)178 the Commission 
analysed in great detail the position of the remaining competitors and 
concluded that "the competitors in these markets are relatively weak. 
The bargaining ability of the customers is limited. The combination of 
these factors leads to the conclusion that the new entity could act to 
a significant extent independently of its competitors and customers, 
and would thus have a dominant position on the commuter markets 
as defined. "179 
Two further examples may suffice to demonstrate the 
Commission's approach. In Magneti-Marelli/CEAC (1991), 180 which 
was finally cleared with conditions and obligations under Article 8 (2) 
of the Regulation, the Commission argued that the merging 
enterprises would attain a dominant position in the French market for 
starter batteries as "the market share of the new entity would amount 
to some 60 % in France" and "the gap in relation to the next largest 
competitor would be considerable (of the order of 40 %)". In another 
battery case, Varta/Bosch (1991), 181 which was also declared 
compatible with the common market subject to conditions and 
obligations under Article 8 (2), the Commission reasoned in its 
statement of objections that "in addition to the market share of 44 % 
and the lead of about 25 % over the next competitior, particular 
account was taken of the fact that the next competitors for the new 
entity in terms of market share were small and medium-sized 
companies with far less financial strength and smaller production 
capacity. " 
176 See Chapter 6.4.1. (2) at pp. 249. 
177 See Chapter 7.5.1. (1) at pp. 323. 
178 A6rospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland (2.10.91), [1991 ] O. J. L 334/42. 
179 AL6rospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland (2.10.91), [1991] O. J. L 334/42, para 51. 
180 Magneti-Marelli/CEA, [1991] O. J. L 222/38, para 16. 
181 Varta/Bosch, [19911 O. J. L 320/26, para 58. 
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8.4.3. Economic and Financial Power 
Article 2 (1) (b) of the Regulation mentions among other criteria 
to be taken into account by the Commission the economic and 
financial power of the merging firms. Although the Commission has 
taken this factor into consideration at various times, it has not gained 
the crucial weight it has under German law. 182 This might have to do 
with the fact that the German "deterrence-doctrine", which is the 
dogmatic basis for the importance attributed to the financial strength 
criterion, has apparently not been adopted by the Commission. 
In Matsushita/MCA (1991), 183 for example, a case which 
concerned the market for audio and video equipment, the 
Commission stated that "the most important aspect of the proposed 
concentration is the possibility that the combination of the massive 
resources of MEl with the market position of either party might create 
considerable competitive advantages. " However, the concentration 
was cleared unconditionally under Article 6 (1) (b) as sufficient 
competition remained. 184 
8.4.4. Barriers to Entry and Potential 
Competition 
Barriers to entry of new competitors are frequently considered by 
182 At to German law see Chapter 7.5.1. (1)(b) at pp. 323. 
183 Matsushita/MCA, CMLR 4 [1992] M36. 
184 The financial strength was also taken into account in Accor/Wagon Lits, 
[1992] O. J. L 204/1 para 17; Magneti-Marelli/CEA, [1991] O. J. L 222138, 
para 16: "in addition, the financial strength of the new entity and that of its 
parent companies, and its greater access to the lead market, would also 
have to be taken into consideration". 
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the Commission. These may consist of intellectual property rights, 185 
high costs involved or the need to achieve economies of scale in 
order to operate competitively, technological advantages in terms of 
research and development, 186 consumer preferences, brand loyalty 
or advertising costs187 and so forth. Connected with entry barriers is 
the actual likelihood of new entry by potential competitors which is 
regularly considered by the Commission by way of a- necessarily 
uncertain - prognosis. 188 
In Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval (1991)189, for instance, the Commission 
reasons: "Although the Commission has identified at least one 
potential entrant it considers that the barriers to entry are sufficiently 
high to prevent that, and other, potential entrants from significantly 
limiting Tetra Pak's freedom of action... The reasons for this view are 
as follows: - Tetra Pak owns many patents useful for the production 
of an aseptic carton packaging machine. These valuable patents are 
not available to other potential entrants... " 
185 Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, [1991 ] O. J. L 290/35. 
186 A6rospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland (2.10.91), [1991] O. J. L 334/42. 
187 Nestle/Perrier, [1992] O. J. L 356/1. 
188 For a thorough analysis see for example A6rospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland 
(2.10.91), [1991] O. J. L 334/42 paras 53-63, at 63: "lt follows that there is 
no realistic significant potential competition in the commuter markets in 
the foreseeable future..... The markets in the early 1990s, in contrast, are 
characterized by the following factors: 
- there are eigth competitors altogether already on the markets. The 
aircraft available are all based on modern technology which fulfils the 
stringent customer requirements in this respect for the foreseeable future, 
- current forecasts as outlined above show that the markets are 
approaching maturity and will decline and stabilize from the mid-1990s, 
- the markets are not therefore attractive to new entrants, and it is not 
rational to now enter. The expectation is rather that some of the existing 
competitors will leave. " See also Mannesmann/Hoesch, [1993] O. J. 
L 114/34 where the concentration in the steel tube sector was cleared 
despite a finding of market dominance due to a market share on the 
German market exceeding 70 % because the Commission considered it 
highly likely that new foreign competition would enter. For a more detailed 
analysis of this aspect see LOffler, in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 2 
FKVO, Rn. 69. 
189 Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, [19911 O. J. L 290/35 at para 3.4. 
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A number of additional factors may be taken into account by the 
Commission, in particular vertical elements such as the access to 
supply or sales markets, 190 and countervailing purchasing power. 191 
As in Britain and Germany, these criteria are regularly confined to a 
contributory function. Industrial policy as opposed to competition 
considerations have apparently not gained significant weight. 192 
There is at least no reference to such considerations in the published 
decisions. 
8.5. Concluding Remarks 
Although the Merger Regulation contains elements of both 
British and German law, it is very much a distinct set of rules with a 
character of its own and is not closely modelled on either national 
law. 
Politically, the most controversial issue has always been the 
demarcation of jurisdiction between the Community and the national 
merger control authorities which is nowadays reflected in the 
discussion on the reduction of the Community dimension thresholds. 
Firmly based on the one-stop shop principle designed to avoid 
multiple filings and conflicting decisions, the Merger Regulation 
provides for a clear and simple, albeit somewhat crude, jurisdictional 
190 ICI/Tioxide, [1990] O. J. C 304/27; Viag/Continental Can, [1991] O. J. 
C 156/10. Mitsubishi/UCAR, [1991] O. J. C 5/7. 
191 Alcatel/Telettra, [1991] O. J. L 122/48. For a detailed analysis see 
Nordemann, Buying Power and Sophisticated Buyers in Merger Control 
Law: The Need for a more Sophisticated Approach, [1995] 5 ECLR 270- 
281. 
192 See Jones/Gonzäles-Diaz, The EEC Merger Regulation, pp. 162; Löffler, 
in Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht, Art 2 FKVO, Rn. 79. 
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test based on turnover thresholds. Due to the simplicity of this test 
and the present height of the thresholds there is relatively little scope 
for jurisdictional conflicts between the Commission and Member 
States. This is a remarkable achievement by the Regulation. Yet, 
concentrations not having a Community dimension in terms of the 
thresholds required may in fact have serious anti-competitive effects 
affecting competition in the common market. Vice versa, not every 
concentration meeting the substantial threshold requirements 
obstructs cross-border competition. The German and Dutch Clauses 
introduced to refine the somewhat simplistic threshold test are, 
however, used restrictively by both the Commission and the Member 
States, except Germany. However, the mentioned shortcomings of 
the threshold test have so far not been felt so much by the Member 
States and the companies involved as the thresholds are as a result 
of a political compromise rather high and the merger control regime 
exercised by Brussels is relatively lenient anyway. However, if the 
thresholds are reduced either nominally by the Council or creepingly 
in the long run due to inflation, it is submitted that the scope for 
jurisdictional conflict will increase as the jurisdictional reach of 
Commission expands; in particular the German Clause (referral to a 
Member State) will then be invoked more often. The Alcatel/AEG 
Kabel (1991) case has shown that there is a real potential for 
conflict. 193 
The second pillar of the jurisdictional test, the definition of a 
concentration has been proved to be narrower with respect to 
minority holdings than the merger definitions applied in the U. K. and 
Germany. This may lead to the somewhat inconsistent result, that 
the acquisition of a substantial minority stake having a Community 
dimension may, because it does not constitute a concentration as 
defined by the Regulation, not be assessed by the Commission. 
Hence, despite having a Communtiy dimension these transactions 
193 Alcatel/AEG Kabel, [1992] O. J. C 6/23 = CMLR 4 [1992] 80 = WuW/E 
EV 1713,1714. See Chapter 8.3.3. (1) at pp. 370. 
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remain subject to (multiple) national merger control. A more uniform 
concentration/merger definition in the European Union appears 
therefore desirable in the long run. Although the national merger 
definitions could by harmonized by way of a new Directive, it is 
doubted whether this is necessary at present as the definitional 
divergencies have so far apparently not caused any major trouble. 
An easier option would be to expand the jurisdictional reach of the 
Merger Regulation, which is directly applicable within the Member 
States, so that any discrepancies between national merger 
definitions would be less felt in practice. Yet, this would mean to 
further reduce the role played by the national merger control 
authorities which does not appear to be politically opportune at 
present. There seems to be a tendency that the Commission in 
interpreting the concentration definition of the Regulation is moving 
closer to the broad merger concepts applied in Britain and Germany 
which basically means that the Commission is widening its definition 
and, thus, extends its jurisdictional reach creepingly. 
Concerning the extra-jurisdictional scope of the Regulation the 
turnover-test applied is highly practicable, but far too undeveloped to 
really filter out those concentrations involving non-EC corporations 
which affect the common market. A comparison with the much more 
flexible and far broader criteria applied under British and German law 
underlines this point. Yet, whichever solution is found, the 
extraterritorial application of merger control law will always be a 
problem. 
As to the institutional framework, the Merger Regulation differs 
from both British and German law. In common with the U. K. system, 
where only the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry may block a 
merger, under the Regulation the final decisions are also taken by a 
political institution: the college of Commissioners. This has been 
criticised above insofar as all Commissioners - including those who 
are no experts on competition law and policy - are involved. In this 
respect, British law differs as thereunder only the Secretary of State 
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for Trade and Industry and not the whole cabinet is charged with the 
decision-taking. It is submitted that the European merger control 
regime would gain credibility if the position of the Competition 
Commissioner was strengthened parallel to the situation in Britain so 
that he would become responsible for taking merger decisions rather 
than the full Commission. The German idea of an independent 
European competition authority modelled on the FCO in Berlin 
seems too far-reaching, unnecessary at present, and politically 
unrealistic. 
In terms of substantive law, the European Merger Regulation is 
relatively closer to German law as it applies the test of market 
dominance whereas in Britain the broader public interest concept 
prevails. In applying the various criteria used to assess market 
dominance, which do not differ fundamentally from the competition 
criteria applied in Britain and Germany, the approach taken by the 
Commission is rather flexible. In particular the market share criterion 
is, as in Britain, treated with a high degree of flexibility sharply 
contrasting with the German approach which is, partly due to legal 
presumptions (33 per cent threshold), rather focused on market 
shares. The general perception of the business community, namely 
that European concentration control is more lenient than German 
merger control, appears to be correct. With respect to Britain, a 
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The comparison of takeover regulation and barriers in Britain 
and Germany has contrasted two fundamentally diverging regulatory 
systems. The British regime governed by the City Code and 
administered by the Takeover Panel is well established and has 
been in operation for almost three decades the Panel having 
handled more than 6.000 announced takeover bids. Compared to 
this wealth of experience in Britain, the German takeover 
environment is still very much in its infancy with virtually no "real" 
Anglo-style (hostile) public takeover bids. Not surprisingly, thus, a 
proven regulatory framework for public takeover offers does not exist 
in Germany. The newly introduced voluntary German Takeover Code 
1995 might be a first (controversial) step into the right direction, but 
lacks an efficient enforcement mechanism. 
Various factors both legal and cultural have been identified 
causing this antagonistic situation thwarting the concept of a "level 
playing field" in the common market. While the British market for 
corporate control is by and large open to foreign bidders who are 
willing to act within the regulatory framework of the City Code, 
German stock corporations, albeit not impregnable, are difficult prey. 
To begin with, compared to Britain the German securities market 
is rather underdeveloped due to a different corporate finance 
tradition relying more on debt rather than equity financing. Hence, 
the number of suitable listed stock corporations with widely 
dispersed shares is comparatively small. Non-listed stock 
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corporations or limited companies do not normally qualify as targets 
as they are often either owned by few investors, typically a family, or 
are part of a (closed) corporate group and the transfer of shares is 
often made conditional upon the consent of all shareholders. 
Moreover, the organisational structure of German stock 
corporations as provided for in the Stock Corporations Act 1965 and 
ancilliary employment Acts is not conducive to a functioning market 
for corporate control. Unlike British public companies where the 
shareholders may remove a director before the expiration of his 
period of office by ordinary resolution, notwithstanding anything in 
the articles or in any agreement between the company and him, the 
two-tier board system in Germany makes things far more 
complicated. First of all, there is no direct right for the shareholders 
to dismiss the members of the management board, who effectively 
run the company. The shareholders may only dismiss the members 
of the supervisory board, a three-quarter majority usually being 
required, and it is then within the supervisory board's discretion to 
dismiss the members of the management board the underlying 
concept being the independence of the management board. 
Although the two-tier board system prevents a bidder having the 
required majority from immediately installing its own management, 
he would succeed in the long run. Nevertheless, though, the two-tier 
board system clearly hampers takeover bids. A drawback of the 
German system is that as a result of the high degree of 
independence from shareholders enjoyed by the management of a 
German stock corporation together with the absence of any risk of 
being fired, the management may not perform as efficiently and 
effectively as the shareholders as owners of the company might 
wish. Short-termism, however, an evil often complained about in 
connection with the British industry, as a result of the permanent 
pressure on the management to content shareholders financially with 
high dividends as opposed to long-term investment, is effectively 
prevented by the two-tier board system making the management to a 
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large extent independent from such pressure. The German two-tier 
board system clearly promotes long-term strategic planning and 
investment, a feature that has certainly contributed considerably to 
the relative success of German industry in the postwar period. To 
some extent, short-termism appears to be the price to pay for the 
benefits of a functioning market for corporate control. Put simply, in 
terms of corporate governance, Britain and Germany appear to 
represent two almost diametrically opposed models at an extreme: 
management discipline and efficiency through a functioning market 
for corporate control versus long-term strategy and investment 
through management independence from short-term shareholder 
pressure. 
In addition to the two-tier board system, another corporate 
governance feature to that degree unknown in English company law 
is the extensive employee representation and co-determination on 
supervisory board level guaranteed by German company and labour 
law. Again, this is no hard barrier preventing a bidder from winning 
control, but a factor making corporate governance at the post- 
acquisition stage more complicated and rendering German stock 
corporations less attractive to (foreign) bidders. Obviously, the 
structure of German stock corporations, in particular the division of 
power between shareholders, management and employees, is no 
barrier specifically erected to scare off (foreign) takeover bids, but a 
feature which has developed over decades as an intrinsic part of the 
corporate and political culture in Germany the consequence being 
that there is little prospect of any rapid change neither on national 
level nor through European initiatives. 
Another aspect with both legal and cultural implications on which 
the respective takeover environments in the U. K. and Germany differ 
substantially is the role of the banks. Due to a certain corporate 
financing tradition in Germany (close housebank relationship 
together with frequent bank representatives on supervisory boards of 
German blue chip companies), a number of legal provisions 
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patronizing the banks (restricted voting rights in combination with 
proxy voting by banks), together with the absence of stringent 
disclosure provisions and the fact that German banks often hold 
significant stakes in German stock corporations resulting in a rather 
non-transparent thicket of mutually supportive holdings and 
interlocks, German banks enjoy a uniquely powerful position. One of 
the major German banks opposing a (foreign) takeover bid would 
therefore constitute a major problem for any bidder. Unlike the 
corporate structure of German stock corporations there are, 
however, indications that the situation regarding the role of the banks 
will change slowly. The Securities Trading Act 1994, partly based on 
European Directives, has introduced relatively stringent disclosure 
provisions regarding listed stock corporations and the traditional 
housebank relationship might in times of increased competition in 
the banking sector lose some of its importance. The need for making 
the German securities market more open and transparent in order to 
win investor confidence and strengthen the competitive position of 
Germany as a financial centre has clearly been recognized by 
government and industry leaders as the "Finanzplatz Deutschland" 
campaign shows. It is very likely that in the next years legislation will 
be introduced restricting the power of banks. A legislative measure 
overdue, for example, is the abolition of restricted voting rights for 
listed stock corporations. Restricted voting rights are clearly intended 
to protect the incumbent management against shareholder pressure 
and boost the banks' power through their proxy votes. 
Present developments on European level, however, can not be 
expected to really further the idea of a level playing field for takeover 
bids. The newly proposed Takeover Directive 1996, being the result 
of a politcal compromise, is far too vague to bring about any tangible 
change. Neither does it provide for a sufficiently precise takeover 
procedure nor an imperative mechanism designed to protect minority 
shareholders. Such a Directive having little more than an alibi 
function is simply unnecessary. Pursuant to the European principle 
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of subsidiarity, it is submitted that the Commission should shelve the 
proposal for a Takeover Directive until a genuine consensus is found 
and, more importantly, until there is a real need for a Takeover- 
Directive. Clearly, with respect to Germany where inherent structural 
barriers effectively prevent or at least discourage public takeover 
bids it is difficult to see why a Directive providing for a takeover 
procedure and the protection of minority shareholders should do 
anything in terms of promoting a level playing field. Such a Directive 
makes sense only where there is already a takeover bid activity 
which needs to be regulated. Germany has not reached that stage 
yet. Concerning Britain, there is, of course, intensive public bid 
activity. But Britain has a well functioning regulatory framework and 
there is therefore equally little reason to believe that the U. K. should 
need the proposed Takeover Directive. 
It is submitted that what is needed are further efforts on 
European and national level to lessen the more structural barriers 
which obstruct cross border acquisitions. The proposed Fifth 
Directive contains some very useful measures to that effect, like the 
curtailment of voting right restrictions as installed by some listed 
German Stock Corporations. However, there appears to be little 
movement in that direction the proposed Fifth Directive remaining 
blocked for political reasons. Some of the barriers identified, 
however, like the two-tier board system and employee 
representation, are manifestations of the corporate-industrial culture 
in Germany and can for political reasons not simply be abolished by 
any legislative measure nor is this wanted in Germany. As the idea 
of a regulation providing for a European Company (Societas 
Europaea) is not on the agenda any more, the only real chance of a 
level playing field for takeovers will in the very long run come from 
slow change forced by increasing international competition and 





Merger control is a young field of law very much in a state of flux. 
It is inherently inexact and somewhat speculative as it is entirely 
based on a most complex prognosis as to how markets will develop 
in future as a result of a (proposed) merger. This prognosis is all the 
more difficult where international factors come into play which might 
be difficult to properly assess for a national or even European 
authority. Potential market entry, for example, is something nobody 
really can foresee. Although this thesis concentrates on the legal 
technicalities of merger control and deliberately avoids the 
fundamental economic question whether merger control makes 
sense at all, given the inherent inadequacies of merger control law 
this seems a question worth thinking about. Maybe market forces 
and the ability to prevent abuses of market power would suffice to 
guarantee sufficiently open and competitive markets. However, this 
is an issue clearly not on the agenda at present. 
The regulatory scene in Britain and Germany is characterized by 
the coexistence of national rules, which apply to "national' mergers, 
and the directly applicable European Merger Regulation, which is 
applicable where a concentration has a "Community dimension". The 
analysis has shown that the national merger control regimes of 
Britain and Germany reflect the different legal cultures in which they 
have developed. This is most evident with respect to the institutional 
frameworks of merger control. In Britain, where three institutions are 
charged with policing mergers, mergers may be blocked by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry only, hence, ultimately by a 
political institution. Thus, merger control is to some degree seen as a 
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means to shape industrial policy and therefore contains a political 
element. In Germany, it is distinctly seen as an administrative affair 
almost exclusively in the hands of the independent Federal Cartel 
Office and the courts, which are heavily involved in the merger 
control process as virtually no blocking decision remains legally 
unchallenged. 
This different approach to merger control is also mirrored in the 
substantive appraisal criteria. In the U. K. the relevant substantive 
criterion against which mergers are assessed is the public interest. 
This criterion is highly flexible allowing the merger control authorities 
to take into account all matters which appear to them in the particular 
circumstances to be relevant. Although, in line with German and 
European law, competition is by far the single most important public 
interest criterion taken into account by the U. K. authorities. The 
German Federal Cartel Office and the German courts strictly focus 
on the question whether the merger may be expected to result in the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Their flexiblity is 
further restricted by the weight attributed to the market share the 
merging enterprises are expected to attain by way of legal 
presumptions (33 per cent presumption) contained in the Act against 
Restraints of Competition. Merger control in Germany is therefore 
comparatively inflexible and rigid on the one hand, but rather 
predictable on the other. In Britain, the opposite tends to be true. 
In theory, there is no jurisdictional overlapping between the 
national and the European merger control authorities: the one-stop 
shop principle applies pursuant to which Brussels has access only to 
those concentrations which have a Community dimension. It has 
been demonstrated that the jurisdictional demarcation based on 
turnover thresholds set up by the Merger Regulation is rather 
simplistic and that there is a potential for jurisdictional conflict. 
However, any shortcomings of the Regulation in that respect have so 
far been easy to take for anybody involved as the current Community 
dimension thresholds are deliberately set at rather high level which 
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ensures that only relatively few concentrations come within the reach 
of the Merger Task Force at the Directorate General IV and the 
merger control regime exercised in Brussels has been rather lenient - 
too lenient as many in Germany claim. However, at least the relative 
importance of the Merger Task Force is probably going to grow in the 
long run. Although it seems unlikely for political reasons that the EC- 
Commission will succeed with its proposal to formally reduce the 
current thresholds, due to inflation, the enlargement of the European 
Union, and business transactions ever increasing in volume, more 
and more transactions will fall under the Regulation. 
A key problem of any national merger control system these days 
is the growing internationalization of markets. This does not only lead 
to multiple national filings which carry the inherent risk of conflicting 
decisions by national merger control authorities. Moreover, the 
national merger control authorities are at best seriously challenged 
with policing such mergers. Simply not to allow a geographic market 
definition exceeding national borders, as both the U. K. and German 
merger control authorities do, means closing the eyes to the 
commercial reality and looks like a trick rather than a solution. As 
large multinational companies operate at an international or even 
global stage, the national authorities monitoring these transactions 
also have to have an international perspective and cross-border 
powers if they are to be taken seriously as a counterweight to the 
multinational companies. It has been demonstrated that "foreign" 
mergers may well affect the national market. However, for reasons of 
the public international law principle of non-intervention in foreign 
affairs, the hands of the national authorities are by and large bound. 
Although these fundamental issues have been recognized and the 
Merger Regulation tries to tackle the problem to some degree, it is 
submitted that the efforts do not go far enough and the proposed 
threshold reduction would be a first step into the right direction. On a 
national level it appears that there is a need to redefine the role of 
the national merger control authorities in the face of an increasingly 
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international business world. Clearly, to hand over power to Brussels 
is a measure highly unpopular with both Britain and Germany. 
However, unlike takeover regulation, merger control can not be 




German Takeover Code Appendix 1 
German Takeover Code 1995 
Takeover Code of the Stock Exchange Experts Commission 
INTRODUCTION 
The Takeover Code is a set of recommended rules of conduct for parties involved in voluntary 
public takeover offers, which has been drawn up by the Stock Exchange Experts Commission. 
The Code is designed - without prejudice to any statutory rules - as a flexible instrument which 
can be adapted from time to time in accordance with practical experience. While not adressing 
the question of whether public takeovers are expedient, the Code is, nevertheless aimed at 
helping to ensure that public offers contain all the information necessary to enable a careful and 
properly informed decision to be made by the holders of securities and the boards of the relevant 
company (target). The Code is intended to prevent market manipulation and to ensure that all 
parties involved act in good faith. For this reason, the Code must be observed no only according 
to its letter but also according to its underlying purpose. 
DEFINITIONS 
Public Offers 
Public Offers within the meaning of this Code are public purchase and exchange offers for 
cash or in consideration of other securities, as well as invitations to make offers, which are made 
by an offeror to the holder of securities in a target (other than in fulfilment of a legal obligation) 
with the intention of acquiring those securities at a fixed cash price or by way of exchange for 
other securities within the meaning of section 2 paragraph 1 of the Securities Trading Act 
(WpHG). 
Offeror 
Offeror within the meaning of this Code is any natural or legal person who alone or together 
with other persons, makes a public offer. 
Target 
Target within the meaning of this Code is any stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) or 
partnership limited by shares (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien) with its corporate seat in 
Germany, the securities of which are the subject-matter of a public offer and are listed on a 
German stock exchange or have been included in the over-the-counter market (Freiverkehr) 
with the target's consent. 
Securities 
Securities within the meaning of this Code are all rights which the offeror is seeking to acquire 
and which directly or indirectly confer voting rights at the general meeting of the target. These 
include ordinary shares, shares with enhanced voting rights and those preference shares which 
This translations relies on a translation obtained from the German Takeover Panel 
which was prepared by law firm Fresh fields. Only the German version is authoritative. 
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carry voting rights at the time of the announcement of the offer, as well as substitutes for such securities (e. g. American Depository Receipts, ADRs). Rights to subscribe for those shares 
which can be newly created by a unilateral declaration on the part of the holder of the right are also securities within the meaning of this Code. The Code also applies to offers to acquire 
securities resulting from an issue which have been neither admitted to trading on a stock exchange nor included in the over-the-counter market (Freiverkehr), if other securities resulting from the same issue are traded on a stock exchange. 
If a public offer is made for non-voting preference shares, the rules of the Code shall apply by 
way of analogy. 
Takeover Panel 
The member of the Takeover Panel will be appointed by the Commission of Stock Exchange Experts Commission. The Takeover Panel will mainly be responsible for the resolution of disputes. 
Executive 
The Executive of the Takeover Panel is its executive arm. The Executive is responsible for 
monitoring compliance with the Code. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article 1 
In the course of a public offer, the offeror must treat all holders of securities of the same class 
equally. 
Article 2 
The offeror and the target must provide all holders of securities which are the target of the 
public offer with the same information needed to evaluate the offer. The information must be 
accurate and stated in an approriate manner. This applies not only to the information set out in 
Article 7 but also to any additional information given, irrespective of whether it is contained in the 
offer itself or otherwise made public by the offeror or the target. 
Where a public offer has been made, the management board (Vorstand) of the target is 
obliged, upon proper exercise of its discretion and in the interests of the holders of securities, to 
make such information as has been made available to the original offeror also available to any 
other persons who have demonstrated a genuine interest in taking over the target. The 
Takeover Panel shall determine, upon application by the target, whether or not such interest is 
genuine. 
Article 3 
During the offer period the offeror and the target must refrain from doing anything which could 
result in unusual changes in the market price of securities of the target or securities which are 
being offered in exchange for securities of the target. In particular, statements should be avoided 
which could mislead the holders of securities of the offeror or of the target or which could 
mislead the market. 
Article 4 
The announcement of an offer should generally be preceded by consultations between the 
offeror and the target. 
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Article 5 
Prior to making a public offer, the offeror must inform the target, the German stock exchange 
on which the securities of the target and, where applicable, the securities offered in exchange 
are listed, the Federal Supervisory Office for Securities Trading and the Executive of the Takeover Panel as to the content of the offer and thereafter publish the offer without delay in at least one national journal for mandatory stock exchange notices (Bbrsenpflichtblatt). 
Article 6 
For the purposes of the preparation and implementation of the offer the offeror shall retain the 
services of an undertaking authorised to provide investment services within the meaning of the EC Directive. This undertaking shall have either its seat or a branch in a member state of the European Union. 
CONTENT OF THE OFFER 
Article 7 
The offer must include at least the following: 
1. name of the offeror and, where applicable, the undertaking retained pursuant to Article 6 
of the Code; 
2. name of the target; 
3. the securities which are the subject-matter of the offer; 
4. the maximum and/or minimum amount of securities which the offeror undertakes to 
acquire together with an explanation of the allotment procedure pursuant to Article 10; 
5. information concerning the purchase price or other consideration and about the 
implementation of the offer; 
6. information concerning the principal factor relevant to the determination of the 
consideration; 
7. indication of wheterh the offer will be accepted upon the shareholder of the target 
declaring his acceptance or whether the shareholders of the target are merely being 
invited to offer securities of the target to the offeror; 
8. information concerning timing and concerning the amount of securities of the target 
acquired by the offeror prior to the offer and any contracts entered into in respect of such 
securities but not yet performed; 
9. where applicable, information concerning direct and indirect holdings of the target in the 
offeror (to the extent known); 
10. any statement made by the target; 
11. the offer period; 
12. any conditions attached to the offer and any right of withdrawal reserved by the offeror; 
13. information concerning the aims and intentions of the offeror in relation to the target and 
the possible effects of a successful offer, in particular with regard to the financial situation 
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of the offeror and the target; 
14. notice of the effecto that holders of securities of the target have a right to withdraw from 
the acceptance of the offer pursuant to Article 14; 
15. notification of the date on which the result of the offer will be published; 
16. indication of the progress of any merger control procedure (if applicable); 
17. notice of any dispensation granted by the Takeover Panel form provisions of this Code (if 
applicable); 
18. undertakings by the offeror to comply with the provisions of this Code. 
Article 8 
Any announcement addressed to holders of securities of the target shall be prepared with the 
higest standards of care and accuracy. 
Article 9 
The offer may only be made subject to conditions the fulfilment of which cannot be brought 
about by the offeror itself. In case of doubt, the conditions should be cleared with the Executive. 
Article 10 
If the number of securities held by holders of securities accepting the public offer is higher than 
the number of securities which the offeror has undertaken to acquire, the acceptances by 
holders of securities must be scaled down on a pro rata basis. 
Article 11 
The offeror must give the holders of securities which are the subject-matter of the offer an 
appropriate period of time to consider the offer and come to a decision. The offer period must be 
at least 28 days but no more than 60 days. 
DUTIES OF THE OFFEROR 
Article 12 
Following the announcement of its public offer, the offeror is obliged, by the following business 
day, to notify the Executive and to publish all dealings (number, price) in securities of the target 
which have been carried out by it for its account following announcement of the public offer. This 
duty alos applies to dealings in securities within the meaning of section 2 paragraph 1 of the 
Securities Trading Act if such securities are offered in exchange for securities of the target. It 
does not apply to the acquisition of shares in reliance on section 71 paragraph 1 No. 2 of the 
Stock Corporation Act. 
Article 13 
If the offeror acquires securities of the target during the offer period on more favourable terms 
than those set out in the offer, the more favourable terms shall apply to all holders of securities 
of the same class even if they have already accepted the public offer. 
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Article 14 
The offeror may, within the offer period, make an offer which is more favourable to the holders 
of securities of the target - in particular if, following publication of the offer pursuant to Article 5, 
more favourable offers for the purchase of the relevant securities of the target are made by third 
parties. In such a case, the offeror may extend the original offer period by a period cleared with 
the Executive. If the offeror makes use of this right, it must ensure that all holders of securities 
who have already accepted the offer are (retrospectively) treated equally. Such holders of 
securities shall have the right to withdraw from the offer already accepted in order to accept the 
more favourable offer. 
Article 15 
If during a period to be specified by he offeror in the offer, which period must not be less than 
12 months, a more favourable voluntary offer is made by the offeror, and if during this period no 
offer is made by a third party, then the offeror must also make the more favourable offer 
available to those who accepted the initial offer. 
Article 16 
If, following the entry into force of this Code, a holder of securities comes to hold more than 
50 per cent of the voting rights in a target (including voting rights which are deemed to be held 
by him pursuant to section 22 paragraph 1 of the Securities Trading Act) (majority shareholder), 
as a result of acquisitions on or off the stock exchange, and if, within a period of 18 months from 
the date on which this threshold has been exceeded, neither the traget nor the majority 
shareholder has passed resolutions for: 
an enterprise agreement with the target in accordance with sections 291 et seq. of the 
Stock Corporations Act; 
the integration of the target in accordance with sections 319 et seq. of the Stock 
Corporations Act; 
a change of the legal form of the target in accordance with sections 190 et seq. of the 
Conversion Act (Umwandlungsgesetz); 
the merger of the target with the majority shareholder in accordance with sections 2 et 
seq. of the Conversion Act; 
then the majority shareholder shall within a further period of three months make an offer to all 
other holders of securities of the target for the acquisition of the remaining securities (mandatory 
offer). 
A mandatory offer is dispensable: 
if the 50 per cent threshold was exceeded by virture of securities which the majority 
shareholder holds only for an interim period for the purposes of placing them with third 
parties; 
in the event that the majority shareholder unintentionally acquires more than 50 per cent 
of the voting rights of the target and without delay reduces his share in the voting rights to 
50 per cent or less; 
if, within a period of 18 months following the date on which the 50 per cent threshold was 
exceeded, the majority shareholder has been released by the general meeting of the 
target, from the obligation to make a mandatory offer and has prior thereto confirmed in 
writing to the Executive that he will not exercise his voting rights when this item of the 
agenda is voted upon. 
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Voting rights attaching to securities which are held for dealing purposes and for which an 
exemption has been granted by the Federal Supervisory Office for Securities Trading under 
section 23 paragraph 2 of the Securities Trading Act shall not be taken into account. 
Article 17 
If, after exceeding the 50 per cent threshold and prior to making the mandatory offer, a 
majority shareholder has not made any further purchases of securities of the target, the price 
offered in the course of the mandatory offer must resonably reflect the then current market price. 
It shold not be more than 25 per cent below the price which the majority shareholder paid for 
securities of the target in the six month period prior to the passing of the threshold. 
If, 7after exceeding the 50 per cent threshold and prior to making the mandatory offer, a 
majority shareholder has made further purchases of securities of the target, the the weighted 
average price paid in the course of such purchases shall, provided that it is higher than the price 
referred to in paragraph 1 above, be used as the basis for determining the price to be offered in 
the course of the mandatory offer. 
These provisions shall apply by way of analogy if securities are offered by way of exchange. 
DUTIES OF THE TARGET 
Article 18 
The target shall publish without delay - and, at the latest, within 2 weeks following publication 
of the offer -a reasoned statement of its position in relation to the offer. 
Article 19 
After the announcement of a public offer and prior to the announcement of the result of the 
offer, the administrative or executive boards of the target (including the administrative or 
executive boards of any company associated with the target) may not take any measures which 
conflict with the interests of the holders of securities in accepting the offer. 
This applies inter alia to resolutions regarding: 
the issue of new securities; 
material changes to the assets or liabilities of the target; and 
the conclusion of agreements outside the ordinary course of business. 
This shall not apply to ongoing captial measures or to the performance of contracts which had 
been entered into by the target prior to the announcement of the public offer or if the general 
meeting expressly authorises these measures to be taken in the event of a public offer. 
TAKEOVER PANEL 
Article 20 
1. The Takeover Panel shall consist of at least seven but not more than fifteen members. 
2. The members of the Takeover Panel, its Chairman and his Deputies, shall be appointed 
by the Stock Exchange Experts Commission. 
German Takeover Code Appendix 1 
3. The appointment will be made for a period of five years. A re-appointment is possible. 
4. When deciding upon the composition of the Takeover Panel, particular regard should be 
had to the following groups: 
issuers; 
- institutional investors; 
- private investors; 
credit institutions and providers of investment services. 
5. If a member of the Takeover Panel leaves, the Stock Exchange Experts Commission 
shall appoint a new member for the remaining term of office of the member who has left. 
6. The Stock Exchange Experts Commission shall issue rules of management and 
procedure for the Takeover Panel and the Executive. 
7. The Takeover Panel shall appoint the Head of the Executive Bureau. 
Article 21 
Potential offerors, targets and providers of investment services are asked to acknowledge the 
provisions of the Code. The Executive will regularly publish a list of those enterprises and 
persons who have acknowledged these provisions. 
If this Code is contravened, the Executive may publish its comments, recommendations and 
decisions in relation to the particular case. Prior to publication, the Executive must grant the 
parties concerned a hearing. The parties concerned may then appeal to the Takeover Panel 
prior to publication and the Takeover Panel's decision shall be final. 
Article 22 
Within a period of two weeks following its announcement, the Executive shall examine whether 
or not a public offer complies with the Code. The offeror, the target and the enterprises involved 
pursuant to Article 5 shall give the Executive all information necessary for the supervision of, and 
compliance with, the Code. 
Article 23 
The Takeover Panel may (wholly or partly) release the offeror or the target from individual 
provisions of the Code if the application of such provisions would damage the legitimate 
interests of the offeror, the target or the holders of securities of the target. This applies, in 
particular, to the duty to make an offer pursuant to Article 16. Any decision regarding such 
release will be published, with reasons, by the Takeover Panel. 
Article 24 
This Code shall come into force on 1 October 1995. 
Frankfurt, 14 July 1995 
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German Stock Corporation Act 1965* 
§12 
Voting right. No multiple voting rights 
(1) Each share gives the right to vote. However, under the provisions of this Act preference 
shares without a voting right may be issued. 
(2) Multiple voting rights are not permitted. The hightest competent authority for the economy 
of the state in which the association has its domicile may grant exceptions to the extent this is 
necessary to guard prevailing interests of the general economy. 
§15 
Connected enterprises 
Connected enterprises are legally independent enterprises which in relation to each other 
constitute either enterprises held by a majority and enterprises holding the majority (§ 16), 
dependent and dominant enterprises (§ 17), group enterprises (§ 18), mutually participating 
enterprises (§ 19), or parties to enterprise contracts (§§ 291,292). 
§16 
Enterprises held by majority and enterprises holding the majority 
(1) If the majority of the shares in a legally independent enterprise belongs to another 
enterprise or if another enterprise is entitled to the majority of the voting rights (holding the 
majority), then such enterprise constitutes an enterprise held by a majority, and the other 
enterprise is an enterprise holding it with a majority. 
(2) For (ordinary) corporations the portion of shares which belongs to an enterprise is 
determined by the ratio which the aggregate nominal amount of the participations belonging to it 
bears to the nominal capital, and for mining corporation by the ration between the number of the 
mining shares. Shares held in tis won enterprise shall be deducted, for (ordinary) corporations 
from the nominal capital, for mining corporations from the number of the mining shares. Shares 
in the enterprise belonging to another for the account of the enterprise are deemed to be 
equivalent to holding shares in its own enterprise. 
(3) The portion of the voting rights to which an enterprise is entitled is determined by the ratio 
of the number of the voting rights which it may exercise from the shares belonging to it to the 
For a complete translation of the of the German Stock Corporation Act 1965 refer to 
Schneider/Heidenhain, The German Stock Corporation Act, Kluwer Law International, 
1996. See also Müller/Galbraith, The German Stock Corporation Law, 2nd edition 
1976, Fritz Knapp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. The translation contained in this 
Appendix is based on this text. A translation of the relevant provisions of the law of 
groups, §§ 291-328 of the Stock Corporation Act, can also be found in 
Schmitthoff/Wooldridge, Groups of Companies, London, 1991. 
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aggregate number of all voting rights. From the aggregate number of all voting rights there shall be deducted the voting rights from shares held in its own enterprise as well as from shares 
which are equivalent pursuant to subsection 2 sentence 3. 
(4) In shares belonging to an enterprise there shall also be included shares belongign to an 
enterprise dependent on it or to another for the account of the enterprise or of an enterprise 
dependent on the latter and, if the owner of the enterprise is a single trader, also those 
participations which constitute other property of the owner. 
§17 
Dependent and domiating enterprises 
(1) Dependent enterprises are legally independent enterprises on which another enterprise 
(dominating enterprise) is able to directly or indirectly exercise a dominating influence. 
(2) It is presumed that an enterprise held by a majority is dependent on the enterprise holding 
the majority. 
§18 
Corporate group and group enterprises 
(1) If a dominating and one or more dependent enterprises are joined by the uniform direction 
of the dominating enterprise, then they consitute a corporate group; the individual enterprises 
are group enterprises. Enterprises between which a contract of domination exists (§ 291) or if 
one of them is integrated into the other (§ 319) are to be considered as joined by a uniform 
direction. It is presumed that a dependent enterprise forms a corporate group with the 
dominating enterprise. 
(2) If legally independent enterprises are joined by a uniform direction without the one 
enterprise being dependent on the other, then thy also constitute a corporate group; the 
individual enterprises are group enterprises. 
§19 
Mutually participating enterprises 
(1) Mutually participating enterprises are enterprises with a domestic domicile in the legal form 
of an (ordinary) corporation on a mining corporation which are connected in such a manner that 
each enterprise owns more than one fourth of the shares in the other enterprise. § 16 
subsection 2 sentence 1, subsection 4 apply to the determination of whether or not an enterprise 
owns more than one fourth of the participations in the other enterprise. 
(2) If one of the mutually participating enterprises holds a majority in the other enterprise or if 
one is able to directly or indirectly exercise a dominanting influence on the enterprise, then the 
one is to be considered a dominating, the other a dependent enterprise. 
(3) If each of the mutually participating enterprises holds a majority in the other enterprise or if 
each is able to exercise a dominating influence directly or indirectly on the other enterprise, then 
both enterprises are to be considered as dominating and as dependent. 
(4) § 328 is not to be applied to enterprises which constitute dominating or dependent 
enterprises pursuant to subsections 2 and 3. 
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§ 20 
Duty to disclose 
Appendix 2 
(1) As soon as an enterprise owns more than one fourth of the shares of a stock corporation 
with a domestic domicile it shall inform the association of this fact in writing without undue delay. § 16 subsection 2 sentence 1, subsection 4 apply to the determination of whether or not the 
enterprise owns more than one fourth of the shares. 
(2) With respect to the duty to inform pursuant to subsection 1 there shall also be counted as 
shares belonging to the enterprise those shares 
1. the transfer of ownership of which the enterprise, on an enterprise dependent on it, or 
another for the account of the enterprise or of an enterprise depedent on the latter, may 
demand; 
2. which the enterprise, or an enterprise dependent on it, or another for the account of the 
enterprise or of an enterprise dependent on the latter, is obligated to take over. 
(3) If the enterpris i an (ordinary) corporation or a mining corporation, then it shall also inform 
the association in writing without undue delay as sonn as it owns more than one fourth of the 
shaes, not including the shares pursuant to subsection 2. 
(4) As soon as the enterprise holds a majoritiy (§ 16 subsection 1) it shall also inform the 
association of this fact in writing without undue delay. 
(5) If the participation no longer exists in the amount creating the duty to inform pursuant to 
subsections 1,3 or 4, then the association shall be informed of this fact in writing wuthout undue 
delay. 
(6) The association shall publish the existence of a participation of which it has been informed 
pursuant to subsections 1 or 4 in the association's journal without undue delay; the enterprise to 
which the participation belongs shall be named therein. If the association is informed that the 
participation has ceased to exist in the amount creating the duty to inform pursuant to 
subsections 1 or 4 then this fact shall alos be published in the association's journal without 
undue delay. 
(7) Rights from shares which belong to an enterprise obligated to inform pursuant to 
subsections 1 or 4 may not be exercised for the period in which the enterprise has failed to give 
the information neither by the enterprise itself, nor by an enterprise dependent on it, nor by 
another for the account of the enterprise or of an enterprise dependent on the latter. 
§21 
Duty of the association to disclose 
(1) As soon as the association owns more than one fourth of the participations in another 
(ordinary) corporation or mining corporation with domestic domicile it shall inform the enterprise 
in which the participation exists of this fact in writing without undue delay. § 16 subsection 2 
sentence 1, subsection 4 apply accordingly to determine whether or not the association owns 
more than one fourth of the shares. 
(2) As soon as the association holds the majority (§ 16 subsection 1) in another enterprise it 
shall inform the enterprise in which it holds the majority of this fact in writing without undue delay. 
(3) If the participation no longer exists in the amount creating the duty to inform pursuant to 
subsections 1 or 2, the association shall inform the other enterprise of this fact in writing witout 
undue delay. 
German Stock Corporation Act Appendix 2 
(4) Rights from participations which belong to an association obligated to inform pursuant to subsections 1 or 2 may not be exercised for the period in which it has faiiled to disclose the information. 
§ 22 
Evidence of the participations so communicated 
An enterprise to which an information has been given pursuant to §2 subsections 1,3 or 4, § 21 subsections 1 or 2 may request at any time to be shown evidence of the existence of the participation. 
§ 68 
Transfer of nominative shares. Transcription in the share register 
(1) Nominative shares may be transferred by indorsement. For the form of the indorsement, the evidence of the holder's title and his obligation to deliver articles 12,13 and 16 of the Bills of Exchange law (Wechselgesetz) apply accordingly. 
(2) The articles of association may make the transfer dependent on the consent of the 
association. The consent is granted by the board of management. The articles of association 
may determine the reasons for which the consent may be refused. 
(3) If a nominative share passes to another person, then the association must be notified. The 
share must be submitted and evidence of the passing must be given. The association registers 
the passing in the share register. 
(4) The association is obligated to examine the regularity of the chain of indorsements and of 
the declarations of transfer, but not the signatures. 
(5) These provisions apply accordingly to interim certificates. 
§ 76 
Direction of the stock corporation 
(1) The board of management shall direct the association as a matter of its own responsibility. 
(2) The board of management may consist of one or more persons. In associations with a 
share capital of more than three million Deutsche Mark it shall consist of at least two persons 
unless the article of association determine that it shall consist of one person. The provisions 
regarding the appointment of a director of personnel remain unaffected. 




(1) If the board of management consists of serveral persons, then all of the members of the 
board of management are authorized only to manage jointly. The articles of association or the 
rules of business of the board of management may determine otherwise; it may not however be 
dtermined that one or more members of the board of management may decide differences of 
opinion within the board of management against the majority of its members. 
(2) The board of management may set up its rules of business unless the articles of 
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asociation have conferred upon the supervisory board the issuing of rules of business or the 
supervisory board issues rules of business for the board of management. The articles of 
association may regulate the rules of business in detail with binding effect. Resolutions of the board of management regarding its rules of business must be taken unanimously. 
§ 78 
Outside Representation 
(1) The board of management represents the association in and out of court. 
(2) If the board of management consists of serveral persons, then all members of the board of 
management are only authorized to represent the association jointly, provided the articles of 
association do not provide otherwise. If a statement with legal effect must be made to the 
association, making it to one member of the board of management suffices. 
(3) The articles of association may alos determine that individual members of the baord of 
management are aothorized to represent the association solely or jointly with a Prokurist. The 
supervisory board may make the same dtermination, provided the articles of association 
authorize it to do so. Subsection 2 sentence 2 applies accordingly in these cases. 
(4) Members of the board of management authorized to represent jointly may authorize 
individual members among themselves to transact a certain business or certain kinds of 
business. This applies accordingly if an individual member of the board of management is 
authorized to represent the association jointly with a Prokurist. 
§ 84 
Appointment and removal of management 
(1) The supervisory board appoints members of the board of management for a maximum of 
five yeras. A renewal of the appointment or extension of the period of office is permissible, in 
each case for a maximum of five years. This requires a renewed resolution of the supervisory 
baord which may be taken at the earliest one year before the expiration of the current term of 
office. An extension of the period of office may only be given, without a new resolution of the 
supervisory board, for an poointment for less tahn five years, provided the aggregate term of 
office does not thereby constitute more than five years. This applies accordingly to a contract of 
employment; however it may provide that it continues to apply in the case of an extension of the 
term of office an until the term expires. 
(2) If several persons are appointed as members of the board of management, then the 
supervisory board may nominate a member as chairman of the board of management. 
(3) The supervisory board may revoke the appointment of a member of the board of 
management or the nomination as cahirman of the board of management if there is an justified 
reason for doing so. In particular a gross violation of duties, incapability of proper management 
or withdrawal of confidence by the shareholders' meeting, unless the confidence has been 
withdrawn for obviously arbitrary reasons, constituts such justified reason. This applies also to 
the board of management which was appointed by the first supervisory board. The revocation is 
effective until its ineffectiveness has been determined by a final court decree. For claims under 
the contract of employment, the general provisions of law apply. 
(4) The provisions concerning special majorities required for a resolution of the supervisory 
board regarding the appointment or removal of a labour-director contained in the Act of 21 May 
1951 (Bundesgesetzblatt I. S. 347) concerning the co-determination of employees in the 
supervisory and management boards of mining and steel corporations (Montan- 
Mitbestimmungsgesetz) apply notwithstanding anything stipulated in the previous subsections. 
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§ 87 
Principles for the compensation of members of the board of management 
(1) The supervisory board shall take care in determining the aggregate compensation of the 
individual member of the board of management (salary, profit sharing, compensations for 
expenses, insurance premiums, commissions and fringe benefits of any kind) in such a way that 
the aggregate compensation keeps within reasonable relation to the duties of the member of the 
board of management and to the situation of the association. This applies accordingly to 
pensions, payments to surviving dependents and consideration of a related kind. 
(2) If after the determination a substantial deterioration of the associations situation occurs in 
such a way that the continuation of the compensation referred to in subsection 1 sentence 1 
would constitute a grave inequity to the association, then the supervisory board, and the court 
upon motion of the supervisory board in the case of § 85 subsection 3, are authorized to make 
resonable reductions. The contract of employment is otherwise not affected by a reduction. The 
member of the board of management may however terminate his contract of employment as of 
the end of the next calender quarter year, with a period of notice of six weeks. 
(3) If bankruptcy proceedings are instituted against the association's assests and if the 
receiver in bankruptcy serves notice to terminate the contract of employment of a member of the 
board of management, then such member may only claim the damage, arising out of the 
termination of the employment. The same applies if composition proceedings are instituted 
against the association and the association serves notice to terminate the contract of 
employment. 
§ 93 
Duty of diligence and liability of members of the board of management 
(1) In their management the members of the board of management shall employ the diligence 
of an orderly and conscientious manager. They shall keep secret the confidential statements 
and secrets of the association, espcially trade and operational secrets which have become 
known to them from their service on the board of management. 
(2) Members of the board of management who violate their duties are jointly and serverally 
liable to the association for the resulting damage. If it is contested whether or not they have 
applied the diligence of an orderly and conscientious manager, then the burden of proof is on 
them. (continues with subsections 3-6) 
§ 95 
Number of members of the supervisory board 
The supervisory board consists of three members. The articles of association may determine a 
specific higher number. The number must be divisible by three. The maximum number of 
members of the supervisory board is for associations with a share capital 
up to 3.000.000 Deutsche Mark at nine 
of more than 3.000.000 Deutsche Mark at fifteen 
of more than 20.000.000 Deutsche Mark at twentyone. 
Deviating provisions of the Act of 21 May 1951 (Bundesgesetzblatt I. S. 347) concerning the 
co-determination of employees in the supervisory and management boards of mining and steel 
corporations (Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz) and of the Act to amend the law on co- 
determination of employees in the supervisory and management boards of mining and steel 
corporations of 7 August 1956 (Bundesgesetzblatt I. S. 707 Mitbestimmungsänderungsgesetz) 
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are not affected by the foregoing provisions. 
§ 96 
Composition of the supervisory board 
(1) The supervisory board is composed 
in associations to the the Co-determination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) applies, of members 
of the supervisory board of the shareholders and of employee members, 
in associations to which the Act of 21 May 1951 (Bundesgesetzblatt I. S. 347) concerning the 
co-determination of employees in the supervisory and management boards of mining and steel 
corporations (Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz) applies, the members of the supervisory board of 
the shareholders and of employee members and additional members, 
in associations to which §§ 5 to 13 of the Co-determination Amendment Act 
(Mitbestimmungsänderungsgesetz) apply, of members of the supervisory board of the 
shareholders and of employee members and of one additional member, 
in associations to which § 76 subsection 1 of the Works Constitution Act 1952 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) applies, of members of the supervisory board of the shareholders 
and of employee members, 
in other associations only of members of the supervisory board of the shareholders. 
§ 101 
Appointment of members of the supervisory board 
(1) The members of the supervisory board are elected by the shareholders' meeting unless 
they are to be named to the supervisory board or to be elected as employee members of the 
supervisory board pursuant to the Co-determination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz), the Co- 
determination Amendment Act (Mitbestimmungsänderungsgesetz), or the Works Constitution 
Act 1952 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). The shareholders' meeting is only bound by electon 
proposals pursuant to §§ 6 and 8 of the Co-determinantion Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz). 
(2) A right to name members of the supervisory board may only be granted by the articles of 
association and only for specific shareholders or for the holder at the applicable time of specific 
shares. Holders of specific shares may only be grated the right to name supervisory board 
members if the shares are nominative shares (not bearer shares) and if their transfer requires 
the consent of the association. The shares of the holders of the right to name are not considered 
as a special class. Rights to name may only be granted for the maximum altogether of one third 
of the number of the members of the supervisory board as determined by the law or the articles 
of association. (continues) 
§ 102 
Term of office of the members of the supervisory board 
(1) Members of the supervisory board may not be appointed for a period beyond the end of 
the shareholders" meeting which decides on the discharge from responsibility for the fourth fiscal 
year after the beginning of the term of office. The fiscal year in which the term of office begins is 
not counted. 
(2) The office of the member for replacement terminates at the latest with the expiration of the 
term of office of the replaced member of the supervisory board. 
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§ 103 
Removal of the members of the supervisory board 
(1) Members of the supervisory board who were elected by the shareholders' meeting without 
it being bound to an election proposal may be removed by it prior to the expiration of their term 
of office. The resolution requires a majority which comprises at least three fourths of the votes 
cast. The articles of association may determine a different majority and additional requirements. 
(2) A member of the supervisory board who has been named to the supervisory board on the 
basis of the articles of association may be removed and replaced by another at any time by the 
party entitled to the right to name. If the preconditions for the right to name as determined by the 
articles of associations have ceased to exist, then the shareholders' meeting may remove the 
named member with a simple majority of votes. 
(3) Upon motion by the supervisory board for cause regarding the person of a member of the 
supervisory board, the court shall remove this member. The supervisory board decides on 
making the motion with a simple majority. If the member of the supervisory board has been 
named to the supervisory on the basis of the articles of association, the the shareholders whose 
shares equal the aggregate of one tenth of the share capital or the nominal amount of two 
million Deutsche Mark may also make the motion. An immediate appeal is permissible against 
the decision. 
(4) In addition to subsection 3, the Co-determination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz), the Co- 
determination Act concerning the coal and steel industry (Montan-Mitbestimmungsgesetz), Co- 
determination Amendment Act (Mitbestimmungsanderungsgesetz), and the Works Constitution 
Act 1952 apply to the removal of the members of the supervisory board who were neither 
elected by the shareholders' meeting without it being bound to an election proposal nor named 
to the supervisory board on the basis of the articles of association. 
(5) The provisions for the removal of the member of the supervisory board apply to the 
removal of the member appointed for his replacement. 
§ 111 
Duties and rights of the supervisory board 
(1) The supervisory board shall supervise the management. 
(2) The supervisory board may inspect and examine the books and records of the association 
as well as the assets, in particular the association's cash on hand and the inventory of securities 
and merchandies. It may also commission with this individual members or charge special 
experts with specific assignments. 
(3) The supervisory board must call a shareholders' meeting if the welfare of the association 
requries it. For the resolution a simple majority suffices. 
(4) Measures of the management cannot be conferred upon the supervisory board. The 
articles of association or the supervisory board may however determine that specific kinds of 
transactions may only be entered into with its consent. If the supervisory board refuses its 
consent, then the board of management may request that the shareholders' meeting decide on 
the consent. The resolution by which the shareholders' meeting consents requires a majority 
which comprises at least three fourths of the votes cast. The articles of association may 
determine neither a different majority nor additional requirements. 
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§ 116 
Duty of diligence and liability of members of the supervisory board 
§ 93 regarding the duty of diligence and the liability of the members of the board of management apply accordingly to the duty of diligence and the liablilty of the members of the supervisory board. 
§ 134 
Voting right 
(1) The voting right is exercised pursuant to the nominal amounts of the shares. In case a shareholder owns several shares the articles of association may limit the voting right by determining a maximum amount or graduations. In addition the articles of association may determine that the shares which belong to another person for the account of a shareholder shall be counted together with the shares owned by the shareholder. In case the shareholder is an enterprise, it may in addition determine that, together with the shares owned by it, those shares 
which belong to an enterprise dependent on it or dominating it or being connected with it in a 
combine or which belong to another person for the account of such enterprises, shall also be 
counted. The limitations are not considered for the calculation of a capital majority required by the law or the articles of association. 
(2) The voting right begins with the complete performance of the contribution. (continues) 
(3) The voting right may be exercised by a holder of a proxy. It is required and sufficient that 
the proxy be in writing. The proxy shall be submitted to the association and remains in its 
custody. 
(4) The form of exercising the voting right follows the articles of association. 
§ 135 
Exercising of the voting right by banks and persons acting professionally 
(1) A bank may only exercise or cause to exercised a voting right for bearer shares which do 
not belong to it if it is authorized in writing. In its own shareholders' meeting the authorized bank 
may only exercise the voting right by virtue of the proxy to the extent that the shareholder has 
expressly given directives for the individual subjects on the agenda. 
(2) A proxy may only be issued to a specific bank and only for the maximum of fifteen month. 
It is revocable at any time. The form of the proxy must be fully completed when it is issued and 
may not contain other declarations. It shall contain the date of the signing. The period in 
sentence 1 begins, at the latest, with the date of the signing. 
(3) The authorized bank may only substitute persons who are not its employees if the proxy 
expressly permits a substitution and the authorized bank has no branch at the location of the 
shareholders' meeting. The same applies to a transfer of the proxy by the authorized bank. 
(4) The bank may exercise the voting right from the proxy in the name and by naming the 
shareholder. If the proxy so determines the bank may also exercise the voting right in the name 
of whoever is concerned. If the bank exercises the voting right in the shareholder's name by 
naming him, the certificate of the proxy shall be submitted to the association and be held in 
custody by it. If it exercises the voting right in the name of whoever is concerned, the compliance 
with the requriements provided for in the articles of association for the exercise of the voting 
right is sufficient evidence towards the association of its right to vote; if the articles of association 
contain no provisions, the presentation of the shares or of a certificate to deposit of the shares 
with a notary or a secuirties deposit bank, suffices. 
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(5) If the shareholder has not given directives to the bank for exercising the voting right, then the bank shall exercise the voting right in accordance with its own proposals as communicated 
to the shareholders, pursuant to § 128 subsection 2, unless the bank may assume from the 
circumstances that the shareholder would, with the knowledge of the facts, approve of deviating in the esxercise of the voting right. 
(6) The effectiveness of the casting of the vote is not impaired by a violation of subsection 1 
sentence 2, subsections 2,3 and 5. 
(7) A bank may exercise the voting right of nominative shares which do not belong to it an if it 
is entered into the stock ledger as their holder, only on the basis of a proxy in writing in the name 
and by naming the shareholder. Subsection 1 sentence 2, subsections 2,3 and 5 shall apply to 
an authorization or to a proxy, in addition subsection 4 sentence 3 shall apply to the proxy. 
Otherwise subsection 6 applies. 
(8) The bank shall inform the shareholder and give the reasons, if by exercising the voting 
right it has deviated from a directive of the shareholder or, if the shareholder has not given a 
directive, it has deviated from its own proposal as communicated to the shareholder pursuant to 
§ 128 subsection 2. 
(9) Subsections 1 to 8 apply accordingly to the exercising of the voting right by 
1. associations of shareholders, 
2. managers and employees of a bank, if the shares which do not belong to them have been 
entrusted to the bank for custody. 
3. persons who professionally offer towards shareholders to exercise the voting right in the 
shareholders" meeting. 
This does not apply if the person who wishes to exercise the voting right is the legal 
representative or the spouse of the shareholder or related to him up to the fourth degree of 
consanguinity or of relation by marriage. 
(10) A bank is obligated to accept the order of a shareholder to exercise the voting right in a 
shareholders' meeting if its keeps shares of the association to exercise the voting right in the 
same sharholders' meeting. The obligation does not exist if the bank maintains no branch at the 
location of the shareholders' meeting and the shareholder has not permitted the transfer of the 
proxy to or the substitution of persons who are not employees of the bank. 
(11) The liability of the bank to compensate for damages resulting from a violation of 
subsections 1 to 3,5,7,8 or 10 may not be excluded nor limited in advance. 
§ 291 
Contract of domination. Contract to transfer profits 
(1) Enterprise contracts are contracts by which as stock corporation or an association limited 
by shares subjects the direction of its association to another enterprise (contract of domination) 
or by which it obligates itself to transfer all its profits to another enterprise (contract to transfer 
profits). A contract by which a stock corporation or an association limited by shares undertakes 
to conduct its enterprise for the account of another enterprise is also considered as a contract to 
transfer all of the profit. 
(2) If the enterprises which are not dependent on each other submit themselves by contract to 
a uniform direction, without having one of them become therewith dependent on another of the 
contracting enterprises, then this contract does not constitute a contract of domination. 
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§ 328 
Limitation of rights 
(1) If a stock corporation or an association limited by shares and another enterprise constitute 
mutually participating enterprises, then as soon as the existence of the mutual participation has 
become known to one enterprise or the other enterprise has made a communication to it 
pursuant to § 20 subsection 3 or § 21 subsection 1, rights from the participations of the other 
enterprise which belong to it may only be exercised in the maximum of one fourth of the 
aggregate participation of the other enterprise. This does not apply to the right to new shares 
from a capital increase from reserves. § 16 subsection 4 is to be applied. 
(2) the limitation of subsection 1 does not apply if before it had received such a 
communication from the other enterprise and before the existence of the mutual participation 
has become known to it, the enterprise has made a communication on its own to the other 
enterprise pursuant to § 20 subsection 3 or § 21 subsection 1. 
(3) If a stock corporation or an association limited by shares and another enterprise constitute 
mutually participating enterprises, then the enterprises shall communicate to each other the 
amount of their participation and every change in writing without undue delay. 
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German Securities Trading Act 1995* 
§21 
Duty to disclose 
(1) Whoever reaches, exceeds or falls below by acquisition, sale or in any other way 5 per 
cent, 10 per cent, 25 per cent, 50 per cent, or 75 per cent of the voting rights in a stock- 
exchange listed stock corporation (party under a duty to report) shall notify the company and the 
Federal Supervisory Authority without delay in writing at the latest within 7 calendar days of the 
reaching, exceeding or falling below the specified thresholds as well as of the amount of his 
voting rights share and including his address. The notification period begins at the point in time 
at which the party under a duty to report has knowledge thereof or should have known according 
to the circumstances that his voting rights share has reached, exeeded or fallen below the 
specified thresholds. 
(2) Companies listed on the stock exchange within the meaning of this Part are domestically 
domiciled companies whose stocks are admitted to official trading on a stock exchange in a 
member state of the European Communities or in another contracting state of the European 
Economic Area Agreement. 
§ 22 
Ascribing Voting Rights 
(1) Voting rights arising from stocks of the stock exchange-listed company are deemed to be 
the equivalent of voting rights of the party under a duty to report for duties to report pursuant to 
§ 21 subsection 1 if 
1. the stocks belong to a third party and are kept by such third party for the account of the 
party under a duty to report or for the account of an enterprise controlled by the party 
under a duty to report, 
2. the stocks belong to an enterprise which the party under a duty to notify controls, 
3. the stocks belong to a third party with whom the party under a duty to notify or an 
enterprise controlled by it has concluded an agreement which binds both to pursue long- 
term joint purposes regarding management direction of the stock exchange-listed 
company in that they exercise their voting rights in unison, 
the party under a duty to notify has assigned the stocks to a third party as collateral unless 
such third party is authorized to exercise the voting rights arising from such stocks and 
announces its intention to exercise such voting rights, 
5. usufruct of the stocks has been granted to the benefit of the party under a duty to report, 
6. the party under a duty to report or an enterprise controlled by it can acquire the stocks by 
unilateral declaration, 
7. the stocks have been entrusted for safekeeping to the party under a duty to report and to 
For a complete translation see Peltzer/Scesniak, German Securities Trading Act, Otto 
Schmidt Verlag, Köln, 1995. The translation provided here relies on this translation. 
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the extent that such party can exercise voting rights arising from such stocks in its own discretion if no special instructions of the stockholder are present. 
(2) The voting rights to be ascribed are to be separately specified in the notifications pursuant to § 21 subsection 1 for each of the numbers in subsection 1. 
(3) A controlled enterprise is an enterprise for which the party under a duty to notify, directly or indirectly, 
1. has a right to the majority of the voting rights of the stockholders or of the shareholders, 
2. has the right as stockholder or shareholder to appoint or recall the majority of the 
members of the administrative, directing or supervisory organ or 
3. has exclusive rights as stockholder or shareholder to the majority of voting rights on the 
basis of an agreement concluded with other stockholders or shareholders of this 
enterprise. 
§ 23 
Non-consideration of voting rights 
(1) The Federal Supervisory Authority shall permit, upon written request, that voting rights 
arising from stocks of the stock exchange-listed company shall not be considered in calculating 
the voting rights share if the applicant 
1. is an enterprise admitted to participate in trading on a stock exchange in a member state 
of teh European Communities or in another contracting state to the European Economic 
Area Agreement, which enterprise performs securities services, 
2. holds or intends to hold the concerned stocks as trading stock and 
3. indicates that the acquisition of the stocks is not intended to gain influence over the 
management direction of the company. 
(2) The Federal Supervisory Authority shall permit, upon written request of an enterprise 
domiciled in a member state of the European Communities or in another contracting state to the 
European Economic Area Agreement and which enterprise does not meet the preconditions of 
subsection 1 no. 1 that voting rights from stocks of the stock exchange-listed company shall not 
be considered in respect of the 5 per cent notification threshold if the petitioner 
1. holds or intends to hold the concerned stocks in order to make short-term use of existing 
or expected differences between the acquisition price and the sales price and 
2. indicates that the acquisition of the stocks is not intended to exercise influence over the 
management direction of the company. 
(3) In auditing the annual report of an enterprise which has ben exempted pursuant to 
subsections 1 or 2, the annual report auditor shall determine in a separate memorandum 
whether the enterprise has followed the provisions of subsections 1 no. 2 or of subsection 1 
no. 1 and shall submit such report together with the annual report audit to the legal 
representatives of the enterprise. The enterprise is obliged to submit such memorandum of the 
annual report auditor to the Federal Supervisory Authority without delay. The Federal 
Supervisory Authority can repeal the exemption pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 without 
consideration of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) if the duties pursuant to sentence 1 and 2 have not been met. If 
the exemption is rescinded or repealed, then thee enterprise can apply anew for exemption at 
the earliest three years after the effective date of the rescission or repeal. 
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(4) Voting rights arising from stocks which shall not be considered because of an exemption 
pursuant to subsection 1 or 2 cannot be exercised if a duty to report pursuant to § 21 
subsection 1 would exist in the event of their consideration. 
§ 24 
Notification by group companies 
If a party under a duty to notify belongs to a group for which a group financial report must be 
produced pursuant tO §§ 290,340i of the Commercial Code, then the duties to report pursuant to § 21 subsection 1 can be performed by the parent company or, if the parent company is itself a 
subsidiary, by its parent company. 
§ 25 
Publication duties of the listed company 
(1) The comapny listed on the stock exchange shall publicize reports pursuant to § 21 
subsection 1 without delay, at the latest 9 calender days after receipt of the report, in the 
German language in an official national stock exchange journal. The party under a duty to report 
is to be identified in the publication by name or firm name and residence or domicile. The 
company listed on the stock exchange shall announce in the Federal Gazette without delay the 
official stock exchange journal in which the report has been published. 
(2) If the stocks of the stock exchange-listed company are admitted to official trading on a 
stock exchange in another member state of the European Communies or in another contracting 
state to the European Economic Area Agreement, then the company shall undertake publication 
pursuant to subsection 1 sentences 1 and 2 without delay, at the latest 9 calender days after 
receipt of the report also in a stock exchange official journal aof such country or, to the extent 
that the law of such country prescribes another form of informing the public, in such other form. 
The publication must be in a language which is permissible in such state for such publications. 
(3) The stock exchange-listed company shall send the Federal Supervisory Authority proof of 
publication pursuant to subsections 1 and 2 without delay. The Federal Supervisory Authority 
shall inform sth stock exchanges specified in subsection 2 of the publication. 
(4) The Federal Supervisory Authority shall upon written application, exempt the stock 
exchange listed company from the duties to publicize pursuant to subsections 1 and 2 if the 
Authority is, after consideration of the circumstances, of the opinion that the publication would 
disserve the public interest or would inflict substantial damage upon the company to the extent, 
in the latter event, that non-publication could not lead to misleading of the public concerning 
assessment of the essential facts and circumstances of the concerned securities. 
§ 26 
Notification duties of companies domiciled abroad 
(1) If the voting rights sahre of the stockholder of a foreign domiciled company whose stocks 
are admitted to official trading on a domestic stock exchange reach, exceed or fall below the 
thresholds specified in § 21 subsection 1 sentence 1, then the company is bound, to the extent 
that the preconditions of subsection 3 are not present, to publicize this fact and the extent of the 
voting rights shre of the stock holder without delay, at the latest within 9 calender days, in an 
official national stock exchange journal. The notice period begins at the point in time at which the 
company has knowledge that the voting rights share of the stockholdere has reached, exceed or 
fallen below the thresholds specified in § 21 subsection 1 sentence 1. 
(2) § 25 subsection 1 sentences 2 and 3, subsection 3 and 4 respectively shall be applied to 
publications pursuant to subsection 1. 
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(3) Companies domiciled in another member state of the European Communities or in 
another contracting state to the European Economic Area Agreement and whose stocks are 
admitted on a stock exchange to official trading must undertake publications prescribed by the law of the domiciliary state on the basis of Council Directive 88/627/EC of December 12,1988, Article 10, concerning information to be publicized upon acquisition and sale of a substantial 
equity holding in a stock exchange-quoted company (O. J. L 348/62) domestically in a national 
stock exchange reporting journal in the German language. § 25 subsection 1 sentence 3 applies 
respectively. 
§ 27 
Evidence of reported equity holdings 
Whoever has submitted a report pursuant to § 21 subsection 1 must, upon demand of the 
Federal Supervisory Authority or of the stock exchange-listed company prove the existence of 
the reported equity holding. 
§ 28 
Suspension of voting rights 
Voting rights arising out of stocks belonging to a party under a duty to report or to an enterprise 
directly or indirectly controlled by such party may not be exercise for the time during which 
reporting duties pursuant to § 21 subsection 1 are not performed. 
§ 29 
Federal Supervisory Authority powers 
(1) The Federal Supervisory Authority can demand information and the submission of 
documents of the stock exchange-listed company and of its stockholders to the extent that this 
is necessary to supervise the performance of the duties regulated in this Part. The powers 
pursuant to sentence 1 are in effect also in respect to persons and enterprises whose voting 
rights are to be ascribed pursuant to § 22 subsection 1. § 16 subsection 6 shall be applied. 
(2) The Federal Supervisory Authority can issue guidelines according to which it decides in a 
normal case whether the preconditions for a reportable event under the duty to report or whether 
an exemption from the duties to report pursuant to § 21 subsection 1 are present. The guidelines 
shall be published in the Federal Gazette. 
(3) The Federal Supervisory Authority can perform publications pursuant to § 25 
subsections 1 and 2 at the cost of the stock-exchange listed company if the company does not 
perform its duty to publicize or performs such duty improperly, incompletely or not in the 
prescribed form. 
§ 30 
Cooperation with the relevant foreign authorities 
(1) The Federal Supervisory Authority shall cooperate with the responsible offices of the other 
member states of the European Communities, of the other contracting states to the European 
Economic Area Agreement and, in the event of nos. 1 and 4, also with the approriate authorities 
of third countries, in order especially to further that 
1. parties under a duty to notify officially residing, domiciled or usually resident in one of 
these countries perform their duties to report in an orderly manner, 
2. stock exchange-listed companies perform their duty to publicize pursuant to § 25 
subsection 2 in an orderly manner, 
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3. the parties under a duty, pursuant to the regulations of another member state of the 
European Communities or of another contracting state to the European Economic Area 
Agreement, to notify in such country and with a domestic official residence, domestically 
domiciled or usually domestically residing perform their duties to report in an orderly 
manner, 
4. foreign domiciled companies whose stocks are admitted to official trading on a domestic 
stock exchange perform their duties to publicize domestically in an orderly manner. 
(2) The Federal Supervisory Authority may communicate facts, including information 
pertaining to specific individuals, to the responsible authorities of the other member states or 
contracting states to the extent that this is necessary to supervise observance of reporting and 
publication duties. In communicating facts, notice shall be given that the responsible authorities, 
without prejudice to their duties in criminal law matters concerning violations of reporting or 
publication duties, shall use the facts communicated to them (including information pertaining to 
specific individuals) exclusively to supervise observance of such duties or within the context of 
administrative or court proceedings in conjunction therewith. 
(3) In the event of subsection 1 no. 3, the Federal Supervisory Authority enjoys powers 
pursuant to § 29 subsecton 1. 
Bank Holdings 1995 
Bank Holdings 1995 
Appendix 4 
Voting rights of the 10 largest German banks in listed German Stock 
Corporations as notified pursuant to § 21 of the Securities Trading Act 
Bank Holding 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG BHH Braunschweig-Hannoversche Hypothekenbank AG Hannover 60,0 
ASKO Deutsche Kaufhaus AG, Saarbrücken 10,5 
Bayrische Hypotheken- 
und Wechselbank 
Württemberger Hypo Württembergische Hypothekenbank AG, Stuttgart 78,8 
Neue Baumwoll-Spinnerei und Weberei Hof AG, Hof 26,33 
AGROB AG, München 52,72 
Brau und Brunnen AG, Dortmund 33,38 
Allianz Aktiengesellschaft Holding München 5,0 
Rosenthal AG, Selb 15,0 
Bayrische Landesbank 
Girozentrale 
Bürgerliches Berghaus Ingolstadt AG, Ingolstadt 61,4 
Thüga AG, München 29,7 
Walter Bau-AG, Augsburg 16,9 
Süd-Chemie AG, München 18,96 
Bayrische Vereinsbank AG Vereins- und Westbank AG, Hamburg 75,0 
Neue Baumwoll-Spinnerei und Weberei Hof AG, Hof 42,4 
Süddeutsche Bodencreditbank AG, München 54,7 
Nürnberger Hypothekenbank AG, Nürnberg 85,4 
BHB Bayrische Handelsbank AG, München 76,4 
Aktien-Brauerei Kaufbeuren AG, Kaufbeuren 75,7 
BFG Bank AG Holzmann, Philipp AG, Frankfurt am Main 10,0 
BHF-Bank Berliner Handels- 
und Frankfurter Bank 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank (Actien-Gesellschaft), Hannover 75,1 
Wayss & Freytag AG, Frankfurt am Main 5,1 
AGIV Aktiengesellschaft für Industrie und Verkehrswesen, Frankfurt am 
Main 
48,7 
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BW Bank Baden-Württem- 
bergische Bank AG 
Württembergische AG, Versicherungs-Beteiligungsgesellschaft, Stuttgart 15.0 
Württembergische Lebensversicherung AG, Stuttgart 13,1 
ZEAG Zementwerk Lauffen Elektrizitätswerk Heilbronn AG, Heilbronn 6,25 
Commerzbank Corporate 
Finance 
RHEINHYP Rheinische Hypothekenbank AG, Frankfurt am Main 97,5 
Linde AG, Wiesbaden 10,2 
Salamander AG, Kornwestheim 10,7 
Karstadt AG, Essen 10,3 
PHOENIX AG, Hamburg 9.6 
Delbruck & Co., 
Privatbankiers 
Süd-Chemie Aktiengesellschaft, München 5,46 
Deutsche Bank AG Deutsche Beteiligungs AG Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaft, 
Königstein 
24,58 
Linde AG, Wiesbaden 10,1 
Daimler-Benz AG, Stuttgart 24,4 
Vögele, Joseph AG, Mannheim 9,95 
Holzmann, Philipp AG, Frankfurt am Main 25,83 
Frankfurter Hypothekenbank AG, Frankfurt am Main 94,32 
Deutsche Centralbodenkredit-AG, Berlin 95,24 
Hutschenreuther AG, Selb 25,1 
Schmalbach-Lubeca AG, Braunschweig 10,0 
Continental AG, Hannover 10,25 
Salamander AG, Kornwestheim 10,69 
Allianz AG Holding, München 10,0 
PHOENIX AG, Hamburg 10,0 
KHD Klöckner-Humbold-Deutz AG, Köln 28,42 
Deutsche Bank Lübeck AG, vorm. Handelsbank Lübeck 93,78 
DG Bank, Deutsche 
Genossenschaftsbank 
BHF-Bank Berliner Handels- und Frankfurter Bank, Frankfurt am Main 9,61 
DVB Deutsche Verkehrs-Bank AG, Frankfurt am Main 55,41 
VK Mühlen AG, Hamburg 6,92 
AGAB AG für Anlagen und Beteiligungen, Frankfurt am Main 24,65 
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Dresdner Bank AG Buderus AG, Wetzlar 11.1 
Deutsche Hypothekenbank Frankfurt AG, Frankfurt am Main 96,5 
HAMBURGHYP Hypothekenbank in Hamburg AG, Hamburg 86,2 
Continental Aktiengesellschaft, Hannover 6,5 
Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG, München 9,9 
Bilfinger + Berger Bauaktiengesellschaft, Mannheim 25,1 
Allianz AG Holding, München 10,0 
OLB Oldenburgische Landesbank AG, Oldenburg 62,6 
Frankfurter Bankgesellschaft 
gegr. 1899 AG 




Württemberger Hypo Württembergische Hypothekenbank AG, Stuttgart 10,0 
Landesbank Schleswig- 
Holstein, Girozentrale 
Jacobsen, W., AG, Kiel 59,03 
Landwirtschaftliche Renten- 
bank, Frankfurt am Main 
BM Bäckermühlen Aktiengesellschaft, Bietigheim-Bissingen 96,4 
NORD LB Norddeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale 
BHH Braunschweig Hannoversche Hypothekenbank AG, Hannover 30,0 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG, Berlin 15,01 
Continental AG, Hannover 17,9 
Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie 
KGaA 
Rheinboden Hypothekenbank AG, Köln 50,6 






Bürgerliches Brauhaus Ravensburg-Lindau AG, Ravensburg 15,83 
Verband der Sparda-Banken 
e. V. 
DVB Deutsche Verkehrs-Bank AG, Frankfurt am Main 15,6 
Vereins- und Westbank AG Geestemünder Bank AG, Bremerhaven 95,0 
WestLB Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale 
Krupp, Fdedr., AG Hoesch-Krupp, Essen 7,21 
Deutsche Babcock AG, Oberhausen 10,0 
Gerresheimer Glas AG, Düsseldorf 10,0 
Asko Deutsche Kaufhaus AG 10,5 
Stöhr & Co. AG, Mönchengladbach 19,48 
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Camoany law and direct taxation 
Camoany law. industrial dsesocracy and accounting standards 
Brussels, 13.7.1993 
XV/6019/93 
XV. D. 2 DRI/rb 
Sub ect: Questionnaire on the regulation of take over bids 
1. Many Member States have adopted legislation or codes of conduct in 
_order 
to regulate changes in the control of companies listed on 
stock exchanges. However there are many differences between 
national regulations indicating that Member States do not pursue 
the same policy objectives or, even if that were the case, that 
their views differ concerning the need for and the effectiveness of 
various instruments which could be used to achieve these 
objectives. 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to enable the Commission to 
assess the position of Member States on the following: 
the basic assumptions which are the heart of the Commission's 
proposal 
the measures proposed in order to meet the objectives of 'he 
proposal 
the present state of national legislations and the importance 
of takeovers in Member States' economies. 
2. The Commission's modified proposal for a 13th Council directive, 
which met with strong resistance on the part of several Member 
States before Council meetings were discontinued in June 1991, was 
based on the following assumptions: 
a) There is a risk that shareholders suffer a reduction in the 
value of these shares if there is a change in control of ; heir 
company 
Do you agree Yes/no 
b) Minority shareholders should be treated equally when a take 
over bid is made. 
Do you agree Yes/no 
ný hý -- - . Jix 
c) Shareholders should be given sufficient time anc i^`or, ýa; icn 
before they have to decice wnether they accept a bic 
Do you agree Yes/no 
d) The decision concerning a change in control should be made by 
the owners of the company and not by its management 
Do you agree Yes/no 
e) The employees of the target company need to be informed as 
well. 
Do you agree Yes/no 
f) Within the internal market the shareholders of listed public 
limited companies should be given equivalent guarantees. 
Do you agree Yes/no 
-g) Equivalent guarantees require a 
directive coordinating national 
measures 
Do you agree Yes/no 
3. Based on these assumptions the Co ission had proposed the 
following main measures. 
a right to exit for minority shareholders by way of a 
mandatory bid made by a new controlling shareholder and 
triggered by reaching a threshold (to cover 2 a) 
Do you agree Yes/no 
b) -a procedure for voluntary or mandatory 
take over bids (for 
100 % of remaining shares, equal conditions for all 
shareholders, full disclosure) 
(to cover 2b and 2 c) 
Do you agree Yes/no 
c) -a restriction on defensive measures 
taken by management to 
frustrate bids without specific consultation of the 
shareholders' meeting (to cover 2 d) 
Do you agree Yes/no 
d) -a right for employees to be fully informed by the ýiCCer 
(to cover 2 e) 
Do you agree Yes/no 
4. Each of the measures listed under 3 could be covered 
a) at national level only, by law or self regulation 
b) at Community level, by a directive or by recommendation 
c) by a detailed directive or by a framework directive 
DO YOU AGREE THAT THE FOI. LGK I NG WEASURES ARE NEEDED AND SHOULD BE ILPQSFD 
At national level At Community level 
Content of measures by Iaw by self by a detailed by a framework by a 
regulation directive directive recormtendotion 
Mandatory bid yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no 
ECualtreatment yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no 
in case of any bid 
(mandatory and 
voluntary) 
Full disclosure to yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no 
shareholders 
Full disclosure to yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no 
workers 
limitation of yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no 
defensive measures 
5. If you oppose a mandatory take over bid do you agree that there 
should be alternative measures giving equivalent protection 
Yes/no 
a) If yes please describe briefly those alternative measures 
b) If no please explain briefly why minority shareholders do not 
need special protection in the case of a change in control 
r-ý2^CIX 
ID . 
If you are in favour of a mandatory bid do you agree that t, e 
should be triggered 
z IC 
by crossing a threshold 
Yes/no 
by the intention of crossing a threshold 
Yes/no 
by the fact that shares had been acquired off the market at a 
higher price (control premium) 
Yes/no 
6 a) If you are in favour of a threshold do you agree that this 
threshold should not be higher than 
51 X Yes/no 
33 % Yes/no 
25 % Yes/no 
6 b) If you are in favour of a threshold do you agree that there 
should be some derogations 
Yes/no 
7. If you are in favour of restricting the power of the target 
company's management to frustrate a take over bid do you agree that 
the management 
should not be allowed to take any frustrating measures 
Yes/no 
should only be allowed to take measures approved by the 
shareholders' meeting once the bid has been declared 
Yes/no 
should also be al lowed to take measures authorised by the 
shareholders meeting within /12 months/ before a bid is 
declared 
Yes/no 
8. Has your takeover regulation been introduced or modified since the 
beginning of 1991 
Yes/no 
If yes please summarize new legislation 
Apoendix 5 
9. Do you have the intention to change your legislation 
Yes/no 
If yes please summarize intended changes 
10. Please indicate the number of take over bids in your country in 
hostile friendly 
- 1990 Number 
1991 Number 
1992 Number 
P. S. The Commission will gladly receive any additional observations 
or comments you might wish to communicate to the Commission's 
services. 
If you have any questions concerning the questionnaire please 
contact the secretariat of Mr. Wolff DG XV. D. 2 (Tel: 295.4123 
or Fax: 295.6500) 
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Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council 
Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover Bids 
- Brussels, 07.02.1996 - COM(95) 655 final - 
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 54 
thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission; 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee; 
Whereas it is necessary to coordinate certain safeguards which Member States require of 
companies and firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty for 
the protection of members and others, in order to make such safeguards equivalent throughout 
the Community; 
Whereas it is necessary to protect the interests of shareholders of companies governed by the 
law of a Member State when these companies are subject to a takeover bid or to a change of 
control and their securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market within the scope of this 
Directive; 
Whereas only action at Community level can ensure an adequate level of protection for 
shareholders throughout the Union and provide for minimum guidelines for the conduct of 
takeover bids; whereas Member States acting independently are not able to establish the same 
level of protection especially in the case of cross-border take-overs or purchases of control; 
Whereas the adoption of a Directive is the appropriate procedure for laying down a framework 
consisting of certain common principles and a limited number of general requirements which 
Member States will be required to implement through more detailed rules according to their 
national systems and their cultural contexts; 
Whereas Member States should take the necessary steps in order to protect shareholders 
having minority holdings after the purchase of the control of their company; whereas such a 
protection can be ensured either by obliging the person who acquired the control of a company 
to make a bid to all shareholders for all or for a substantial part of their holdings or by providing 
for other means which attain the objective of at least an equivalent level of protection of minority 
shareholders; 
Whereas each Member State should designate an authority or authorities to supervise all 
aspects of the bid and to ensure that parties to takeover bids comply with the rules made 
pursuant to this Directive; whereas the different authorities mus cooperate with on another; 
Whereas it is desirable to encourage the voluntary control exercised by self regulatory bodies in 
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order to avoid recourse to administrative or judicial action; 
Whereas to reduce the scope for insider dealing offerors should be required to announce their 
intention of launching a bid as soon as possible and to inform the supervisory authority and the 
offeree company's board of the bid before they are made public; 
Wherea the addressees of a takeover bid should be properly informed of the terms of the bid by 
means of an offer document; 
Whereas it is necessary to set a time limit for takeover bids; 
Whereas to be able to perform their functions satisfactorily, supervisory authorities must at all 
times be able to require the parties to the bid to provide information on it; 
Whereas to avoid operations which frustrate the bid it is necessary to limit the powers of the 
board of directors of the offeree company to engage in operations of an exceptional nature; 
Whereas the board of the offeree company should be required to make public a document 
setting out its opinion on the bid and the reasons on which it is based; 
Whereas it is necessary that Member States provide for rules covering the cases when the bid 
may be withdrawn or declared viod once the offer document has been made public, the right of 
the offeror to revise its bid, the possibility of competiting bids for the securities of a company 
which are necessarily to the advantage of its shareholders and the disclosure of the result of the 
bid; 
have adopted this Directive 
Article 1: Scope 
The coordination measures prescribed by this Directive shall apply to the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions or other mechanisms or arrangements of the Member States relating 
to takeover bids for the securities of a company governed by the law of a Member State, where 
such securities are admitted, wholly or partially, to trading on a market in one or more Member 
States which is regulated and supervised by authorities recognised by public bodies, operates 
regularly and is accessible, directly or indirectly, to the public. 
Article 2: Definitions 
For the purposes of this Directive: 
- "takeover bid" ("bid") shall mean an offer made to the holders of the securities of a company 
to 
acquired all or part of such securities by payment in cash and/or in exchange for other securities. 
A bid may be either mandatory, if so provided by Member States as means to protect minority 
shareholders, or voluntary; 
- "offeree company" shall mean a company whose securities are 
the subject of a bid; 
- "offeror" shall mean any natural person or legal entity 
in public or private law making a bid; 
Draft Takeover Directive 1996 Appendix 6 
- "securities" shall mean transferable securities carrying voting rights in a company or conferring 
entitlement to obtain transfereable securities carrying such rights; 
- "parties to the bid" shall mean the offeror, the members of the offerors administrative or 
management board, if the offeror is a company, the addressees of the bid and the members of 
the administrative or management board of the offeree company. 
Article 3: Protection of minority shareholders 
1. Where a natural person or legal entity who as a result of acquisition, holds securities which 
added to any existing holdings give him a specified percentage of voting rights in a company 
referred to in Article 1, conferring on him the control of that company, Member States should 
ensure that rules or other mechanisms or arrangements are in force which either oblige this 
person to make a bid in accordance with article 10 or offer other appropriate and at least 
equivalent means in order to protect the minority shareholders of that company. 
2. The percentage of voting rights which confers control for the purposes of paragraph 1 and 
the way of its calculation shall be determined by the law of the Member State where the 
supervisory authority is located. 
Article 4: Supervisory authority 
1. Member States shall designate the authority or authorities, which will supervise all aspects of 
the bid. The authorities thus designated may include associations or private bodies. Member 
States shall inform the Commission of these designations and shall specify all divisions of 
functions that may be made. 
2. the authority competent for supervising the bid shall be that of the Member State in which the 
offeree company has its registered office if the securities of the company are admitted to trading 
on a regulated market in that Member State. Otherwise, the competent authority shall be that of 
the Member State on whose regulated market the securities of the company were first admitted 
to trading and are still traded. 
3. Without prejudice to their duty of professional secrecy, the competent authorities of the 
Member States shall cooperate, in so far as necessary for the performance of their duties and 
for this purpose shall supply each other with any information that may be necessary. 
4. The supervisory authorities shall have all the powers necessary for the exercise of their 
functions, which shall include responsibility for ensuring that the parties to a bid comply with the 
rules made pursuant to this Directive. In addition Member States can provide that their 
supervisory authorities may, on the basis of a reasoned decision, grant derogations from the 
rules drawn up in accordance with this Directive provided that in granting such derogations the 
supervisory authorities shall respect the principles mentioned in article 5. 
5. This Directive does not affect the power which courts may have in a Member State to decline 
to hear legal proceedings and to decide whether or not such proceedings affect the outcome of 
the bid provided that an injured party enjoys adequate remedies, whether through an appeals 
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procedure operated by the supervisory authority or through the right to take proceedings before 
the courts to claim compensation. 
Article 5: General principles 
1. For the purposes of the implementation of this Directive, Member States shall ensure that the 
ules or other arrangements made pursuant to this Directive respect the following principles: 
(a) all holders of securities of an offeree company who are in the same position are to 
be treated equally; 
(b) the addressees of a bid are to have sufficient time and information to enable them 
to reach a properly informed decision on the bid; 
(c) The board of an offeree company is to act in the interests of the comapny as a 
whole; 
(d) false markets must not be created in the securities of the offeree company, of the 
offeror company, or of any other company concerned by the bid; 
(e) offeree companies must not be hindered in the conduct of their affairs for longer 
than is reasonable by a bid for their securities. 
2. In order to attain the objective set out in paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that rules 
are in force which satisfy the minimum requirements set out in the following articles. 
Article 6: Information 
1. Member States shall ensure that rules are in force requiring that the decision to make a bid is 
made public and that the supervisory authority and the board of the offeree company are 
informed of the bid before this decision is made public. 
2. Member States shall ensure that rules are in force requiring the offeror to draw up and make 
public in good time an offer document containing the information necessary to enable the 
addressees of the bid to reach a properly informed decision on the bid. Before the offer 
document is made public, the offeror shall communicate it to the supervisory authority. 
3. Those rules shall require that the document state at least: 
the terms of the bid; 
the identity of the offeror or, where the offeror is a company, the type, name and 
registered office of that company; 
the securities or class or classes of securities for which the bid is made; 
the consideration offered for each security or class of securities and the basis of the 
valuation used in determining it with particulars of the way in which the 
consideration is to be given; 
the maximum and minimum percentages or quantities of securities which the 
offeror undertakes to acquire; 
Draft Takeover Directive 1996 Appendix 6 
- details of any existing holdings of the offeror in the offeree company; 
all conditions to which the offer is subject; 
the offeror's intentions with regard to the future business and undertakings of the 
offeree company; its employees and its management; 
the period for acceptance of the bid, which may not be less than four weeks or 
more than ten weeks from the date on which the document is made public; 
where the consideration offered by the offeror includes securities, information 
abouts those securties. 
4. Member States shall ensure that rules are in force requiring that the parties to a bid to 
provide the supervisory authority at any time on request with all information in their possession 
concerning the bid which the supervisory authority considers necessary for the discharge of its 
functions. 
Article 7: Disclosure. 
1. Member States shall ensure that rules are in force which require a bid to be made public in 
such a way as to avoid the creation of false markets in the securities of the offeree company or 
of the offeror. 
2. Member States shall ensure that rules are in force which provide for the disclosure of all 
information or documents required in such a manner as to ensure that they are both readily and 
promptly available to the addressees of the bid. 
Article 8: Obligations of the board of the offeree company 
Member States shall ensure that rules are in force requiring that: 
a) after receiving the information concerning the bid and until the result of the bid is 
made public, the board of the offeree company should abstain from any action 
which may result in the frustation of the offer, and notably from the issuing of 
shares which may result in a lasting impediment of the offeror to obtain control over 
the offeree company, unless it has the prior authorisation of the general meeting of 
the shareholders given for this purpose; 
b) the board of the offeree company shall draw up and make public a document 
setting out its opinion on the bid together with the reasons on which it is based. 
Article 9: Rules applicable to the conduct of bids 
In addition Member States shall ensure that rules are in force which govern the conduct of bids 
at least for the following matters: 
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a) withdrawal or nullity of the bid 
b) revision of bids 
c) competing bids 
d) disclosure of the result of bids 
Appendix 6 
Article 10: Mandatory bid 
1. Where a Member State provides for a mandatory bid as a means to protect the minority 
shareholders, this bid shall be launched to all shareholders for all or for a substantial part of their 
holdings at a price which meets the objective of protecting their interests. 
2. If the mandatory bid comprises only a part of the securities of the offeree company and 
shareholders offer to sell to the offeror more shares than the partial offer covers, shareholders 
should be treated equally by means of a pro rata treatment of their shareholdings. 
Article 11: Transposition of the Directive 
1. Member States shall ensure that the laws, regulations and administrative provisions or other 
mechanisms or arrangements necessary for them to comply with this Directive are in force 
before 1 April 1998. 
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the provisions or other arrangements 
referred to in paragraph 1, making express reference to this Directive. 
Article 12: Addresses of the Directive 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
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Merger Control Provision of the German 
Act Against Restraints of Competiton 




Market Domination; Presumptions; Abuse Control 
(1) An enterprise is market dominating within the meaning of this Act if it, either as one 
offering or calling for a specific kind of goods or commercial services, 
1. is without competitors or is subject to no substantial competition; or 
2. has a paramount market position in relation to its competitors; in this context, in addition 
to its market share, regard shall be given in particular to its financial strength, its access to 
the supply and sales markets, its inter-relationships with other enterprises as well as to 
legal or factual barriers to the entry of other enterprises into the market, the ability to shift 
its supply or demand to other goods or commercial services, as well as the possibility of 
the opposite market side to change to other enterprises. 
(2) Furthermore, two or more enterprises shall be deemed to be market dominating insofar 
as, for factual reasons, substantial compeieiton between them for a specific kind of goods or 
commercial services does not exist, either generally or in specific markets, and insofar as they in 
their entirety fulfill the conditions of subsection (1). 
(3) It shall be presumed that 
1. an enterprise is market dominating within the meaning of subsection (1) if it has a market 
share of at least one-third for a specific kind of goods or commercial services; this 
presumption shall no apply if the turnover proceeds of the enterprise during the last 
preceding business year amounted to less than 250 million Deutsche Marks; 
2. the conditions specified in subsection (2) are fulfilled if, with respect to a specific kind of 
goods or commercial services, 
a) three or fewer enterprises together have a market share of 50 per cent or more, or 
b) five or fewer enterprises together have a market share of two-thirds or more; 
this presumption shall no apply insofar as enterprises are concerned whose turnover proceeds 
during the last preceding business year amounted to less than 100 million Deutsche Marks. 
§ 23 (1), sentences 2 to 10, shall apply analogously to the calculation of market shares and 
turnover proceeds. 
(4) In respect of market dominating enterprises, the Cartel Authority shall have the powers 
set out in subsection (5), insofar as such enterprises abusively exploit their market dominating 
position in the market for these or other goods or commercial services. An abuse within the 
mianing of sencence 1 shall exist in particular if a market dominanting enterprise as on offering 
or calling for a specific kind of goods or commercial services 
1. impairs, without justifiable cause in a way materially affecting competition in the market, 
the opportunities of other enterprises to compete; 
2. demands prices or other business terms deviating from those which would have been 
agreed on with a high degree of likelihood if effective competition had existed; in this 
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context, particualr regard shall be given to thee conduct of other enterprises active on comparable markets on which effective competition exists; 
3. demands less favourable prices or other business terms than those demanded by the 
market dominating enterprise itself on comparable markets from purchasers of the same kind, unless there is a justifiable cause for the difference made. 
'(5) Under the conditions of subsection (4), the Cartel Authority may prohibit abusive conduct 
of market dominating enterprises and declare agreements to eneffective; § 19 shall apply 
analogously. Prior to such action, the Cartel Authority should call upon the parties involved to 
cease and refrain from the abuse objected to. 
(6) Insofar as the conditions of subsection (1) are fulfilled by group enterprise within the 
menaing of § 18 Stock Corporations Act, the Cartel Authority shall have the powers pursuant to 
subsection (5) with respect to each enterprise of the group. 
§ 23 
Report of Mergers 
(1) A merger of enterprises shall be reported to the Federal Cartel office without undue delay 
if in the last business year preceding the merger, the participating enterprises had collectively 
turnover proceeds of not less than 500 million Deutsche Marks. If a participating enterprise 
constitutes a dependent or dominating enterprise within the meaning of § 17 of the Stock 
Corporation Act or a group enterprise within the meaning of § 18 of the Stock Corporation Act 
then the enterprises so connected shall be regarded as a single enterprise for purposes of 
computing turnover proceeds and market shares; if several enterprises, on the basis of an 
agreement or otherwise, act together in such a manner that they can jointly exercise a 
dominating influence over a participating enterprise, thean each of them shall be deemed to be a 
dominating enterprise. § 277 (1) of the Commercial Code shall apply to the calculation of 
turnover proceeds; turnover proceeds from sales and services between enterprises which are 
connected within the meaning of sentence 2 (internal turnover proceeds) and consumption taxes 
shall not be taken into account; turnover proceeds in foreign currencies shall be converted into 
Deutsche Marks at the offical exchange rate. In respect of banks and building loan savings 
banks, one-tenth of total sales, and in respect of insurance companies, the premium income of 
the last preceding business year, shall be substituted in place of turnover proceeds. The amount 
of total assets shall be reduced by those items which reflect participations in connected 
enterprises within the meaning of sentence 2; premium income shall be the income derived form 
the prime- and re-insurance business, including the part thereof expended for re-insurance. For 
enterprises whose business consists in whole or in part of distribution of goods, only three- 
fourths of the turnover proceeds therefrom shall be taken into account. For enterprises whose 
business consists in whole or in part in the publication, production or distribution of newspapers 
or periodicals or parts thereof, twenty times the turnover proceeds shall be taken into account; 
sentence 6 shall remain unaffected. In the case of an acquistion of the assets of another 
enterprise in whole or in substantial part, the computation of market shares and turnover 
proceeds of the seller shall be based only on the part of the assets sold. Sentence 8 shall apply 
analogously to the acquistion of shares, insofar as less than 25 per cent of the shares remain 
with the seller and the merger does not fulfill the prerequisites of subsection (2), No. 2, 
sentence 3, Nos. 5 or 6. A person or an association of persons, neither of which is an enterprise, 
shall be deemed to be an enterprise for the purposes of this Act, if such person or association 
holds a majority interest in another enterprise. 
(2) The following transactions shall be deemed to be a merger within the meaning of this Act: 
1. The acquisition of the assets of another enterprise in whole or in substantial part by 
amalgamation, consolidation, short merger or other means. 
2. The acquisition of shares in another enterprise, if such shares alone or together with other 
shares already held by the enterprise 
a) equal or exceed 25 per cent of the capital or the voting rights of the other enterprise; or 
b) equal or exceed 50 per cent of the capital or the voting rights of the other enterprise, or 
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c) secure the enterprise a majority interest within the meaning of § 16 (1) of the Stock Corporation Act. 
The shares held by the enterprise are deemed to include also those shares which are held 
either by a connected enterprise within the meaning of subsection (1), sentence 2, or by 
another for the account of these enterprises and, where the owner of the enterprise is a 
sole proprietor, also those sharaes which form part of other assests of the owner. If 
several enterprises acquire within the above-decribed scope, simultaneously or 
successively, shares of another enterprise, this shall alos be deemed to be a merger 
among the participating enterprises with regard to those markets in which such other 
enterprise is active (joint venture). Furthermore, the acquisition of shares shall also be deemed to be a merger, insofar as the purchaser is afforded by agreement, articles of 
association or resolution a legal position equivalent to that of a shareholder in a stock 
corporation holding more than 25 per cent of the voting capital. 
3. Agreements with another enterprise by means of which 
a) an enterprise group within the meaning of § 18 of the Stock Corporation Act is created, 
or the number of group enterprises is enlarged; or 
b) such other enterprise obligates itself to conduct its business for the account of the 
enterprise or to transfer its profits in whole or in part to the enterprise; or 
c) the business of the other enterprise is leased or otherwise transferred in whole or in 
part to the enterprise. 
4. The placing of the same persons, of the extent of at least one-half of the members 
thereof, on the supervisory board, on the board of management, or on such other 
corporate organ as may be authorized to conduct the management of enterprises. 
5. Any other combination of enterprises on the basis of which one or several enterprises can 
exercise directly or indirectly a dominating influence on another enterprise. 
6. Any combination of enterprises as designated in Nos. 2,4, or 5 in connection with which 
shares of a lesser amount than specified in No. 2, sentence 1, subpara. a), are acquired, 
a legal position pursuant to No. 2, sentence 4, is not afforded, the scope of identity of 
persons required by No. 4 is not achieved, or the exercise of a dominant influence within 
the meaning of No. 5 is not possible, provided that as a result of the combination one or 
several enterprises can exercise directly or indirectly an influence on another enterprise 
that is material with regard to competition. 
(3) A merger is presumed to exist also if the participating enterprises have previously been 
merged within the meaning of subsection (2), unless the merger does not lead to a substantial 
strengthening of the already-existing enterprise connection. It does not consitute a merger if a 
bank, in connection with the formation or capital increase of an enterprise or otherwise in the 
course of its business, acquires shares of another enterprise for the purpose of selling such 
shares in the market, provided that it does not exercise voting rights arising form such shares, 
and provided that the sale is made within one year; in connection with the formation of an 
enterprise, the exercise of voting rights in the first shareholders" meeting after the formation 
does not constitute a merger. If an enterprise participating in a merger consitutes a connected 
enterprise within the meaning of subsection (1), sentence 2, then the dominating enterprise as 
well as those enterprises on which the dominating enterprise is dependent shall be deemed to 
be a participating in the merger. If two or more enterprises merge, this shall also be deemed to 
be a merger of their dependent enterprises. 
(4) The following shall be obligated to make the report: 
1. in the cases of an amalgamation, consolidation or short merger, the owners of the 
transferee enterprises or the newly-formed enterprise or their representatives, and, in the 
case of legal entities or partnerships, those persons who, by law or articles of association, 
are authorized to act as representatives, 
2. otherwise 
a) the owners of the enterprises participating in the merger; and 
b) in the case of subsection (2), Nos. 1 and 2, also the seller or their representatives, and 
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in the case of legal entities or partnerships, those persons who, by law or articles of association, are authorized to act as representatives; in the case of lit. b), subsection (3), 
sentence 3, shall apply analogously. 
(5) The form of the merger shall be indicated in the report. The report shall further contain the following information regarding each participating enterprise: 
1. name or other designation and place of business or legal residence, 
2. type of business, 
3. the market shares, including the basis for their computation or estimation, if for the 
participating enterprises together such market shares amount to at least 20 per cent 
within the territory in which this Act applies or within a substantial part thereof, and the 
turnover proceeds; in the case of insurance companies, the premium income shall 
substitute the turnover proceeds; 
4. when shares of another enterprise are acquired, the amount of the shares acquired and of 
the aggregate participation held. 
If a participating enterprise is a connected enterprise within the meaning of subsection (1), 
sentence 2, then the information required pursuant to sentence 2, Nos. 1 and 2, shall also be 
given with respect to the enterprises so connected and the information required pursuant to 
sentence 2, No. 3, shall be given for each enterprise participating in the merger and together for 
the enterprises so connected with it, and the group relationships and the dependancy and 
participation relationships among the connected enterprises shall be reported. 
(6) The Federal Cartel Office may demand form each participating enterprise information 
regarding market shares, including the basis for their calculation or estimation, and regarding 
turnover proceeds for a specific kind of goods or commercial services, which have been realized 
by the enterprise in the last business year preceding the merger. If a participating enterprise 
consitutes a connected enterprise within the meaning of subsection (1), sentence 2, then the 
Federal Cartel Office may also demand information regarding the enterprises so connected; it 
may demand information also from the connected enterprises. § 46 (2), (5), and (9) shall apply 
analogously. The Federal Cartel Office shall determine a reasonable period for the furnishing of 




(1) § 22 (1) to (3) notwithstanding, for purposes of merger control it shall be presumed that a 
merger will create or strengthen a paramount market position if 
1 an enterprise which had during the last business year preceding the merger turnover 
proceeds of at least two thousand million Deutsche Marks mergers with another 
enterprise which 
a) is active in a market in which small and medium-sized enterprises collectively have a 
market share of at least two-thirds and the enterprise participating in the merger together 
have a market share of at least five percent; or 
b) has a market dominating position in one or several markets in which an aggregate 
turnover of at least one hundred and fifty million Deutsche Marks was achieved during the 
last preceding calendar year; or 
2. the enterprises participating in the merger had collectively during the last business year 
preceding the merger turnover proceeds of at least twelve thousand million Deutsche 
Marks and at least tow of the enterprises participating in the merger individually had 
turnover proceeds of at least one thousand Deutsche Marks; this presumption shall not 
apply insofar as the merger fulfills also the requirements of § 23 (2), No. 2, sentence 3, 
and the joint venture is not active in a market in which a turnover of at least seven 
hundred and fifty million Deutsche Marks was achieved during the last preceding calendar 
year. 
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(2) For purposes of merger control an entirety of enterprises shall be deemed to be market dominating if they consist of 
1. three or fewer enterprises which have in market the hightest market shares and together 
a market share of 50 per cent; or 
2. five or fewer enterprises which have in amarket the highest market shares and together a market share of two-thirds, 
unless the enterprises demonstrate that the competitive situtation permits the expectation that 
substantial competition between them will remain in existence after the merger or such entirety 
of enterprises does not have a superior market position in relation to the other competitors. Sentence 1 shall not apply insofar as enterprises are concerned which had turnover proceeds of less than one hundred and fifty million Deutsche Marks during the last preceding business year 
or if the enterprises participating in the merger collectively had a market share of less than 15 per cent. § 22 (2) and (3), sentence 1, No. 2, shall remain unaffected. 
(3) § 23 (1), sentences 2 to 6 and 8 to 10 apply analogously to the calculation of turnover 
proceeds and market shares. 
§ 24 
Control of Mergers 
(1) If it is to be expected that a merger will create or strengthen a market dominating position, 
the Cartel Authority shall have the powers set forth in the following provisions, unless the 
participating enterprises demonstrate that, by means the merger, improvements of the 
competitive conditions will also occur and that these improvementss will outweigh the 
disadvantages of the market domination. 
(2) If the conditions of subsection (1) are met, the Federal Cartel Office must prohibit the 
merger. The Federal Cartel Office may prohibit a merger as soon as the plan for the merger has 
become known to it; the Federal Catel Office may prohibit completed mergers only within on 
year after receipt of the complete report pursuant to § 23; § 24a (2), sentence 2, Nos. 1 and 5 to 
6, shall apply analogously. Prior to such prohibtion, the highest authorities of the states in which 
the participating enterprises maintain their legal residence shall be given the opportunity for 
comment. If the Federal Cartel Office has issued the order pursuant to sentence 1, it shall be 
unlawful to consummate the merger without permission of the Federal Minister of Economics or 
to participate in its consummation; legal transactions in violation of this prohibition shall be 
invalid; this provision shall not apply to agreements concerning an amalgamation, consolidation, 
short merger, integration or formation of an enterprise nor to enterprise agreements within the 
meaning of §§ 291 and 292 of the Stock Corporation Act, when such agreements have become 
legally effective by entry in the Commercial Register or the Register of Cooperatives. A 
completed merger which has been prohibited by the Federal Cartel Office shall be dissolved, 
unless the Federal Minister of Economics grants permission for the merger. 
(3) The Federal Minister of Economics shall, on application, grant permission for the merger, 
if in the individual case the restraint of competition is compensated by the overall economic 
advantages of the merger or if the merger is justified by an overriding public interest; in this 
connection, regard shall also be given to the competitive capability of the participating 
enterprises in the markets outside the territory in which this Act applies. The permission may 
only be granted if the scope of the restraint of competition does not endanger the principle of the 
market economy. The permission may be subjected to restrictions and duties. These may not be 
directed at placing the conduct of the participating enterprises under continous supervision. § 22 
shall remain unaffected. 
(4) The application for the granting of permission for the merger shall be submitted to the 
Federal Minister of Economics in writing within a period of one month. The period shall 
commence with the service of the order of the Federal Cartel Office referred to in subsection (2), 
sentence 1; if the order of the Federal Cartel Office is appealed within the period provided 
for in 
§ 65 (1), sentences 1 and 2, then the period for the application for permission shall commence 
on the date on which the order of the Federal Catel Office becomes unappealable. 
The Federal 
Minister of Economics should decide on the application within four months following the 
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expiration of the periods for the application for permission referred to in sentences 1 and 2. Prior to the ministerial decision, the highest authorities of the states in which the participating 
enterprises maintain their legal residence shall be given opportunity for comment. 
(5) The Federal Minister of Economics may revoke the premission, amend it by ordering 
restrictions or subject it to duties, if the particpating enterprises contravene a duty connected 
with the permission. The Federal Minister of Economics may withdraw the permission if the 
participating enterprises have obtained it through fraud, threat, bribery or through furnishing of information incorrect or incomplete in material aspects. 
(6) The dissolution of a completed merger may also be accomplished by removing the 
restraint of competition in a manner other than through the re-establishment of the originally 
prevailing conditions. The Federal Cartel Office shall order the measures necessary for the dissolution of the merger if 
1. its order referred to in subsection (2), sentence 1, has become unappealable; and 
2. in case the participating enterprises had filed an application for the granting of permission 
with the Federal Minister of Economics, the rejection of such application, or, in the case of 
subsection (5), the revocation or withdrawal have become unappealable. 
In this connection, the Federal Cartel Office, with due regard for the preservation of the interests 
of third parties, shall order those measures which accomplish the objective with the least 
expense and the least burden for those involved. 
(7) The Federal Cartel Office may, for purposes of enforcing its order, in particular 
1. compel those who are obligated to dissolve the merger to carry out the ordered measures 
without undue delay by imposing one or more times an enforcement fine between 10.000 
and one million Deutsche Marks; 
2. prohibit the exercise of voting rights attached to shares of a participating enterprise which 
are held by or to by attributeded to another participating enterprise, or subject the exercise 
of such voting rights or the manner of sich exercise to permission of the Federal Cartel 
Office; 
3. declare agreements effecting mergers as designated in § 23 (2), Nos. 1 and 3, to be 
ineffective; this provision shall not apply to agreements concerning an amalgamation, 
consolidation, short merger, integration or formation of an enterprise nor to enterprise 
agreements within the meaning of §§ 291 and 292 of the Stock Corporation Act, when 
such agreements have become legally effective by entry in the Commercial Register or in 
the Register of Cooperatives; 
4. appoint a fiduciary who shall make the required legal declarations and carry out the 
required acts on behalf of the parties obligated to dissolve the merger; in this connection, 
the extent to which the rights of those concerned shall be suspended during the duration 
of the fiduciary relationship shall be specified; §§ 664 and 666 to 670 of the Civil Code 
shall be applied analogously to the legal relation between the fiduciary and such obligated 
parties; the fiduciary may claim a resonable compensation from such obligated parties. 
(8) Subsections (1) to (7) shall not apply 
1. if the aggregate turnover proceeds of the participating enterprises collectively amounted to 
less than five hundred million Deutsche Marks during the last preceding business year; or 
2. if an enterprise which is not a dependent enterprise and which had during the last 
preceding business year turnover proceeds of not more than 50 million Deutsche Marks 
joins another enterprise, unless the enterprise had turnover proceeds of at least four 
million Deutsche Marks and the other enterprise had turnover proceeds of at least on 
thousand million Deutsche Marks, or 
3. insofar as a market is concerned in which goods or commercial services are offered for at 
least five years and in which a turnover of less than ten million Deutsche Marks was 
achieved during the last calender year. 
§ 23 (1), sentences 2 to 10, shall be applied in computing turnover proceeds. 
(9) Subsection (8), sentence 1, No. 2, shall not be applied insofar as by reason of the merger 
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competition is restricted within the meaning of subsection (1) in respect of the publication, production, or distribution of newspapers or periodicals or of parts thereof. 
§ 24a 
Notification of Merger Plans 
(1) Notification of the plan for a merger may be given to the Federal Cartel Office. Notification 
of the merger plan must be given to the Federal Cartel Office if 
1. one of the enterprises participating in the merger had turnover proceeds of at least two thousand million Deutsche Marks during the last preceding business year; or 
2. at least two of the enterprises participating in the merger had each turnover proceeds of 
one thousand million Deutsche Marks or more during the last preceding business year, or 
3. if the merger, pursuant to state law, is to be effected by legislative enactment or by any 
other sovereign act; 
this provision shall not apply to mergers pursuant to § 23 (2), No. 6. § 23 shall apply analogously 
to the notification, provided that in the application of § 23 (1), sentence 1, and § 23 (6), the date 
of the notification shall be substituted for the date of the merger, and provided further, that in 
cases of an amalgamation, consolidation or short merger the owners, representatives or 
persons authorized to represent the enterprises participating in the merger shall be required to 
give the notification. The notification shall only be deemed to be effected if it contains the 
particulars referred to in § 23 (5). § 46 (9) shall apply analogously to the knowledge and 
documents obtained on the occasion of the notification. 
(2) If notification of the merger plan has been given to the Federal Cartel Office, the Federal 
Cartel Office may prohibit the merger only if it informs whoever has given the notification that it 
has begun an examination of the merger plan issues the order pursuant to § 24 (2), sentence 1, 
within four months after receipt of the notification. However, the Federal Cartel Office may 
prohibit the merger after the exiration of the four-months period if 
1. the enterprises participating in the merger have agreed to an extension of the period; or 
2. the merger is completed even though the one-month period referred to in sentence 1, the 
four-month period therein referred to has not yet expired; or 
3. the merger is completed in a manner other than as notified; or 
4. the merger has not yet been completed and the circumstances, on the basis of which the 
Federal Cartel Office has refrained form giving information pursuant to sentence 1 or form 
prohibiting the merger pursuant to § 24 (2), sentence 1, have materially changed; or 
5. the Federal Cartel Office has been caused, by incorrect or incomplete information given 
by the enterprises participating in the merger or by another, to obstain form giving 
information pursuant to sentence 1 or from prohibiting the merger pursuant to § 24 (2), 
sentence 1; or 
6. a demand for information pursuant to §§ 23 (6) or 46 was not, or not in time, fulfilled 
thereby causing the conduct of the Federal Cartel Office referred to in No. 5. 
(3) The notification of the merger plan shall not affect the obligation to report the merger 
pursuant to § 23; in the report pursuant to § 23, reference may be made to the documents 
submitted with the notification of the merger plan. 
(4) If notification of a merger plan must be given pursuant of subsection (1), sentence 2, it 
shall be unlawful either to complete the merger or to participate in the completion of the merger 
prior to the expiration of the one-month period referred to in subsection (2), sentence 1, and, in 
case the Federal Cartel Office has given information pursuant to subsection (2), sentence 1, 
prior to the four-months period therein referred to or its consented-to extension, unless the 
Federal Cartel Office has informed the notifying party in writing prior to the expiration of the 
periods referred to in subsection (2), sentence 1, that ther merger plan does not 
fall under the 
prohibition requirements of § 24 (1); legal transactions in violation of this prohibition shall 
be 
invalid; this provision shall not apply to agreements concerning an amalgamation, consolidation, 
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short merger, integration or formation of an enterprise nor to enterprise agreements within the meaning of §§ 291 and 292 of the Stock Corporation Act, when such agreements have become legally effective by entry in the Commercial Register or in the Register of Cooperatives. 
§ 24b 
Monopolies Commission 
(1) A Monopolies Commission shall be established to regularly give its opinion on the development of enterprise concentration in the Federal Republic of Germany and on the 
administration of §§ 22 to 24a. It shall be composed of five members who must have particular knowledge and experience in the fields of economics, business administration, social policy, technology or business law. 
(2) The members of the Monopolies Commission may belong neither to the Government nor to the legislature of the Federation or a state, nor to the civil service of the Federation, a state or 
any other legal entitiy under public law, with the exception of university professors and members 
of an academic institute. Furthermore, they may not be representatives of a business 
association nor of an organization of employers or employees, nor have a permanent 
employment or other permanent service contract with such association or organization. 
Furthermore, they may not have held such a position during the year preceding appointment as 
a member of the Monopolies Commission. 
(3) In its opinion, the Monopolies Commission should evaluate the prevailing state of 
enterprise concentration as well as its foreseeable development in the light of economic policy, 
in particular competition policy, and appraise the administration of §§ 22 to 24a. It should also 
indicate amendments of the pertinent provisions of this Act which it deems to be necessary. 
(4) The Monopolies Commission shall only be bound by the mandate established by this Act 
and shall be independent in its activities. If a minority is of a dissenting view in the preparation of 
the opinions, then the minority may state its dissenting views in the opinions. 
(5) The Monopolies Commission shall prepare an opinion every two years on or before 
June 30, the first opinion to be prepared on or before June 30,1976, covering the conditions 
prevailing during the last two preceding full calendar years, and transmit it to the Federal 
Government without undue delay. The opinions pursuant to sentence 1 shall be presented 
without undue delay by the Federal Government to the legislature and shall at the same time be 
published by the Monopolies Commission. The Federal Government shall comment to the 
legislature on these opinions without undue delay. In addition thereto, the Monopoly may in its 
discretion prepare additional opinions. The Federal Government may request the Monopolies 
Commission to deliver additional opinions. The Monopolies Commission shall transmit the 
opinions pursuant to sentences 4 and 5 to the Federal Government without undue delay and 
shall publish them. The Federal Minister of Economics may also request an expert opinion from 
the Monopolies Commission in individual cases which are before him for decision pursuant to 
§ 24 (3). 
(6) The members of the Monopolies Commission shall be appointed by the Federal President 
upon designation by the Federal Government. One member shall retire from office as of July 1 
of each year in which an opinion is to be rendered pursuant to subsection (5), sentence 1. The 
order of retirement shall be determined by lot in the first session of the Monopolies Commission. 
The Federal President shall, upon designation by the Federal Government, form time to appoint 
a new member for a term of four years. Reappointments shall be permitted. The Federal 
Government shall consult the members of the Monopolies Commission before it designates new 
members. The members shall be entitled to resign from office by giving notice to the Federal 
President. In the event that a member leaves prematurely, a new member shall be appointed for 
the term of office of the retired member; sentences 4 to 6 shall apply analogously. 
(7) The resolutions of the Monopolies Commission shall require the approval of at least three 
members. The Monopolies Commission shall elect a chairman from its members. The 
Monopolies Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 
(8) The Monopolies Commission shall be provided with a secretariat. The function of the 
secretariat shall be the procuring and compiling of source materials, the technical preparation of 
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sessions of the Monopolies Commission, and the printing and publication of the opinions as well as attending to such other administrative matters as may occur. 
(9) The members of the Monopolies Commission and the staff of the secretariat shall be 
obligated to keep secret the deliberations as well as the working papers which have been designated as confidential by the Monopolies Commission. The duty of secrecy shall extend also to information which is given to the Monopolies Commission and is designated as confidential. 
(10) The members of the Monopolies Commission shall receive a lump sum compensation 
as well as reimbursement of their travel expenses. These shall be determined by the Federal 
Minister of Economics subject to agreement by the Federal Minister of the Interior. The costs of the Monopolies Commission shall by the Federation. 
Other provision of the GWB relevant to merger control, but not included in Part Three of 
the GWB L------------------------------------------------------- 
§ 46 
Rights of Information and Investigation 
(1) Insofar as required for the exercise of the functions of the Cartel Authority under this Act, 
the Cartel Authority may 
1. demand information form enterprises and associations of enterprises regarding their 
economic conditions; 
2. inspect and examine business records at the enterprises and associations of enterprises 
during normal business hours; 
3. demand information from business and professional associations regarding the articles of 
association and resolutions, as well as the number and names of members to whom the 
resolutions apply. 
(2) Owners of enterprises or their representatives, and in the case of legal entities, 
partnerships or associations without legal personality, persons designated as legal 
representatives by law or by articles of association, as well as representatives who have been 
appointed in accordance with § 36 (2), shall be obligated to furnish the information demanded, to 
submit business records and to permit the examination of these business records as well as the 
entry into offices and business premises. 
(3) Persons who are commissioned by the Cartel Authority to make examinations may enter 
the offices of enterprises and associations of enterprises. The basic right of Article 13 of the 
Constitution is insofar restricted. 
(4) Searches may be made only by order of the judge of the Local Court competent for the 
district where the search shall be made. §§ 306 to 310 and 311 a of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure shall apply analogously to an appeal from such order. If danger of delay exists, the 
persons referred to in subsection (3) may conduct the necessary searches during business 
hours without judicial order. At the place of the search, a record of the search and its marterial 
results shall be made which, in the case that no judicial order was issued, shall also show the 
facts which led to a supposition of danger or delay. 
(5) A person obligated to furnish information may refuse to answer questions if the answer 
would expose himself or a relative, as defined in § 383 (1), Nos. 1 to 3, of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, to the danger of criminal prosecution or of proceedings pursuant to the Act on 
Administrative Offenses. 
(6) The Federal Minister of Economics or the highest state authorities shall call for 
information by means of an individual written order; the Federal Cartel Office shall call for it by 
means of a decree. The legal basis, the subject matter and the purpose of the request 
for 
information must be specified therein and a reasonable time period within which the information 
ist to be furnished must be determined. 
(7) The Federal Minister of Economics or the hightest state authority shall order the 
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examination by means of an individual written order; the Federal Cartel Office shall order it by 
means of a decree with the consent of the President. The time, the legal basis, the subject 
matter and the purpose of the examination must be contained therein. 
(8) (repealed) 
(9) Knowledge and records obtained either through information received pursuant to 
subsection (1), Nos. 1 and 3, or through measures taken pursuant to subsection (1), No. 2, may 
not be used for tax proceedings or administrative fine proceedings concerning administrative tax 
offenses or exchange control contraventions; the provisions of §§ 93,97,105 (1), 111 (5) in 
connection with § 105 (1), and § 116 (1) of the Basic Tax Code shall not be applied to that 
extent. Sentence 1 shall apply neither to proceedings concerning criminal tax offenses and tax 
proceedings connected therewith if cogent public interests require their implementation nor in 
the event of the willful giving of wrong information by the person obligated to give information or 
by persons acting for him. 
§ 48 
Oranisation of the Federal Cartel Office 
(1) A Federal Cartel Office shall be established as an independent Superior Federal Authoritiy 
with its seat in Berlin. 
(2) Decisions of the Federal Cartel Office shall be made by the Decision-units, which shall be 
established ad determined by the Federal Minister of Economics. Otherwise, the President shall 
determine allocation and operation of business of the Federal Cartel Office by means of rules of 
operation; they shall require confirmation by the Federal Minister of Economics. 
(3) The Decision-units shall decide in bodies composed of a Chairman and two Associates. 
(4) Chairmen and Associates in the Decision-units must be civil servants appointed for life. 
Chairmen and Associates must be qualified to serve as judges or in senior administrative 
positions; Chairmen shoud, as a rule, be qualified to serve as judges. 
(5) The members of the Federal Cartel Office may not be owners, managers or members of 
the board of management or of the supervisiory board of an enterprise, a cartel or a business or 
professional association. 
§ 49 
General Directives of the Minister of Economics 
Insofar as the Federal Minister of Economics issues general directives to the Federal Cartel 
Office with regard to the issuance of or the abstention from issuance of orders pursuant to this 
Act such directives shall be published in the Federal Gazette. 
§ 62 
Right of Appeal 
(1) Appeal from orders of the Cartel Authority shall be permissible. It may also be based upon 
new facts and evidence. 
(2) Appeal shall be open to participants in proceedings before the Cartel authority (§ 51 (2) 
and (3)). 
(3) 
(4) Decisions on an appeal shall be made exclusively by the Court of Appeals competent for 
the district where the Cartel Authority has its seat, and in cases of §§ 24 and 24a, exclusively by 
the Court of Appeals competent for the district where the Federal Cartel Office has its seat, and 
even if the appeal is from an order of the Federal Minister of Economics. 
§ 36 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure shall apply analogously. 
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§ 73 
Second appeal on points of law 
(1) Appeals on points of law to the Federal Supreme Court from the decrees of the Court of Appeal on the merits shall be permissible, if the Court of Appeals has granted leave to appeal on 
points of law. 
(2) Leave to appeal on points of law shall be granted if 
1. a question of law of fundamental significance is concerned; or 
2. the development of the law and maintenence of uniform decision practice require a 
decision of the Federal Supreme Court. 
(3) The decision of the Court of Appeals must state whether leave to appeal on points of law 
is granted or not. If it is not granted, a statement of reasons shall be required. 
(4) Granting of leave to appeal on points of law from decisions of the appellate courts shall 
not be required if one of the following defects in the proceedings existed and has been raised on 
appeal: 
1. if the court making the decision was not consituted according to provisions of law, 
2. if a judge, who was excluded by law from his judicial office or was sucessfully refused for 
fear of his being prejudiced, participated in the decision, 
3. if a participant was refused his right to be heard, 
4. if a participant was not represented in the proceedings according to provisions of law, 
unless the consented explicitly or implicitly to the conducting of the proceeding, 
5. if the decision was made on the basis of an oral hearing in which the provisions regarding 
public proceedings were violated, or 
6. if the decision does not contain a statement of reason. 
§ 73 
Second appeal on points of law 
(1) The refusal to grant leave to appeal on points of law may be appealed independently by 
an appeal from failure to grant leave. 
(2) The decision regarding the appeal from failure to grant leave shall be made by the 
Federal Supreme Court in the form of decree which must contain a statement of reasons. The 
decree may be issued without an oral hearing 
(3) 
§ 98 (2) 
Scope of Territorial Application 
(2) This Act shall apply to all restraints of competition which have effects within the territory in 
which this Act applies, even if they are caused outside the territory in which this Act applies. It 
shall also apply to export cartels within the meaning of §6 (1) insofar as enterprises are 
participating in them which maintain their legal residence within the territory in which this Act 
applies. 
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Checklist for Merger Control Procedures 
- Federal Cartel Office, Berlin 1990 - 
Single Firm market domination 
1. Market share 
2. Financial Strength 
3. Access to supply or sales markets 
4. Interlocks 
5. Barriers to market entry 
6. Competition from imperfect substitutes 
7. Foreign competition 
8. Buying power on the opposite side of the market 
9. Market phase 
10. Overall appraisal of competitive conditions 
II. Oligopolistic market domination 
A. Competitive conditions 
1. Market share 
2. Symmetry of the oligopoly 
3. Interlocks 
4. Barriers to market entry 
5. Competition from imperfect substitutes 
6. Foreign competitors 
7. Buying power on the opposite side of the market 
8. Market phase 
9. Overall appraisal of competitive conditions 
B. Competitive process 
C. Relationship between the oligopolies and outsiders 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
I. Single Firm Market Domination 
Introductory Remarks 
The Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC) offers a double definition for single-firm market 
domination. Accordingly, an enterprise is either market-dominating, if it is not exposed to any 
competition or to any substantial competition, or if it has a paramount market position in relation 
to its competitors. A paramount market position follows in particular from the market share, the 
financial strength, the access to the supply or sales markets, the links with other enterprises as 
well as the market entry barriers (Section 22 (1) of the ARC). 
The second alternative, where the conditions of competition (market structure) are the decisive 
element, is of greatest practical importance in merger control, and there it is primarily discussed 
in this checklist. The first alternative, for which the competitive process (market conduct) is of 
crucial importance, primarily covers extreme cases of market dominance (see Bundestags- 
Drucksache VI/2520 p. 21) and is therefore not discussed specifically below. 
To establish market domination as a result of a paramount market position, the ARC requires an 
overall appraisal of all the conditions of competition relevant to the market affected by the 
merger (BGH WuW/E 1504 "GKN-Sachs"). The competitive process in principle is of no 
importance for the finding of a paramount market position. A paramount market position is, in 
particular, not precluded by the existence of substantial competition (BGH WuW/E 1449 
"Valium"). 
A paramount market position is present, if an enterprise, due to market- or firm-related structural 
criteria, has a scope of action which is not sufficiently controlled by its competitors. If the 
enterprise is able to use parameters of competition or pursue market strategies without having 
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regard to its competitors, there is at least a danger of the essential functions of competition being no longer fulfilled. The same applies, if such a competitive effect arises without the 
enterprise engaging in conduct to that end (Section 22 (1) No. 2, Section 24 (1) of the ARC; BGH WuW/E 1506 f "GKN-Sachs"). 
A paramount market position is strengthened trough a merger, if the merger further deteriorates 
the conditions of competition on the market concerned. After establishing a paramount market 
position, it has to be examined whether the already existing scope of autonomous action is 
widened and workable competition thus becomes even less likely (BGH WuW/E 1691 "Springer- 
E. Wochenblatt"). Such strengthening effect is already present, if the enterprise after the merger is better able to fend off imitation competition and thus in a position to maintain or secure its 
paramount market position (BGH WuW/E 1536 f "Erdgas Schwaben"). The standard of proff to 
establish a strengthening effect is lower, the more extensively the market concerned is already dominated. 
A paramount market position is created by a merger, if an enterprise therby gains a scope of 
action in the affected market which is no longer sufficiently controlled by its competitors. What 
matters here is the post-merger conditions of competition. A prognosis of the conduct of the 
merged firm is not necessary. In the event of substantial pre-merer competititon, however, there 
must be a strong probability that such competition will no longer take place in future (BGH 
WuW/E 1755 "Kläckner-Becorit"). 
The following firm- and market-related conditions of competition allow to draw conclusionts as to 
the likelihood of an enterprise having a superior scope of action in the maket affected by the 
merger. This is due to the fact that certain types of conditions of competition imply a typical kind 
of condict given reasonable considerations and motivations of the enterprises (BGH 
WuW/E 1510 "GKN-Sachs"). The listing is not exhaustive and not all of the criteria mentioned 
are meaningful for every market. Mentioned are only some frequently occurring or normally 
meaningful conditions of competition. 
1. Market share 
The market share characterises the current market position and significance of an enterprise 
and provides information on its possible scope of action. A significant market share suggests a 
paramount market position. If there are alos barriers to entry in the maket concerned, single-firm 
market domination is likely to exist. A market share assessment is particularly meaningful, if 
besides the absolute size of the market share (a), the difference between the market share of 
the enterprise concerned and that of its largest competitor as well as the distribution of market 
shares generally (b) and the development of market shares in time are ascertained and 
evaluated (c). 
a. The higher the absolute market share of an enterprise, the greater the likelihood that it has a 
not sufficiently controlled scope of action. The higher the market share of an enterprise, the 
ghigher also its ability to restrict competition in the market concerned. The enterprise will, in 
particular, be able to determine the priece of the relevant product or service by changing its own 
supply or its own demand. 
If the market share of an enterprise attains or exeeds the 33 1/3 per cent threshold, a restrictive 
influence on competition is particularly likely and single-firm market domination is presumed 
(Section 22 (3) No. 1 of the ARC). At the same time this raises the standards of proof to 
establish that contrary to the presumption there is no paramount market position. They are the 
higher, the more clearly the one-third threshold is exceeded. 
the inding of a paramoung market position does not depend on the existence of a market share 
of at least 33 1/3 per cent. Enterprises with smaller market shares may alos be dominant, 
provided other conditions of competition create a paramount scope of action (Section 23a (1) 
No. la of the ARC; KG WuW/E OLG 2889 if. "Krupp-Total"). 
b. The greater the difference between a firms's market share (or relative market share) and that 
of its largest competition and the more fragmented the market shares of its other competitors, 
the greater the likelyhood that the market (share) leader has a scope 
for restrictive action (BGH 
WuW/E 2155 f. "Rheinmetall-WMF"). Moreover, absolute and relative market shares are 
FCO Merger Control Checklist 1990 Appendix 8 
interdependent. The absolute size of the market shares loses importance, as the market share difference widens and the market share structure is otherwise atomistic (KG WuW/E 
OLG 2863 f. "Rewe-Florimex"). 
These two criteria provide information on the competitors' ability to offer the other side of the 
market alternative choices, should the market leader use his scope of action to restrict 
competition. Relevant evidence can be supplemented by findings regarding 
competition'production capacities and their degree of utilisation (KG WuW/E OLG 1752 "GKN- 
Sachs"). The larger the number of competitors and the smaller their market shares, the greater 
the likelihood of their adjusting to the market leader's competitive behaviour and thus the the 
existence of an uncontroled scope of action. 
A paramount market position ist to be presumed prima facie, if 
- the absolute and relative market share of an enterprise are significant, 
- the supply is otherwise heavily fragmented, and 
- all other conditions of competition are not in conflict with the presumption. 
This applies also if the above-mentioned conditions are created as a result of a merger with a 
compeitior and consequently the creation of a paramount market position it be expected (so- 
called "purely structural case"; BGH WuW/E 1755 f. "Klöckner-Becorit"). 
If the conditions of a purely structural case are not satisfied, the matter turns on the question 
whether the market share obtained by the merged enterprises as a result of the merger provides 
them with a scope of action no longer sufficiently controlled by their competitors. In principle the 
market share of merged enterprises amounts to the sum the market shares previously held by 
them separately. If the enterprieses concerned do not form an economic unit as a result of the 
merger (Section 23 (1) sentence 2 of the ARC), as a rule internal competition between them is 
excluded, though. Market share losses due to a shift of customers to other suppliers are 
particuarly unlikely, if the range of supplies firmly established in the marekt is fully retained 
(KG WuW/E OLG 2138 "Klöckner-Becorit"). 
If an enterpries already holds a dominant position in the market concerned due to its significant 
market share, that position can be strengthened even through minor increases in market share 
as a result of a horizontal merger (BGH WuW/ 1659 "Alsen Breitenburg-Klöckner"). 
c. The development of market shares over time can also be indicative of the presence or 
absence of a paramount market position. Competition is a dynamic process of initial moves of 
one competitor and responses of others to catch up with him. Accordingly, the market shares of 
enterprises in principle fluctuate over time. A persistently large market share consequently is an 
indication that tere is an uncontrolled scope of action (BHG WuW/E 1504 "GKN-Sachs"). Market 
share fluctuations comined with changing market leadership or sustained heavy market share 
losses speak against its existence. 
However, the possible causes of the market share development must always be considered, 
too. Market share losses in situations of intese price competition make market dominance 
unlikely (KG WuW/E OLG 2534 "Springer-az"). 
2. Financial Strength 
Paramount financial strength may provide a firm with a scope of action, in particular as regards 
the use of parameters of competition such as price, capital spending, research, and advertising. 
Paramount financial strength results in a paramount market position if it has a discouraging or 
deterrent effect on competitiors in the sense that it prevents actural competitors from engaging 
in active competition and potentialcompetitors from enteringthe market ("resources" theory; BHG 
WuW/E 1510 f. "GKN-Sachs"). 
Single-firm market domination owing to financial strength is expecially likely to occur if a firm 
also has a significant market share and if there exist barriers to entry that do not result from the 
Fimr's deterrent potential alone. 
the discouraging and deterrent effects that may be caused by financial strength can also be 
produced by other resources such as R&D (BKartA WuW/E 2356 "Daimler-MBB"), technological 
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and business knwo-how (BGH WuW/E 1751 "Klöckner-Becorit") as well as resources that are 
specific to a particualr industry or market (BGH WuW/E 1858 if. "Springer-Münchener 
Zeitungsverlag"). 
a. A firm's financial strength is determined by its possibilities of equity and debt financeing. It 
may be assessed by measures such as turnover, porfit, cash flow, net operating margin, credit line, access to national or international capital markets, and other criteria. Turnover is the 
criterion for instituting proceedings based on the legal presumptions as to market penetration, 
combined market dominance, and size in Section 23a (1) of the ARC. High turnover, however, is 
not always tantamount to high earnings. Therefore, it may not in every case be sufficient to 
consider turnover alone (BGH WuW/E 2582 "Kampffmeyer-Plange"). On theother hand, loses in 
one field of operation and a prolonged recession alone will not deprive a firm of its financial 
strength (BGH WuW/E 1756 "Klöckner-Becorit"). 
the financial resources of other enterprises may be added to those of the merging firms only if 
the former and the latter form an economic unit (Section 23 (1) sentence 2 of the ARC) - as a 
result of the merger, as the case may be. Links with financially strong firms may also have to be 
taken into account (BGH WuW/E 2582 "Kampffmeyer-Plange"). 
A paramount market position owing to financial strength is to be taken into account only if the 
financial power of the firm concerned exceeds that of its competitors. The stronger its resources, 
the greater its potential for predatory and disciplinary action, and the more likely single-firm 
market domination is to occur, provided that financial strngth can be brougth to bear on the 
market concerned (b. infra). The existence of financially strong competitors does not preclude a 
paramount market position of the merging firms (BGH WuW/E 1512 "GKN-Sachs"). It may, e. g., 
be unlikely that those competitors actually use their financial resources, a conclusion possibly to 
draw if their market shares have persisted at competitively insignificant levels for some time 
(BGH WuW/E 2581 "Kampffmeyer-Plange"). 
b. Discouraging and deterrent effects of paramount financial strength on competitors are to be 
expected if the competitors believe that the merging firms are likely to use those superior 
resources. 
A firm may use its financial strength on most product and service markets for all kinds of 
purposes. Financial strength is likely to be used on appropriate markets if it allows predatory or 
disciplinary strategies to be successfully pplied. A precondition for such strategies is that the 
financially strong firm disposes of free production capacity for increasing supply at short term. 
Further indications are given, inter alia, by the buyer's possibilities of changing to other 
suppliers, the ability of competitors to react successfully with parameters other than those 
relating to funancial strength, and the significance of the market concerned to the overall 
operations of the finacially strong enterprise. The existence of entry barriers and the market 
phase are alos of special importance to the successful use of predatory and disciplinary 
strategies. 
It is particularly difficult to prove anitcompetitive effects of paramount financial strngth if a 
paramount market position results from a pure conglomerate merger. This is most likely to 
happen on markets of mainly small and medium-sized firms, even if the merging firms have low 
market shares (Section 23a (1) No. 1a of the ARC; BKartA WuW/E 2251 "Springer-Schlei 
Verlag"). The burden of proof is less heavy where existing market domination is further 
increased. This is very likely to occur if a market-dominating firm with a significant market share 
gains additional financial strength (Section 23a (1) No. 1b of the ARC). A dominating market 
position is strengthened in particular if the acquiring firm has already been competing with the 
acquired firm on neighbouring product markets ("market extension" merger; BGH WuW/E 1511 
"GKN-Sachs") or if the merger serves to pursue particular business policies which may be 
reflected in an influx of capital, or in capital spending and expansion plans (BGH WuW/E 2157 
"Rheinmetall-WMF"). 
3. Access to supply or sales markets 
A firm's easier access to the supply or sales markets for goods and services and relation to its 
competitors may give the firm considerable scope of action in the market concerned and allow it 
to occupy a paramount market position. A paramount market position is present, in partiuclar, if 
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based on its easy access to the supply or sales markets, a powerful firm (in terms of market 
share) may make access to such markets difficult for its rivals or even impossible (market foreclosure effect). This is also true, if the effect of market foreclosure occurs without the firm having adopted any behaviour to that end. Potential competitors perceive this restreaint of 
competition as higher barriers to market entry. 
The effect of market foreclosure occurs above all, if a firm is engaged not only in the market 
concerned but also in an important upstream or downstream market (vertical integration) and 
occupies at least powerful positions in both markets (a. ). A restraint of competition similar to the 
market foreclosure effect, but usually less severe may be causes by the supply of a full line of 
products. This applies only if the suppliers's rivals offer a less wide range of products and 
services or none at all (b. ). Access to the sales markets may also be made difficult for rivals, 
where a diversified firm is in a position to promote its sales in the market concerned by means of 
reciprocal dealing (reciprocity) (c. ). Finally, resource-bases competitive advantages may give a firm easy access to the supply or sales markets (d. ). Unlike vertical integration, the latter three 
restraints of competition alone as a rule cannot give rise to a paramount market position. Rather, 
other structural factors, in particualr market share, must alos be present. However, the supply or 
rounding off of a full line of products, reciprocal dealing or the resource-bases competitive 
advantages which result from a merger are likely to strengthen a paramount market position. 
a. A paramount market position of a vertically integrated firm is the more likely, the higher its 
absolute and relative shares of the market concerned and of an important upstream or 
downstream market. Market foreclosure effects are likely, in particular, if important competitors 
depend on supplies from (BKartA WuW/E 1722 "BP-Gelsenberg") or sales to (BKartA 
WuW/E 2346 f. "Daimler-MBB") the vertically integrated firm. They may also occur, if the 
vertically integrated firm holds a market position in the supply or sales market. 
Market foreclosure effects resulting from a vertical merger strengthen as a rule the market 
position of the merging enterprises. They may result in the creation of a paramount market 
position. They are very likely to strengthen the paramount position already held in the market 
concerned (BGH WuW/E 1769 "Teerbau-Makadam"). For such links between enterprises 
strengthen a dominant position by making innovative competition even more difficult for vertically 
non-integrated competitors and raising the barriers to entry for potential competitors. This is all 
the more true, wher the merger occurs between two firms that dominate their respective levels 
of the market (BKartA WuW/E 2346 "Daimler-MBB"), in which case as a rule this market 
position is deemed to be strengthened. 
Paramount market positions resulting from vertical integration may occur not only, if a firm is 
engaged at two levels of a market at a time, or if tow firms operating at different levels of the 
market form an economic unit (Section 23 (1) sentence 2 of the ARC). Easy access to the 
supply or sales markets may alos be due to links with suppliers or buyers (BGH WuW/E 2581 
"Kampffmeyer-Plange"; BKartA WuW/E 1912 f. "Lufthansa-first"). For even if a firm holds a 
minority share in a supplier or buyer, preference will always be given to the latter, unless its 
rivals submit more favourable offers (BGH WuW/E 1768 "Teerbau-Makadam"). 
A upply relationship which existed before a vertical merger beween the parties in principle does 
not preclude the creation or strengthening of a paramount market position (BGH WuW/E 1952 f. 
"Braun-Almo"). A supply relationship generally does not result in the parties cooperating as 
closely as they wourd if they merged, nor is such a relationship as durable as a merger. 
b. Easy access to the sales market as a result of a firm offering a full line mainly of 
complementary and substitute products presupposes that there is a regular demand for the 
relevant goods and services from a competitively significant number of buyers, and that no other 
firm offers a comparable range of goods. this applies similarly to the supply of turnkey 
(production) plants or package deals. The upply of a full line of products or of turnkey plants will 
restrict competition primarily if the buyers may achieve economies of scope by concentrating 
their purchases on the supplier of the full line or if the supplier, due to his market power in a 
submarket of that line of products, may cause buyers to concentrate their purchases on him, 
e. g. by means of tie-ins. Such predatory competition at the cost of one-product firms may be 
engaged in not only by diversified suppliers operating in several product markets, but alos by 
firms that offer goods or services belonging to the same product market in a wie range of price 
and quality (KG WuW/E OLG 3762 "Pillsbury-Sonnen Bassermann'). 
Easy access to the sales market based on the supply of a full line of products may sinificantly 
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enlarge a firms's scope fo action in the market concerned, but does not, as a rule, allow it to 
engage in independent action that is no longer controlled by competitors. For this to be possible, ther must be additional factors, primarily a significant market share. This applies equally to 
conglomerate or horizontal mergers whcih enable a firm to offer a full line of products for the first 
time. However, if a firm already has paramount market position in the market concerned, that 
market position may be strengthened by a merger allowing the firm to offer or round off a full line 
of products (BKartA WuW/E 2418 "WMF-Hutschenreuther"). The paramount market position is likely to be strngthened if the other merging firm has a strong position (in terms of market 
shares) in a submarket of the line of products (BKartA WuW/ 1855 f. "IBH-Wibau"). A 
strengthening of the paramount market position may be assumed to occur if the merging firms 
are market-dominating in their respective submarkets (BKartA WuW/E 2331 f. "Messer 
Griesheim-Buse"). 
c. Easy access to the sales market as a result of reciprocal dealing presupposes that a firm 
makes purchases from its customers in a third market. The number of those customers must be 
significant in terms of competition int the market concerned. Competition will be restricted if 
those custormers grant the diverisfied firm preferential treatment over its competitors in 
pruchasing in the market concerned, but may not by itself create a paramount market position. 
This applies alos to conglomerate mergers allowing reciprocity. However, if a paramount market 
position already exists in the market concerned, it may be strengthened by a merger providing a 
possibility of reciprocal dealing. The paramount market poisition is likely to be strengtehened if 
the other firm involved in the merger may cause a significant number of buyers to purchase from 
the market-dominating supplier (BKartA AG 81,290 "Südzucker-KWS") or is itslef market- 
dominating as a buyer. 
d. Easy access to sales or supply markets owing to a firm's resource-based competitive 
advantages may result from, among other things, a good reputation or acceptance in the market 
(BGH WuW/E 1504 "GKN-Sachs"), a dense network of own outlets (BGH WuW/E 2156 
"Rheinmetall-WMF"), a large number of production plants that allow to supply a large area, or a 
secure supply of raw materials (BGH WuW/E 2581 "Kampffmeyer-Plange"), a network of own 
correspondents (BGH WuW/E 1757 f. "Springer-Münchener Zeitungsverlag"), oran own chain of 
first-rate hotels (BKartA WuW/E 2178 "TUI-Air Conti"). Resource-base competitive advantages 
of a firm may also to a limited extent be an obstacle to other firms' access to supply or sales 
markets. This will substantially increase the likelihood that a firm which also has significant 
market shares enjoys a paramount maret position. To the extent that such a position already 
exists, it may be strengthened by a merger that improves the market-dominating firm's access 
to upstream or downstream markets (BKartA WuW/E 2376 "Melitta-Kraft"). 
4. Interlocks 
Interlocking directorates and interlocking capital arrangements among firms, in particular with 
competitors, custormers or suppliers may be contributing factors of a paramount market 
position, but may not lead to its creation. Restraints of competition resulting from interlocks are 
largely covered by other structural criteria contained in this checklist. Thus, interlocks with 
financially powerful firms may enlarge a firm's financial scope, and interlocks iwht custormers or 
suppliers may scure sales outlets or sources of supply as well as increase barriers to market 
entry. This criterion is significant in the case of interlocks with competitors. 
Interlocks with actual or potential competitors as well as with suppliers of imperfect substitutes 
as a rule restrict competition among those competitors. Unilateral and cross minority holdings or 
joint ventures generally result in mutual consideration of the other party's interests. They may 
also enable firms to prevent other companies in which they hold participations from engaging in 
competitive action that would place them at a disadvantage. 
5. Barriers to market entry 
Barriers to entry are an indication of the importance of potential competiton to the competitive 
process on the market concerned. As long as a powerful firm is unable to quote excessive 
prices or cannot dispense with R&D because other potential competitors would be likely to enter 
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the market, the latter have a controlling effect on the powerful firm's scope of action, and single- firm market domination cannot be assumed to exist. However, if barriers toentry prevent 
potential competition from effectively conrolling the powerful firm's freedom of action, it is far 
more likely that the latter enjoys a paramount market position. High entry barriers in principle 
restrict potential competition (a. ). 
If there are no barreirs to entroy or if entry is easy, it is likely that potential competition exists. 
By merging with a potential competitor, an established powerful or market-dominating firm may 
substantially increase or secure its scope of action (b. ). 
a. Barreirs to market entry are legal or economic obstacles hindering firms otuside a market from entering it. Such obstacles may actually exist for all potential new entrants, or they may 
render market entry based on reasonable commercial considerations and motives unlikely. They 
need not preclude market entry, nor need they exist indefinitely. It is enough if they delay or 
impede market entry for a competitively significant period of time. 
Entry barriers consist in particular in 
- Statutory restrictions of market entry 
Legal provisions may restrict market entry or the use of certain parameters by firms and thereby 
decrease potential competition in favour of the established firms. Examples are conditional 
authorisations for environmentally harmful plants (BKartA WuW/E 1758 "Teerbau-Makadam") or 
for the operations or rates of transport companies or public utilities. The same applies to limited 
resources owned by established firms, e. g. raw or waste materials deposits, locations, airport 
slots, patents. Technological constraints on the absorptive capacity of downstrean markets may 
also consitute barriers to entry (BKartA WuW/E 1949 "Morris-Rothmans"). 
- Economies of scale 
Economies of scale enjoyed by established firms in R&D, production (BGH WuW/E 1504 "GKN- 
Sachs") or the marketing of their products (BKartA WuW/E 2328 "Messer Griesheim-Buse") may 
render market entry unlikely for factual reasons. Economies of scale arise as costs of R&D, 
production or marketing decrease with growing firm size. New entrants will in general secure 
only small initial market shares. The greater the market share that is required to achieve the 
same economies of scale as the established competitors, the higher the barriers to entry due to 
the necessary initial capital requirements and risks to be borne by new entrants. 
The same applies to economies of scope that are often realised by diversifying firms. Economies 
of scope arise if one firm is engaged in different commercial activities at lower costs than would 
be incurred if different firms carried on each activity separately. This includes advantages of 
vertically integrated firms that may require a new entrant to enter the market at more than one 
level at the same time. 
- Strategic barriers to entry 
By their market conduct, established firms may erect factual entry barriers for new entrants and 
thereby render entry more difficult for them. The practice of all manufacturers of a particular 
market to conclude exclusive dealing contracts with their customers (Section 18 of the ARC) is 
an example of strategic entry barriers (BKartA WuW/E 2215 f. "Linde-Agefko"). Demarcation 
and concession agreements with public utilities (Section 103 (1) of the ARC; BKartA 
WuW/E 2157 f. "EVS-TWS") or industry-wide (Section 5 (1) of the ARC) or individual firms" 
standards for complementary goods have similar effects. 
Strategic barriers to entry may alos exist in the form of buyer preferences for established 
suppliers insofar as the preferences have been created by advertising and inter-brand 
competiton. 
FCO Merger Control Checklist 1990 
- Deterrent potential of market leader 
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A substantial market-strategic or resource-based deterrent potential of the market leader on the 
market concerned may also limit potential competition and render market entry by similarly 
situated firm unlikely (BGH WuW/E 1510 "GKN-Sachs"). Even if this does not preclude market 
entry, new entrants may be deterred bythe ability of established firms to keep them from 
attaining a competitively significant market position. A substantial deterrent potential exists, e. g., if the market leader owns considerable market-specific resources (BGH WuW/E 2283 "SZ- 
Donau Kurier"), if it has financial strnegth on a market characterised by advertising and inter- brand competition (KG WuW/E OLG 3079 "Morris-Rothmans"), if it is interlinked with major 
customers (BGH WuW/E 1769 "Teerbau-Makadam"), or if it has a market-dominating position 
on substantial geographic submarkets (BGH WuW/E 1860 "Springer-Münchener 
Zeitungsverlag"). In all these cases the market leader has a paramount market position even before any new entry occurs - also in relation to potential competitors. For this reason, significant 
market shares or a high degree of concentration may themselves constitute high barriers to 
entry. 
- Market trends 
Market entry is the more likely to occur, the higher the future profit prospects are expected to be. 
New and growing markets or markets with excess demand therefore have lower barriers to entry 
than have stagnant markets with excess capacities. 
The success or failure of pre-merger entry may be an indication of the competitive significance 
of barriers to entry intor the market concerned. Market entry suggests the existence of 
substantial potential competition, unless - measured by the new entrants' market shares - it has 
remained competitively insignificant (KG WuW/E 2836 "Holtzbrick-Rowohlt", on the one hand, 
and 2865 "Rewe-Florimex", on the other). Where market entry failed or no entry was made, even 
though the new entrants met all the necessary conditions of successful market entry, it may be 
assumed that entry barriers exist. 
b. If the freedom of action of an established powerful firm is only effectively controlled by 
potential competitors, merger with a potential competitor may provide the established firm with a 
paramount market position (BKartA WuW/E 1649 f. "Erdgas Schwaben"). If the established firm 
already has a pramount market position, it will as a rule be strengthend by any merger with a 
significant potential competitor, because possible improvements in the conditions of competition 
are thereby rendered less likely (BKartA WuW/E 1724 "BP-Gelsenberg"). Potential competitors 
are among others, firms which clearly intend to enter the market (BKartA WuW/E 1723 "BP- 
Gelsenberg"), which produce relevant goods or services for in-house consumption (BKartA 
WuW/E 2249 "Hills-Condea") or supply them on nearby markets, which can easily use their 
capacities for the production of other goods or services, or which are on up-stream or 
downstream markets (BGH WuW/E 1952 "Braun-Almo"). 
Potential Competiton may also be restricted by vertical or conglomerate mergers. However, this 
restraint of competition is only a side-effect of vertical integration or strengthened resources and 
therefore does not by itself lead to the creation or strengthening of a paramount market position. 
6. Competition from imperfect substitutes 
Competiton may come from goods or services which, though in the eyes of buyers being 
imperfect substitutes for those of the market concerned, may replace them to a limited extent or 
under certain conditions (a. ). Competition from imperfect substitutes therefore in principle plays 
an important role only as a form of residual competition in a market already characterised by a 
paramount market position. Consequently, a restraint of competition as a result of a link-up of an 
enterprise operating in the market concerned (primary market) with a substitution rival as rule 
can only strengthen already existing market dominance but not result in creating it (b. 
). On the 
other hand, competition from imperfect substitutes may not be so significant as to preclude the 
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presence of a paramount market position. 
a. Goods or services may be imperfect substitutes for various reasons. For example, a shift to an imperfect substitute may be possible for buyers only in the long term, because they must make investments first to be able to actually use the substitute (e. g., when switching from 
elctricity to gas aa source of energy). The choice of the imperfect substitute may imply a change in the tase or the habits of buyers (e. g. when shifting from a political weekly to a national daily). A 
change may also be burdensome woing to price differneces in connection with the purchase or the use of the imperfect substitutes. 
Several goods or services that belong to different product markets may serve as imperfect 
substitutes. The intensity of competition from imperfect substitutes may differ depending on how 
good a substitute on product migth be for another rom the buyer's point of view. In the case of heterogeneous products or services the intensity of competition from imperfect substitutes may differ also in respect of individual suppliers in the primary market (BGH WuW/E 2123 f. "G+J- 
Zeit"). 
b. Competition from imperfect substitutes in principle is a form of residual competition in 
dominated markets and may control the scope of action available to the enterprises involved 
only imperfectly. The presence of a paramount market position can thus be precluded only in 
exceptional cases, if, e. g. a completely new product which belongs to a different product market 
will replace the product in the market concerned in the foreseeable future. Just as competition 
from imperfect substitutes in principle does not preclude the presence of a paramount market 
position, the mere restraint thereof through a link-up of an enterprise in the primary market with 
a substitution rival does not lead to the creation of such a market position. Existing dominat 
positions may be strengthened therby, though. Such a strengthening effect it likely to occur, if 
the dominant enterprise mergeres with a powerful (in terms of market shares) substitution rival 
(BGH WuW/E 1536 f. "Erdgas Schwaben"). This applies in particular, if the latter holds a 
paramount market position in the market for the imperfect substitute as well. In may then be 
assumed that after the merger both firms will be able to exert influence on or control over the 
extent and the intensity of competition from imperfect substitutes to their own advantage. 
7. Foreign Competitors 
The significance of foreign competitors to the domestic market conduct does not always 
correspond to that of domestic competitors. Participation of foreign competitors in domestic 
markets may depend on factors that are irrelevant to domestic competitors. Their market shares 
may therefore understate or overstate their competitive significance (a. ). Potential foreign 
competition may be taken into account in exceptional cases only (b. ). 
a. Actual foreign competitors and domestic competitors in principle have to be treated the same. 
The market position of actual foreighn competitors has to be determined according to the criteria 
used for domestic competitors. Their market shares have to be determined on the basis of their 
actual domestic shipments or sales. However, market shares might give a misleading 
impression of the actual significance of foreign competitors to the competitive conduct in the 
domestic market. 
The competitive significance of foreign competitors may be greater than their actual domestic 
shipments indicate. This will be the case, for example, if the foreign supplier occupies a leading 
position in the world markets or if important domestic buyers have already done a dreat deal of 
business with the foreign competitor in foreign markets. In general, the competitive significance 
of firms with small market shares in the domestic market whose location or center of activities 
lies within the EC is greater than could be assumed from their market shares. However, the 
competitive significance of foreign competitors may be smaller than their actual domestic 
shipments suggest. This may be possible, in particular, if there are tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade, voluntary (export) restraints (BKartA WuW/E 2366 "Linde-Lansing") or if buyers give 
preerence to domestic competitors (BKartA WuW/E 2250 "Hills-Condea"). Generally speaking, 
the competitive significance of firms whose location or focus of activities lies outside the 
EC is 
smaller tha is reflected by their shares of the domestic market. This is true, in particular, of firms 
from Socialist countries. Moreover, the domestic activities of foreign competitors may be limited 
for firm-specific reasons. The type and level of their domestic operations - e. g. mere imports or 
independent domestic production - or interlinks or cooperation with 
domestic competitors may 
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give a first indication. 
b. Potential foreign competition as a rule is of very limited importance to domestic markets because the likelihood of market entry cannot be established with sufficient certainty. The 
absence of trade barriers and the presence of foreign competitors in adjacent geographic 
markets of other countries tend to be indicative of potential competition. An indication thereof does not suffice, however, for such competitors to be included as potential competitors (KG WuW/E 3079 "Morris-Rothmans"). 
8. Buying power on the opposite side of the market 
The likelihood of a paramount market position increases in proportion to the degree of fragmentation of the other side of the market. Firms wielding buying power on the other side of the market by contrast may stand in the way of market domination by a single firm. 
If a buyer accounts for most of the demand in a market, its buying behaviour can greatly 
influence competition among suppliers. There will be no supply-side market domination if the 
buyer's purchases are determined by strategic considerations rather than by the supplier's 
competitive conduct (BGH WuW/E 1752 "Klöckner-Becorit"). A strategic buying behaviour is 
likely if the supply market is of great importance to the buying enterprise, e. g., because the cost 
of the primary product essentially determines the selling price of the procesed final product. On 
the other hand, placing orders according to quotas or in order to prevent exits from the market 
does not in itself constitute market-strategic demand. When making procurement decisions, 
public buyers generally have to take account of political rather than market strategy 
consideration; domestic firms are therfore given priference in most cases (BKartA 
WuW/E 2348 f. "Daimler-MBB"). As a rule, their buying power, if any, equally affects all suppliers 
and does not contribute to the maintenance of competition among suppliers. 
Vertical integration or mergers between firms enjoying buying power and dominant suppliers as 
rule prevent adoption of market-strategic buying behaviour that promotes competition among 
suppliers. 
If an oligopsony accounts for most of the demand, the same applies in principle as in the case of 
monopsony (KG WuW/E OLG 3763 "Pillsbury-Sonnen Bassermann"). 
9. Market phase 
The market phase refers to the development stage of a market and hence to the stability of its 
competitive conditions. There is an essential difference between the two early market phases, 
the experimental stage and the growth stage (a, ), and the two late stages, the maturity and the 
stagnation phases (b. ). In principle, a paramount market position is more likely to exist in the 
lates market phases than in the early ones. 
The market phase is not so much an independent criterion as a criterion complementary to other 
conditions of competition. 
a. In the experimental and growth phases of a market, competitive conditions undergo perpetual 
change and therefore are hardly indicative of any stable scope of action. While the relevant 
product or service has already found a market, it can still be greatly developed and improved; 
other possible uses may still be discovered. Many competition parameters may be used and 
rather than enticing away custormers from competitors their use will create a new demand. 
In these early market phases high market shares are not unusual, if not inevitable. From the 
growth phase onward, thy will be dismantled by newcomers if there are no or low barriers to 
market entry. Economies of scale and buyer preferences caused by inter-brand and advertising 
competition alone do not constitute entry barriers. Financial strength is of minor importance, 
because an expanding market allows all firms the necessary scope. In addition, the use of 
financial resources can mostly be neutralised by other, usually technical resources. Upstream 
and downstream markets as a rule are open to all firms. 
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Nevertheless, paramount market positions are not impossible in the early market phases. Therfore, new markets are also subject to merger control (Section 24 (8) No. 3 ARC). The 
creation of paramount positions requires that - particularly as regards their research and development potential - the merging firms have a significant competitive edge over all their 
competitors which is unlikely to diminish even in later market phases. A paramount scope of action is likely in particular if a merger results in a market barrier to potential competitors (BKartA WuW/E 2146 "GfL"). 
b. In the maturity and stagnation phases the conditions of competition in the market concerned 
change more slowly, if at all. In relation to the general trend, the market growth is below average. Products and production processes can hardly be improved any further; all efforts are now being 
aimed at distribution. All possible uses of the relevant goods have been discovered and tested. Any remaining compeition parameters can only be used to respnd to competitors' moves. Therfore what tends to be used is the less easily imitable parameters. Instead of price 
competition there is a growing amount of competition on quality, service and advertising (BGH 
WuW/E 1509 "GKN-Sachs"). 
Since actual competitors in the market orient themselves by existing conditions of comptition, 
large market shares are unlikely to decrease in later market phases. Competitive advantages 
which individual firms may enjoy - e. g. because of their superior financial strength or their easy 
access to the supply or sales markets for goods and services - render innovative competition 
more difficult and are likely to exclude disadvantaged or less gighly integrated firms. New entry is 
rather unlikely, particularly if the market is stagnant (KG WuW/E 1752 "GKN-Sachs"). 
Competition is likely to resume only if as a result of innovations the market reenters an earlier 
market phase or definitely enters the phase of decline in which firms may try to reduce the costs 
of their market exit. 
Paramount market positions are therefore likely to occur mainly in the two later market phases. 
While the mere fact that a market moves into a late phase does not pose a threat to competition, 
the chances that there will be post-merger competition can greatly diminish. This is also true of 
resumption of competition, if paramount market positions are created or strengthened in the late 
market phases as a result of mergers (KG WuW/E 3080 "Morris-Rothmans"). 
10. Overall appraisal of competitive conditions 
In a final, overall appraisal all competitive conditions that are of significance to a particular 
market have to be examined to establish whether a paramount market position and hence 
single-firm market domination are likely (BGH WuW/E 1980 "SZ-Münchener Anzeigenblätter"). 
Market conduct should be taken into account only, if the conditions of competition alone give but 
a poor indication of the presence of a paramount market position (BGH WuW/E 1759 "Klöckner- 
Becorit"). 
In the case of highly diversified firms with particularly great resources it may be necessary to 
analyse the spillover effects of their competitive potential which cross the lines of the market 
affected by the merger. 
A paramount market position is very likely, if all conditions of competition considered either 
separately or together indicate that a firm's scope of action is no longer controlled by its 
competitors. Here the independent scope of action in relation to individual competitiors may also 
derive from various structural criteria. In relation to competitors with financial strength, for 
example, a firm's scope of action may derive from its significant market share, wheras in 
relation to its mid-size competitors its scope of action may result from its easier access to the 
sales market. 
However, very few factors or even a single one may sufice to indicate a paramount market 
poistion. Most relevant in this context are the structural factors market share - assuming a 
"purely structrual case" (see I. 1. b. supra) - and financial strength, particulary 
if one of the 
monopoly presumptions (Sections 22 (3) No. 1,23a (1) ARC) applies. If both the market share 
and the financial strength of a firm provide evidence of its uncontrolled scope of action and 
if in 
addition there are barriers to new entry, a paramount market position is very 
likely. In the 
presence of this combination of competitive conditions, very ample evidence 
is required to rebut 
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the presumption of single-firm market domination. If a firm's market share and financial strength are insufficient evidence of its paramount scope of action, the remaining conditions of competition may still give the firm a decisive advantage over its competitors (KG WuW/E OLG 2889 f. "Krupp-Total"). 
What applies to competitive conditions as indicators of a paramount market position also applies to the conditions of competition which prevent a paramount market position. One single 
structural factor may be sufficient to rule out a firms's independent scope of action (KG WuW/E OLG 4105 "w+i Verlag-Weis Druck"). For instance, a firm's paramount scope of action as 
evidenced by a significant market share may be offset by a rival's financial strength. For as long 
as they have the necessary capacity reserves financially strong rivals may disrupt the market leader's monopolistic conduct considerably even if their market shares are small. Similarly, 
market specific resources of competition may prevent a firm gaining a paramount market 
position as a result of its paramount financial strength. 
If a particular market is characterised by conditions of competition which indicate that a firm may 
or may not have an uncontrolled scope of action, without one structural criterion being sufficient 
evidence against a paramount market position, then those criteria must be appraised as they 
relate to each other. Again of special importance are the meaningful criteria market share, 
financial strength and barriers to entry. The greater the likelihood of an independent scope of 
action on the basis of those criteria, the greater the amount of evidence of offsetting factors that 
is required to rebut such an assumption. 
If the appraisal of competitive conditions does not give a clear indication of the presence or 
absence of a paramount market position, the analysis has to include the actual market conduct 
so that the structural criteria can be better evaluated (BGH WuW/E 1716 "Mannesmann- 
Brueninghaus"). The presence of substantial competition in the market concerned in intself does 
not rule out the presence of a paramount market position (KG WuW/E OLG 2543 "Braun- 
Almo"). A paramount position can be excluded only if substantial competition in turn results from 
structural factors that are not affected by the merger (BGH WuW/E 1756 "Klöckner-Becorit"). 
If there is no sufficient evidence to show the presence or absence of a paramount market 
position even after the market conduct has been taken into account, and if the conditions for 
presuming market domination pursuant to Sections 22 (3) No. 1,23a (1) ARC are met, then 
single-firm market domination can be concluded to be present on that basis (case of "non- 
liquet"; BGH WuW/E 1754). 
Where the analysis involves the creation or strengthening of a paramount market position as a 
result of a merger, the appraisal has to compare pre-merger and post-merger conditions of 
competition in the market concerned. Also to be considered are the future trend of the market 
and further changes in the competitive conditions expected as a result of the merger, if 
competition is not restricted already upon completion of the merger (BGH WuW/E 1507 f. "GKN- 
Sachs"). 
It is rare for mergers to change compeititive conditions (quantitatively) so profoundly that the 
appraisal reveals totally different conditions after the merger. This is particularly true when the 
creation of a paramount market position is the alternative to be analysed. However, the 
conditions of competition that remain unaffected by the merger are not decisive where other 
competitive conditions indicate a threat to substantial competition. In a market where barriers to 
new entry are present, a significant increase in market share concentration may already suffice. 
If substantial competition has been found to exist prior to the merger, the analysis must 
determine whether the merger will change the conditions of competition so drastically that after 
the merger substantial competition no longer has the effect of preventing market power (BGH 
WuW/E 1755 "Klöckner-Becorit"). 
For example, this effect of substantial competition will no longer be present, if as a result of the 
merger the market strategy potential of a firm is sbstantially expanded or if the firm gains distinct 
competitive advantages over its rivals (KG WuW/E OLG 3764 "Pillsbury-Sonnen Bassermann"; 
4173 "Kampffmeyer-Plange"). 
in a market fully dominated by a firm in a paramount market position, the effect of any 
deterioration in the competitive conditions on the market conduct is disproportaionate. Singe-firm 
domination is more likely to strengthened, the higher the intensity of the restraint of competition 
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already being practiced. For the greater the control over the market, the greater the need to protect what competition is left (BGH WuW/E 1860 "Springer-Münchener Zeitungsverlag"). 
In the case of highly diversified firms or firms with parituclarly great resources as well as in the 
case of giant mergers (Section 23a (1) No. 2 of the ARC), the examination has to include an analysis of possible spollover effects whcih cross the lines of the market affected by the merger. the substantial cumulation of resources of of market-dominating positions and resources may have spillover effects and increase the likelihood of paramount market positions existing, being 
created or strengthened in the market concerned as a result of the merger. This can be 
assumed to occur, in particular, if due to the merger a firm accounts for a very large percentage 
of the production capacities and jobs of an economic sector, becomes the dominant industry 
leader and can use the resulting political influence at the expense of its competitors (BKartA 
WuW/E 3247 "Daimler-MBB"). Moreover, the competitive potential of a diversified firm may be increased considerably by the fact that its market positions and spheres of influence are 
respected by other large firms. For example, a large firm may use its financial strength with great 
restraint in markets in which it competes with another large firm or may altogether forego entry 
into markets in which a large firm already operates. 
II. Oligopolistic Market Domination 
To establish oligopolistic market domination for the purposes of merger control, the ARC 
requires an overall assessment of all the conditions of competition and the competitive process 
in the market affected by ther merger of enterprises (BGH WuW/E 2027 "Texaco-Zerssen"). In 
principle 
- in the market affected by the merger there must be conditions of competition which induce 
totality of firms (oligopoly) for forego competitive actions and facilitate conscious parallelism 
(A. ), 
no substantial competition must exist among oligopolists (B. ), and 
provided other firms (outsiders) are active in the market besides the oligopolists, no 
substantial competition must be left between the outsiders and the oligopolists. 
Alternatively, there must be a paramount market position of the oligopoly in relation to 
outsiders (Sections 22 (2), 24 (1) of the ARC) (C. ). 
Thus, for the purposes of an overall assessment, the competitive process and the conditions of 
competition in principle carry the same weigth in establishing the presence of oligopolistic 
market domination. This is not so, if the conditions of the qualified oligopoly presumption are met 
(Section 23a (2) of the ARC). Then oligopolistic market domination is precluded by substantial 
competition only if substantial competition is still highly likely to take place in future in spite of 
unfavourable conditions of competition. 
Where the analysis concerns the strengthening of oligopolistic market domination, it has also to 
be examined, in addition to the above-mentioned examination required in principle, whether the 
conditions of competition can be expected to deteriorate further. Forecasting of competitive 
conduct is not required. It is sufficient if the merger is highly likely to facilitate or secure parallel 
behaviour. The evidence requirements for establishing such a strengthening are the lower, the 
higher the degree of market concentration already reached. 
Where the creation of oligopolistic market domination is concerned, the post-merger conditions 
of competition will be the deciding factor. An overall assessment of the post-merger conditions 
of competition must reveal that the oligopoly can be expected to adopt conscious parallelism in 
future. Again, conduct forecasting can be dispensed with. However, the substantial compeition 
found or assumed to exist before ther merger must be highly likely no longer to be present after 
ther merger. The indicative effect of the presence of substantal competition before the merger is 
the smaller, the greater the change in the conditions of competition in the market concerned as 
a result of the merger. 
The following three sections of this checklist are arranged in the same order as that provided by 
the legal definition of oligopolistic market domination (Section 22 (2) of the ARC). In a slightly 
different order, they may also be used to determine wheter the qualified oligopoly presumption 
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(Section 23a (2) of the ARC) is rebutted. In checking the first alternative of rebuttal (the conditions of competition may be expected to leave substantial competition also following the merger), Part II. B. (competitive process) should be referred to first and then Part II. A. (conditions 
of competition). The second alternative of rebuttal (the oligopoly has no paramount market position in relation to outsiders) can be checked according to Part II. C. (relationship between the 
oligopolists and outsiders). 
A. Competitive conditions 
1. Market share 
Often the market shares of the leading firms in a market and their distribution allow a (first) determination of the presence of a potentially market-dominating totality of firms (a. ), as well as 
an assessment of the competitive process in the market affected by the merger (b. ). 
a. In finding out which firms are members of a market-dominating oligopoly and which firms 
should be considered outsiders, the line can be drawn in theory between those firms that use 
their parameters with the interests and reactions of other firms in mind, and those that can only 
passively adjust to such behaviour. If a market leader can afford to ignore even his largest 
competitors' reactions, then there is no oligopoly, but possibly single-firm market domination. 
Since it is nearly impossible in practice to determine the decisive factor, firm-related structural 
criteria - such as market shares and differences between market shares and also resources, 
access to supply or sales markets etc. (KG WuW/E 4105 "w+i-Weiss-Druck") - are used to define the oligopoly and the outsiders as well as the oligopoly and the possible presence of 
single-firm market domination. 
b. It is only above a certain degree of concentration of supply or demand in a market that the 
oligopolistic interdependence of firms will be perceptible. Competitive moves by individual firms 
will affect competitors and induce them to react. Increasingly, the potential reactions of 
competitors will be taken into account when a firm uses its parameters. The stronger the 
interdependence having already existed before or arising from mergers, the more likely are 
practices to avoid competition (conscious parallelism) and hence the exclusion of substantial 
competition. 
The market share thresholds of the oligopoly presumptions (Sections 22 (3) No. 2,23a (2) of the 
ARC) point to tight oligopolies in which the fimrs belonging to the oligopoly are very likely to take 
parallel courses of action. The exclusion of substantial competition from the oligopoly is the 
more likely, the tighter the oligopoly and the fewer the outsiders. As the degree of concentration 
decreases, the likelihood of parallel behaviour diminishes. Where the degree of market 
concentration falls significantly below the thresholds of the presumptions, conscious parallelism 
as rule can be expected to occur in transparent markets for homogeneous products. 
The development of market shares of the oligopolists over time may alos provide meaningful 
information about the competitive process. Stable or relatively stable market shares or 
differences between the oligopolists' shares point to an uncompetitive oligopoly. This is true, in 
particular, if market shares have remained stable despite significant changes in external market 
circumstances, such as a substantial drop in demand (BKartA WuW/E 2301 "Heidelberger 
Zement-Malik"). 
However, if market shares are so unstable that the firms hold different ranks with every new 
period it can be assumed that there is a competitive oligopoly. Short-term fluctuations in market 
shares (two-four periods) in principle are more meaningful than are long-term fluctuations. The 
former point to active competitive conduct, whereas the latter are more likely to result from 
structural changes of the market conditions such as a change in buyer preferences (KG WuW/E 
OLG 3075 f. "Morris-Rothmans"). However, the causes of the market share fluctuations also 
have to be considered. If they merely result from inter-brand and advertising competition without 
quality competition being also present, even market share fluctuations will give no indication of 
the presence of substantial competition (see II. B. 2. infra). 
If a horizontal merger results in substantial market shares being concentrated in the hands of the 
leading firms of the market affected by the merger, oligopolistic market domination will likely be 
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created. At any rate, this will occur, if the thresholds of the oligopoly presumptions aare 
exceeded or reached (for the first time). As a rule, the oligopolistic interdependendence will become so strong that strategies to reduce competitive pressure through parallel action become 
very likely. 
Where a market-dominating oligopoly already exists, it is likely to be further strengthened by any 
aubsequent horizontal merger which results in the oligopoly becoming tighter or outsiders joining 
the oligopoly. As the number of oligopolists decreases, the competitive conduct within the 
oligopoly as a rule becomes more transparent, which facilitates parallel behaviour. Mergers with 
outsiders will reduce the latter's ability to undertake competitive moves which might disrupt the 
parallel behaviour of the oligopolists. This occurs, in particular, where mergers take place with 
outsiders that are particularly efficient and the most likely source of competitive impulses (for 
"catch-up mergers" see II. A. 2. infra). 
2. Symmetry of the oligopoly 
The more equal the firm-related structural characteristics of the firms belonging to an oligopoly 
are, the greater the likelihood of conscious parallelism will be (KG WuW/E OLG 3080 "Morris- 
Rothmans"). 
A symmetrical oligopoly consisting of firms with largely similar market shares, comparable 
resources and a comparable ease of access to the supply or sales market tends to be 
uncompetitive, since any competitive action would be equally perceptible to all firms, easily 
detectable due to the transparency of the competitive conduct, and hardly promising because all 
the firms have a similar retaliatory potential. An oligopoly that is symmetrical due to its vertical 
integration would also be uncompetitive, if substantial competition merely resulted in the 
oligopolists' scope of action being narrowed down considerably visa-ä-vis non-integrated 
competitors in downstream markets (BKartA WuW/E 2250 "Hills-Condea"). If the oligopolists 
enjoy advantages in competition wich outsiders do not have or do not have to the same extent, 
e. g. a full line of products, possibilities of reciprocal dealing, resource-based advantages, etc., 
parallel predatory practices to the detriment of outsiders are likely to occur. 
Asymmetry of an oligopoly, on the other hand, is not in itself a sufficient indication of substantial 
competition among the oligopolists, but asymmetrical oligopolies have a greater potential for 
indivisdual competitive conduct. 
Merger that lead to the firms in the oligopoly becoming structurally similar may encourage 
parallel behaviour. In principle, this applies to vertical and conglomerate mergers as well as 
horizontal mergers (as regards the latter, see II. A. 1. b. supra. ). 
Vertical mergers resulting in a more balanced degree of vertrical integration within the oligopoly 
as a rule increase the transparency of market conduct. They may also eliminate disruptive 
suppliers or buyers, which significantly facilitates or safeguards parallel behaviour. 
Conglomerate mergers may lead to a levelling of resources and thus of retaliatory potentials and 
thereby encourage conscious parallelism. If all the firms in an oligopoly have competitive 
advantages after the merger, predatory behaviour is likely to occur. 
In exceptional cases, mergers that create greater symmetry of an oligopoly may intensify 
competition if the firms engaging in competition actually become more competitive in relation to 
the fimrs belonging to the oligopoly ("catch-up merger"; KG WuW/E OLG 3081 "Morris- 
Rothmans"). 
This applies mainly to vertical and conglomerate mergers as a result of which an oligopoly which 
is clearly asymmetrical in terms of market shares, market share differences, resources and 
vertical integration becomes more balanced. Horizontal mergers may improve the conditions of 
substantial competition within an oligopoly only in very exceptional circumstances, e. g. if there is 
a distinct asymmetry of market shares bordering on market domination by the merging firms. In 
principle, the upper limit for horizontal catch-up mergers is a combined market share of 15 per 
cent (Section 23a (2) sentence 2 of the ARC). In particular, a horizontal merger is very likely to 
lead to the creation or strengthening of oligopolistic market domination if the merging firms 
become equal to, or even surpass, the former market leader (BKartA WuW/E 1923 if. "Burda- 
Springer"; 1952 f. "Morris-Rothmans"). 
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3. Interlocks 
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Interlocking directorates or capital links among the firms belonging to an oligopoly will increase the likelihood of conscious parallelism. This applies both to interlocks on the market affected by the merger (a. ) and to interlocks on third markets (b. ). 
a. A market-dominating oligopoly is assumed to exist prima facie, i. e. on the basis of an 
analysis of the competitive conditions alone, if the firms are directly or indirectly (through third 
firms) interlinked to such a degree that one firm can control all the others. 
If firms are interlinked to such an extent, there will be no substantial competition because this 
might harm the interlinked firms (BGH WuW/E 2240 "G+J-Zeit"; KG WuW/E OLG 4106 "w+i- 
Weiss-Druck"). The same applies where the firms forming an oligopoly are interlinked through a joint venture that is active on the same market to deter new entry (BGH WuW/E 2195 if. 
"Abwehrblatt II"). 
b. If the firms belonging to an oligopoly are interlinked on third markets either through 
interlocking directorates or capital links, there is as a rule an increased tendency towards parallel 
behaviour on the market concerned (spillover effect). Parallel conduct is particularly likely of 
occur if the cooperation take place on a neighbouring geographic or a related product market. 
The same applies if the success of the joint venture is of special importance to the firms 
belonging to the oligopoly. There is a high likelihood of conscious parallelism if the joint venture 
operates on a downstream or an upstream market, if this creates uniform buying or selling 
conditions for the firms forming the oligopoly, and if consequently their scope for competitive 
action is restricted (BKartA WuW/E 2145 "GfL"). 
A similar effect on competititive conduct as in the case of interlocks may also occur if the firms 
form an oligopoly on markets other than the one affected by the merger. If they are also rivals on 
third markets and if there exists an uncompetitive oligopoly in at least one of those markets, 
parallel behaviour is likely of occur on the market concerned in the sme circumstances as apply 
in the case of joint ventures operating on third markets. 
Similar anitcompetitive effects as those resulting form interlocks may come from cartels (BKartA 
WuW/E 2145 "GfL") or cooperation and customer-supplier relationships among the oligopolists 
(BKartA WuW/E 2249 "Hills-Condea"). 
4. Barriers to market entry see 1.5. supra. 
5. Competition from imperfect substitutes see 1.6. supra. 
6. Foreign competitors see 1.7. supra. 
7. Buying power on the opposite side of the market 
In a highly concentrated market, oligopolistic market domination is the more likely, the more 
fragmented the opposite side of the market is. However, powerful firms on the opposite side of 
the market may impede conscious parallelism by suppliers. 
Large buyers in relation to the entire volume of demand may play off oligopolistic suppliers 
against each other and cause them to engage in covert competitive action (secret competition). 
Parallel behaviour may thereby become more difficult or even impossible. This applies in 
particular to the supply markets of industrial buyers, in particular if demand is irregular and takes 
the form of large individual orders. On the other hand, large buyers will provoke conscious 
parallelism. In spite of the presence of large buyers, parallel behaviour is therefore very likely to 
occur in the case of homogeneous products in general, and in the case of heterogeneous 
products if there is a high degree of concentration among suppliers and if barriers to market 
entry are very high. 
If the oligopoly of suppliers is virtually faced by only one buyer on the opposite side of the 
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market, the same principles apply as in relation to single-firm market domination (see 1.8. 
supra. ). 
8. Market phase see 1.9. supra. 
9. Overall appraisal of the competitive conditions 
All relevant competitive conditions on the market concerned have to be assessed in determining 
whether oligopolistic market domination is likely to occur. 
Even if an analysis of the relevant conditions of competition suggests that not all of them point to 
oligopolistic market domination, it may nevertheless be likely, subject to an examination of the 
competitive process. In this analysis, all the competitive conditions speaking in favour of that 
assumption must be compared with those speaking against it. In doing so, the possibilities of 
conscious parallelism and the likelihood that such conduct will actually occur after the merger 
haver to be assessed in relation to each other. Special attention should be paid to the significant 
criteria market share and barriers to entry, for these are a necessary condition of paralles 
behaviour. The greater the likelihood of parallel behaviour appears on the basis of those criteria, 
the more evidence is needed to rebut that expectation. Interlocks and the market phase are also 
important criteria. 
Where the pre-requisites for presuming an oligopoly are met (Sections 22 (3) No. 2,23a (2) of 
the ARC), it has to be examined whether, on balance, the relevant conditions of competition 
clearly indicate that substantial competition will be maintained. As regards the rebuttal of that 
presumption, the same evidentary requirements must be met - in the opposite sense - as for the 
presumption of a market-dominating position. The same standards apply to non-prohibition and 
prohibition of a merger. 
If besides the central criteria market share and barriers to entry certain other competitive 
conditions exist and are combined with the former, making parallel behaviour very likely, other 
conditions of competition must be assessed only insofar as they would counteract such 
behaviour. An example of such a combination of competitive conditions is the coexistence of a 
tight oligopoly, homogeneous bulk commodities, a transparent market, a stagnant or mature 
market phase, and high barriers to market entry. 
A merger does not alter all the conditions of competition on the market concerned to such an 
extent that their post-merger appraisal would be totally different from that before the merger. In 
determining whether oligopolistic market domination will be created, it is decisive whether at 
least some of the competitive conditions will b changed so greatly by the merger that the existing 
level of competition will no longer be ensured in future. This may be the case, e. g., if overall 
concentration increases significantly in the presence of barriers to entry. Evidence of substantial 
competition before the merger is therefore at most an indication of what may be expected after 
the merger (KG WuW/E OLG 3072 "Morris-Rothmans"). 
If as a result of examination of the conditions of competition if appears that there is no sufficient 
likelihood of an anticompetitive oligopoly, the competitive process need not be analysed. 
B. Competitive process 
An assessment as to whether there is substantial competition within the oligopoly on the market 
affected by the merger is to be made on the basis of the parameters of competition actually used 
by the enterprises concerned. Provided all crucial functions of competition are fulfilled on 
account of the use of parameters, and, in particular, the firms' ability to raise prices remains 
limited, substantial competition is present (BGH WuW/E 1828 "Tonolli°). 
1. In the case of homogeneous products, no competition in quality (or only very limited 
competition in quality) can take place, because the goods supplied by different manufacturers do 
not show any differences that are of importance in the eyes of buyers. In view of the oligopolistic 
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interdependence which allows no significant price differences, it is not possible in the majority Of cases to determine with reasonable certainty in oligopolistic markets whether there is price competition. In such markets it is therefore all forms of residual price and quality competition as wII as factors of minor importance such as competition in services, terms and the provision of advice to customers which decide whether competition is still substantial. 
For competition to be substantial it is not sufficient that enterprises make use of the scope of 
action which is available in markets with homogeneous products. Rather, the intensity and 
significance to the market of the actual use of parameters altogether must be such that 
competition is workable (BGH WuW/E 2028 "Texaco-Zerssen"). Substantial competition is not likely to exist, if the firms operating in the market concerned artificially further increase the 
market transparency typical of homogeneous products markets, e. g. by open price systems and delivered-price systems (BKartA WuW/E 2299 f. "Heidelberger-Zement Malik") or through the 
so-called "Englische Klausel" (BKartA WuW/E 2321 "Messer Griesheim-Buse"). 
2. In the case of heterogeneous products, competition in terms of price and quality is possible 
and a major factor in establishing the presence of substantial competition. 
If uniform pricing decisions by the oligopolists are observed over time, competition is no longer 
substantial, unless an innovative, dynamically developing product is concerned. Price 
competition at the distribution level is not substantial, if the demand at that level is controlled by 
consumer preferences as a result of supplier advertising. Interbrand, advertising and R&D 
competition counts only in connection with competition in quality (KG WuW/E OLG 3074 f. 
"Morris-Rothmans"). Inter-brand and advertising competition which only relates to intangible 
product characteristics is a form of predatory competition and therefore not substantial (BKartA 
AG 86,380 f. "NUR-ITS"). 
3. If a review of the competitive process does not provide clear evidence of the presence of 
substantial competition, a market-dominating oligopoly can be assumed to exist, if the conditions 
of the oligopoly presumption are satisfied - subject to a review of the relationship between the 
oligopolists and outsiders (C. infra. ) -, provided the conditions of competition prevailing in the 
market concerned confirm the presentation of a least are not in conflict with it (KG WuW/E 
OLG 3071 "Morris-Rothmans"; case of "non liquet'). 
4. Even if substantial competition is found to exist in the market, oligopolistic market domination 
may be present, if such competition takes place only temporarily or locally (BGH WuW/E 2030 
"Texaco-Zerssen") or is of a predatory nature. Indicia thereof may, e. g., be exchange rate 
fluctuations, cyclical excess capacities (BKartA WuW/E 1575 "Kaiser-VAW"), uniform defensive 
behaviour adopted by the oligopolists against newcomers (KG WuW/E 3078 "Morris-Rothmans") 
or competitive advantages the oligopolists have over outsiders (see C. infra. ). 
C. Relationship between oligopolists and outsiders 
Provided outsiders operate in the market affected by the merger besides the oligopolists, the 
assumption of oligopolistic market domination also requires an absencs of substantial 
competition or a presence of a paramount market position of the oligopoly as far as the 
relationship between the oligopolists and outsiders is concerned. 
The examination as to whether the oligopoly has a paramount market position corresponds to 
that for single-firm market domination (see I. supra. ). For that purpose, the totality of the 
oligopolists take the place of the single firm. 
The question of whether there is substantial competition in the relationship between the 
oligopolists and outsiders has to examined on the basis of the same criteria as apply to the 
examination as to whether substantial competition exists within the oligopoly (see II. B. supra. ). If 
it was not found to exist within the oligopoly, substantial competition as a rule is not likely to be 
present either in the relationship between the oligopolists and outsiders. For conscious 
parallelism to cannot be sustained indefinitely within the oligopoly, if there is substantial 
competition from outsiders. If, in spite of parallel behaviour by the oligopolists, there is 
substantial competition in the relationship between the oligopolists and outsiders, it may be a 
form of predatory competition. Predatory competition is particularly likely to exist, if the 
oligopolists enjoy competitive advantages over outsiders (cf., e. g., BKartA WuW/E 1923 
if. 
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"Burda-Springer"; AG 86,380 f. "NUR-ITS"). 
An overall assessment of the respective results is necessary to complete the review of the 
conditions of competition, the competitive process and - if necessary - the competitive 
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